The Khilafat Movement in India.,1919-1924. by Qureshi, M. N.
THE KHILAFAT MOVEMENT IN INDIA, 1919-1924
"by
MUHAMMAD NAHM! QURESHI 
(School of Oriental and African Studies)
Thesis submitted to the University of London 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 1973
ProQuest Number: 10672675
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10672675
Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
ABSTRACT
This thesis is an attempt to examine the ferment among Indian 
Muslims consequent to the threatened dismemberment of the Ottoman 
Empire at the end of the First World War, which for six years 
dominated the political scene of the Sub-continent. It essentially 
analyses the various cross-currents which converged to make the 
Khilafat movement so turbulent*
The Introductory Chapter discusses, in the light of contemporary 
events, the gradual involvement of Indo-Muslim sentiment with the 
Ottoman Khilafat and with the ideal of pan-Islamism until the 
Armistice of Deoember 1918* Chapter II (December 1918-July 1920) 
studies the demand for the preservation of status quo ante bellum 
for Turkey as the Allied Powers begin to re-draw her map, the 
formation of the Central Khilafat Committee, the approaches to the 
Indian and the Allied Governments, and the search for an effective 
formula in concert with the Hindus resulting in the scheme of 
non-co-operation* Chapter III (May 1920-November 1920) discusses 
the voluntary withdrawal (hi.lrat) in the olassioal Islamio tradition 
of between fifty and sixty thousand Muslims from India to 
neighbouring Afghanistan* Chapter IV (August 1920-March 1922) 
examines the course and failure of the non-co-operation experiment, 
together with other attempts to force a revision of the stringent 
Treaty of Sevres. Chapter V (February 1922-June 1923) deals with 
the aftermath of non-co-operation, the break-up of Hindu-Muelim 
entente and the effects on the Khilafat movement of the developments 
in the Near and the Middle East. . Lastly, Chapter VI (July 1923- 
Deoember 1924) discusses the weakening of the movement after the 
conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923, and its final 
collapse as a result of the abolition of the Khilafat and the 
expulsion of the Sultan from Turkey in March 1924* It also examines 
the re-emergence of the All-India Muslim League as a force in Muslim 
politics and briefly looks into the phase when the movement, at the 
time of the Hedjaa crisis, begins to acquire an increasingly academic 
character which lingers on into the 1930s.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTORYa
THE HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE KHILAFAT MOVEMENT
The impending dismemberment of the Ottoman Knpire after her
defeat in the First World War threw the larger portion of the world
of Islam into confusion and dismay. In Muslim India (see Table I
and Diagram l) it caused even greater tremors. Turkey, as the only
surviving Muslim empire, ruling large Christian populations and
seemingly capable of resisting Europe, had been the pride of the
2Muslims, especially those under foreign domination. As a symbol
of the worldly power of Islam and the seat of its ‘universal’
caliphate, Turkey had provided them with a rallying-point. In India
she had also given them a feeling of security in the midst of the 
3
Hindu majority. But, since the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, a fear had haunted the Indian Muslims that if Turkey was 
to disappear they ’would become like unto Jews - a mere religious 
sect whose kingdom was gone'.^ Thus, Turkey was to them 'the last 
hope of Islam'." Naturally, the threatened spoliation of her empire 
at the end of the War in November 1918, combined with other factors, 
engulfed the greater part of India in an intense agitation for the 
preservation of Turkey's integrity and sovereignty. It took an 
anti-British character because, of all the Allied Powers, Britain 
was held to be chiefly responsible for Turkey's as well as India's 
misfortunes.
1
For a study of its effects on the Muslim world see Syed Sulaiman 
Nadvi, Duniya-i-Islam aur Masaia-i-Khilafat, Bombay, 1922.
2
This fact was acknowledged even by the British administrators 
in the East. See Mark Sykes, 'Asiatic Turkey and the New Regime', 
PCAS, Dec. 1908, pp. 2-5.
3
'Memorandum on Indian Moslems', PSSF, 53/l'5? Ho Also see H.A.R. 
Gibb, ed., Whither Islam?, London, 1932, p. 735 and Asia Ahmad, 
Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-19649 London, 1967? 
p. 123.
4
V. Chirol, 1Pan-Islamism’, PCAS, Nov. 1906, p. 14. As late as the 
1890s even a staunch pro-British like Syed Ahmed Khan held the same 
view. See Theodore Morison, 'Muhammadan Movements', in Sir John 
Gumming, ed.. Political India, 1832-1932, London, 1932, pp. 95-96*
5
See the views of Tassaddaq, Hussain Khan, D.S.P., C.I.D., PSD,
2765/18.
The Indo-Muslim involvement in the ideal of Islamic fraternity 
or 'pan-Islamism' - the term coined hy a German in the 1870s and 
popularised "by a Frenchman in the 1880s - and with the Ottoman
6Khilafat was a phenomenon not peculiar to the Indian sub-continent. 
Basically., it reflected the desire for that ideal universal socio­
political order under one leader which had always been the cherished 
dream of the Muslims. But this ideal state had 'never had more than
6
The first use of the term thus far discovered is that by Franz von 
Werner in Turkischo Skizzen (Leipzig, 1877? I* P* 95)* Later in 
l88l Gabriel Charmes borrowed the term in an article in the Revue de 
deux Mondes (XLVII, p. 924)* See Dwight E. Lee, 'The Origins of Pan- 
Islamism', AHR9 XLVII, 1941-42? P* 280? The Rise of Islam and the 
Caliphate. The Pan-Islamio Movement, handbook prepared under the 
direction of the Historical Section of the British Foreign Office, 
London, 1919? P* 54? and C.W. Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets, 
London, 1957? p. 93* In Britain the term was first used by Wilfred 
Scawen Blunt in an article written in 1881 but published in the 
Fortnightly Review of Jan. 1882. See his 'Future of Islam - V', FR, 
XXXI, p. 380 For a fuller examination of the divergent theories 
about the origin and character of pan-Islamism seo Behdjet Wahby Bey, 
'Pan-Islamism', NO, LXI, May 1907? pp. 860-72? E.G. Browne, 'Pan- 
Islamism', in F.A. Kirkpatrick, ed., Lectures on the History of the 
Nineteenth Century, Cambridge, 1902, pp. 306-30? V. Chirol, 'Pan- 
Islamism', PCAS, Nov. 19065 A.R. Colquhoun, 'Pan-Islam', NAR,
CLXXXII, 19065 pp. 906-I85 Nikki R. Keddie, 'Pan-Islam as Proto- 
Nationalism', JMH, XL, No. 1, March 1969? pp. 17-28? Majid Khadduri, 
'Pan-Islamism', EB, XVII, pp. 227-28? M.H. Kidwai, Pan-Islamism, 
London, 1908? D.S. Margoliouth, 'Pan-Islamism', PCAS, Jan. 1912? 
Sharif al-Mujahid, 'Pan-Islamism', A History of the Freedom 
Movement, III, Part I, Pakistan Historical Society, Karachi, 1961, 
pp. 88-117? A. Vambery, 'Pan-Islamism', NO, LX, Oct. 1906, pp. 547- 
585 and G. Young, 'Pan-Islamism', ESS, XI, pp. 542-44*
7
Muslim jurists have not only interpreted the shariat - the Quranic 
text and tho Traditions - as the basis of the Khilafat but with some 
exceptions have consensus as to the religious necessity of the 
institution. The recognition of and submission to the Khalifa or the 
Olil Amr ('Those in authority' - Quran, 4*83) was considered 
binding on the Faithful except when the former deliberately flouted 
'fck0 shariat. See Abul Kalam Azad's religio-political treatise 
Masala-i-Khilafat wa Jazira-i-Arab, Calcutta, 1920. Some other 
comprehensive discussions on the institution of the Khilafat ares 
M.H. Abbas, All About the Khilafat, Calcutta, 1923? pp. 2-78? Ameer 
Ali, 'The Caliphate, a Historical and Juridical Sketch', CR, CVII, 
June 1915? PP» 681-94? Muhammad Ali, Khilafat in Islam, Lahore, 1920? 
Anon., 'The Sultan of Turkey and the Caliphate', CR, CX, Aug. 1916, 
pp. 199-205? T.W. Arnold, The Caliphate, London, 1924? — ,
'Khalifa', El, II, pp. 881-85? G.C. Badger, 'The Precedents and 
Usages Regulating the Muslim Khalifate', NC, II, Sept. 1877? PP* 
274-82? H.A.R. Gibb, 'Some Considerations on the Sunni Theory of the
-  7 -
0
a brushing contact with reality1« Barely two decades after Prophet 
Muhammad’s death in 623 A.D. , its basis was being questioned by the
9
Shias as well as by the Khawarij. By 750 A.X). there was no longer 
any one universally recognised caliphate* Independent rulers in 
the ’core’ and on the ’fringe' of the Islamic Empire appropriated 
to themselves the titles of Amir-ul-Mominin and Khalifa.'*'0 So much 
so that at one time there were as many as three caliphs in the 
Muslim world, each claiming the allegiance of the Faithful. Yet, 
in spite of the impotence of the 'central' Khilafat, the fiction of 
its authority, under an hieratic cloak and exalted by jurists like 
Al-Mawardi (974-1058) and Al-Ghazali (1058-1111), still survived and 
lingered even after the disappearance of the Baghdad Caliphate at the
Caliphate’s Archives d'histoiro du droit oriental, III, 1948, pp. 
401-10? S. Sajjad Hussain, Dali 1 -ul-Mutaha.yyirin Badd-i-Khilafat-i- 
Shaikhains Delhi, 1906? Javid Iqbal, 'The Development of Muslim 
Political Philosophy in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent', Cambridge 
University Ph.D. thesis, 1954? PP* 1-49? Maulana Faizul Karim, Facts 
About the Khilafat, Karachi, 1919? S. Lane-Pool, "The Caliphate’, QR, 
CCXXIV, Ho. 444? July 1915? PP* 162-77? A.n, Lybyer, 'Caliphate',
ESS, III, pp. 145-49? D.B. MacDonald, Development of Muslim Theology, 
Jurisprudence, and Constitutional Theory, London, 1903? pp* 10-59?
D.S. Margoliouth, 'The Caliphate Yesterday, To-day and To-morrow', in 
J.Rc Mott, ed*, The Moslem World of To-day, London, 1925? PP* 33-44? 
Abul Ala Maududi, Khilafat wa Mulukiyyat, Lahore, 1966? M. Abul 
Hasanat Nadvi, Khilafat-i-Islamia aur Turk, Delhi, 1920? Maulana 
Syed Sulaiman Nadwi, 'Khilafat and the Koreish', 5A, II, July 1920, 
pp. vi~ix? Maulana Syed Najm-ul-Hasan, Al~Nabuwwat~wa-Al-Khilafat, 
Lucknow, 1924? CoA. Nallino, Notes on the Nature of the Caliphate in 
general and on the alleged Ottoman Caliphate, Italian Foreign 
Ministry, 1919? PS§F? P. 3344720“with 3344720? S.M. Raza Naqvi, ed*, 
Khilafat wa Dnamat, I, Lucknow, 1936°, PSM, B. 307? Mufti M.H. Qadiri, 
Ayat-i-Khilafat, Badaun, ^1922/? Maulavi M. Talha, Masala-i-Khilafat 
aur Ahkam-i-Shariat, Lucknow,~1922§ Malik M. Tufail, Al-Khilafat, 
Amritsar, 1920? and F.A* von Kremer, Culturgeschichto des Orients 
unter den Chalifen? Vienna, 1875-77* English translation by Khuda 
Bukhsh, The Orient under the Caliphate, Calcutta, 1920.
8
P. Hardy, Partners in Freedom and True Muslims, Lund, 1971? P* 12.
9
Muhammad Iqbal, Khilafat-i-Islamia? Lahore, 1923? PP* 24-31? 8. 
Nasim Hassan, Istikhlaf, Amroha, 1919? S.M, Sibtain, Khilafat-i- 
Ilahiya, I, Lahore, 1916? A Student of History, The Khalifate 
Agitation in India? Madras, 1922, pp. 64-72? and C.S. Hurgronje,
Mohammedanism<> New York and London, 1916, pp* 98-101.
10
E.g., the Ummayad rulers in Spain and North Africa (756-1492), the 
Fatamid rulers in Egypt (909-1171) ancL Qutb-ud-din Mubarik (1316-20) 
in India.
11hands of the Mongols in 12 58 A.D. Large portions of the Sunni
Muslim world continued to submit to the Abbasid Caliphs at Cairo and
12later to the Ottomans at Constantinople.
Thus? India had been somewhat accustomed to the fiction of the
1 central1 Khilafat since the very early days of the Arab conquest
13of Sind in 711 A.D. Practically throughout the pre-Mughal period
the Abbasid Caliphs of Baghdad*, and later their faineant successors
in Cairo*, were regarded as the source and sanction of the Sultans'
legal authority. ^  Some of the Sultans - Mahmud of Ghazna (998-1030) ?
Shams-ud-din Iltutmish (1211-36) ? Muhammad bin Tughluq. (1325-51) ~
15had especially sought and obtained the caliphal investiture.  ^ Even 
the few Sunni provincial dynasties? which assumed independence from 
Delhi*, did so in the name of the Abbasid Caliphs*, whose names appeared 
on the coins. This practice continued until the advent of the
Mughals in 1526? whose rule coincided with the 'transfer' of the
11
Arnold? 'Khalifa'? p. 882^  H.A.R. Gibb and H. Bowen? Islamic 
Society and the West*, I*, Part I*, London? 1950? p. 32? H.A.R. Gibb? 
'Al-Mawardirs Theory of the Khalifa'? 10? XI? 1937? PP* 291-302^  H.K. 
Sherwani? Studies in Muslim Political bought and Administration? 2nd 
ed.? Lahore? 1945? PP* 247-59? A.K.S. Larabton? 'The Theory of 
Kingship in the Nasihat ul-Mulk of Ghazali'? IQ? I? No. 1? April 1954? 
pp, 47-55? D. Binder? 'Al-Ghazali!s Theory of Islamic Government'?
MS’/? XLV? No, 3? July 1955? PP* 229-41? E.I.J. Rosenthal? Political 
Thought in Medieval Islam? Cambridge? 1958? pp. 21-61 and 84-109? —— ? 
Islam in the Modern'National State? Cambridge; 1965? PP* 12-27? and 
I*H* Ghauri? 'The Sunni Theory of Caliphate and its Impact on the 
Muslim History of India'? JPUHS? XIII? Dec. 1961? pp, 93-99°
12
Sharif al-Mujahid? op, pit.*, p. 91.
13
For details see Syed Sulaiman Nadvi's commendable research pamphlet 
Khilafat aur Hindustan? Azamgarh? 1921.
14
Aziz Ahmad? Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment? 
Oxford? 1964? p* 10? Nadvi? Khilafat aur Hindustan? pp. 32-45? and
E. Thomas? 'Coins of the Kings of Ghazni'? JRAS? IX? pp, 267-386 and 
XVII? pp. 138-208.
15
Arnold? The Caliphate? pp. 82-105? and Nadvi? Khilafat aur 
Hindustan? pp* 9-24®
16
Ahmad? Studies in Islamic Culture? p. 10.
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17Khilafat from Cairo to Constantinople. Though the diplomatic
exchanges between the two Snpires continued upto the chaotic days
of the Mughal rulo in the late eighteenth century, the Mughals, like
other independent rulers (e.g., Shia Persia), never conceded the
l8Ottoman claim to the 'universal' Khilafat.
The position, however, changed gradually when the Mughal rule
began to totter. There is evidence - though it is scant - to suggest
that by the second half of the eighteenth century, as a consequence
of the political decline and religio-ethical disintegration, the
Muslims in India were developing some kind of attachment to the
Ottomans. Because, when in the 1760s the Porte was projecting an
alliance with Prance, the British ambassador in Istanbul, (Sir) James
Porter, endeavoured to oppose the treaty lest it should affect the
British interest among the Indian Muslims as rivals of the French in
India. ^  Even Shah Wali Ullah (1703-62), the famous divine of Delhi,
20who apparently showed disconcern for the Ottoman Khilafat, twice
referred to the Turkish Sultan as Amir-ul-Mominin in his Tafhimat-d- 
21Ilahiyaho Later, in 1789, the gesture was reflected in Tipu
Sultan's endeavour to obtain an investiture from the Ottoman Caliph 
22Abdul-IIamid I. However, it ?/as not until the 1840s that the 
position of the Indo-Muslim orthodoxy with regard to the Ottoman 
Khilafat began to crystallize. Shah Muhammad Ishaq (1778-I846), 
the grandson of Wali Ullah, was probably the first Indian alim to
17
It is said, though writers disagree (e.g., Arnold, The Caliphate,
Chapters XI and XII, pp. 129-58), that when Sultan Saleem I
conquered Egypt in 1517 the last Abbasid Caliph Al-Muttawakkil 
transferred the Khilafat to him by a formal deed of assignment. See
Ameer Ali, 'The Caliphate', pp. 693-4'>
18
F.Y/o Buckler, 'The Historical Antecedents of the Khilafat 
Movement', CR, CXXI, Ho. 677s May 1922, p. 606. Also see Ahmad, 
Studies in Islamic Culture, pp» 22-47•
19
A.A. Adnan, G.L. Lewis and E.Z. Karal, 'Turkey', SB, XXII, p. 377«
20
Aziz Ahmad, 'An Eighteenth-Century Theory of Caliphate', SL, 
XXVIII, 1968, pp. 143-44.
21
Azad, Masala-i-Rhilafat■> p. 8 3.
22
M.H. Khan, History of Tipu Sultan, Calcutta, 1951? PP* 132-38. 
also 0©o I.Ho Qureshi, 'The Purpose of Tipu Sultan's Ehbassy to 
Constantinople', JIH, XXIV, 1945? PP<* 77-84*
-  10 -
support the Ottoman political policies when he migrated to Mecca 
23
in l841» From then on? the inclination of the ulama,, at least
of the Wali Ullah school, was to recognise and actively to proclaim
24the Ottoman title to the 'universal* Caliphate. ^
By the early 1850s, the Ottomans were themselves reported to he
pushing the Sultan's claim as Caliph in India through their 
25emissaries. It is not surprising, therefore, that in 1854 Lord
Dalhousie (l8l2~6o), the Governor-General of India, found among
Muslims considerable interest and sympathy for the 'Sultan of Room'
26or the 'Commander of the Faithful* as he was considered to he.
When the Crimean War broke out in that year, 'great interest and
excitement1 was reported to be felt 'by all the Mussulman population
27in India, especially on the western frontier*• Links with
Constantinople became more intimate with the disappearance in 1858 of
28the last vestiges of Muslim rule in India. In their search for a
'centre* and to escape British reprisals, not only did the Indian
ulama turn to the Ottoman Caliph, but also, in a number of oases,
notably those of Rahmatullah Kairanwi (l8l8~9l)? Haji Imdadullah
(1817-99)9 Abdul Ghani (d. 1878), Muhammad laqub (b. 1832) and
Khairuddin (1831-1908), they migrated to Mecca and some even visited 
29Constantinople.  ^ Even those ulama. like Karamat Ali Jounpuri
23
Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand for 
Pakistan, London, 1963, p* 19, n. 1, and pp. 24-25°
24
Ahmad, Islamic Modernism, pp. 123-24.
25
The information was supplied to the British by Abbas Pasha of 
Egypt. See PRO, F.O., 78/1316, 78/851, 78/860 and 78/887. In fact 
one consular report hints at such activity as early as 1835/36.
See 78/1316.
26
J.G.A. Baird, ed., Private Letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie, 
London, 1910, p. 300.
27
Ibid., p. 295*
28 “
Buckler (op. pit., p. 608), George Birdwood (The Times9 June 12. 
1877) and Abdul Ghani (Thoughts on Caliphate, Karachi, 1919? P« 10) 
wrongly consider 1857/58 as the starting point of Indian Muslim 
interest in Turkey.
29
See Bible se Quran Tak, I, ed., Akbar Ali and M.T. Usmani, Karachi, 
1968, pp. 198-208£ Tufail Ahmad Manglori, Musalmanon ka Raushan 
Mustaqbil, Delhi, 1945? P» 122f Mufti Intizamullah Shahabi, East 
India Company aur Baghi Ulama, Delhi, n.d.spp. 45 and 71-72?
Muhammad Miyan, Ulama-i-Hjnd ka Shandar Mazi, IV, Delhi, 1960, pp.
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(1800-73)9 who pleaded for loyalty to the British did so on the 
Basis of the 'friendship that exists "between the British Nation
30and the acknowledged Head of our Religion? the Sultan of Turkey'*
To some extent the British were themselves responsible for
strengthening the Indian attachment to Turkey - though it is not
clear whether tho encouragement given to pan-Islamism was a well-
defined policy or the work of a few officials. Nevertheless? tho
British had bolstered Turkey in the eyes of Indian Muslims ever
since tho Crimean War and exploited the Sultan's image as Caliph
31for reasons of political expediency. A significant example? during
the fateful days of 1857 - as also in 1799 in. the case of Tipu
Sultan - was the procurement from Sultan Abdul-Mejid I (l839“*6l)
of a proclamation advising Indian Muslims to remain loyal to his
33allies? the British. The advantages of the CaliphTs position
I85? n. 1? 317-18 and 340-41? W.C. Smith? 'The 'Ulama' in Indian 
Politics'? in C.H. Philips? ed.? Politics and Society in India?
London? 1963? P* 50? A.B. Rajput? Maulana Abul Kalam Azad? 2nd ed.? 
Lahore? 1957? PP* 12-13? and M.U. Haq? Muslim Politics in Modern 
India? Meerut? 1970? pp. 62-64* Khairuddin was Abul Kalam Azad's 
father.
30
See Abstract of the Proceedings of the Mahomedan Literary Society 
of Calcutta. Lecture by Moulvie Karamat Ali (of Jounpore) ona~ 
question of Mahomedan Law Involving the Duty of Mahomedans in British 
India tov/ards the Ruling Power? Calcutta? 1871? p. 14*
31
Birdwood's communication to The Times? July 9? 1877* Also see
V. Chirol? India? London? 1926? PP* 217-18.
32
Copy of Sultan Salim’s letter to Tipu? dated Sept. 20? 1798? in 
/r „7 M» Martin? The Despatches? Minutes? and Correspondence? of the 
Marquess Wellesley, K*G.? Luring his Administration in India? I? 
London? 1836? pp. 414-17? n.
33
Mustafa Kamil Pasha? Masala-i-Sharqiyya? Cairo? 1898? translated 
into Urdu from Arabic by Niaz Fatehpuri? Pindi Bahawuddin? n.d.? 
p. 10. Also see Nadvi? Khilafat aur Hindustan? p. 82$ and Syed 
Mahmud? Khilafat aur Inglistan? Patna?”/7l92l7? p. 68. The Sultan 
also gave free passage to British reinforcements to India through 
g^ypl* When the British finally reconquered Delhi from the 
Mutineers in 1858? the Porte complimented the British and as a further 
gesture of good-will the Sultan contributed towards the Wutiny Relief 
Fund. The Sultan's pro-British attitude was primarily the result of 
the help ho had received from the British in the Crimean War. Partly? 
it was due to his conviction? despite the efforts of the Russian 
ambassador to the contrary? that the Indian Revolt was not a war 
between Islam and Christianity. See PRO? F.O.? 78/1271? 78/1272? 
78/1274? 78/1288 and 78/1331 *
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were such that in 1877 the British tried to use his name in 
Afghanistan to disarm the Amir's hostility.^
Whatever the reasons for its inception? pan-Islamism in India?
which had almost coincided with similar waves among the Muslims of
Central Asia?"^ Indonesia and Malaysia? did not become a movement
until the early 1870s. It was in this period that the Ottomans
themselves? under various pressures? began to emphasise more strongly
their ecumenical authority over Muslims under the political suzerainty
of other governments. Tho first ideologists of pan-Islamism in
37Turkey were the Young Ottoman intellectuals though Sultan Ahmed III 
in 1727 and later Mustafa III in 1774? Ip treaties with the Persians 
and the Russians (Kuchuk Kaynarja) respectively? had each pushed his
•J O
claim to be ’Caliph of all Muslims'. The Young Ottomans?
particularly Namik Kemal (184O--88)? inspired a union of Islam under
Ottoman leadership as a reaction against the Tanzimat doctrine of
39Muslim-non-Muslim fusion. The growth of the pan-Islaraic ideal had
34
In the summer of 1877? the British manoeuvred tho Sultan into 
sending a mission to Afghanistan whose purpose was to make an appeal 
for Muslim solidarity against Russia and for friendly relations with 
Britain. This had been made possible because the Sultan himself was 
anxious to create ’a real unity between the Muslims'. The mission? 
however? was unsuccessful. See Basbakanlik Arsivi? Istanbul? Irade 
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been stimulated, apart from the intellectual activity, by the Russian 
occupation of the Central Asian Khanates and the movements of 
unification among the Germans and the Italians in the 1860s and 70s.4<"> 
The Government of Sultan Abdul-Aziz (1861-76), in the strict tradition 
of Ahmed III, propagated this sentiment through press and emissaries? 
it was carried to perfection by his successor Abdul-Hamid II (1876- 
1909).41
The underlying idea in mobilising the forces of Islam was to
strengthen the position of the Ottoman Government and to save it
42from European encroachments. Partly, it seems, the mobilisation was 
intended to divert the attention of the Turkish people from internal 
unrest4'* and that of the Arabs from any nationalistic aspirations.44 
The pan-Islamic orientation was also actively encouraged by the 
Germans, particularly in the 1880s and 90s, to advance their own 
political and economic interests at the expense of Britain, Prance 
and Russia.4  ^ The German Emperor, Kaiser William II (1859-1941)? 
himself came to Turkey twice on state visits4  ^and cemented a 
friendship which eventually dragged Turkey into the Great War on the 
side of the Central Powers. For the present pan-Islamism seemed to
40
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41
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in the East, London, 1929? p. 45* ln 1877 a large number of Turkish 
emissaries were reported to be travelling about in India. See Lytton 
to Sir Erskine Percy, May 29? 1877? IP.
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The desperate state of affairs in Turkey can be followed in Ahmed 
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enhance Turkey’s position and the Sultan came to he regarded by the
European Powers as a kind of Muslim 'Pope' having 'spiritual’
authority over all Muslims. The Sultan's claim was acknowledged in
subsequent treaties by Austria-Hungary (1908), Italy (1912) and
Greece and Bulgaria (1913) - errors which the Allies later strove
to undo in the abortive Treaty of Sfevres (1920) and the definitive
47Treaty of Lausanne (1923).
The accumulative effect of these factors on Indian Muslims 
had been that already by the early 1870s the claim of the Ottoman
APt
Sultan was widely accepted and his name read in the Friday khutba.
Some of the middle-class intelligenstia actively encouraged the
popular notions. Even Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-98)? whose ideas later
changed with the turn in the British policy towards Turkey, eulogised
49'the Caliph1 and popularised the Turkish fez. The diligent
encouragement of the pro-Turkish sentiment by both Muslim intellectuals
and British administrators had been so effective that when in the
simmer of 1876, as a result of a rather ruthless suppression of the
Bulgarian revolt by Turkey, public opinion in Britain turned hostile
50towards the Ottomans, the Indian Muslims began to bring pressure 
to bear upon the British Government to remain friendly with the 
Sultan. In September of that year Lord Lytton, the Viceroy of 
India (I876-8O), frankly told Queen Victoria that Muslim loyalty 
'would be rudely shaken' if Britain was forced into war against
c *1
Turkey by Gladstone (1809-98) and his supporters. When the Russo- 
Turkish War broke out in April 1877? considerable excitement was
47
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generated in India, particularly in Bengal and Delhi, and large
52sums of money were remitted to Constantinople.
An interesting feature of the situation, as elsewhere in the 
Muslim world, was that Shias joined Sunnis in demonstrating their 
support for the Ottomans, regarding the Khilafat as capable of 
unifying the Muslim community. The lead given in this direction 
by the Anjuman-i-Islam (Bombay) of the Bohra leaders Badruddin 
Tyabji (1844-1906) and Mohammed Ali Rogay,  ^was later sustained 
by Cheragh Ali (1844-95) of Hyderabad (Deccan),^ and still later 
by Ameer Ali (1849-1928), the Aga Khan (1877-1957)? M.Ii. Ispahani, 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1940) and others.
In the years that followed the Russo-Turkish War, the pro-Turkish
feelings of the Indian Muslims rapidly increased in intensity.
Until recently the historians of Islam had been prone to credit this
growth to Jamal-ud-din 'Afghani' (1858-97)? the legendary Iranian
57philosopher-statesman. Recent research has, however, exploded
58this myth. Jamal-ud-din1s impact on contemporary India (or even 
contemporary Turkey) was limited. The pan-Islamic movement had
52
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PP» 550-51? D.S. Margoliouth, 'Pan-Islamism', pp. 7-H? Qazi Abdul 
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developed in India even before Jamal-ud-din arrived in the
sub-continent and it was only later that symbolic importance was
increasingly attached to his role in the escalation of the movement.
Although his name became legendary from the early 1890s onwards
through the works of Shibli Ntunani (1857-1914) Abul Kalam
Mohyuddin Ahmed Azad (1888-1958) and later of Sr. Muhammad Iqbal
(1876~1958)? can be argued that Jamal-ud-din1s actual influence
59on India was slight. In fact, it would be a fair conjecture to 
argue that Jamal-ud-din developed his own anti-British feelings and 
pan-Islamic tendencies as a result of, and not prior to, his earlier 
visits to India in the late 1850s and early 60s.
Thus, it is obvious that, quite apart from the ’Afghani’ legend, 
there were some other factors responsible for the growth of Indian 
pan-Islamic sentiment in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
The primary factor, it seems, was the increased European pressure on 
the dar al-Xslam. The spoliation was such that, apart from India and 
the Central Asian Khanates which had already been devoured by Britain, 
Russia and China between 1850s and 70s, there remained not a Muslim 
state on the ’fringe1 - from Algeria in the West to the Malaysian 
Archipelago in the East - which did not pass under European domination. 
The only segments of the dar a1-Islam left seemingly independent were 
the territories in the ’core1 and they too were threatened, Between 
I878 and 1882 a number of Ottoman territories and dependencies - 
including Bulgaria, Serbia, Rumania, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Tunisia and Egypt - either became independent or were lost to various
60European Powers. This continuous pressure of Christendom, exerted 
under one pretext or the other, gave rise to a feeling among Indian 
Muslims that the maintenance of the power and independence of the 
last great Muslim Power was not only the most pressing problem but 
also the concern for the entire Muslim world.
Los Angeles and London, 1972, pp. 59-60, 129-42 and 421-225 and Aziz 
Ahmad, ’Afghani’s Indian Contacts’, JAOS, LXXXIX, No. 5? July-Sept. 
1969, pp. 476-504.
59
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60
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Another factor in this connection was the anti-Turk fervour
of the British statesmen like Gladstone and Rosebery (1847-1929)
and the mounting campaign in the 1890s against the Ottoman treatment
of the rebellious non-Muslim subject nationalities., The Armenian
question, which began in the 1870s as a humanitarian protest, had by
the 1890s, with the support of the eccliastics, assumed an anti-
Islamic character., An appeal was made to the British public to help
’win Mecca1 and eventually the whole Muslim world for Christ.^ For
a long time a section of the British press assailed the Turkish race,
62Islamic faith and its Prophet. The controversy as to whether the
Sultan had any rightful title to the Khilafat? which had been started
63in the 1870s by retired Indian civilians, was revived and his claim 
re jected.^
In turn, the encroachments on the dar al-Islam and the 
*narrow-minded’ Christian scholasticism touched a sensitive chord 
in India and coupled with the exhilaration felt at the Turkish 
victory in the Greaco-Turkish War (1897) resulted in considerable
61
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65unrest among the Muslims. It also contributed to a serious anti-
British uprising among the Frontier Tribes^ and the Mujahidin.^
An even greater concern was engendered in India when the Powers
intervened and deprived Turkey the fruits of her victory. The
question came to be represented as one of Crescent versus the
Cross and the reaction was conspicuously reflected in the Muslim 
60press. Consequently, in August 1897? Government of India 
convicted or deported the editors of a number of Muslim papers, 
banned Turkish and Cairene journals, and took action against those
69suspected of spreading disaffection.
But if the growing effervescence of the Muslims had moved 
the Government to action, it also caused anxiety to some Muslim 
leaders, notably Rafiuddin Ahmad (1865-1954) and Syed Ahmed Khan? 
lest this enthusiasm should damage the community's position without 
effectively helping the Turks. Therefore, in the wake of the 
Russo-Turkish War they took pains to show that pan-Islamism was 
not a movement for conquest or aggression but 'an assertion of 
the natural feeling of self-preservation and self-respect'.
65
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70Nor was the British raj in danger. The Sultan of Turkey was not
their ruler who could claim their temporal or spiritual allegiance.
Their religious duty was plains 'to obey our rulers and remain
quite loyal to them'. The most they could do was to pray for
friendly relations between the British Government and the rest of 
71the Muslim world. A more overt effort was that of Mirza Ghulam
Ahmad (1859-1908) of Qadian, the head of the Ahmadiyya community.
While trying to disseminate feelings of loyalty he attempted to
72
uproot the very idea of the jihad. Most surprisingly of all,
Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (1828-1905), the co-founder of the Deoband
and one of the alim who is said to have taken part in the Revolt
of 1857, also issued a fatwa in 1898 that 'Indian Muslims were bound
by their religion to be loyal to the British Government even if it
75were engaged in war with the Sultan of Turkey'»'
But such endeavours seem to have had no effect. During the
first decade of the twentieth century the Indian Muslim involvement
with Turkey became even deeper. No mean part was played in this by
the Indian Muslims residing abroad, especially in Britain. They
sought to combat anti-Islamic anti-Turk propaganda. As early as
1886, a pan-Islamic society called the Anjuman-i-Islam had been
74established m  London with branches in India.  ^ In 1903, an Indian 
barrister, Abdulla al-Mamun Suhrawardy (1875-1935), revived this 
almost defunct society under the new name of 'The Pan-Islamic 
Society of London' Mushir Hosain Kidwai (b. 1878) of Gadia, 
another Indian barrister, became its secretary and Mahmud Shairani 
(1880-1946), an Indian orientalist, was elected its joint
70
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nc
secretary. The Society, apart from establishing direct contact
with Turkey, rendered valuable service in focussing, especially
through its journal Pan-Islam, the Muslim feelings on questions
77effecting Turkey and Islam. No wonder that when in 1906 renewed
excitement was witnessed in India over the British ultimatum to
Turkey following the Turko-Egyptian border dispute and Cromer's
repression of Egyptian nationalists, the British Government deprecated
the suggestion to question the validity of the Sultan’s title to the 
78
Khilafat. The opposition to the Ottoman pretensions, as in Syed
Ahmed's days, came from within. Nawab Haji Ismail Khan (b. 1852)
of Datauli and Mohsin-ul-Mulk (1857-1907) attempted to dispute the
79Ottoman claim with arguments borrowed from Syed Ahmed.’' But their 
reasoning achieved nothing except sharp rebukes. It was this 
'undesirable prospect' of the pan-Islamic movement in India that, 
among other factors, induced the loyalists like Mohsin-ul-Mulk and 
the Aga Khan to agree to the formation of the All-India Muslim 
League in May 1906, in order that they might channel the feelings 
of their co-religionists.^
For a few years after the formation of the Muslim League the
Indian Muslims appeared to take increasing interest in domestic
affairs and were able to secure separate representation by the
81Indian Councils Act 1909* But the pan-Islamic fervour was never
76
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forgotten. This is evident from the hearty manner in which the
Indian Muslims contributed towards the expenses of the construction
82of the Hedjaz Railway. Moreover, the Hindu agitation against
Curzon's (1859-1925) administrative measure of partitioning Bengal 
83in 1905? the gradual spoliation of Persia by Britain and Russia
following the Anglo-Persian Convention (1907)? the French aggression
in Morocco, and the misfortunes of Turkey in the Balkans had weighed
heavily upon them.^ Thus when in September 1911? Italy, with the
connivance of the British and the French, made a buccaneering raid
upon Ottoman Tripoli the indignation of Muslim India was widespread.
Public meetings were held in major towns of the country condemning
85the unprovoked Italian aggression and beseeching the Indian and
British Governments to support 'our sacred Khalifa the Sultan of
86Turkey against the most unrighteous and wicked war'. The London
Muslim League even threatened to raise volunteers for the assistance 
87
of Turkey. The Muslim press was full of denunciation of the
88'Italian brigandage1. Like the Italians who dubbed the War a
82
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89crusade and even implicated the Pope's name, a Muslim journal
depicted the Christian Powers as ’individually and collectively'
90projecting the ruin of Islam.
In order to render financial assistance for the relief of
the Tripolitan sufferers a Red Crescent Society was established in 
91Calcutta, but the material assistance came mostly from Upper India
where Muhammad Inshaullah of the Watan (Lahore) and Zafar Ali Khan
(1870-1956) of the Zamindar (Lahore), remitted large sums of money 
92to Turkey. The contributors included Nawab Sultan Jahan Begum of
Bhopal (1858-1950).^ Ameer Ali organised from Britain a medical
mission to Tripoli for the relief of the Ottoman sick and wounded.
The funds were again provided by Inshaullah and Zafar Ali Khan, with
94the Madras Muslims also contributing liberally. In order to bring
pressure to bear upon the Government, some of the Muslim leaders
encouraged the boycott of the Italian goods which, with the Muslim
League's blessings and the active support of such prominent
businessmen as Fazulbhoy Currimbhoy (b. 1872) and Ibrahim Rahimtoola
(1862-1942)) gained some measure of success in Bombay, the U.P., the 
95Punjab and Bengal. With the Tripolitan issue was merged the
Persian question, and Sunnis joined Shias in condemning the Russian
occupation of northern Persia and the bombardment of the shrine of
96Imam Ali Raza in Meshhed. A Persian Red Crescent Society was
89
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formed in Calcutta to which the Aga Khan alone subscribed five 
97thousand rupees. The British Government was called upon to 
persuade Russia to stop oppression and remove her troops from
. 98Persia,
These representations to the British Government, however, had 
99no effect except that the Foreign Office secured from the Italian
Government an assurance of non-interference with the ha.ii pilgrim
traffic. Opinion prevailed in Whitehall that ’we do not intend
101to let our policy be influenced by Moslem agitation'. But from
the Indian Muslim point of view the significance of the crisis had
been the rallying together of the Muslims from all parts of the
country. Thus, when in October 1912, the Balkan States launched
a combined attack on Turkey, which eventually deprived her of her
European provinces except Eastern Thrace, Constantinople and the
Straits, the Indian Muslim indignation was still more spontaneous
and bitter. In spite of the efforts of the loyalists like the
102Aga Khan 'to stem the flow from within1, there were numerous 
103demonstrations. A section of the Muslim press was extremely 
outspoken}^ The ulama of the principal religious seminaries of 
the country, excepting Ahmad Raza Khan (1856-1921) of Bareilly 
and his associates, patched up their differences in order to
97
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105concentrate on the issue. The Deoband ulama made it incumbent on
Muslims by a fatwa to give money to the Red Crescent Society and even
106declared that the diversion of the zakat money was permissable.
The poet-theologian Shibli Numani, repudiating his earlier stance on
the Ottoman Khilafat9 raised the cry of 'Islam in Danger' and his
young protdgd, Abul Kalam Azad, went a step further and proclaimed
that the time for .jihad had come"P^ Shaukat Ali (1875-1958), the
U.P. journalist, issued an appeal in the Comrade to organise a
volunteer corps 'to fight against the filibustering gang of dacoits 
1 Oft
in the Balkans', His brother Mohamed Ali (1878-1951)? the Oxford- 
educated editor of the Comrade, advocated that the funds collected
109for the Aligarh University should be handed over to Turkey on loan.
As a practical proof of sympathy Mohamed Ali organised an
all-India medical mission under Dr. Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari (1880-1956),
a former resident medical officer to the Charing Cross’Hospital in 
110London, The Indian mission, which was one of the other half-dozen
105
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mercy missions including Ameer Ali's Red Crescent mission from
London and a Muslim mission from Bombay, reached Constantinople
at the end of December 1912, and rendered valuable service to the
111sick and wounded soldiers. But, 'the most important result of
the mission', according to Dr. Ansari, 'was the formation of a bond
112of union between the Turkish nation and the Indians'. During
their sojourns in Turkey the mission was able to establish contacts
not only with Enver Pasha (1881-1922) and other Young Turk leaders,
but also with the Egyptian nationalists, notably Shaikh Abdul Aziz 
113Shawish. Early in 1913, in collaboration with Shawish, Ansari
and Zafar Ali Khan (who was also visiting Constantinople at that
time) propounded a scheme for a rehabilitation colony in Anatolia
for Muslim refugees from Mecedonia, a university in Medina, an
Islamic bank and a co-operative society}"^ The project was actively
supported by the Comrade which also encouraged the Indian Muslims
115to purchase Turkish security bonds.
'But perhaps the most important development of pan-Islamism 
in India was the foundation in May 1913? of a society called the 
Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba (Society of the Servants of the Kaaba)!^ 
Qayyara-ud-din Mohamed Abdul Bari (1879-1926), the influential alim 
of Farangi Mahal seminary in Lucknow, was its President and Mushir 
Hosain Kidwai and the Ali brothers its other promoters. The
111
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ostensible object of the Anjuman was religious, i.e., the protection
of Mecca and other Holy Places of Islam from non-Muslim encroachments.
But there is reason to believe that the real object of the promoters,
despite their strong denial, was to further the political programme
of pan-Islamism. Evidence suggests that the Anjuman derived its
inspiration from Ottoman sources. But the factor which had moved
the promoters to action was the realisation that Turkey was weak and
no longer in a position to ward off effectively the dangers
threatening the dar al-Islam. Thus, as a remedy they decided on a
two-fold plans first, to organise the Muslims so that they could
oppose any non-Muslim invasion, and, secondly, to strengthen Turkey
as the one powerful Muslim power, capable of maintaining 'an
independent and effective Muslim sovereignty1 over the sacred places
of Islam. For this purpose the Anjuman undertook to contribute half
its income and bound its members by oath to protect the Holy Places,
absolving them of any obligation to temporal allegiance to the
Government of India. The dastur-ul-amal directly appealed to the
Muslim communities under non-Muslim rule to unite for the purpose
117of maintaining the 'effective sovereignty' of a Muslim Power.
Soon the Anjuman acquired a reputation and, despite a lack of 
co-operation from Deoband and Bareilly, achieved the remarkable feat 
of bringing the ulama, especially those of Farangi Mahal connection, 
into the field of practical politics. This was the beginning of 
that union between the ulama and the western-educated leadership 
which later helped them to launch the Khilafat movement. Within a 
year or two of its establishment, the Anjuman's branches were 
established in London, Constantinople, Cairo and Singapore. The 
Society's emissaries actively encouraged disaffection against non- 
Muslim Powers, attempted & Turco-Arab integration and later during
the War tampered with the Indian troops stationed in the Middle
- ,118 East.
With the cry to 'save Islam' began a reorientation of Muslim 
politics. In spite of Britain's declared neutrality in the trials
117
Ibid.
118
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and tribulations of Turkey, a belief had gained credence, and
rightly too, that she was no longer the safe custodian of Muslim
interests. The suspicion was strengthened by the revocation in
December 1911» of the partition of Bengal, all along proclaimed as
a 'settled fact'. The resentment felt at this 'betrayal', together
with the non-fulfilment of the demand for an affiliating Muslim
university at Aligarh, led to the conviction among Muslim leaders,
even of loyal stamp, that to protect their rights they must depend
upon themselves}"^ Thus, Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk (1829-1917) began to
impress on the Muslims the necessity of relying on their own
strength instead of having blind faith in the promises of the 
120Government. Abdul Halim Sharar (1860-1926) decried the 'policy
121
of mendicancy' of the League leaders. And Shibli Numani, supported
by Zafar Ali Khan, advised the community to shun the 'old-gaurds' and
122resort to political agitation.
The same trend was reflected in the Muslim press. The Vakil
of Amritsar, in particular, urged the community to emulate the
Hindu methods of agitation which had borne such solid results as
123the unsettling of the partition of Bengal. They should even join
the Hindus and make a common cause with them. The 'extremist' Hindu
press also seemed to reciprocate these feelings, though somewhat 
124suspiciously, and taunted the Muslims that they had been abandoned 
125by the Government. The Muslims had themselves tasted the fruits
119
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of agitation over the demolition by the Cawnpore Municipality of
126an annexe of a mosque in the summer of 1913* Indeed some died in
the police firing and went to jail thus successfully turning an
insignificant local incident into a serious all-India affair.
Khwaja Syed Muhammad Ali Hassan Nizami (1878-1957) of Delhi even
127proclaimed that India was dar al-harb. The ulama and the politicians
arrayed themselves against the Government - Abdul Bari in Lucknow,
Mohamed Ali in Delhi, Azad in Calcutta, Mazhar-ul-Haque (1886-1930)
in Patna, and Zafar Ali Khan in Lahore - and compelled it to come 
128to terms with them.
Thus, the strength of Muslim agitation was discovered at
Cawnpore. The expansion of what one recent writer calls the Muslim
129'ideologico-dynamic' political consciousness, supercharged by Islam’s
humiliation abroad and plights within, had transformed the Indian
Muslims from a body of petitioners into assertive agitators. Self-
government ’suitable to India' became the plank of their politics,
130and conservatism and ultra-loyalism stood condemned. The Ilindu-
Muslim rapproaohement, towards which the leaders had been gradually
131moving since the 1890s, was struck and finally sealed at Lucknow
126
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in December 1916, in a ’pact' in which Jinnah, the young Bombay
132barrister, played a leading role.
During the post-Cawnpore period the unrest seemed to subside
owing to the Turkish reoccupation of Adrianople in the summer of
1913- However, the pan-Islamic sentiment was sustained by the
133Comrade, the Al-Hilal and the Zamindar. This was also encouraged
by a number of Turkish emissaries who visited India in early 1914,
ostensibly to thank the Indian Muslims on behalf of the Turkish
Government for their help in the Tripolitan and the Balkan Wars and
134to obtain funds for the Ottoman Red Crescent Society. During
their sojourns these Turks made contacts with Dr. Ansari, the Ali
135brothers and other well-known pan-Islamists. There were also many
other suspicious Turkish visitors, well-supplied with cash, who were
reported to have been sent to stir up trouble in India^^ It was
also reported about this time that the Turkish Government was
negotiating with a German firm in Hamburg for the purchase of rifles
137for the purpose of arming the Indian Muslims. Turkey was also
known to be spreading pro-Turkish sentiment through her press and
Ottoman officials in India and such of her Indian contacts as the
Delhi barrister Shaikh (Sir) Abdul Qadir (1874-1950), formerly of
138Suhrawardy's Pan-Islamic Society of London.
Thus, in July 1914? when war broke out between Serbia and 
Austria, Indian Muslim sympathies went with the latter, because 
Serbia had been one of the Balkan confederates in the recent
132
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hostilities with Turkey. Subsequently, when Germany and Russia
also became embroiled, they championed Germany’s cause on account
139of the memories of the Russo-Turkish War. But generally the Indian
Muslims were jubilant at the sight of the Christian Rowers fighting
among themselves and believed it to be a punishment from the Almighty
for their ill-treatment of Turkey}^ Many thought that the War would
lead to the downfall of Christendom and the revival of the Islamic
powerM1 Yet, when in August 1914? England joined too on the side
of Serbia and Russia?the Muslim sympathies, in spite of their pro-
German leanings for her supposed Turkophila tendencies, paradoxically
veered round to her side. Mass meetings of Muslims were held
throughout the country offering prayers for the success of British
arms and pledging their services as a mark of 'unswerving allegiance
142and unflinching devotion to the British Crown1. At some places
over-enthusiastic maulavis went so far as to declare that those who
143fell in the War for Britain would be shuhada. Efforts were also 
made to organise a Red Crescent mission of Muslim volunteers to 
assist the British troops and the equipment of Ansari*s Balkan 
medical mission was handed over to the Government. Huge subscriptions 
were made towards the War Relief Pund^^
Except for the comrade of Mohamed Ali and the Al-Hilal of Abul 
Kalam Azad, the tone of the Muslim press too was on the whole pro- 
British. Even the traditionally anti-British papers like the Zamindar
139
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and the Muhammadi (Calcutta), urged loyalty and assistance to the 
145 .
Government. TThe reason for this unexpected pro-British outburst
seems to have been the result primarily of the declaration of
neutrality by Turkey}^ Partly, it was the successful British
propaganda that Britain's cause was righteous and that she had been
147forced into the War. But with the educated classes of Muslims
1 AR
the expression of loyalty was generally a political expedient
bound up with the expectation of the fulfilment of India's 'natural
149rights' after the War, and the necessity to India of Britain's
150tutelage 'in her present stage of national and communal growth'.
But this Muslim loyalty, unlike that of the Hindus, was at best
151conditional on Turkish neutrality, except on the part of a few
152who thought that Indian Muslims had no concern with Turkey, In
general, Muslim opinion was deeply anxious about the possibility
of Turkey ranging herself on the side of Germany and Austria.
'Jihad1 leaflets of the Ottoman Red Crescent Society appealing for
153funds were already in circulation in India. Tewfik Bey's letters
to Mazhar-ul-Haque and Shibli Humani written from Constantinople
in August 1914> betrayed the intention of Turkey to support the 
154Central Powers. Similar indications came from the letters written
145
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by the Indian pilgrims in Mecca to their relatives in India, which
155described big troop mobilisation by the Turks. Thus, the Indian
Muslims were extremely worried at the delicate situation. Th6ir
predicament was that if Turkey did join the War against Britain how
were they to reconcile their pan-Islamic sentiments with their
declared loyalty to the British Crown, Mazhar-ul-Haque tried to
provide an answer when he stated at a public meeting at Bankipore
in September 1914s n^ e are Musalmans and we are Indians and we have
to perform our duty in this double capacity. I am happy to believe
156that these two interests do not clash, but are entirely identical1,
Clash in fact they did as would be seen later, but presently the
educated class realised that Turkey would gain nothing by joining
the War and might lose much. The ulama on the other hand were more
157worried about the threat to the Holy Places. Thus, there was a
158genuine desire that Turkey should remain neutral. Accordingly,
159Mohamed Ali and Dr. Ansari, like the Russian Muslim leaders, sent
a joint telegram to Talaat Pasha (1894-1921), one of the triumvirate
then ruling the Ottoman Empire, pleading with him to keep Turkey
neutral}^ Abdul Bari in his telegram to the Sultan begged him
l61either to remain neutral or side with Britain. At the same time 
he pleaded with the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge (I858-I927), that Britain 
should adopt such attitude towards Turkey as might help maintain such
155
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162a neutrality. The Ottoman Consulate in Bombay which was approached
on the subject, also conveyed to Constantinople the deep anxiety of
the Indian Muslims and their sincere desire for Turkey’s neutrality,
163frankly confiding that ’all the Mohammadans are for the British'.
The Government of India was nevertheless anxious. Reports from
some provinces had indicated that in the event of a rupture with
Turkey they would find the Muslim community passively hostile.
Yet the Government, assured by the loyalists and the ruling chiefs,
convinced itself that 'nowhere in India is there any sign that a
Turkish jihad would induce Indian Mahomedans to give really serious 
165trouble’. In order to deal with the anti-British section of the
pan-Islamists, the Government brought out its long arm and set the
Press Act in motion to gag some of the Muslim papers and ban those
166imported from Turkey. Abul Kalam Azad was daily harassed by the
Press Censor to 'improve1 the tone of the Al-Hilal}^ Zafar Ali
168Khan was interned in his native village and soon Mohamed Ali
forfeited security of the Comrade for spelling out grievances
against the Allies in a rejoinder to The Times’ leading article
169'The Choice of the Turks'. These methods were successful, and,
162
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by the end of October 1914s though excitement still prevailed, it 
was obvious that little if any active sympathy would be displayed 
with Turkey should she take the field against Britain.
Thus, when Turkey did join the War against the Allies on
170November 1, 1914? it caused no sensation. What excitement there
was, was soothed by the Government's assurance about the immunity
171of the Holy Places in Arabia and Mesopotamia from Allied attack.
Not surprisingly, when the news of the proclamation of jihad by the
Sultan reached India early in December, it failed, as in the rest
172of the Muslim world, to create much flutter. The moderates - 
Nawab Sir Salimulla (1884-1915) of Dacca, A.K. Fazlul Haq (1873-1962) 
and Abul Kasem in Bengal, Rafiuddin in Bombay, Raja Mohamed Ali 
Mohammad Khan (1877-1931) of Mahmudabad in the U.P., and Muhammad 
Shafi (1869-1932) and Fazl-i-Husain (1877-1936) in the Punjab - 
moved first and by their overt expression of loyalty made it 
difficult for the 'extremists' to take an opposite line effectively. 
Subsequently, for reasons of expediency and tamed by Government 
repression, they too seemed to realise that the Muslim interests 
were bound up with the British Government. Thus, men of every class 
and shade of opinion, Sunnis, Shias and Ahmadis, came forward to 
attest their unswerving loyalty to the Crown - a feeling which had 
remarkable similarity with the attitude adopted by the Muslims in
170
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173Russia. The All-India Muslim League and its branches, like the 
Indian National Congress, hastened to assure the Viceroy that the
174participation of Turkey in the War in no way affected their loyalty. 
Nizam Mir Usman Ali (1886-1967) of Hyderabad, the Begum of Bhopal,
Nawab Syed Hamid Ali Khan (1875-1930) of Rampur and other Muslim
175ruling chiefs, vied with one another in reaffirming their allegiance.
But most important was the expression of fealty issued under the
signatures of sixty-nine leading Delhi Muslims, including the Ali
brothers. Dr. Ansari, Hakim Ajmal Khan (1864-1927)? Obeidullah Sindhi
(1872-1944) and Hassan Nizami, advising Muslims to remain compliant
to the Government and do nothing which might cause their loyalty to
be suspected}^ The ulama of Nadva and Deoband and various an.jumans
177in the country followed suit. Even Abdul Bari, after some hesitation, 
demanded from the Muslims the sacrifice of their lives for the British
1 7R
raj. Similar declarations of loyalty in unequivocal terms were
179issued by the Chief Mujtahid of the Shias and by Bashir-ud-din 
Mahmud Ahmad (1889-1965)? the head of the Qadiani wing of the 
Ahmadiyya community
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The Muslim press though bitter and sullen at the 'calamity1
nevertheless accepted the position that Muslim India would render
181unto Caesar that which was Caesar's, The four leading pan-Islamic
journals, the Comrade, the Al-Hilal, the Islamic Mail and the
Musalman, also shared this opinion, though they did not hesitate to
point out to the Government that the Indian Muslims were deeply
concerned about the Sultan-Caliph and that it should avoid any action
182which might affect their attitude. It was also suggested that in
order to remove apprehension, Britain should declare that even if
the Allies succeeded in vanquishing Turkey, her integrity would be
183maintained after the War. Here were the germs of the future Khilafat 
movement.
The enthusiasm for loyalty, however, varied from province to
province (depending on the influence of the moderate men) - from
an expression of intense spontaneity in Poona to lukewarmness in
the U.P, and its total absence in Assam. In Bengal there was actual
difference of opinion and the Al-Hilal argued for suspension of
1 ft/1
judgement on Turkey's action. But behind this manifestation of
loyalty there was more than a mere gratitude regarding the promised
protection of the Holy Places. It was the political expediency so
truthfully characterised by the Aligarh Institute Gazette (November
4, 1914) that 'with the stability of the British Government our
welfare and prosperity are bound up, in its weakness and destruction
185we see our own weakness and ruin'.  ^ No doubt, therefore, that in
advising loyalty Mazhar-ul-Haque reminded the Muslims that 'on our
186present attitude depends our future destiny' 5 the Raja of
Mahmudabad equated the achievement of Muslim political rights in
187future with their attitude 'at this critical juncture'j ' and
181
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Fazlul Haq harped on the peace and security that the Muslims were
188enjoying under the British rule. It was perhaps this expedient
which led Dr. Suhrawardy, the pan-Islamist, and Professor Khuda
Bukhsh (1877-1931)> "the historian, to change their views and deny
189that the Sultan of Turkey was the rightful Caliph.
The Government wisely refrained from rushing the Muslim community
into condemning Turkey and let the excitement take its own course.
However, it obtained its end by suppressing the 'extremists’, as it
190did later with the Ali brothers by interning them in 1915? and
191by encouraging the moderates to be more vocal. In addition, it
whipped up support from a section of the ulama which was traditionally
opposed to Abdul Bari and Mahmud Hassan (1851“1920) of Deoband and
thus, too willing to help. Fatawa to the effect that the war with
Turkey was political and not religious and that the jihad against
the British was religiously unlawful, were secured from Ahmad Raza
Khan of Bareilly, Abdul Haq of Calcutta, the brothers Abdul Hamid
and Abdul Majid of Parangi Mahal, Pir Mihr Ali Shah of Golra (Punjab),
192Maulavi Abdul Aziz Samdani and Maulavi Syed Muhammad Razvi. Abdul
Bari and Mahmud Hassan not only refused to sign but openly opposed
such attempts. The pro-British fatawa, however, lost much value
when one of the sponsors disclosed that the Government had engineered 
193the move. At some places the officials attempted to get the
188
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194Sultan's name omitted from the Friday khutba. A Deputy Collector
of the U.P. even suggested that the Muslims should collectively
request the Government to become the Khadim-i-Haramain-i-Shari fain
195and establish its direct control over the Hedjaz. Such attempts 
were, however, strongly resisted. In Bengal, for instance, when 
Nawab Salimulla of Dacca and his group attempted to delete the 
Sultan's name from the khutba, they got a thorough trouncing from 
the press.
As the War progressed Indian Muslims began increasingly to
apprehend the probable disappearance of the last independent Muslim 
197Power. Already inflammatory leaflets had made their appearance,
including an uptodate version of a well-known qasida originally
composed about the time of the Revolt of 1857? purporting to
198prophesy exact events leading to the final triumph of Islam.
In certain pan-Islamic circles the prospects of the jihad was
199discussed in private meetings. The encouragement had perhaps
come from the activities of several hundred Indian pilgrims in the
Hedjaz who had stayed back under the influence of two members of
the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba to fight for Turkey?^0 A controversy
also arose whether it was obligatory for true Muslims to perform
the hijrat. Mahmud Hassan was reported to have given a fatwa to
the effect that the hijrat was incumbent on Muslims 'who could free
201themselves from family and other ties'.
194
Report on the internal political situation in the U.P., Dec. 16, 
1914, PSSF, P. 227/15 with 4265/14, I5 and Mussulman, Nov. 1, 1914, 
ibid.
195
Mohamed Ali to Abdul Bari, Dec. 21, 1914? Nuqush, CIX, p. 16.
196
Islamic Mail, Dec. 1, 1914? and Masawat, Dec. 3? 1914? PSSF, 
4265/l47"i and "II.
197
M.S. Sulaiman Ashraf, Al-Balagh, Aligarh, n.d.,. passim.
Also see Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari, Dec. 19, 1914? Ali Bradran,
P. 439.
198
Report on the internal political situation in the U.P. for the 
second fortnight of Nov. 1914, PSSF, P. 5057/14 with 4265/14, II.
199
Bamford, op. cit., p. 120.
200
ICHPP, Jan. 1919? Pro. No. 206.
201
'Third Note on the Silk Letter Case*, by Cleveland, Sept. 26, 1916, 
and the statement of Maulavi Muhammad Masud of Deoband in PSSF, 
4260/16. This refers to earlier events.
-  39 -
The first practical result of this propaganda appeared in
February 1915? when, instigated by the Mujahidin agents, a group
of Lahore students (later joined by some from the Frontier) crossed
into Afghanistan, with the object of proceeding to Turkey and fighting 
202for the Caliph. Some of these students later played a significant
r8le in the Turko-German and pan-Islamic revolutionary schemes. The
'extremists' among the pan-Islamists alligned themselves with the
German-assisted Indian revolutionaries in Batavia and the Ghadr
Party based in San Francisco, and stretched the plot to the Tribal
203area, Afghanistan and several other parts of Asia and Europe.
The propaganda also penetrated the Indian army?^ First, there was
trouble at Bombay with the 10th Baluch Regiment who shot some British
officers when they were embarking the ship for active duties
overseas. Later, the Indian units at Rawalpindi and Lahore too
were involved and there were defections of Muslims from the Indian
Expeditionary Force which had landed in France. But a much more
serious incident took place in February 1915? among the Muslim
infantry posted at Singapore, Thinking that they were going to be
sent to fight the Turks, they mutineed, shot eight officers, gave
205a pitched battle and escaped into the hinterland.  ^ Again, early in 
1916, several killings and desertions were reported from among the 
Afridi units?^
202
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More ambitious was the bid of the pan-Islamists, spearheaded
by the ulama of Deoband, to overthrow the British rule in India
in league with the Frontier tribesmen and with the assistance of
207Turkey and Afghanistan. Mahmud Hassan, who had been developing
his anti-British scheme since 1905 in collusion with the educated
element and the Mujahidin, had skillfully promoted it in India
and spread it secretly to Central Asia, the Hedjaz, and Mesopotamia,
208through emissaries and cypher letters. At the outbreak of the
War he became convinced that success was out of the question unless
209supported by a foreign Muslim Power. Therefore, he despatched
Obeidullah Sindhi, his former colleague and the then Principal of
the Nazarat-ul-Muarif, Delhi, to Kabul in the autumn of 1915? and
himself proceeded to Constantinople via the Hedjaz with a view to
210arriving finally in the Tribal area on the Indian frontier.
In Kabul, Obeidullah, with the connivance of the Afghan
Government, brought into his sphere the runaway students, the
Mujahidin agents and other Indian residents, established contacts
with the Turko-German Mission in Kabul and the German-supported
Indian revolutionaries Mahendra Pratap (d, 1886) and Professor
Barkatullah (1859-1927)? and eventually joined their 'Provisional
211Government of India'. Among the various plans that he prepared
was the establishment of a 'Junud Allah' (Army of God) with the
headquarters at Medina and with subordinate commands at Constantinople, 
212Tehran and Kabul. In the Hedjaz Mahmud Hassan established contacts
207
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208
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with the Turks and obtained from Ghalib Pasha, the Ottoman Governor
of the Hedjaz, a declaration of jihad against the British for
circulation in India. The document, known as the 'Ghalib Hama',
was smuggled into India by a trusted follower of Mahmud Hassan,
213photographed and distributed.
But the whole plot was unravelled by the Punjab C.I.D. with
the accidental capture of the 'Silk Letters’ - the letters written
by Obeidullah and Maulavi Ansari of Deoband from Kabul to Mahmud
Hassan, containing reports of their progress in Afghanistan and
India? As a result, a number of arrests were made in India.
Mahmud Hassan was himself arrested along with his associates by
Sharif Hussain (1856-1931) of Mecca and handed over to the British.
He was interned at Malta where he remained till his release in 
2151920. For a time the Mujahidin, along with the Tribes, continued
their raids on British India under Haji Fazal Wahid (1856-1937)
of Turangzai, an alim associate of Mahmud Hassan, and others but
216the plot m  fact fizzled out under British punitive measures.
The uncovering of the ’Silk Letter Conspiracy' enabled the
Government to take necessary preventive measures. Shortly afterwards
Azad was externed by the U.P, and the Punjab Governments and in
217April 1916, he took up residence at Ranchi under surveillance.
Fazl-ul-Hasan Hasrat Mohani (1878/80-1951)? the journalist of the
Urdu-i-Mualla repute, was interned by the U.P. Government at
Lalitpur in Jhansi and, on refusing to comply, he was imprisoned 
218for two years. However, the Kabul wing of the pan-Islamists was
213
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able to continue it£ activities. But despite their attempts to win
over Amir Habibullah (1872-1919) of Afghanistan, the British were
219able to obtain his neutrality. Turko-German plots to subvert the
Indian masses and the ruling chiefs were also discovered and made 
220ineffective. However, what made a more serious dent in the ideal
of pan-Islamism and the 'universal’ Khilafat, was the Arab revolt
against the Ottoman Government in June 1916, under Sharif Hussain
221of Mecca, resulting in his seizure of Mecca, Jeddah and Taif.
The Hedjaz revolt, which was in the beginning unaccompanied
by any general Arab uprising in other territories due to the tight
Turkish control, appeared to the Muslim world at first as completely
222devoid of a nationalistic spirit. Thus, to the Indian Muslims the
223rebellion was a British engineered stab in the back of the mi Hat. 
They were particularly alarmed by the non-Muslim threat to the Holy
219
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224Places. Great indignation was, therefore, caused when the British
and Anglo-Indian papers alleged that the Indian Muslims had welcomed 
225the revolt. Demonstrations were held all over the country in order
226to express abhorrence at the Sharif's action. On June 26, 1916,
the Council of the All-India Muslim League met at Lucknow and passed
a resolution condemning the 'outrageous conduct1 of Hussain which it
227thought had jeopardised the safety of the Holy Places. Abdul Bari
dubbed Hussain and his sympathisers as the 'enempes of Islam^2  ^ and
Ajmal Khan frankly told the Viceroy that the British policy of aiding
229Hussain was a serious blunder and ought to be remedied.
Little did the Indian Muslims know that the spirit of Arab
nationalism was very deep, that the revolt had been initiated by the
Arabs themselves, that Hussain was working in his own and not British
interests except in so for as they furnished his particular schemes,
and that the British by their help, were only utilising his services 
250against an enemy. Hussain and the Arabs generally were as suspicious
251of the Allied designs on Arabia as the Indians were. The British 
too, despite the temptation and clamour in certain quarters to support 
an Arab caliphate, refused to be involved in the Khilafat question
224
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232
simply for fear of the consequences in India. Far from
establishing a direct influence in Arabia, which they knew was
dangerous and impossible, the British endeavoured to prevent any
other non-Muslim power from obtaining any control over the Holy 
233Places. But even by their help to the Arabs, the British had 
been able to abolish, as T.E. Lawrence (1888-1935) had once desired, 
'the threat of Islam, by dividing it against itself, in its very 
heart'?54
For the Government of India the Arab revolt and its effect
233
on Muslims in India was the chief worry. Therefore, its policy 
as a whole was conciliatory,. In August 1916, Lord Chelmsford 
(1868-1933), the new Viceroy, explained to Austen Chamberlain 
(1863-1937)? the Secretary of State for India, thus*
We in India have no sympathy whatsoever with the 
Turk and have no desire to see him let down 
lightly. At the same time, as administrators 
of an enormous Muslim community, we cannot but 
sympathise with the predicament in which they 
are placed by this war between their temporal 
and spiritual leaders, and for this reason we 
desire to deal gently with their feelings, while 
subscribing in the fullest and most loyal manner 
to the policy of His Majesty's Government.236
Though the Muslim excitement and the Turko-German intrigues 
237
continued, necessitating the Government to tie up a good many
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238troops, some of them European, the hulk of the community not only
remained loyal to the British Crown but contributed materially to
the defeat of their Caliph. Indian Muslim soldiers, despite some 
239
desertions, fought and died in different theatres of the War, and
without their aid, Prime Minister Lloyd George (1879-1941) later
admitted, 'we should not have conquered Turkey at all1?^ But all
through the War the community was confronted with the difficult
and distracting dilemma of reconciling the conflicting demands upon 
241its loyalty. Thus, whilst the Indian Muslim soldiers were fighting
the troops of their Caliph in the Near and the Middle East, prayers
242were being offered for his welfare in the Indian mosques. At
times there had been reassuring pronouncements from the Government,
in part due to the vulnerability of the British position in and out
of India, On January 12, 1915? Hardinge had given an assurance for
243the independence and integrity of Turkey. Edwin Montagu (1879- 
I924), Chamberlain's successor at the India Office, had made a 
pronouncement on August 17, 1917? "the 'progressive realization 
of responsible government in India'^4 ^n  ^ George, on
238
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January 5? 1918? pledged the maintenance of Turkish sovereignty
245once the War was over. The last named pronouncement had been
rendered particularly necessary as the Bolshevists, after the Russian
Revolution of 1917 an8 a separate peace with Germany, had started to
expose the secret Allied treaties aiming at Ottoman dismemberment?^
On January 5? 1918? Lloyd George, with the full consent of the
British political parties, unequivocally declared in his famous
war-aims speech that they were not fighting 'to deprive Turkey of
its capital, or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and
247
Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race1. 1 The Indian 
Muslims took this as an unalterable pledge and tenaciously clung 
to it. But they conveniently forgot that nowhere had the Premier 
indicated a willingness to restore to Turkey any of the territories 
in which Britain was interested. Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Arabia 
could not be exposed once again to the 'tyranny of the Sultan and 
his pashas '?^
Yet the unbearable strain occasionally erupted in the form of
sporadic violence as in the case of the Calcutta riots of September
1918, sparked off by the publication of insulting remarks about the
249Prophet in an Anglo-Indian paper. Such outbursts were clearly 
symptomatic of the disturbed state of the whole Muslim body politic 
and indicative of the presence of a strong pan-Islamic sentiment -
245
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though, the Muslim leaders were prone to dismissing it as a mere
250Western shibboleth. J The Turkish reverses in the War had thus 
only heightened the existing tension. It was in this background 
that the War oame to an end in November 1918.
250
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CHAPTER II
THE INCEPTION AND GROWTH OB1 THE MOVEMENT
The Armistice between the Allies and Turkey was signed at
Mudros on October 30, 1918. The unconditional surrender of Turkey*
followed on November 11 by a quick German capitulation, brought the
European War finally to a close. The advent of peace was greeted in
India with much relief. The future of Turkey, no doubt, caused some
anxiety but in view of the repeated pledges of the Indian and the
2
British Governments, the Indian Muslims hoped that the Sultan-
Caliph would be presented with a lenient treaty, safeguarding the
3prestige of the contracting parties* Some even believed that as a
reward for the Indian Muslim loyalty and services in the War,
Britain would trGat her fallen foe with commiseration and 
4generosity.
To their great disappointment, the Indian Muslims discovered 
that whereas the Armistice had loft the territorial readjustment to 
the Peace Conference, any suggestion of the restoration of Turkish 
sovereignty over the liberated1 territories would be viewed with 
utmost disfavour by the Allies. From the outset the latter strove 
to make the Muslim world realise that Turkey had boen beaten 
completely and that the Aimistice was not a 'mere suspension of 
hostilities pending amicable negotiations'• With remarkable 
celerity, the Entente Powers had begun to sooure their respective 
spheres of economic and strategic interests in tho Ottoman Empire. 
Britain moved in to control tho Straits, Mesopotamia and Arabia
1
For the terms of the Armistice see PP, 1919? Grad. 53*
2
Hardinge's communique of Nov. 1914, and speech of Jan* 12, 1915? 
and Lloyd George's speech of Jan. 5s 1918. See above, pp. 34 & 45-46.
3
Sea Bombay Samachar9 Nov. 4s 1918, BNNR 1918. Also soe Mufid-i- 
Rozgar, Nov. 3s 1918, ibid. $ San.j Vartaman, Nov. 2 and 6, 1918, 
ibid.% Akhbar-i-Islam, Nov* 16, 1918, ibid.g Vakil, Nov. 6, 1918, 
PNNR 19185 Leader, Nov. 16, 1918, ibid.% and Political Bhomiyo, Nov. 
29, 19185 BNNR 1918,
4
Akhbar-i-Islam, Bee. 9, 10, 11 and 12, 1918, BNNR 1918,
5 ,
S/S to V, Tel. P., Nov. 16, 1918, CP.
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generally? which? besides strengthening tho defence of her rich
Indian Empire? was to furnish her with the possible oil deposits of
Mosul and necessary cotton fiolds of Diala. France was manoeuvring
to preserve her privileges in Syria* Italy v/as intent on holding
on to tho Dodecanese and the vilayet of Adalia# America,, though
unwilling to accept any territorial reward? was* nevertheless?
advocating the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.
Secret treaties and other war-time arrangements had committed
the Allies to a policy of ’the setting free of the populations
subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks? and the turning out of
Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to Western 
7civilisation'. In the main three secret agreements spelled tho 
death of the Ottoman Empires first? the Treaty of London between 
tho Entente Powers and Italy? April 26? 1915? secondly? the 
Tripartite (Sykes-Picot) Agreement between Britain? Franco and 
Russia? April 26~0ctober 23? 1916? and thirdly? the Treaty of St. 
Jean de Maurienne between Britain? France and Italy? April 19-
g
September 26? 1917* Besides? there were two other agreements
6
Harry N. Howard? The Partition of Turkey. Norman? 1931? pp. 181- 
213« Also see J. Nevakivi? Britain? France and the Arab Middle 
East? 1914-1920? London? 1969? P« 95? H°L. Buell? ’Oil Interests in 
tho Fight for Mosul’? OH? XVII? No. 6? March 1923? PP* 931-38? and 
S.H. Longrigg? Oil in the Middle East? London? 1954? P* 44*
7
See the Allied reply to President Wilson’s note? dated Jan. 10? 
1917> The Times, Jan. 12? 1917* Also see A.J. Balfour’s note to 
Wilson? Dec. 18? 1916? in H.W.V. Tamperley? ed.? A History of the 
Peaoe Conference of Paris? VI? London, 1924? P* 23% Balfour's 
statement in the Imperial War Council? May 1917? Papers Relating to 
the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Lansing Papers?
1914"!920? II? Washington? 1940? p. 23§ and his memo, to Lloyd 
George? June 26? 1919? FRO? P.O.? 37l/4l8l.
8
PP? 1920? Cmdc 671? E.L. Woodward and R. Butler? ed.? Documents 
on British Foreign Policy? 1919-1939? First Series? IV? London?
1952? pp* 241-51? 638-39 and 640-41? and Elie ICedourie? England 
and the Middle East? London? 1956? pp* 29-141* For British proposals 
on tho partition of Turkey as recommended by the Interdepartmental 
and the Eastern Committees see PSM? B. 234 and B. 276 and PRO? CAB 
2 7 /2 4 and CAB 42/3* The maps indicating the four possible solutions 
for the settlement in Asiatic Turkey are reproduced in Nevakivi? 
Britain? France and the Arab Middle East? pp* 20-21. For the 
British grand strategy during the War see Paul Guinn? British 
Strategy and Politics? 1914-1918? Oxford? 1965*
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between the Powers about the Straits? Constantinople and Asia Minor?
as well as the pledges given to the Arabs for their complete
independence and those to the Zionists for a separate homeland in 
9
Palestine. According to these treaties? the Allies contemplated to
strip Turkey not only of her entire European possessions? including
the imperial capital? Constantinople? but also to deprive her of her
10eastern territories of Mesopotamia? Palestine? Arabia and Syria.
In this way Turkey was to be left with practically nothing? not even
an important access to the sea? and what was more important? was
11also to lose her sovereignty. Thus? while a complete dismemberment
of Germany? the principal enemy? was not contemplated? Turkey was to
be saddled with a much harsher peace treaty.
With the past history of Western encroachments on the Muslim
kingdoms of Tunisia? Algeria? Egypt and Persia? the impending
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire came like a shock to the Indian
Muslims. Turkey's downfall vfas felt deeply 'for with it was closely
interwoven the question of the Khalifat© and of the guardianship of
12the holy places of Islam*. Related to the sad plight of Islam
abroad was also the question of its possible effect on their position
in India. Being* in minority? the Indian Muslims had an unmitigated
fear that 'the collapse of tho Muslim Powers of the world is bound
to have an adverse influence on the political importance of the
13Musalmans in the country'. Besides? a feeling had been growing
9
Howard? op. oit., p. 181. For the Constantinople Agreement with 
Russia see J.C. Hurewitz? ed.? Diplomacy in the Hoar and Middle East? 
II? Princeton? 1956? PP* 7-H« For the pledges to the Arabs see 
PSSF9 53/l5? I-VI® For the Zionist question see L* Stein? The 
Balfour Declaration? London, 1961.
10
See the British and the French declarations of policy in Hindu? 
Hov. 15? 1918. Also see PSM, B. 310 (a)$ and Tamperley? op., cit.?
p. 28.
11
Curzon was willing to leave Turkey as an independent Asiatic 
state? but Lloyd George? who exercised an unusual degree of control 
over foreign policy after the Armistice? insisted not only on a 
total destruction of the Ottoman Empire but also Turkey's extinction 
as a sovereign country.- See Earl Ronaldshay? Life of Lord Curzon?
III? London? 1928? pp. 259-68.
12
Fazlul Haq? All-India Muslim League Session^ , Delhi? Presidential 
Address, Calcutta? /1919/? P « 2.
13
Resolution xxi? All-India Muslim League Session? Delhi? Dec.
1918? J&P? 2272/19.
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among the educated Muslims that? in spite of their loyalty to the 
British during the War? their community had not been treated with 
sympathy? and that their views carried little weight with the 
Government.^ As evidence? they cited the recent outbursts of 
Montagu and Chelmsford against the separate electorates? 'which is 
the life and soul of all our political activities of the present
*i j- jL 6
day' - an opinion which was shared equally by the ulama. The
latter were particularly exasperated over the omission from the
Reform scheme of any mention of their representations to the
Secretary of State in 1917 wherein they had pleaded for the
17preservation of Muslim rights and privileges. Added to this was 
a deep feeling of resentment over the Press Act and the Defence of 
India Act which had been frequently used to impede the publication 
of Muslim journals like the Comrade, the Hamdard, the Al-Hilal? the
•l'q 1
Al-Balagh and the Zamindar. But what they felt most acutely was
the continued detention of some of their leaders? especially Mahmud
19Hassan? the Ali brothers? Abul Kalam Azad and Hasrat Mohani.
At such a juncture when the Muslims were uneasy? the 
Government of India inaptly gave them another cause for concern. It 
nominated a Hindu? Lord Sinha of Raipur (1864-1928)? instead of a 
Muslim? to represent India at the Peace Conference. The Muslims 
feared that a non-Muslim? however able and judicious? could not 
fully comprehend and represent their views on questions affecting
14
These views were expressed by loading Muslims to Ronaldshay? the 
Governor of Bengal. See Ronaldshay to Chelmsford? Sept. 11? 1918? 
CP.
15
See Dr. Ansari's speech at the Delhi Muslim League Session in 
Doc. 1918. Bombay Chronicle? Dec. 31? 1918.
16
See A.M.M. Sajjad to Abdul Bari? Dec. 4? 1918? Huqush (Lahore)? 
CIX? April/May 1968? p. 93.
17
Ronaldshay to Chelmsford? Sept. 11? 1918, CP. For the ulama's 
representations to Montagu see PP? 1918? Gmd. 9178? Addresses 
Presented in India to His Excellency the Viceroy and the Right 
Honourable the Secretary of State for India, pp. 8—10$ and E.S. 
Montagu? An Indian Diary, ed.? V. Montagu? London? 1930? p. 45*
18
Ronaldshay to Chelmsford? Sept. 11? 1918? OP.
19
Hew Times (Karachi)? Dec. 29? 1917s BMR 1918$ Punjab (Lahore), 
Jan. 5? 1918? PNHR 1918$ Maharashtra (Poona)? Jan. 6? 1918? BNNR 
1918$ and Sind Moslem (Sukkur) ? April 6, 1918? ibid. For full 
details of the internments see ICHPP, June 1919? Pros. Hos. 440- 
525. Mohani had been released in May 1918 but the restrictions on 
him were still in force.
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Islam. The nomination was interpreted as a calculated move on the
20part of the Government to injure Muslim interests. The Muslims 
were in a predicament.
Among the prominent leaders who had escaped internment during 
the War only a few - Abdul Bari, Dr. Ansari, Ajmal Khan and Mushir 
Hosain KLdwai - were still politically active. ICLdwai was based in 
London, running the principal pan-Islamic propaganda organisation 
called the Islamic Information Bureau, and Ansari*s and Ajmal Khan's 
activities were confined to Delhi and somo places of Upper India. 
Abdul Bari was the only leader who enjoyed a position of pre­
eminence in Muslim India. He was not only revered for his piety and 
learning, but, since the Gawnpore Mosque affair of 1913? had come 
to acquire great hold on the Muslim masses. Moreover, because of 
his position as the foremost pir with thousands of followers all 
over India, most of the important pan-Islamists - Hasrat Mohani, the 
Ali brothers, KLdwai, Jan Muhammad Chotani, Shah Sulaiman Phulwari
(1859-1935)? T.A.K. Sherwani - were either his disciples or close 
21friends. This personal conclave of ulama and the educated elite 
with anti-British leanings was remarkably important in fostering the 
movement for lenient treatment for Turkey.
Abdul Bari had been in constant touch with most of his associates,
22including the Ali brothers and Azad who were still in detention.
A campaign for the release of the Muslim internees, headed nominally 
by ’Bi Amman’ (1853-1924)? Ihe mother of the Ali brothers, had
20
Paisa Akhbar (Lahore), Bov. 16, 1918, PMR 1918$ Aftab (Lahore), 
Nov. 22, 1918, ibid.3 Husrat (Amritsar), Nov. 24, 1918? ibid.% Watan, 
Dec. 13, 1918, ibid.% and Wafadar (Havasir), BHBR 1918, pp. 19-20.
21
The writer is indebted to Maulana Jamal Mian, the only son of 
Abdul Bari, for this information, which he supplied in an interview 
in London in Aug. 1969. Also see Khlliyat Hasrat Mohani, Maktaba 
Ishaat-i-Urdu, Delhi, 1959s PP* 57—58? M.S. Shaheed Farangi Mahalli,
*IChadam-i-Kaaba Maulana Shaukat Ali’, Ali Bradran, ed., Rais Ahmad 
Jafari, Lahore, 1963, p. 88.
22
See letters to Abdul Bari from Ajmal Khan, Ansari, Mohani, KLdwai, 
Zafar Ali Khan and others in Nuqush, CIX, passim. For the Ali 
brothers see ibid. 9 pp. 18-19 and 56-65, and Ali Bradran, pp. 436- 
501. In this case the intermediaries were Shoaib Qureshi, Abdur 
Rahman Siddiqui, Iqbal Shaidai, Khaliquzzaman and Ghate, the Ali 
brothers’ lawyer. Interview with Jamal Hianp Huqush, CIX, p. 583 
an& Tmroze (Lahore), Jan. 12, 1969* For Azad see Huqush, CIX, p. 36 
and ICHPP, June 1919? Pro. Ho. 49G.
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23already been underway since early 1917* Abdul Bari, Ajmal Khan,
Ansari, Jinnah, Raza Ali (1882-1949) an|l other Muslim leaders were
active in this connection and in the winter of 1917 MvK. Gandhi
(1869-1948) had also been persuaded to support the campaign.^ The
latter, while in Britain, had gauged the depth of Muslim feeling
over the Turkish question. He quickly perceived that here was an
opportunity to foster his friendship with the Muslim leaders. He
already knew the Ali brothers and after their internment had
25maintained the 'hot-line' with Chhindwara. Through Dr. Ansari
the circle of his Muslim friends widened and eventually included 
26
Abdul Bari, the man he wanted most to befriend. However, it was
not until April 1918, that Gandhi expressed his sympathy publicly
when, at the Delhi Imperial Ysfar Conference, ho forcefully presented
27the Muslim point of view with regard to Turkey. He followed it
up by an appeal to the Viceroy, requesting him to issue 'definite
assurances about Mahomedan States', 'As a Hindu1, he reasoned, 'I
cannot be indifferent to their cause. Their sorrows must be our 
28sorrows’. By associating himself with the Muslim cause, Gandhi 
had earned the gratitude of the Muslim leaders. Their friendship 
blossomed into an unwritten pact to help each other for the 
promotion of Hindu-Muslim unity, an amicable solution of the
29constitutional problems and, most important, the Turkish issue. x
23
See Mr. Shaukat Ali and Mr. Mohamed Ali, Muslim Internees Series 
Ho. 1, Delhi, 19185 Mohamed Ali, Freedom of Faith and Its Price, 
London,'1920$ J&P, 2433/20 with 145l720§ Shubhoaaya (Dharwary,Jan. 
4, 1918, BN1TR 19l8§ Hew Times, Dec. 29, 1917? ibid. 3 Sind Moslem, 
April 6, 1918, ibid.g Bombay Chronicle, Oct. 24? Bov. 21, Dec. 19 
and 20, 19185 and Punjab9 Jan. 5? 1918, PMR 1918.
24
Gandhi's participation was the result of his meeting with 'Bi 
Amman' at Calcutta in Dec. 1917- See Bombay Chronicle» Jan. 1,
1918. For Gandhi's efforts in this regard see Gandhi to Maffey,
Jan. 1, 21 and April 27, 1918, and Gandhi to Shoaib Qureshi, Feb.
27, 1918, The Collected Yforks of Mahatma Gandhi /hereafter referred 
to as CW/, XIV, Delhi, 1958-*, pp. 141-42, 161-62, 373-74 and 220.
25
O.S. Ghate and Shoaib Qureshi wero the intermediaries. See Gandhi 
to Ghate, Aug. 6, 19183 Gandhi to Shoaib, Sept. 24? 1918, CW, XV, 
pp. 4-5 and 51-52• He also wrote directly to Mohamed Ali. See 
Gandhi to Mohamed Ali, Hov. 18, 1918, ibid., pp. 63-64.
26
Bombay Chronicle, Jan. 1, 1918.
27
It immediately earned him the gratitude of Abdul Bari. See 
Abdul Bari to Gandhi, /April 1918/, Huqush9 CIX, pp. 14-15-
28
Gandhi to Chelmsford, April 29, 1918? CW? XIV, p. 377•
29
See below, pp. 58—60#
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But for the time being nothing tangible emerged and the Muslims were
30left to themselves to develop their agitation.
The Ali brothers had been egging Abdul Bari to action. When, in
December 1918, they were granted peimission on parole for three weeks
31to visit their sick relatives in Rampur, they visited Abdul Bari
32at Lucknow and discussed with him the Turkish question. Shaukat
Ali, with a view to launch a systematic agitation, pressed Abdul Bari
33to recall KLdwai to India. KLdwai, the brain behind the agitation
in its embryonic stage, had kept Abdul Bari well informed about the
political developments in Kurope and used to supply him elaborate
briefings.^ When the War ended, he was himself anxious to return to 
35India but the Government of India, sensing-the implication, had
36refused him permission. However, his absence from India was more
than compensated by the resourcefulness of Dr. Ansari and Ajmal Khan 
who sought to work up a demonstration of popular sympathy for the
Khilafat cause before the Peace Conference had begun its
37deliberations at Paris. The forthcoming session of the All-India
Muslim League at Delhi in December 1918, afforded an excellent 
opportunity. Special invitations were sent out to a number of ulama 
and other Indian leaders, including many Hindus, to take part in the 
deliberations.^
30
Dr. J.M. Brown, in her book Gandhi's Rise to Power (Cambridge, 
1972, Chapter VI), argues that it was Gandhi who spurred the Muslims 
to action and organised the Khilafat movement when their own leaders 
were lukewarm about it. On the contrary there is plenty of evidence 
to show that it was the Muslim leaders who initiated and developed 
the agitation without any inspiration from outside. Indeed they 
themselves pulled Gandhi into the Khilafat movement.
31
ICHPP, Poll.-Jan. 1919 - 189-203 - Part B.
32
■ Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari, Jan. 26, 1919? Ali Bradran, pp. 502-3.
33
Ibid.
34
See, e.g., Kidwai to Abdul Bari, Sept. 2, 1914? Nuqush, CIX, 
pp. 83-84.
35
• ICHPP, Poll.-Jan. 1919 - 20-23 - Part B.
36
Ibid., Poll.-May 1919 - 312-15 - Part Bj and Poll.-Feb. 1920 - 
260 - Part B.
37
Ansari to Abdul Bari, n.d., Huq.ush, CIX, p. 102-3.
36
Ibid. Also see J&P, 1424/19.
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Thus, the first public expression of the anxiety over the fate of 
Turkey after the War was given at the Muslim League session. The 
meetings held on December 30 and 31, 1918, under the chairmanship of 
Fazlul Haq of Bengal, were attended by many prominent Hindu and Muslim 
loaders, including a large number of the ulama representing various 
seminaries and schools of thought in the country. Besides Abdul Bari 
and his Farangi Mahal group, thero were Mufti Kifayatullah (1875-1952), 
Ahmad Saoed and Abdul Latif on behalf of the Anjuman-i-Ulama of Delhi, 
Sanaullah (1869-1948) representing the ulama of the Ahl-i-Hadis 
school, and Abdul Kadir Azad Subhani (1882-1957) attending on behalf 
of the ulama of Cawnpore. The ulama of Deoband, who had become 
cautious since the discovery of the Silk Letter Conspiracy and the 
internment of Mahmud Hassan, did not attend. They also found it hard 
to revise their views on the Khilafat question or to disown the loyal 
war-time stance. But in order not to look entirely aloof, Hafiz 
Ahmad, the Nazim, wrote cautiously supporting the League resolutions. 39
Dr* Ansari's address as the Chairman of the Reception Committee, 
written by Abdul Ghaffar (1894-1956) of the Jamhur in consultation 
with Abdul Bari,^ v^ as a strongly-nvorded exposition of the Muslim 
case. He emphasised that every government, howsoever strong, had 
responsibility towards its subjects which it could not ignore. The 
time had come when the ministers of the Crown must do thoir duty by 
the Muslims of Indias the war-time pledges must be honoured and the 
temporal power of Islam saved from further dismemberment. All non- 
Muslim control must be removed from the Jazirat-ul-Arab (Arabia, 
Palestine and Mesopotamia) and the territories restored to Sultan- 
Caliph Vahid-ed-Din Mohammed VI (1861-1926) of Turkey. Ansari 
maintained that no other porson could claim the Caliph’s 'rightful* 
authority and that Sharif Hussain of Mecca, who had rebelled against 
him, was 'actuated by his personal ambitions and selfish interests', 
and thus, deserved to be killed. Ansari went on to criticise not only 
the British Government for its anti-Turk policy but also lashed at the 
British Indian authorities for their alleged ill-treatment of the 
Indian Muslims, recounting a long list of grievances against the 
Government, including the internments, gagging of the press, and slow 
pace of constitutional reforms
39 ICHPP9 March 1919? Pro. No. 251. Also see J&P, 1424/19.
40
Bombay Chronicle, Dec. 31, 1918, and J&P, 1424/19*
41
Ibid.
The aggressive spirit of Hr* Ansari*s address* which was later
proscribed "by the Government* was reflected in the speeches which
followed* Fazlul Hag in his presidential address dwelt on the alleged
42evil effects of the British rule in India? Abdul Bari was so worked 
up that he objected to the display of Union Jack flags in the hall and 
Azad Subhani Justified the proclamation of Jihadl  ^ The excited tenor 
of the proceedings unnerved the more cautious League leaders - not 
because they were unconcerned about the fate of Turkey but because 
they disputed the use of the League platform for vontilating Muslim 
grievances in such language as was used by Dr. Ansari and others. In 
the Subjects Committee meeting at Ajmal Khan's house, Jinnah,
Nabiullah and Saiyid Wazir Hasan (1874-194?) unsuccessfully tried to 
impress upon the delegates that nothing which might compromise their 
national position should be done at that particular Juncture. But 
Ansari* Ajmal Khan and others by playing upon the religious feelings 
of the Muslims carried the majority with thom.^
A medley of resolutions was passed though their tone was 
temperate. One of these pointed out the 'great resentment and ill-
i
feeling among the Musalmans* that would result from any departure from 
the declared British policy of non-interference in the Khilafat 
question* Another resolution protested against the occupation of 
Jerusalem* Hajaf and other Muslim sanctuaries by the British forces 
and urged their immediate evacuation. Yet another, requested the 
British representatives at the Peace Conference to use their influence 
in maintaining the territorial and political sovereignty of the 
Caliph and his full suzerainty over the Jazirat-ul-Arab and other
45Holy Places in accordance with 'the requirements of the Islamic law *
The Muslim League session is of great political significance. It 
marked the beginning of that campaign for the lenient treatment for 
Turkey which had been simmering all through the War. It also 
registered the emergence of young pan-Islamists as the new leaders of 
Muslim India, who, in concert with the Congress, wore out to change 
the whole perspective of Indian Muslim politics. It was not
42
Fazlul Haq, All-India Moslem League 1918 Session* Presidential 
Address, above, n* 12.
43J&P, 1424/19-
44 
Ibid.
45
Ibid. Also see Fazlul Haq to Lloyd George, Tel. Jan. 2, 1918? PSSF, 
P. 360/19 with 380/19, III.
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insignificant that the League resolved to confer with the Congress on
the question of the Reforms^ and the Congress allowed its platform
to he used by Ajmal Khan to attack the Government’s policy towards the 
47Khilafat. Another significance of the Delhi session was the
presence of a group of leading ulama who were willing to put the seal
of religion on the Khilafat demands. It was the beginning of an open
estrangement from the Government and for the first time the session of
Afithe League closed without the usual cheers for tho King Hhperor.
The moderates like the Raja of Mahmudabad and Wazir Hasan? jolted by
this sudden change in Muslim politics,, found it impossible to remain
in the League any longer and in March 1919? "the instance of Sir
Harcourt Butler (1869-1938)? the Lt.-Governor of the U.P.? both of
49them resigned from the League.
Despite the divisions in the Muslim camp? the trend of Muslim
opinion with regard to the Khilafat question was giving anxious moments
to the Government of India. On January 31? 1919? Chelmsford frankly
warned Montagu that failure to voice Indian views would exacerbate
50feelings already sore. Three weeks later he reported again*
There is no doubt that Moslems generally are much 
exercised and anxious as to the future of Turkey 
and a small irreconcilable section is steadily 
endeavouring to work up fanatical feelings. The 
religious aspect of this movement makes it 
difficult to cope with. It cannot however be 
ignored that it contains^the seed of possible 
d ange rou s d evelopme nt s.
With the concurrence of the India Office? the Government of India 
tried to reassure tho Muslim community that the British Government 
still adhered to its pronouncements and pledges and that due
52consideration would be given to their views at the Peace Conference.
But this had no effect? the discontent sproad rapidly.
4 6
J&P? 1424/19.
47
Report of the Thirty-Third Session of the Indian Rational Congress 
held at Delhi on the 26th? 28th? 29th? 30th, 31st December? 1918? 
Delhi? 1919? pp. 12-14.
48
J&P? 1424/19.
49
See Butler to Earl Richards? March 5? 1919? BP.
5°
V to S/S? Tel. P.? No. 123? Jan. 31? 1919? ££•
51 V to S/S? Tel. P.? No. I85? Feb. 18? 1919? CP.
52
ICHPP? March 1919? Pro. No. 254«
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Sine© the Peace Conference had already started its deliberations
at Paris in January 1919? Abdul Bari decided to strengthen the
Khilafat demands by a foitnal sanction of the ulama. Early in the
year? he circulated a fatwa to the effect that all Muslims were bound
to assist in re-establishing the authority of the Khilafat. Sixty-
six ulama affixed their signatures to the fatwa but some politically
cautious ulama? particularly those from Allahabad? Cawnpore? Delhi and
54Bareilly? refused to do so. But in spite of this set-back the pan-
Islamists did not relax their efforts. They were thus able to produce
a spurt of activity among the educated Muslims. Soon telegrams and
memorials from various individuals and associations all over the
country, entreating that Turkey be spared the humiliation of
dismemberment? started to pour into the Viceregal Lodge in Delhi and
55Whitehall in London.
In spite of the hectic activity? the movement still lacked a
coherent all-India character. The agitation was mostly centred in the
larger towns of the U.P., Bengal? the Punjab? Bombay and Sind where
the work was organised by local leaders through the existing network
of the Muslim League organisations. A chance to widen the scope of
the movement was? however? presented in March 1919? when Gandhi
turned to Abdul Bari for support in his Satyagraha or 'passive
56resistance' campaign against the unpopular 'Rowlatt' Bills.
Originally? Abdul Bari had strong objections to uniting with Hindus as
57he considered this to be hairaful for the Muslim oommunity. But with
53 V to S/S? Tel. P.? No. 293? March 21? 1919? CP. Also see P.O. 
Bamford? The Histories of tho Non-Co-operation and Khilafat Movements? 
Delhi? 1925? P. 137.
54
Interview with Malik Lai Khan? ex-Secy. of the Punjab Khilafat 
Committee? at Lahore in Sept. 1966. Also see S.A.A. Soleman? Anti 
Khalif Intrigues in Sind? Sukkur? 1919? Part I? p. 3? H.F. Owen? 
'Organizing for the Rowlatt Satyagraha of 1919’? in R* Kumar? ed.? 
Essays on Gandhian Politics? Oxford? 1971? P* 64? and P.C.R. Robinson? 
'The Politics of U.P. Muslims? 1906-1922'? Cambridge University Ph.D. 
thesis? 1970? pp. 342-44*
55 ' ,
PSSF? 380/19? I? II and III.
56
The Bills aimed at reloading the Government with arbitrary powers 
in place of the Defence of India Act when it ceased to be operative 
six months after the conclusion of peace. See Vemey Lovett? A History 
of the Indian Nationalist Movement? London? 1920? p. 171. Gandhi 
himself called his agitation 'civil resistance' and not 'passive 
resistance'. See his letter to Abdul Aziz? Aug. 8? 1919? CW? XVI? p. 13.
57
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his changed outlook on a Hindu-Muslim rapprochment. he at once seized
the opportunity and after an interview with Gandhi at Lucknow he
58declared his support for the Satyagraha campaign. In return Abdul 
Bari obtained a promise of Hindu support for the Khilafat cause.
It was agreed /reported a Government informer/ that 
when the agitation was at its height there would be 
a large meeting of Ulemas /sic/? Maulvis and 
Mahommadans generally? at which Abdul Bari should 
be elected Shaikh-ul-Islam and the Muslim demands 
regarding the Khilafat? the holy places? etc.? 
should be formulated. The Hindus would support 
these demands which should be submitted to His 
Excellency the Viceroy with the warning that non- 
acceptance of them would mean jehad. In return 
for the assistance of the Hindus? Abdul Bari? in 
his capacity as Shaikh-ul-Islam? was to issue a 
fatwa declaring that the animal originally 
sacrificed by Ibrahim was a sheep and not a cow?eg 
and that cow-sacrifioo was prohibited in future. ^
Evidently? Gandhi and Abdul Bari were both utilising each other
and the issues they stood for to their own advantage. Gandhi
exploited the Khilafat issue to gain Muslim support and through them
the leadership of a united India. Otherwise? he himself admitted that
he 'cared nothing for Turkey as such? but the Indian Mahommadans did
... and /he/ felt justified in championing it'.^ The high sounding
61moral reasons which he gave for his joining the Khilafat movement
were merely for public consumption. Moreover? by his help to the
Khilafat movement Gandhi wanted ’to enlist the Musalman's sympathy in
62the matter of cow protection*» Indeed he made the attainment of
swara.j and even the survival of Hinduism conditional on the protoction 
£ ^
of cow. Whether it was this aspect or whether it was to bind tho
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Hindu support for the Muslims that Gandhi treated tho Khilafat as a
1 Kamadh.uk1 , the mythical cow that gave whatever one asked of her.
For Abdul Bari? Gandhi’s support meant the strengthening of the
Khilafat movement and perhaps personal fame as the ’Shaikh-ul-Islam*
of the sub-continent. For this he was prepared to modify his earlier
fit r
stance and preach cow protection.
Consequently? Muslim support was built up by rumours that the
’Rowlatt1 Bills were ’intended to enable /the/ Government to coerce
the Mohammedans and prevent them from giving trouble so as to
66facilitate the dismembeiment of Turkey’. Steps were also taken?
mainly at Kidwai’s prompting?^ to organise an agency to concentrate
solely on the Khilafat issue* Wealthy Bombay Muslim businessmen of
Farangi Mahal connection responded first and towards the middle of
March 1919? the Bombay Khilafat Committee was established under Seth
68Mian Muhammad Hajoe Jan Muhammad Chotani. Tho Committee proved the 
embryo of the much powerful Khilafat organisation of the future but 
for the present its orbit was confined to the Bombay Presidency.
Thus? the Khilafat movement and Gandhi’s ’Rowlatt’ Satyagraha 
turned into a forceful agitation - more forceful because it was
69marked by an extraordinary fraternisation of Hindus and Muslims.
64
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But the Khilafat movement was the very antithesis of Satyagrahag the
Muslims were unwilling to adopt non-violence and instigated the Hindus 
70to do the same. The agitation quickly became violent. Early in
April 1920? about half a dozen Europeans and some Indian police were
coldly murdered and considerable damage was done to railway and
71telegraph lines besides other Government property. The outbreaks
were ruthlessly suppressed. Hundreds perished in police and military
firings. Tho most serious tragedy was the massacre on April 13 at
Amritsar when a prohibited but peaceful public meeting was broken up by
shooting without warning by the orders of Brigadier-General Dyer (1863-
1927) killing? according to the official count? approximately 379 and 
72wounding 1200. It1 was followed by Martial Law? punitive measures and
73 74humiliating orders? incorporating a racial element.
The pang over the severity of measures did not come immediately 
but twinged much later when the Congress and tho Hunter Commission 
reports revealed the real extent of Government repression. For the 
present? through a policy of effective repression? tho Punjab had boon
70
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75cowed and the rest of India forced into quiescence. . But
though the Rowlatt agitation was a political failure, the
eruption had convinced the Viceroy that the source of the
trouble was the Muslim discontent, which had been aggravated
by the ’unusual fraternization between Hindus and Mahomedans,
76undoubtedly fostered by Mahomedans1. It is striking that 
at places where Muslims were not much disturbed, as in 
Madras, things remained quiet, and apart from Ahmedabad 
and other places where Gandhi’s influence remained supreme, 
the chief centres of the trouble were those areas where 
Muslim feelings ran high. Of course factors common to
77Muslims and Hindus such as the Distrust of the Reforms,
78 79 80racial tension, economic distress, famine and disease,
8l 82industrial strife, restlessness of the disbanded soldiery
and the repressive policy of the satraps like Sir Michael
75
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1919 - 476 - Part B.
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The racial tension was due not only to the arrogance 
of the Europeans towards Indians generally but also to 
the humiliating treatment meted out to the Indian settlers 
in various parts of the Empire, especially in South and 
East Africa.
79
Soaring high prices of food stuffs and commodities of 
all kinds and of the cotton cloth so largely worn by 
the poor classes, were the reasons of the hardship. The 
situation was made worse by the failure of the monsoon 
of 1918. See PP, 1920, Cmd. 68l, p. 62.
80
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85
O ’Dwyer (1864-1940) of the Punjab had all inflamed the
situation, but the Khilafat issue was at the bottom of the
eruption. This is fully supported by contemporary evidence.
For instance, in the Frontier Muslim politics played a
more important part than the 'Rowlatt* Bills in the 
84demonstrations. Reports from the Punjab indicated that
city mobs were generally composed of Muslims under the
85direction of pan-Islamic and Hindu agitators. Sir
Harcourt Butler was of the opinion that 'It is chiefly 
—  —  86the M/uslim/’s*. In Bengal too it was mostly Muslims
and Marwaris who were prominent with almost a total
87exclusion of Bengali element. Montagu's assessment based
on the provincial reports was also the same: ’Moslem feeling
88is the real cause of the trouble*. Gandhi was himself
positive about this and considered the Khilafat question
89to be the chief factor of unrest. In a letter to Maffey, 
the Private Secretary to the Viceroy, on April 14, 1919, 
he wrote:
The ferment among the Mahomedans is too 
great to be checked for ever. It may 
burst like a torrent at any moment and 
behind the present disturbances are to 
be traced the results of extreme Moslem 
dissatisfaction. It is not confined to 
classes, but^it most decidedly permeates 
the masses.
83
The Punjab was treated quite differently from other 
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A fair idea of the hardened feelings of the Muslims
can be drawn from the letter which the Ali brothers wrote
to the Viceroy from Chhindwara towards the end of April 1919.
The letter recounted at length the wrongs alleged to have
been perpetrated on the Muslims by the British Government,
making wildest demands for the restoration of Egypt and
all other occupied territories of the former Ottoman
Empire to the Caliph. The letter declared that the
Government had no claim on the allegiance of Muslims who
must, if their legitimate demands were not satisfied
within a reasonable time, declare jihad or else perform 
. . 91the hijrat. The demands, as Gandhi put it, were 
'extravagant' and the language in which they were presented 
'inflammatory', but even his cautious counsel, that they 
should be redrafted in 'a reasoned and logical statement'? 2 
was not accepted,, Status quo ante bellum was for the 
Muslim leaders their irreducible- minimum and they 
presented it as a purely religious requirement.
The Viceroy had already in a secret letter to the 
heads of the Local Governments warned that the peace 
terms were likely to be harsh and that they ought to be 
prepared for any Muslim ebullition?^ On May 3, 1919, 
the warning was repeated and the Local Governments were 
instructed 'to do whatever is possible beforehand to 
alleviate the shock and to discount its effects'?^
The information received from the Local Governments 
confirmed that fhe question of the Khilafat was one on 
which the Muslims were generally very greatly exercised
91
Memorial dated April 24, 1919, J&P, 391 5 /1 9 19 with 
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and harsh terms were likely to stir up trouble. But if
the shadow at least of the Turkish Empire was retained
with Constantinople and Anatolia forming part of it and
the Caliph exercising nominal suzerainty over Arabia, in
order to 'save the face of Islam', the Indian Muslims
95would ultimately acquiesce. Even a staunch British
ally like the Nizam of Hyderabad had some time ago warned
the Viceroy that the British Government 'should treat
this subject with the greatest gravity and delicacy it 
96deserves'„
Thus, the fear of serious repercussions drove the
Government to take precautionary measures and to adopt an
attitude of understanding and conciliation towards the
97Muslims m  regard to the Khilafat issue. The Viceroy
repeatedly impressed upon the British Government the
importance of taking some steps to sooth the Indian Muslims,
98'whose attitude was becoming daily more significant'.
Montagu, who was also convinced of the necessity of
conciliating the Muslims, tried to represent their case
sympathetically. But he found Lloyd George violently
pro-Greek and anti-Turk and Balfour ( 184j8~1930) another
redoubtable opponent. Milner (1854-1925) was his only
99supporter in the Cabinet. Nevertheless, the Indian
95
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delegation to the Peace Conference, consisting of
Montagu, Sinha and the Maharaja of Bikaner (l88o-
19^3), attempted to acquaint the Allied statesmen with
the Indian Muslim view on the future of Turkey'}^ On
101May 17, 1919, through the efforts of the Aga Khan,
they were able to present their case before the Council 
102of Four at Paris. The Aga Khan himself and two other
prominent Indian Muslims, Sahibzada Aftab Ahmad Khan
(1867-1930) and Yusuf Ali (1872-1953), accompanied the
delegation. In the interview, the deputationists passionately
pleaded for leniency to Turkey, laying particular stress;
on the Allied pledges, especially Point Twelve of the
American President Wilson's (1856-192 4) Fourteen Points
which called for a 'secure sovereignty' of the Turkish
103portions of the Ottoman Empire. But, in the context
of the policies to which the Allied Powers had already
agreed in principle, the delegation's interview was merely an
eyewash. Lloyd George pretended that he at least had
10 4been converted to their cause but in fact the delegation 
was never treated seriously^^
The intractable attitude of the British Government 
and their allies dismayed the Indian Muslims... Though 
prominent Indian Muslims in Britain, such as Kidwai, M„H. 
Ispahan!, Ameer Ali, Yusuf Ali, Shaikh Abdul Majid,
Nawab W.H.M. Jung and Khwaja Kamal-ud-din (1870-1 92 3),
100
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kept up the pressure through the London Muslim League,
the Islamic Society, the Woking Islamic Centre and
whatever support they could get from the British
Turkophiles'J'^ much depended on the course of the movement
in India. The chance to step up the agitation came about
the middle of May 1919? when the Afghans launched a sudden
107attack on British India. The pan-Islamists lost no time
log
in coquetting with the Ameer’s agents. Since the
Afghan machinations had left the provinces nearer the
Afghan border more excitable it made the dissemination of
the Khilafat propaganda much easier. Abdul Bari circulated
an ‘inflammatory’ leaflet and a lengthy jihad pamphlet
appeared in the U.P. which, on the basis of numerous
quotations from the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet,
109emphasised the necessity of a religious war.
Similarly in the Punjab the prophecy of Shah Neamatullah,
originally made several hundred years before, and in
Bengal a prophecy based on a well-known collection of the
Ahadis, predicting the downfall of Christianity, the
ultimate triumph of Islamic power and the reappearance of
110the Mahdi or Messiah, were gaining wide currency.
A further fillip to the movement came from the 
British and the French decision to authorise the Greek 
troops to occupy Smyrna, deep in the heart of Turkish
106
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Anatolia, on the assertion that the Greeks constituted
111a majority in population. When on May 15* 1919) the
Greeks carried out the landings in Smyrna with inexplicable
112brutality, it aroused immediate indignation in India*
Protest meetings were held all over the country and
resolutions were telegraphed to the India Office and
Downing Street entreating leniency towards Turkey. The
telegrams also contained threats of serious repercussions 
* 113if their demands were not accepted* The intensity of 
excitement was such that Sir George Roos-Keppel (1866-1921), 
the Chief Commissioner of the Frontier, reported:
The people of the Punjab and N.W.F.P. are 
frankly hostile to us ... I have got the Peshawar 
people down just in time or ^g^should have had 
an organised rising here ...
Terrified, the Local Governments mobilised their
resources to counter the agitation. Sir Harcourt Butler,
for instance, tried to influence Abdul Bari through a
number of people on whom the latter relied for financial 
115support. He also manipulated from the Nawab of Rampur
an advice to the Indian Muslims to remain loyal to the 
H  6British. Similar attempts to contain the agitation
were made by other local authorities. In Sind Khan 
Bahadur Nabi Bakhsh, an Assistant Commissioner, launched 
an anti-Khilafat campaign with the help of certain obscure
111
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117maulavis. But such counter activities in effect gained"T T'T    UL 8
little and instead raised a storm of protest.
In June 1919, one more attempt was made to move the
British Government. A memorial was prepared by Ameer Ali
for the Prime Minister. But unfortunately a difference of
opinion developed between the Shia and the Sunni signatories
on the contents of the memorial. Ameer Ali's Shiite
emphasis on the 'spiritual* rather than the temporal side
of the caliphal question was disapproved by the Sunnis,
notably Kidwai and Yusuf Ali. They believed that its
119emphasis in the memorial had weakened their case.
Nevertheless, the memorial was signed by prominent Indian
Muslims in Britain and their British supporters and was
120sent to the Prime Minister. The All-India Muslim League
121also gave its full support to the memorial. In addition
122to it, at the request of Chotani, the League delegation
headed by Jinnah and consisting of Yakub Hasan (l875-19*K)) ,
G.M. Bhurgri (1878-192*0 and Hasan Imam (1871-1933),
which had arrived in London in May 1919 to give evidence
before the Reforms Committee, laid before Lloyd George a
123memorial setting out the Muslim case. Jinnah also 
approached the Prime Minister for a private interview in
12*+order to present the Indian Muslim point of view properly 
but does not seem to have had one.
117
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But in spite of the efforts in London and the
agitation in India no tangible results were produced.
Some newspaper reports suggested that the fate of Turkey
was almost sealed. Abdul Bari became worried and
wished that the Ali brothers were free to lead the 
125agitation. He solicited Gandhi's support m  obtaining
their release and in sounding the Viceroy on the feelings 
126of the Muslims. But Gandhi, though he agreed that the
time for joint and firm action had arrived, offered no
solace and insisted that non-violent Satyagraha was the
only remedy for 'the future of Islam, the future of India
127and parenthetically, the future of the Ali brothers'.
Such a solution did not commend itself either to Abdul 
Bari or to other Muslim leaders who, therefore, decided 
to hold an all-India Muslim conference in order to give 
a more united expression to their feelings than they had 
done hitherto^^
The All-India Muslim Conference was eventually held 
at Lucknow on September 21, 1919, despite the attempts 
of the disgruntled moderate faction of the Raja of 
Mahmudabad to disrupt it. Nearly all the important Muslim 
leaders of different shades of political opinion in the 
country came to attend - about *1-00 coming from outside the 
U.P. and about 600 from out-stations in the province. At 
its two sessions, the Conference was presided over by 
Abdul Bari and Sir Ebrahim Haroon Jaffer (1881-1930), the
125
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129the latter a Member of the Imperial Council. Two
significant decisions were taken by the Conference;
first, the establishment of a central co-ordinating body
and, secondly, the fixing of October 17, 1919, as the
'Khilafat Day' - a day of prayer and protest for the
130safety and integrity of the Khilafat.
The need for a central body had arisen because the 
agitation, which had hitherto been conducted on provincial 
and district levels, had lacked proper organisation, co­
ordination and direction. Mo doubt on Kidwai's suggestion, 
'Khilafat Committees' had already sprung up at some places, 
but there was no central supervisory body which could 
effectively guide and direct the entire movement. The 
Muslim League, which had so far conducted the agitation, 
was reluctant to shoulder the responsibility because of 
the increasingly aggressive nature of the agitation. 
Therefore, it was thought necessary to bring into temporary
existance an organisation which could concentrate all its
131efforts solely on the Khilafat question.
Thus, the Lucknow Conference passed a resolution
which recognised the Khilafat Committee of Bombay as a
central body and recommended the formation of branches
132all over the country. Consequently, at a meeting held
on November 11, 1919, the Bombay Khilafat Committee
changed its title to 'The Central Khilafat Committee of 
133India, Bombay' (hereafter referred to as the CKC).
129
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A draft constitution was subsequently framed and in
accordance with the resolution of the Second Khilafat
13kConference held at Amritsar in December 1919 , was 
circulated among the various district and provincial 
Khilafat committees for their opinion,, This constitution 
was approved with various amendments at the Third 
Khilafat Conference held at Bombay in February 1920. New 
provincial Khilafat committees were established and, 
those already in existence, were affiliated to it.
According to the constitution, the objects of the 
CKC were:
To secure for Turkey a just and honourable 
peace; to obtain the settlement of the 
Khilafat question; also of the holy places 
of Islam and the Jazirat-*ul~Arab in strict 
accordance with the requirements of the 
Shariat; to secure the fulfilment of the 
pledges of Rt. Hon. Mr. Lloyd George, given 
on 5th January, 1919» and of Lord Hardinge, 
regarding the preservation of the integrity 
of the Turkish Empire; for the above 
purpose to approach the British Ministers, 
the Viceroy of India and the British 
public; to carry on propaganda work in and 
out of India; to take such further steps as 
may be deemed necessary.
The CKC with its headquarters at Bombay consisted 
of 200 members - later increased to 250 in 1923° Bombay 
was given 5*+ seats, Sind 20, Madras 15 and the remaining 
seats went to other provinces. The office-bearers of the 
Committee consisted of one President, two Vice-Presidents, 
four (later increased to six) Secretaries and a Tres&surer. 
For the ensuing year Chotani was elected President, Sir
13^
Indian Annual Register, 1920, ed., H.W. Mitra, 
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135
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Fazulbhoy Currimbhoy and Suleman Wahib Vice-Presidents, and 
Mirza Ali Mohammed Khan, Badruddin Abdulla Koor, Ahmad 
Hajee Siddick Khatri and Shaukat Ali (after his release) 
as Secretaries^^
The provincial Khilafat committees, about which no
comprehensive information is available, were required to
work in affiliation with the CKC and where no such
committees existed the central body was to do the work.
The central and the provincial committees were to collect
funds. The CKC was required to maintain proper accounts,
to have them examined by a Chartered Accountant, and on
the 15th of each month to publish a statement of its
accounts™ The CKC was also entrusted with the arrangements
of holding Khilafat conferences and was empowered to
frame bye-laws, affiliate and disaffiliate provincial
137committees and fill up vacancies™
Subsequently, the Jamiyat-i-Khilafat-i-Hind, as the
Khilafat set-up was known, grew into a vast organisation,
overshadowing its parent body, the Muslim League, as well
as the Congress. With a hundred odd local committees and
a vast membership, the Jamiyat-i-Khilafat was the most
powerful Muslim body until the re-vitalisation of the Muslim
League in the late 1920's. The enlarged CKC itself became
the Jamiyat's high-powered committee, charged with the
realisation of its fundamental objectives, one of which
138was the attainment of swara.j for India. At one time the 
CKC controlled five departments - General Department, 
Accounts Department, Books and Pamphlets Department,
136
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Receipts and Clothes Department and Propaganda Department.
In all there were fifteen men working in these Departments,
besides a private secretary to the Honorary Secretaries
and another private secretary to 'Bi-Amman1, the mother
of the Ali brothers. The propaganda work was at first
entrusted to the provincial organisations, but because
of the lack of co-ordination it was later taken over by
the Propaganda Department of the CKC, with Abdul Bari as
its head. A weekly bulletin, edited by Marmaduke Pickthall
139(1875-1936)#. was also published by this Department.
Once the organisational side had been taken care of,
efforts were made to draw in the Hindus still closer. The
experience of the previous April had exhibited to the )
Khilafatists the unbounded advantages of a Hindu-Muslim
rapprochement. But for the majority of the Hindus the
religious and even the political aspects of the Khilafat
movement had little appeal. Among their leaders, Pandit
Madan Mohan Malaviya (l86l-19A6) was perhaps the chief
sceptic. In December 1918, as the President of the
Congress, he had ruled out the plea of C.R. Das (1870-1925)
1 AOto lend support to the Khilafat issue.' Sankaran Nair 
(1857-193^) was openly critical of the Khilafatists' motives!^"
1 Up
B.G. Tilak (1856-1920) was another sceptic though in May
1919, he had attended a Muslim meeting on the Khilafat 
IA3issue in London. Two other prominent Maharashtrians,
Vallabhbhai Patel (1875-1950) and Indulal K. Yajnik, 
exchanged 'many unholy jokes and laughs over the sacred 
cause of the Khilafat' B.C. Pal (1858-1932), who had
139
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1^ +5always dreaded ’the virus of pan-Islamism', was also 
hesitant to lend his support., Motilal Nehru (l86l~193l)i 
coming from a province well-known for its pan-Islamic 
traditions, considered that there were ’many things nearer 
home than the question of the Khilafat which we have to 
attend to’^ ^  V.S. Srinivasa Sastri (1869-19^6) advised 
even Gandhi to stay clear of the Khilafat movement for
lif.8’we have no right to embarrass the Government of India’„
There were others who gave only verbal support and yet
others attached conditions of cow protection before they
l*f9joined the Muslims.
Abdul Bari was prepared to do anything within the
limits of the shariat to placate the Hindus. Already, as
a friendly jesture he had abandoned cow killing at Farangi
Mahal and advised his co-religionists to do the same,
150irrespective of Hindu co-operation. Apparently Gandhi,
who had by this time been definitely pulled into the
Khilafat movement by Abdul Bari, was also disinclined to
lay down conditions as precedent to Hindu co-operation.
He impressed upon his co-religionists that ’unconditional
151co-operation means the protection of cow’. His writings
and speeches were consequently profuse with appeals for
152Hindu support to the Khilafat movement. So when the 
Khilafat Day approached, Gandhi pleaded with prominent 
Hindu and other non-Muslim leaders, as well as the Hindu 
masses, to join the Muslims in their demonstrations so
lk3
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153as to ’put a sacred seal on the Hindu Mahomedan bond'.
But in spite of Gandhi’s efforts and his earlier
claims that twenty-one crores of Hindus were ready to help
Muslims dictate to the Government whatever terms they 
15^
wished, the Khilafat Day (October 17* 1919) inaugurated
no big Hindu-Muslim entente. Only at Dacca, Bombay,
Lucknow, Hyderabad (Sind), Sukkur and a few other places
did the Hindus join the Muslims in demonstrations and
observe hartals. The Muslims were themselves divided and
the observance of the Khilafat Day was mostly confined to 
155larger towns. This lack of enthusiasm on the part of 
the Muslims was perhaps because of the fact that their 
leaders who commanded a hold over the community were 
still interned. However, the significance of the Khilafat 
Day lies in the fact that if the Lucknow Conference had 
imparted an all-India character to the agitation, October 17 
gave it the semblance of an organised movement.
Despite the agitation there was no certainty about
156the final outcome of the peace settlement. On the 
contrary Lloyd George's crusading spirit evidenced by 
his speeches in and outside the Parliament and news from
153
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other sources foreshadowed the adverse nature of the peace 
157treaty. In Britain Kidwai and his associates, with the
financial backing of Seth Abdoola Iiaroon (1872--19A2) of Karachi
and the Ago. Khan, were trying to reach the British public
158through a journal of Muslim opinion. The CKC decided to
supplement these activities and to approach the British
Government directly. At a meeting at Bombay on November lA,
1919* the CKC resolved, probably on the advice of Jinnah
who had returned from Britain that very day, to despatch
an all-India Muslim deputation to Britain early the next 
159year. But the militants under Abdul Bari were not 
satisfied with the moderate approach of the Bombay men 
and favoured an open clash with the Government. As a 
token of their opposition they advocated a boycott of the 
forthcoming victory celebrations in December 1919. A 
move in this regard, which had the support of Gandhi, had 
already been afoot in Bombay, the Punjab and the U.P^^
But the CKC under Chotani, which was against any open 
clash with the Government, wished to adopt a middle course: 
agreeing to celebrate peace with Germany and Austria, but 
abstaining from the festivities should they be extended 
to include victory over Turkeyl^ The rift widened when 
the militants refused to accept this compromise. However, 
a complete deadlock was averted when the CKC agreed to 
accept the militants' contention on the condition that
157
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they postpone the operation of the proposed boycott until 
such time as a Khilafat Conference had. been convened to 
decide the issued2
When on November 23, 1919, the first session of the 
All-India Khilafat Conference opened at Delhi under 
Fazlul Haq's presidency, Abdul Bari’s group from the U„P0, 
alligned with the Punjabis and other militants, dominated 
the proceedings. Religious emotions ran high and anger 
towards the British Government wae manifest. Those who 
favoured joining the peace celebrations were denounced as 
kafirs. But the difference of opinion in the subjects 
committee was not pressed in the open session and the 
Conference unanimously decided in favour of the boycott 
as a religious duty. The provincial and other local 
Khilafat committees were asked to render all possible 
help to the Anti-Peace Celebrations Committee set up under 
Dr. Ansari's chairmanships^
The peace celebrations question settled, the Conference
went on to formulate a definite line of action: they were
to despatch a deputation to Britain and if necessary to
America, to lay the 'true sentiments of /the/ Musalmans
before the responsible British Ministers’. In the event
of the settlement with Turkey not being concluded to
their satisfaction, they were to launch a progressive
boycott of British goods. If this were to happen, they
were to initiate a gradual cessation of co-operation with
the Government. A committee consisting of Ajmal Khan,
Fazlul Haq, Abdul Majid Sharar, Raza Ali and four others
l6Awas appointed to chalk out a programme for this purpose.
162
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The Delhi KhdJLafat programme was, however, thejregult 
of a heated debate. Particular subject of controversy was 
the"~boy%%tt~of British goods, proposed by Hasrat Mohani 
as an extension of the anti-peace celebrations resolution.
Mohani was supported by Abdul Ghaffar, Mumtaz Hussein,
Maulana Fakhir (U.P.), Sanaullah and Daud Ghanavi (Punjab). 
Encouraged perhaps by the boycott of Italian goods during 
the Tripolitan War in 1911/12, they argued that the only 
way to force Britain to accept their demands was to injure 
her trade. Gandhi, Chotani, Syud Hossain, Raza Ali and 
Abdoola Haroon opposed it on the grounds of its impracticability* 
Gandhi laid special stress on his being an expert on 
boycotting. But Gandhi and his supporters were overruled.
Abdul Ghaffar in particular scouted Gandhi's expose and 
demanded a total boycott. The resolution was finally
165carried. It was a clear defeat for Gandhi and the moderates.
There was, however, one consolation for Gandhi. The
gradual withdrawal of co-operation ('non-co-operation')
which he had devised to circumvent Muslim inclination for
l66boycott and violence, was accepted without opposition.
At this time non-co-operation was so vague a concept that
perhaps Gandhi himself did not know what he meant by it.
Even Abdul Bari, who was later to doubt its efficacy and
dispute the non-violent aspect, accepted it without demur
when Syud Hossain interpreted ’non-co-operation1 as the
Islamic tark -i-mawalat (and not adm-i-taawun) in
contradistinction to ishtirak-i-amal which has 110
l6?religious overtones-. But however vague the scheme
165
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may have been, it was a momentous decision and a landmark 
in the history of the Khilafat movement and indeed of India.
In order to obtain the Hindu approval to the Conference 
decisions, a special joint meeting of Hindu and Muslim 
delegates was held the following day (November 24).
Overnight the moderates had recovered their lost ground 
by skilful manoeuvring. The militants also realised that 
if they persisted in following an aggressive course they 
would lose Gandhi's support and Hindu sympathy. Diplomatically, 
they offered the chair to Gandhi. As a further concession 
to him, Fazlul Haq's proposal, which had the support of 
Shraddhanand (1856-1 92 6), Hasrat Mohani, Shankarlal Banker 
(1889-) and others, to combine the Punjab ’wrong1 with 
the Khilafat issue in order to ensure Hindu co-operation, 
was rejected beforehand^ Similarly, the resolution 011 the 
boycott of British goods which he had opposed was not 
repeated. Instead a resolution was passed thanking 
Gandhi and Hindus for their sympathy. Once Gandhi had been 
placated, the resolution on the boycott of the peace 
celebrations was passed amidst great enthusiasm} 68
Another significant outcome of the Delhi gathering
was the formation of the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind, the
religio-political body of the ulama which played so
169important a role in the Khilafat movement. It was at
Abdul Bari's initiative that the,ulama, at a meeting held
immediately after the Conference, decided to close their
ranks and launched the Jamiyat with Kifayatullah as its
170president and Ahmad Saeed as the secretary. So far
the ulama's participation in the movement had been on an 
individual basis and mostly the result of Farangi Mahal
168
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influence. But now the ulama joined the movement 
collectively. With their enormous prestige and following 
amongst the Muslim masses, the ulama infused new life 
into the agitation. Despite the opposition from the 
Bareilly school and the Bahr-ul-Ulum faction of Farangi 
Mahal and the neutrality of Deoband, the Jamiyat, within 
a short time of its inception, became the nucleus of the 
Indian ulama and imparted a sense of direction to the 
Khilafat movement.
With the backing of the Jamiyat, the Khilafatists
were in a position to launch the boycott of victory 
171celebrations. Abdul Bari's fatwa declaring the
—  172 
participation in the celebrations as sinful and unlawful,
forced even the unwilling to coalesce. The Muslim League
173lent its support to the boycott and Jinnah resigned from 
the Committee of the Bombay Peace Celebrations to which 
he had been appointed without consultation}*^
7-v, When the peace celebrations were finally held on
December 13* 1919, and the following days, the Muslim
community in most of the larger towns of the Northern India 
175stayed away. Even though the Nizam of Hyderabad and
other Muslim rulers had participated in the celebrations,
176the boycott was extremely successful. It was the first 
trial of strength between the Khilafatists and the Government.
171
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The success with which the Khilafatists had used the 
issue unmistakably revealed that the peace terms when 
announced would not be passively accepted. This became 
even more evident when the leaders gathered at Amritsar 
towards the end of December 1919, to attend the Second 
Khilafat Conference and the annual sessions of the Muslim 
League and the Congress.
The Amritsar proceedings were extremely lively 
because, as a result of the Royal Proclamation of December 23, 
1919, accompanying the enactment of the Government of India
177Act 1919, most of the political detenues had been released.
The presence at Amritsar of the Ali brothers, Dr. Saif- 
ud-din Kitchlew (1884-1963) and other released leaders 
(Abul Kalam Azad was not released until January 1920) 
imparted vitality to the deliberations, ushering an era 
of militant mass politics. The leadership of the Khilafat 
movement passed from the moderate Bombay businessmen to 
reckless politicians and ulama. Chotani remained the 
president of the CKC with its headquarters still in Bombay 
but Shaukat Ali became the virtual dictator. Under the 
leadership of the Ali brothers, the CKC emerged as a 
completely independent body. The Muslim League was now 
definitely pushed aside. Instead, Indian Muslims looked 
for a lead from the CKC and the recently established 
Jamiyat-ul-Ulama. It was also at Amritsar that an understanding 
was arrived at between the Muslim and Hindu leaders which 
enabled them to organise the Khilafat movement jointly.
Earlier hesitation of many of the Hindu leaders like 
Motilal, B.C. Pal, Lajpat Rai (1856-1928) and even Tilak 
vanished and they began to pledge Hindu support to the
177
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Khilafat cause* The Congress which had hitherto stood aloof,
179also cautiously lent its support.
The Khilafat Conference, which opened under Shaukat Ali’s
presidency on December 31, 1919? was clearly disappointed at the
disregard shown "by the British Government to repeated Muslim
representations. But still it followed a constitutional course and
decided to send forthwith the delegations to Britain and America.
Another delegation was to visit Turkey the ostensible purpose of
which was to tender on behalf of Indian Muslims ‘sentiments of
180Islamic brotherhood* to the Caliph.
Shortly after the Conference, on January 19, 1920, an
influential deputation of Indian leaders led by Dr. Ansari and
representing cross-sections of Hindu-Muslim communities, waited on
the Viceroy at Delhi in order to obtain permission for the
18Xdelegations to proceed to Britain and America. The
deputationists, in an address prepared by Mohamed Ali and signed 
by twenty-seven prominent leaders, repeated the Khilafat demands, 
declaring that no Muslim could accept or acquiesce in an unjust
178
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settlement ’without jeopardising eternal salvation'. Even 
if the Ottoman Turks were made to accept such a settlement, 
warned the signatories, 'it would remain unacceptable as 
ever to every believing Musalman'.
The Viceroy, 'though not at all happy about it', had 
agreed to receive the deputation 'so that they might give
183vent to their feelings'. But he fully recognised that
the Indian Muslims felt very deeply on the Turkish issue.
He promised to extend certain facilities to the delegation
but v/as in no position to give any assurance about the
fate of Turkey. Nevertheless, Chelmsford tried to pamper
the deputationists with sympathetic words, though he was
equally emphatic that Turkey, when she had her choice,
deliberately drew her sword against the Entente Powers
and must be prepared to pay the price. The ultimate
decision lay not with Britain but with other Great Powers.
He, however, hoped that whatever the decision, the Indian
Muslims would remain staunch in allegiance and loyalty to 
184the King Emperor. But empty words of sympathy carried 
little weight with the Khilafatists. The following day 
they issued a rejoinder in which they openly declared that 
if the peace terms were unfavourable to 'Muslim religion 
and sentiments', it would be impossible for them to give
l8bthe assurance of loyalty which the Viceroy had hoped for.
In the circumstances, the Khilafatists hurriedly 
despatched the delegation to Europe, especially as the 
Peace Conference at Paris had not yet taken a final decision 
with regard to the future of Turkey. In the meantime, an 
all-India Khilafat Conference was held at Bombay from 
February 15-17, 1920, under G.M. Bhurgri's presidency, to 
devise ways and means for strengthening the hands of the 
delegation. The Conference reiterated the Muslim demands and 
issued a manifesto arguing its case and warning the Imperial and
182
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183
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the Allied Governments of ‘the likely consequences of a wrong 
186decision'. The Conferenco also decided to raise a sum of thirty
lakhs of rupees for the expenses of the delegation and the Khilafat
work generally. But when it came to the important issues of
policy, such as the proposed non-co-operation with the Government,
combined with the boycott of British goods and the propaganda in
tho aimy, the cleavage between the militants and the moderates
again came to the surface. It was perhaps for this reason that
many prominent leaders - Ajmal Khan, Ansari, Hasan Imam, Fazlul
Haq, Gandhi, C.R. Das and Motilal Nehru - had stayed away from
Bombay. Tho militants under Abdul Bari and supported by Nur
Muhammad of Sind and Daud Ghaznavi of the Punjab, pressed for the
immediate adoption of non-co-operation along with the connected
items. On the other hand the moderates, consisting mostly of the
Bombay delegates under Chotani, who was himself under Sir Ibrahim
188Rahimtoola's moderating influence, were not prepared to adopt
such a course. At the end of the heated discussion the militants
almost succeeded in carrying the motion in the Subjects Oommittee^^
But at the intervention of Bhurgri, who had been detached from the
militants by Sir George Lloyd (l879~194l)? the Governor of Bombay,
a compromise was accepted. The militants agreed to shelve the
proposals of non-co-operation until the result of the Khilafat
190delegation to Britain was known. For the time being the 
champions of extremism were safely side-tracked.
But there was enough fuel to hearten the militants. 
Hardly had the Conference ended than a wave of discontent 
spread amongst the Indian Muslims as a direct result of the 
agitation in Britain for the expulsion of the Turk from
186
For the manifesto see Appendix on pp. 310-11.
187
Manley’s note above, n. 135*
188
Chelmsford had asked Lloyd, the Governor of Bombay, to get Sir 
Ibrahim to use his influence with Chotani and persuade him to 
adopt a moderate course. See Chelmsford to Lloyd, Feb. 9? 1920,
CP. Also see Governor of Bombay to V, Tel. P., No. 265? Fob. 14,
1920, CP.
189
Soo Manley's note above, n. 135*
190
Ibid. Also see Governor of Bombay to V, Tel. No. 605, April 27, 
1920, CP.
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Constantinople and the 'redemption* of the 'Church' of St. Sophia to 
191Christianity. y The British public opinion? nurtured for almost a
century in hatred and contempt for Turkey? had always been anti- 
192Turk. But the immediate cause of the furore was the decision of
the Supreme Council at its London meeting on February 14s 1920? in
the teeth of opposition from Lloyd George? to allow the Sultan
193provisionally to retain his capital. Annoyed and agitated by the
decision? the Turkophobes arranged several protest meetings under
Lord Robert Cecil (1864-1958) and Lord Bryce (1838-1922)? the two
194most vehement critics of Turkey. ^ On February 26? 1920? a debate
was forced in the House of Commons where Sir Donald Maclean (1864-
1932,)? Robert Cecil? T.P. O'Conner (1848-1929)5 S.F. Oimsby-Gore
(1863-1950) a^d Sir Charles Oman (1860-1946)? relentlessly attacked
the Allied decision and vigorously advocated the expulsion of the 
195Turk from Europe.
The campaign also received sustenance from a number of 
prominent orientalists and intellectuals? including Professor D.S. 
Margoliouth (1858-1940)5 time the tutor of Mohamed Ali at
Oxford? and historian Arnold Toynbee (l889-).'L'^  The British press?
191
The Times? Feb, 17? 1920.
192
K.K. Asia classifies the anti-Turk opinion in Britain into eight 
well-defined groups. See his Britain and Muslim India? London?
19'63 9 PP* 109-11 •
193
See the minutes of the Allied Conference of Feb. 14? 1920. PRO., 
CAB 29/82? I.C.P.-28.
194
For the views of Lord Robert Cecil see PP? 1920? Hansard? 123
H.C. Deb. 58? col. 730. For Lord Bryce see his article 'The 
Settlement of the Hear East'? CR? Jan. 1920? p. 1.
195
For details see PP? 1920? Hansard?• 125 H.C. Deb. 58? cols. 1949- 
2060? especially cols. 1949-55? 1961-63? 1971-89? 2006-8 and 2025-28.
196
For Margoliouth's views see his article 'The Caliphate'? HE? XIV? 
Ho. 182? pp. 294-300. For Toynbee see his articles? 'A Review of 
the Turkish Problem'? ibid. ? XIV? Ho. 170? pp. 1—55 ’The Meaning of 
tho Constantinople Decision'? ibid.? XIV? Ho. 1759 PP* 129-31? and 
'Mr. Montagu's Pound of Flesh'? ibid.? XIV? Ho. 176? pp. 145-49*
For Sir C.W. Chian see 'East and West'? Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society? London? 1920? Sor. 49 Bo. 39 PP* 5-6* For the 
views of Oimsby-Gore? Sir D. Maclean and T.P. O'Conner? see PP? 1920? 
Hansard. 116 H.C. Deb. 58? col. 812§ 117‘H.C. Deb. 58? cols. 963- 
&4>' 123 H.C. Deb. 5S? cols. 676? 752 & 723-24? 125 H.C. Deb. 5S? 
cols. 1951-55* ForE.A. Bag3ey? John Buohan? H. Hamilton Fyfe and 
Samuel Hoare see The Times? Jan.13p 1920. Also see P. Tonapetean?
The Sultan is not Caliph9 London? 1920* The Italian orientalist
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197led lay The Times, lent its active support. To reinforce their
demands the Turkophobes magnified the alleged Armenian massacres
during the War and later in Cilecia by the Nationalists Turks. An
exceedingly vigorous propaganda was conducted on behalf of the
Armenians through such media as the cinema, the theatre and the 
198press. A powerful support came from the Church dignitaries
headed by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York and the Bishops of
London and Manchester who felt robbed of their plan of making
Constantinople the seat of the united Anglican and the Greek
Orthodox churches. Thus they deliberately gave the agitation the
199semblance of a struggle between the Cross and tho Crescent.
Powerful sections of the business community joined the campaign
because of their vested interests.Kidwai and other Indian Muslims
in Britain, with the help of their Turkophile British friends, tried
201as usual to stem the tide, but a mere mention of the word Armenia
202in a British gathering was enough to defeat the Turkish case.
C.A. Nallino1 s pamphlet (Notes on the Nature of the Caliphate., issued 
by the Italian Foreign Ministry in 1919)? disputing the Ottoman claim 
to the Khilafat was in wide circulation in Britain. Copy of the 
pamphlet in PSSF, P. 3344/20 with 3344/20.
197
See, e.g., The Times, Jan. 7 and Feb. 21, 1920.
198
Abdul Hamid, Muslim Separatism in India, Lahore, 1967? P® 137® A 
document, The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. 1915-16# 
prepared by Toynbee and Lord Bryce in 1916 and presented to the 
Parliament was often cited as an indictment against the Turks. See 
PP, 1916, Cmd. 8329.
199
The Times9 Feb. 20, I92O3 Sulairaan Nadvi to Abdul Majid Daryabadi, 
April 1, 1920, Barid~i~Farang, Karachi, 1952? P® 35? and Felix V§,ly±, 
Spiritual and Political Revolutions in Islam9 London, 1925, pp. 37-8.
200
V&lyi, op. cit.o p. 39®
201
The main propaganda work was again done by the Islamic Society and 
the London Muslim League through Kidv/ai’s Islamic Information Bureau 
and its journal, the Muslim Outlook. They ?/ero ably assisted by tho 
British Muslims like Marmaduke Pickthall, Umar Flight and Khalid 
Sheldrake and the British Turkopliiles such as Col. Wedgwood, Brig.- 
G©n. Surtees, Lt.-Col. Aubury Herbert, L't. Comm. Kennworthy and Sir J.
D. Rees. Among other well-known sympathisers were Earl Winterton,
Earl Abingdon, Lord Ampthill, Lord Carmichael, Sir Theodore Morison, 
Sir George Roos-Keppel and Prof. Browne, who had been connected with 
India in one way or the other. The Anglo-Ottoman Society of Lord' 
Mowbray and Strouton also gave its full support. See PSSF, 380/19, I, 
III & IVy Bamford, op. cit., pp. 142 & 145? The Times, May 26 & Sept. 
10, 1919? and Feb. 2, 1920s Barid-i-Farangg CR, July 1919? P* H6s 
and PP, 1919-20, Hansard.
202
Hamid, op. cit.? p. 137®
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These fanatical outbursts of the clergy and the statesmen in
203Britain, produced a counter fanatical furore in India. To make 
matters worse Lloyd George, while defending the Allied decision on 
Constantinople, had admitted in the House of Commons that his pledge 
of January 5? 1918, was after all a solemn pledge, a 'specific, 
unqualified, and deliberate1 declaration, made with the consent of 
all parties in order to reassure the British peoplo and the Indian 
Muslims. This led the Khilafatists to argue that if he was 
committed to Constantinople he was equally pledged to Thrace and 
'the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor* A Khilafat Conference
was held from February 28 to 29, 1920, at Calcutta which, because of 
the recent release of Abul Kalam Aaad, had become the political 
storm-centre.
At Calcutta the Khilafatists went wild. The proceedings of the
Provincial Khilafat Conference were more militant and anti-British
than any yet known. Tho resolutions were supported 'with speeches
of great violence offering sacrifices of life and property in the
cause of Islam'. Two of the delegates, Fazlul Haq and Abul Kasem,
placed letters of resignation from their seats in the Provincial
Legislative Councils, with the President of the meeting, for use
when needed.Azad, the President, stretched Syud Hossain*s
definition of non-co-operation as tho Islamic tark-i-mawalat and  _
recommended it to the Muslims as the only remedy left open to them.
203
See Bhurgri to Montagu, Tel. Feb. 26, 1920, PSSF, P. 226l/20 with 
38o/l9, IVj Chotani to Montagu, Tol. Feb. 27, 1920, ibid., P. 1737/20;; 
and Abdul Bari and Kidwai to Ameer Ali, Mohamed Ali and Tspahani, Tel. 
No. 0017, March 9, 1920, ibid., P. 226l/20.
204
PP, 1920, Hansard, 125 HoC. Bob, 5$, cols. 1960-62. In private 
talk he had always contended that it was not^plodge. See Montagu to 
Lloyd, April 14, 1920, E
205
Reference his pledge of Jan. 5, 1918. See The Tjmos, Jan. 7, 1918.
206
V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 219, March 7, 1920, CP.
207
Azad maintained that the shariat was positive that any mawalat 
(co-operation) with the non-Muslim 'enemies of Islam' (he was careful 
to exclude Hindus from this category) was a sin. Muslims must not 
accept honours or hold service under the Government. Those, who, in 
spite of this injunction, co-operated with the Government were great 
sinners. See his Masala-i-Khilafat wa Jazira-i-Arab. Calcutta, 1920, 
pp. 141-45®
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The main resolution of the Conference, moved by Abdul Bari, went even 
further and threatened to ’cease all relations of loyalty* with 
Britain and to assist the Caliph 'by all possible means' if his 
dominions were not kept intact as they were before the WarB The 
Conference decided that a general hartal should be observed throughout 
the country on March 19, 1920, in order to disprove the assertion of 
Lord Bryce that the Indian Muslims were not concerned at the 
expulsion of the Turk from Constantinople.^^
209The indignation at the 'machinations' of the 'new crusaders'
and the attempts of the British statesmen 'to misrepresent and
210misinterpret the Moslem feelings' was so intense that it not only
211disturbed the moderates like Bhurgri, but also alarmed certain
members of tho British community in India. Crum and Paton, the
representatives of the Bengal and Bombay Chambers of Commerce
respectively in the Imperial Legislative Council, impressed upon the
Viceroy the necessity of continued pressure on the British Government
213to 'avoid, interference with Moslem religious beliefs and scruples'.
Similarly, Colonel Gidey, on behalf of the Anglo-Indian and the
domiciled European community in India, requested the Viceroy to
inform the Prime Minister and the British Parliament of their strong
feelings in favour of the retention of Constantinople by the Sultan
2i a
of Turkey and his recognition as the 'head of the Moslem religion*•
208
Englishman. March 1, 1920. Also see Azad to Lloyd George and 
Montagu, Tel. March 1, 1920, PSSF. P. I894/2O with 380/19, IV.
209
President, Anjuman-i-Attibba, Bombay, to Montagu, Tel. March 2, 
1920, PSSF. P. 1785/20 with 38o/l9, IV.
210
Chotani to Lloyd Georgo, Tel. March 6, 1920, PSSF. P. 2246/20 with 
380/19, IV.
211
See Bhurgri's telegram to Lloyd George and Montagu in Englishman. 
March 1, 1920.
212
• PSSF, P. 2960/20 with 380/19, IV.
213
V to S/S, Tel. P. & R., No. 216, March 6, 1920, CP. Crum tried
to approach the Archbishops of Canterbury and York to persuade them
to give up the agitation. See his message to one Ellison of London
in V to s/s, Tel. P., No. 228, March 10, 1920, CP.
214
ICHRP, Poll.- March 1920 - 28 - Part B.
- 90
The Government of India was perturbed at this state 
of affairs. On March 7, 1920, the Viceroy reported to 
the Secretary of State;
. o . the open expression of disloyalty although 
conditional is danger signal and may at any rate 
lead to local disorder. Bengal and other Local 
Governments have been consulted by us as to the 
measures to be adopted to deal with the situation 
and to check further extension of campaign of 
violence recognising on the one hand the danger 
that fanaticism of masses may be excited to 
disorder point by unchecked agitation, and on 
the other hand the danger that action,-against 
individuals may precipitate trouble.
But, fortunately for the Government of India, as the
volume of excitement increased the moderates began to
withdraw their support from the increasing militancy of
the Khilafat movement. They looked upon the Calcutta
resolutions with deep alarm and detected in them a
preparation for violence. Even Gandhi was unnerved
and declared that he would co-operate with the Muslims
only if they acted with 'sufficient restraint1 and did
not resort to violence,, He frankly told the Muslims that
he would cease to co-operate and would advise every Hindu
to do the same 'the moment there was violence actually
done, advised or countenanced', though he admitted that
'my argument today against violence is based upon pure
217expediency, i.e. its utter futility'.
The Khilafatists realised that the moment was not 
yet ripe for a display of violence. Fear of losing 
moderate support and Hindu co-operation and Gandhi's 
restraining influence'1’ made them to change their 
tactics. On March 9? 1920, the CKC issued a manifesto
215
V to S/S, Tel. P., No, 219, March 7, 1920, CP.
216
Reference in Gandhi’s manifesto of March 7, 1920, CW, 
XVII, pp. 75-6. Also see V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 260,
March 25, 1920, CP.
217
Ibid. Also see his telegram to the Bengal Khilafat 
Committee, March 7, 1920, ibid., p. 77.
218
See Gandhi's Tel. to Shaukat Ali, March 6, 1920, asking 
him to use moderation, ibid., p. 7 0.
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219urging tho people to observe the hartals peacefully.
Shaukat Ali, however, warned that it was their last
appeal to the British Government and in case no positive
response was forthcoming, they would be forced to
220implement the Calcutta resolutions. Thus, when on
March 19, 1920, the Second Khilafat Day was observed, in
spite of the news of the Allied occupation of Constantinople
on March 16, there was no violence or intimidation. The
demonstrations were peaceful and the fairly successful
hartals were voluntary. At some places, particularly in
Patna and Bombay where the Local Governments had been
able to split the Muslims into two camps, the Calcutta
resolutions were not accepted. Hindu participation on the
whole was sparing and half-hearted. In particular, few
attended public meetings, as at Lahore, Cawnpore and
Assam, because the Muslims would not drop the Calcutta
resolutions. Even at a place like Bombay, the Hindu
element constituted only four per cent, of the total
number reported to have been present at the mass meeting.
However, the 'extremist' Hindu leaders, except for Tilak
and his party, whole-heartedly co-operated with the 
221.Muslims. But, these demonstrations and protests had 
little effect as the British policy towards Turkey had 
remained unchanged.
Meanwhile, the Khilafat delegation led by Mohamed Ali
and consisting of Syud Hossain, Syed Sulaiman Nadvi
(1884-19.55) and Hassan Muhammad Hayat (joined later by
222Abul Kasem and Kidwai) had arrived in London on
219
Times of India, March,10, 1920.
220
Ibid., March 18, 1920.
221
Bee Bombay Chronicle, March 20 & 21, 1920; V to S/S,
Tel. p., No. 260, March 25, 1920, CP; Lloyd to Montagu,
March 26, 1920, MP; V to S / S , Tel. P., No. 271, April 2, 
1920, CP; various Tels. from different parts of India to 
Lloyd George, Montagu and Ameer Ali in PSSF, 3^0/19, IV; 
and Iqbal Shaidai to Abdul Bari, n.d., Nuqush, CIX, p. 210. 
222
Abul Kasem left India on April 4 and Kidwai on June 20, 
!920. ICHPP, Sept. 1920, Pro. No. 100; and Nov. 1920, Pro. 
No. 22.
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223February 26, 1 9 2 0, amidst great anti-Turk commotion.
They managed to have two interviews; one on March 2 with
H.A.L. Fisher (1865-1940), Secretary for Education, who
received them on behalf of the indisposed Montagu, and
224the other on March 19 with Lloyd George. In answer to
the Khilafatists' 'irreducible minimum' demand for the
restoration of the Caliph's territorial status quo ante
bellum and his control over the Jazirat-ul-Arab with
wardenship of the Holy Places, Fisher was non-committal
225and Lloyd George obdurate. With his anti-Turk bias, 
the Premier told the delegation that in dealing with 
Austria-Hungary they had applied the principle of self- 
determination and the same must apply to the Ottoman 
Empire. Turkey was not being treated severely because 
she was Muslim and Indian Muslims must get this well into 
their minds. The Turk had been an intolerant and inept 
ruler and the interests of civilisation demanded the 
imposition of some control over him. Therefore, Asia 
Minor must be supervised by the Allies. Arabia should 
belong to Arabs who had no wish to be ruled by the Sultan 
of Turkey. Thrace should go to Greece as reliable census 
had shown the Muslim population 'in a considerable 
minority'. The same applied to Smyrna where 'a most 
careful investigation by a very impartial Committee' had 
revealed a preponderance of non-Turk population and that
223
Sulaiman Nadvi to Abdul Bari, March 4, 1920, Barid- 
i-Farang, p.l4„ At that time there were no less than 
six different delegations in Britain representing the 
Near and the Middle Eastern countries, besides the Greek 
delegation whose propaganda the Indian delegation had to 
counter. Hisabat-i-Wafd-i-Khilafat-i-Europe, published 
by Ahmed Hajee Siddick Khatri, Hon. Secy., CKC, Bombay, 
1923, pp. 7-8. Also see Rais Ahmad Jafari, Sirat-i- 
Mohamed Ali, 1 and II, 2nd. ed., Lahore, 1950, p. 353®
224" T “
For the minutes of the interviews see PSM, B. 370 
and B. 371 *
225
Thomas Jones suggests (Lloyd George, London, 1951? 
p. 197) that Lloyd George's anti-Turk attitude was the 
result of his Gladstonian Liberalism, his romantic 
admiration for ancient Greece and his personal liking 
for Venizilos, the then Greek Premier. But perhaps, the 
imperial consideration of a policy of expansion played as 
much part in the formation of his anti-Turk views.
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the Greek Muslims preferred Greek rule to that of the
m i 226Turks.
Lloyd George remained unmoved by the delegation’s
227arguments and refused to concede a single demand. All
through the interview he was impatient and avoided being
228drawn into discussion. He touched and emphasised only
these aspects which suited him and refused any discussion
on the Palestine question and the massacres of the Turks
in Smyrna. He made no reference to his own pledge of
January 5, 1918. His arguments were one-sided and he
229drew wrong analogies. His statistics on Thrace and
230Smyrna were defective and overwhelmingly Muslim majority
areas were handed over to Greece which had not been even
at war with Turkey - a decision which was thoroughly
231detested by Montagu, strongly opposed by the British
232High Commissioner in Constantinople “ and disapproved by
233the General Staff. ' The settlement of Asia. Minor was
based on an incident (Armenian massacres) the fundamental
23 -^fresponsibility for which had not been established. And
226
PSM, B. 571-
227
See Philip Kerr’s note of March 15, 1920, and Shukburgh’s 
minute of March 16, 1920, PSSF, P. 2130/20 with 380/1 9, V.
228
Mohamed Ali to Shaukat Ali, May 6 , 1920, enclosure, 
Chelmsford to Montagu, June 3, 1920, MP.
229
E.g.,his anology of the loss of the temporal power by
the Pope to that of the Caliph.
230
See Tilley's minute of April 1 0 , 1920, PRO, F.O.,
371/51^1- Also see Admiral Sir F„ de Robeck to Curzon,
March 9, 1920, PRO, P.O., 371/5106.
231
See Montagu’s minute of Nov. 11, 1920, in PSSF,
P. 8039/20 with ^995/19, II.
232
de Robeck to Curzon, March 9, 1920, above, n. 230.
233
See the General Staff memo, on situation in Turkey,
March 15, 1920, PRO, F.O*, 371/50^- Also see the General 
Staff memo, on the Turkish Peace Treaty, April 1, 1920,
PRO, F.O., 371/50^6.
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there seems to be no basis either to his claim that not
merely had the Indian Muslims been heard but the settlement
was very largely affected by their opinion. The Indian
delegation at the Peace Conference to which he referred,
235was never seriously treated and as for the Constantinople 
decision, the credit goes to M. Millerand (1859-1943) (the 
French Premier) and Signor Nitti (1868-1953) (the Italian 
Premier )?^
But, then Lloyd George's attitude precisely reflected
the feelings of some prominent British statesmen and the
vocal British public which had no soft corner for the
Indian demands. The Khilafat movement was dismissed as
nothing but a well-organised, lavishly financed, artificial
agitation^'7 with no sound religious basis^^ and
239unrepresentative of the world Muslim feeling, engineered
240from England by Kidwai and his Muslim associates, and
rendered formidable by the ’shocking weakness1 of the
241Government of India. Therefore, no weight should be
242given to Indian Muslim feeling when dealing with Turkey.
235
See Montagu to Curzon, Aug. 28, 1919, PSSF, P. 4995/19* 
with 4995/19? HI*
236
See the minutes of the Allied Conference in London,
Feb. 14, 1920. PRO, CAB, 29/8? 1*0.P. - 28. The decision 
by the British Cabinet had been taken on Jan. 6, 1922. 
Cabinet Minute 1(20) CAB 23/20., Curzon had recorded his 
note of dissent with the decision, Jan. 7, 1920, C.P. 407 
and Appendix IV to Cabinet 1(20).
237
T.P. 0fConner, Feb. 26, 1920, PP, 1920, Hansard, 125 
H.C. Deb. 5 S, col. 1893.
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P. 2012/20 with 380/19, IV.
239
A.J. Toynbee, 'The Question of the Caliphate', CR, 
CXVII, Feb. 1920, p. 193.
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Curzon to Sir Eyre Crowe, Paris Peace Delegation, No. 
7289, Oct. 30, 1919, enclosure, F.O. to 1.0., No. 145162/ 
M.E./44A., PSSF, P. 6 81 8 /1 9 with 380/1 9, III.
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See Curzon's minute in PRO, F.O. 371/5141. Hardinge 
thought that the Govt, of India was paying too much 
attention to the Muslim feelings. See his undated minute 
(presumably May 19, 1920) in PRO, F.O., 371/5142.
242
See Hardinge's note in PSSF, 380/1 9, ll.
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No wonder Lloyd George's firmness won him the gratitude
243of many in Britain,  ^though it most certainly disappointed
244the Indian Muslims and their sympathisers.
The refusal of the British Government to accept any
of the Khilafatists' demands called for action. The
militants, particularly Abul Kalam Azad, who ridiculed the
'methods of begging', pressed for 'some means of exerting 
245direct pressure'. Naturally, therefore, when on
March 22, 1920, the Khilafatists met at Ajmal Khan's house
in Delhi to consider how best the Calcutta resolutions
of the previous month could be followed up, the question
246of non-co-operation received the first priority. Gandhi,
who had been trying to take the sting out of the Calcutta
programme by disputing such items as the boycott of British
247goods and advice to the soldiers to refuse to serve,
made yet another attempt. As an alternative to violence
or jihad, he again insisted that non-co-operation should
248be absolutely non-violent.
The majority of the Muslim leaders was loath to 
accepting non-violence as a principle. Particular 
objection to it came from Abdul Bari who preferred jihad
243
^ee l1he Times, March 22, 1920. Orientalist Margoliouth 
also praised the firmness of the Premier. See his "The 
Caliphate', NE, XIV, No. 182, pp. 294-300.
244
Major-General Lord Gleichen (1863-1937), for instance, 
wrote a very bitter letter to Lloyd George accusing him 
of vengeance against Turkey in marked contrast to the 
treatment of Austria and Germany. Letter dated March 22, 
1920, PRO, F.O., 371/5141. For the comments of the 
Indian papers see PSSF, P. 3 8 8 5 /2 0 with 380/1 9 , V. Also 
see T.L. Vaswani, The Spirit and Struggle of Islam,
Madras, 1921, pp. 52-ol.
245
Azad had been pressing since Jan. 1920. Quoted in 
Tendulkar, op. cit., I. p. 344.
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V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 260, March 25, 1920, CP.
Prominent among those who attended were: Dr. Ansari,
Abdul Bari, Ajmal Khan, Azad, Kidwai, Shaukat Ali and the 
Nawab of Dacca. Among the Hindus were Gandhi, Lajpat 
Rai, Patel, Malaviya, Khaparde and Tilak.
247
CW, XVII, pp. 73-76.
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or hi.1 rat because other methods would take years to yield
any result* In the end, however, the line suggested by
249Gandhi was generally accepted. At this stage the
organisers were vague as to what form the scheme would
take but eventually the four-phased non-co-operation
contemplated, in its first stage, the renouncing of
Government titles and the relinquishment of honorary posts.
In the event of a negative response from the Government,
they were to proceed with the second stage of persuading
Government servants to tender their resignations. In the
third stage those in the armed services were to be asked
to resign and finally payment of Government dues and taxes
was to be withheld. The organisers also agreed to implement
the scheme progressively in slow stages. In fact the last
250two stages were remote and distant steps.
The Khilafatists had agreed to modify the original 
scheme of non-co-operation mainly because of their desire 
to conciliate Gandhi and not for any intrinsic liking for 
a non-violent programme. Therefore, when Gandhi learnt 
of this from Hasrat Mohani, he remonstrated to Ajmal Khan 
that if the Muslim leaders were not enthusiastic about the
251scheme 'at least they should get rid of a man like myself.
The Khilafatists could ill-afford to lose Gandhi. Dr. Ansari
and Ajmal Khan hastened to reassure Gandhi that 'violence
(even if it could be practiced) ought to be scrupulously
avoided'. They further informed him that most of the
Khilafatists would be with him though they were not sure
252about people with vested interests. In order to give a
249
Ibid.- Azad in his autobiography India Wins Freedom 
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of March meeting to Jan. 1920. It was after the March 
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250
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practical demonstration of Muslim sincerity, Ajmal Khan 
proceeded with his personal non-co-operation. Early in 
April 1920, he renounced the title of Haziq-ul-Mulk, 
conferred upon him by the Government, and returned his 
Kaiser-i-Hind and Coronation Durbar medalsf^^
But not all the Khilafatists reciprocated these
feelings. Apart from the Abdul Bari group, which was
still reluctant to accept a non-violent programme, there
was a considerable body of opinion within the Khilafat
organisation which opposed non-co-operation for completely
different reasons. They, like Gandhi, viewed some of the
items - tampering with the army, the Government services,
and the refusal to pay taxes - as extreme measures. The
chief dissentients were Mirza Ali Mohammed Khan and
Badruddin Abdulla. Koor, both Honorary Secretaries of the
CKC. Other detractors were Sulleman Cassim Mitha,
Suleraan Abdul Wahib, (Sir) Rahimtoola Chinoy (b.l882),
Sheriff Dewjee Canjee and G.M. Bhurgri?^ Chotani himself
was hesitant to support the programme. He had privately
promised George Lloyd that he would 'do his best to get
the clauses refering to the tampering with troops or
Government servants eliminated from the non-co-operation 
255
programme'. Chotani kept his word and when the CKC met
at Bombay on April 11-14, 1920, he tried his utmost to 
256that end. But, Chotani was overruled and the CKC
decided in principle to introduce non-co-operation after 
the publication of the peace terms^^
253
For the text of his letter to the D.C., Delhi, see 
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255
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March 1920, F.C.R. Robinson (op. oit», pp. 374-75)? while 
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As one final effort to move the British Government,
Shaukat Ali, Abul Kalam Azad and others put pressure upon 
Gandhi to proceed to London and plead the Khilafat casep r O
before the British ministers and public., But Gandhi was
259reluctant and looked for an excuse/ His hesitant attitude
created misgivings among the Khilafatists, particularly
Azad, as to his motives. It was whispered that he never
260really intended to go. However, since the opinion m
the GKC was divided and neither the Viceroy nor the Secretary
2 6lof State were favourable to the idea, the matter was dropped. 
Nevertheless, Mohamed Ali's delegation, which had
262stayed on in Britain despite the disheartening conditions
263and suggestions for its recall, made two attempts to
secure a hearing before the Peace Conference. But it met 
264with no success. Its two interviews with Montagu also 
yielded nothing beyond an assurance of his continued personal 
support. Montagu complained of the delegation's uncompromising 
attitude and the extreme nature of demands 'obviously put
258
Gandhi to Montagu, Tel, April 22, 1920, PSSF, P. 3255/20 
with 380/19, V.
259
Gandhi to Chotani, Tel. April l8, 1920, CW, XVII, p„ 322. 
Also see pp„ 3^5“ 6^°
260
V to S/S, Tel. P., No, 379, May 7, 1920, CP; and HFMI,
III, Part I, p. 271.
261
CW, XVII, p. 3^6, Also see Gandhi to Hignell, June 12, 
1920, enclosure, Chelmsford to Montagu, June 2 3, 1920, MP.
The India Office did not want to encourage 'another talker'. 
See Hose's minute in PSSF, P. 3255/2.0 with 380/1 9 , V. Also 
-H™ » II1* Part.I, pp. 272-73. But later, Montagu 
regretted hie action. See Montagu to Reading, June 8, 1921, 
RP.
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delegation. They were particularly embarrassed by the 
Prime Minister's argument regarding the Khilafatists' 
objection to the Arab desire for independence. See James 
A. Malcolm to Sir John Tilley, March 2H, 1920, PRO,
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265forward m  the knowledge that they cannot be met*. Nor
was the delegation able to enlist the support of the
266British political parties. To combat the press propaganda,
the delegation undertook to pay the entire cost of the
Muslim Outlook, subsidised India, and contracted the Daily
267Herald to publish their news in a favourable manner. But 
in the final analysis the delegation's work in Britain was 
fruitless.
Disappointed, the delegation first thought of going 
to America and Japan but later turned to the European 
Powers, especially France and Italy, which were known to 
be sympathetic to Turkey. In France they met with some 
success in influencing public opinion but failed to win 
over the French Government. Millerand, the French Premier, 
gave no encouragement. In Italy Premier Giolitti (1842- 
1928) promised all help to the delegation. He even allowed 
Mohamed Ali to use the Italian diplomatic bag at Rome to 
correspond with Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938) and the Turkish
265
For this information see Montagu to Chelmsford, April 1 
and June 23? 1920, MP; Mohamed Ali to Shaukat Ali, May 6 ,
1920, above, n. 228; and Sulaiman Nadvi to Abdul Bari,
May 6 , 1920, Barid-i-Farang, pp. 66-6 7.
266
Their meeting with Asquith (1852-1928), the former Prime 
Minister and a believer in Gladstonian policy of 'bag and 
baggage', came to nothing. See PP, 1920, Hansard, 127?HoO„
Deb. 5S, cols. 640-41. Their contacts with the Labour Party 
yielded nothing beyond a brief statement of their case at 
the Twentieth Annual Conference of the Party at Scarborough.
See Report of the Twentieth Annual Conference of the Labour 
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Nationalists* The delegation also met the Pope, flirted
with the A.rabs, and re~established contacts with Talaat
Pasha and the Committee of Union and Progress Turks in
268Territet (Switzerland). But it failed to obtain a 
lenient peace treaty for Turkey.
The fate of Turkey was sealed at San Remo (April 19-26,
1920) when the Allied Prime Ministers approved the frame -
269work of the peace treaty. Montagu and other representatives,
who knew of the secret undertakings, were left aghast.
They had tried their best to plead clemency for Turkey
and just before the Conference Montagu had demanded the
right to send a memorandum to the Powers in his capacity
270as Plenipotentiary for India. But Lloyd George had had 
enough of his irritating colleague. 'In fact throughout 
the /Peace/ Conference1, he rebuked Montagu, 'your attitude 
has often struck me as being not so much that of a member 
of the British Cabinet, but of a successor on the throne
n  271
/sic/ of Aurangzeb!' , Montagu contemplated resignation
but swallowed the bitter pill and chose to stay on in the
belief that he might avert trouble in India when the peace
272terms were finally announced.
Meanwhile, in India, as the expected announcement of 
the Turkish peace terms drew nearer, Muslim restlessness 
began to mount rapidly. The Government of India was not 
oblivious to the possibility of violent outbreaks. But
268
For the delegation's activities in Britain and on the 
Continent see the following interesting documents: PSM,
B. 3 6 1; PSSF, 1229/20, IT5 PSSF, ^995/19, I; and PSSF 
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it was well prepared to meet the situation and had
273alerted the military authorities. However, expediency 
impelled the Government of India to avoid, as far as 
possible, any interference with the movement. It 
preferred 'not to make martyrs of fanatical leaders or
27^precipitate trouble by prosecution or executive action*.
This moderate course of action was evidently dictated by 
the belief that the movement would die out, or, if it
275became aggressive, would be defeatedby its own violence.
poZT
Therefore, proceedings were confined to local agitators.
Action against Gandhi was avoided as it was likely to
277focus public attention and provoke outbursts of violence.
Similarly, in the case of Shaukat Ali, no immediate action
was proposed, though the legal possibilities of a
2?8prosecution were being examined. Montagu fully supported
the Government of India's policy for he wished not in
the least to interfere with the Viceroy's discretion in
279the maintenance of law and order. But at the same time 
he did not hesitate to point out, as a general proposition, 
the dangers of anyone governing 'a la O'Dwyer*. Chelmsford, 
whose policy of moderation was always qualified, had been 
equally emphatic that 'in matters of law and order and 
of the safety of Englishmen and women there can be only 
one policy and that is the indisputable supremacy of the 
British raj(, He was prepared for prompt and drastic 
action if necessary. The Punjab affair of the last year 
was for him no hindrance: 'we are confident here that what 
we did last year was necessary and we are prepared to act
273
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2again if any similar occasion arises'.
But the optimistic confidence of the Viceroy was soon 
disturbed by the announcement, on May 11, 1920, of the 
peace terms which aimed at destroying any semblance of 
Turkish independence and stripping her of her empire. 
According to the proposed treaty, Turkey was to cede 
Thrace to Greece almost to the Chataldja Lines and Izmir. 
She was also to cede Tenedos and Imros to Greece. A 
large area in Asia Minor, comprising Smyrna and certain 
other portions, was to be formed into a separate 
autonomous unit under Greek administration but Turkish 
suzerainty. After five years it was to decide its own 
future by a plebiscite. Turkey was compelled to recognise 
the independence of Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine 
and the Hedjaz, and the autonomy of Kurdistan. She was 
also to recognise the British protectorate over Egypt 
and Sudan, the British sovereignty over Cyprus and a 
British mandate for Palestine and Mesopotamia. Similarly, 
Turkey was to recognise the French protectorate over 
Syria and Tunisia anda French Zone in Morocco, and 
Italian sovereignty over Libya and the Dodecanese. Turkey 
was also to renounce her rights secured by the Suez Canal 
Treaty of 1888 in favour of Britain. The Straits and the 
Dardanelles were internationalised and a zone of the 
Straits was created which was to be controlled by a 
commission appointed by the League of Nations. The 
Turkish Army was to be reduced to only 50,000 men including 
2 ,5 0 0 officers whose tenure of service was also restricted. 
The Navy was to be abolished with the exception of a few 
small vessels for police duties. The Turkish Air Force 
was to be completely disbanded. The proposals also 
contained stringent financial clauses. Even the power 
to impose taxes was withdrawn from the Turkish Government 
and vested instead in a commission composed of Britain,
283France and Italy, Capitulations were also re-established. 
281
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The peace terms were published in India on May 15
with a message from the Viceroy who, in view of their
severity, found it difficult to assuage the feelings of
the Indian Muslims* His assurance to them that the
settlement had been greatly influenced by their 
28^representations, bore little comfort for the heart­
broken Muslims. The attitude of the Anglo-Indian press,
285which lamented that Turkey had been let off lightly, 
added to their disappointment. The nationalist papers - 
the Bombay Chronicle, the Independent, the Tribune, the 
Hindu, the Amrita Bazar Patrika - were bitter at the
—— — 286
contemptuous disregard shown to Indian remonstrances.
Even the moderate papers like the header and the Bengalee 
recognised the severity of the termsF^"
Indeed the Muslim disappointment over the 'outrageous'
288peace terms was profound. From Paris the Khilafat
delegation telegraphically entreated the Sultan of Turkey
to summarily reject the terms as the whole Muslim world 
289
was behind him. Shaukat Ali fumed that the Government
of India's communique and the Viceroy's message were 'an
insult to our intellect'. He asked the Muslims to brace
themselves for a life-long struggle and commence the non-
co-operation campaign which 'must be given a full and fair 
290trial'. Gandhi, still worried about the possibility
284-
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285
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of Muslims getting out of control, entreated with them
to exercise restraint. But agreed that non-co-operation
was 'the only effective remedy both for avoiding violence
291and for healing the wound inflicted on Mohammedan India'»
In fact the CKC, anticipating harsh peace terms,
had already decided on May 12 - three days before the
terms were published in India - to start the non-co-
292operation campaign. The decision, however, had been
secured after a good deal of pressure from Kidwai, who
293threatened to resign from the CKC. The dissenters were
further softened by Shaukat Ali and Gandhi who coaxed
them into accepting the non-co-operation programme in
294-all its four stages. A committee consisting of
Shaukat Ali, Chotani, Gandhi, Abul Kalam Azad and Khatri,
2.95was formed to draw the details of the scheme.
On May 28, 1920, the CKC issued a manifesto announcing
its policy. It declared that there was 'no question of
compromise in this matter /i.e., the Khilafat/ of life
and death with millions of Musalmans'. The remedy was
simple. The Muslims and Hindus must 'withdraw co-operation
from the Government and continue to do so till justice
is done*. Should non-co-operation fail, Muslims reserved
to themselves 'the right to take such other and further
296steps as may be enjoined upon them by their religion*.
But the policy outlined in the manifesto was much restricted
291
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in its scope and constituted a virtual reversal of the
decision arrived at earlier on May 12, which had proposed
a much harder line. Only a few items - surrender of
honorary offices and titles, stoppage of all voluntary
financial support and surrender of civil employments under
297the Government - were selected for implementation.
The moderation was obviously an attempt to accommodate 
the waverers. But the adoption of even this moderate 
programme brought the rift into the open. Those members 
of the CKC who passionately believed that the programme 
was unconstitutional and positively dangerous to the best 
interest of the Muslims, or that Gandhi had given a 
wrong lead to them., realised that they could no longer
298stay on the Committee. The first to resign was B.A. Koor.
Ho was followed by Mirza A.M. Khan, G.M. Bhurgri and 
• 299Syed Rifai. The moderate Khilafatists were not the
only sceptics of non-co-operation. Even the militants
among them, Azad and Abdul Bari, were reported to be
dissatisfied with a mere passive step and were doubtful
of its succ;ess^ Azad in particular favoured Muslims
reorganising themselves by electing an Imam (to which
office he himself aspired) and obey his orders implicitly
301regardless of consequences'.
Gandhi and Shaukat Ali had to work hard to keep 
unity among the leaders. At one stage Shaukat Ali was 
so disgusted with Chotani and his Bombay group for their 
attitude towards non-co-operation that he tried to move
297
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302the headquarters of the CKC from Bombay to Lucknow.
Chotani himself wished the transfer to take place for in
that case he could discreetly dissociate himself from 
303the CKC.  ^ But in the end, through the efforts of Gandhi
and Shaukat Ali, the differences were patched up. Chotani
agreed to support the campaign and resigned his honorary 
304magistracy. Azad's doubts about the non-co-operation
scheme also vanished and Abdul Bari was prevailed upon
by Shaukat Ali to give an honest trial to 'Gandhi's
prescription' for at least four or five months and in
the event of its failure 'we shall do what God will 
305command*• Clearly it had been a victory for Gandhi 
and Shaukat Ali.
The leaders, however, were cautious. They strongly
deprecated any action which might precipitate a collision
with the Government and thus afford it an opjjortunity
to smash the movement prematurely. An appeal was issued
by Gandhi that none should act without instructions from the
CKC^^ Those who appeared over-enthusiastic, were quickly
307reprimanded by Shaukat Ali. The Khilafatists seemed to 
be of the opinion that before embarking on non-co-operation 
they should try to extract last minute concessions from
7aQ
the Government-; Because of this the implementation of 
the non-co-operation programme was delayed.
Another hurdle in this connection was the hesitancy 
of the Congress leaders. Most of the Hindu leaders had
302
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no faith in the non-co-operation scheme either because
it was the programme of the Khilafat Committee or because
of its anarchistic nature* Apart from the moderates, the
sceptics included such men as Tilak, Khaparde (1854-1938),
Motilal, C*R* Das, Lajpat Rai, B.C. Pal, I*K* Yajnik and
the Patel brothers - Vithalbhai (1873-1933) and 
309Vallabhbhai* In order to resolve the differences, the
Khilafatists, in consultation with Gandhi, decided to
invite Iiindu-Muslim leaders, regardless of opinion already
expressed on the policy of non-co-operation, to discuss
the issue at a special meeting of the CKC at Allahabad
310m  the first week of June 1920f In the meantime, the
AICC, which was meeting at Benares on May 30 and 31* was
311given an opportunity to examine the question* But in 
view of the extreme divergence of opinion among the 
Congress leaders the Benares meeting ended in a stalemate* 
The consideration of non-co-operation, or any other 
suitable course of action, was postponed for a special 
session of the Congress at Calcutta to be held in the 
beginning of September 1920?^
As arranged, the meeting of the CKC took place at 
Allahabad on June 1 and 2, despite the absence of most 
of the moderates and some ’extremists' like C*R* Das,
Tilak and Joseph Baptista (1864-1930), who had declined
309
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313the invitationo After the preliminary session on June 1
under Chotani’s presidency, where considerable resentment
was expressed against the Congress attitude on non-co-
3l9-operation, a joint Hmdu-Muslim meeting was convened.
Nearly 300 delegates attended, Azad Subhani and Muhammad
Ali of Kasur made a fervent appeal to the Hindus to
support the non-co-operation programme in order to bear
political pressure on the Government. But most of the
Congress leaders were strongly against non-co-operation
or were hesitant to accept it. Mrs. Besant (l89-7“1933)
and Tej Bahadur Sapru (1875-19^9) opposed the scheme
vehemently. Chintamani (1880-19^1) declared that the
plan was unrealistic, and Malaviya and Motilal expressed
their doubts about its practicability. Only B.C. Pal
and Satyamurti (1887-19^7) seemed to support the Muslims 
315m  their ordeal.
Further differences developed on the second day of 
the joint meeting when Hasrat Mohani, the most militant 
of the Khilafatists, suggested joining any Afghan army 
that might invade India to drive out the British. Such 
suggestions, in the context of the hijrat campaign then 
in progress, were bound to cause apprehension among the 
Hindus. Malaviya at once raised strong objections and 
Lajpat Rai warned the Muslim leaders that at the first 
sign of any Afghan involvement 'Hindus would not only 
cease to help, but would actively oppose them'. Shaukat 
Ali, Azad Subhani andZafar Ali Khan assured the Hindu 
leaders that they would fight to a man any invader who 
wanted to conquer India, but the plea made little impact 
for they also appeared sympathetic to the idea of any 
invasion which was undertaken to uphold the prestige of 
Islam. Kidwai also indulged in some sophistry but
313
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could not pacify the Hindus. Even Gandhi's reiteration 
of support to Muslims provided they did not resort to 
violence, failed to save the situation. The meeting
ended in a fiasco without agreement on the non-co-operation
316issue.
Thus, when on June 2 the CKC held its second session 
at Zahur Ahmad’s house, the disappointed Khilafatists 
decided to go ahead with non-co-operation without Congress 
sustenance. All that they had secured was a reaffirmation 
of Gandhi's personal support in the 'war between false 
Christianity and Islam'. On his advice they agreed to 
approach the Viceroy first and to give him one month's 
notice to see if the peace terms were revised. In the 
meantime an internal committee, consisting of Gandhi, 
Shaukat Ali, Abul Kalam Azad, Muhammad Ali of Kasur,
Khatri, Kitchlew and Hasrat Mohani (Chotani refused 
nomination), was appointed to work out the details?^
The interesting feature of the Allahabad meeting was
that it revealed the extent of Hindu apathy towards the
Khilafat movement and its programme. Fear of an Afghan
invasion, real or imaginary, was trumped up to cloak the
real issues. Yet in public, both Shaukat Ali and Gandhi
played down the differences. Shaukat Ali also preferred
not to give much publicity to Gandhi's proposal tco
transpose the third and the fourth stages of the non-
318co-operation programme already accepted. As regards 
Gandhi's claim to 'dictatorship' and Muslim acquiescence 
therein, the whole show was a deliberate stage act by 
the Khilafatists. Evidently, they were exploiting Gandhi's 
weakness for power and leadership and pretended to play 
his game. Otherwise, Gandhi's position in the Khilafat 
movement was, and remained, that of primus inter pares.
For his leadership Gandhi was dependent on the Khilafatists
316
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and without them he had no status, at least among the 
Muslims. He could maintain his shaky hold only by his 
continued support to the Khilafat cause and by guaranteeing 
Hindu co-operation.
Shortly after the Allahabad meeting, the members 
of the Non-Co-Operation Committee of the CKC, with the 
exception of Azad who had been taken ill, assembled at
319Bombay and decided to push the non-co-operation scheme.
A letter to the Viceroy was drafted and circulated for
the leaders' signatures. Eighty-two leading Sunni Muslims
from every province of India signed the letter. Important
abstensions were Abul Kalam Azad and Dr. Ansari. Azad
refused to sign because in his opinion the letter did
not correctly indicate Muslim demands. Ansari was angry
that the powers delegated to the Non-Co-Operation
Committee at Allahabad had been disregarded and objected
320to inviting signatures from outside the Committee.
Nevertheless, on June 22, the memorial, couched in a
moderate but firm tone, was sent to the Viceroy with a
321covering letter from Gandhi.
The signatories, claiming to represent the largest 
body of Sunni Muslim opinion, informed the Viceroy that 
the Turkish peace terms were 'in direct violations of 
the religious sentiments of Mussalmans' and contrary to 
the pledges of the British ministers. In certain 
respects, they contended, 'Turkey had been treated worse 
than other powers' and the Indian Muslims could not 
'bear the thought of the temporal power of the Sultan 
being adversely affected'. Therefore, they requested 
the Viceroy to ask the British Government to secure a 
revision of the peace terms and to warn them that on 
their failure to do so, he (Viceroy) would make common 
cause with the Indian people. 'If unfortunately', the 
signatories declared, 'Your Excellency will not adopt
319
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our humble suggestion, we shall be obliged, as from the 
1st August next, to withdraw co-operation from the Government 
and to ask our co-religionists and Hindu brethren to do 
likewise'„ They expressed the hope that such a serious 
step as non-co-operation would not be necessary and 
assured the Viceroy that 'we shall strive our utmost to 
avoid violence1. They would take up non-co-operation in 
progressive stages 'so as to cause the least necessary 
dislocation or embarrassment to the Government and so as 
to enable us to control and discipline popular feeling'
The memorial was followed the same day by a separate 
letter from Gandhi to the Viceroy in which he explained 
his reasons for associating himself with the Khilafat 
movement. He claimed that, by patient reasoning, he had 
been successful in weaning away the Muslims from the 
hi.jrat and violence, but confessed that he did so not on 
moral but on purely utilitarian grounds. He declared that 
non-co-operation was 'the only dignified and constitutional 
form of such direct action' open to the Muslims. The 
escape from non-co-operation was possible if the Viceroy 
himself led the Khilafat movement. He admitted the risks 
attending the practice of the campaign by the masses, but 
maintained that the fear of 'risks now will be to court 
much greater risks /later/, if not virtual destruction 
of law and order*'.
The non-co-operation campaign was to be inaugurated 
formally on August 1. The items for the first stage 
finally agreed upon were announced on or about June 25.
These were: the surrender of all titles of honour and 
honorary offices; opposition to Government loans; suspension 
by lawyers of practice and settlement of civil disputes 
by private arbitration; boycott of schools by parents; 
boycott of the reformed Councils; non-co-operation in 
Government social parties and similar other functions; 
refusal to accept any civil or military post in Mesopotamia 
or to offer for service in the Turkish territories under
322
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Allied control; and swadeshi. The last two, i.e., refusal 
of civil and military service and swadeshi, as well as 
the refusal to take Government loans, could be started 
immediately. But for the rest the commencement date was
324August 1.
The boycott of the reformed Councils and that of the 
educational institutions and the law courts were innovations 
in the non-co-operation programme and had been incorporated 
after a careful re-appraisal of the situation. In the 
matter of the Council boycott, the CKC was in fact
325preceding Lajpat Rai’s declaration to the same effect
by almost a week. The only difference was that while
the CKC proposed the boycott on the Khilafat issue, Lajpat
Rai advocated it on the basis of the Punjab ’wrong’„ But
then the Khilafatists, especially Mohamed Ali and his
delegation in Britain, were already exploiting the Punjab 
326issue. After the publication of the Hunter Report in
May 1920, the Government's exoneration of O’Dwyer and other
Punjab officials and the inadequate punishment meted out
to Dyer and his glorification in European circles in
India and in Britain, had considerably affected the
327attitude of the Indians. Even the moderates were not
328wanting in their condemnation of the Governments The
Punjab had provided Jinnah and some Bombay Liberals with
329a peg on which to hang the Khilafat grievances. Gandhi,
32^
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ever ready to seize on others’ ideas, quickly changed his 
previous stance and tacked the Punjab issue with the
Khilafat as a bait to attract the Hindus to the non-co-
i. . 330operation campaign1;
Meanwhile, on June 25, the CKC had despatched a secret
letter to various provincial committees throughout the country
urging each of them to send to Bombay a special representative
and a complete provincial census of persons prepared to
act up to the non-co-operation manifesto?^ The provincial
committees were not very optimistic about the campaign,,
Hindus as a community were standing aloof. Its reception
among the various classes of the Muslim community was also
uncertain. The return, in June 1920, of the venerated alim,
Mahmud Iiassan, from a long internment at Malta, and his
unequivocal support for the non-co-operation campaign, had
spurred the Deoband ulama into joining the Khilafatists?^2
but this did not materially alter the situation. It was
still doubtful whether the Taluqdars, Zamindars, titleholders
and the people holding high civil appointments would respond
favourably„ Men like the Nawab of Dacca, the Paja of
Mahmudabad, the Chiefs of the Punjab and other moderates
had long dissociated themselves from the Khilafat movement?1^
The Shia Mujtahids had instructed their followers to stand 
33^aside and the All-India Shia Conference held in Nagina (U„P.) 
in April 1920, had dutifully accepted the decree?"^ The
330
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Qadiani Ahmadis under the direction of Bashir-ud-din Mahmud,
Ahmad, despite the ostracism by the Khilafatists, had
336refused to join the campaign'; Loyalty to the Crown had
■5 -2 :7
always been their motto and they faithfully lived up to it. 
Among them, only the Lahori group of Maulavi Muhammad Ali 
(187^—1951) joined the Khilafatists?^
Even among the Khilafatists there was no unanimity.
Yakub Hasan, for instance, objected to specific items like
the proposal to boycott the educational institutions and
339the reformed Councils. He specifically came down to Bombay
3^0
in the hope of securing the abandonment of these proposals.
KoBu Kuddus Badshah and Abdul Majid Sharar of Madras did
34lnot think that the province was ready yet-; Similarly,
leading Nagpur Muslims declined the CKC’s injunction to test
342public feelings on non-co-operation. The Bihar Provincial
Khilafat Committee reported that there were hardly ten or
twelve people willing to adopt non-co-operation in that 
343province. In the U.P. also there were serious difficulties. 
The Secretary of the Meerut Khilafat Committee informed the 
CKC that only two lawyers in the U.P. were willing to give 
up their practice, and that the public opinion was opposed
336
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to the boycott of the Christian Mission schools and colleges.
The Punjab also appeared to be strongly opposed to the
34bnon-co-operation programme. In Delhi Khwaja Hassan
Nizami and his supporters were disgruntled at the rejection
of their proposal to extend non-co-operation to the Indian 
346States. On the whole, the provincial reports indicated
that many local leaders preferred to postpone the operation
of the non-co-operation campaign until after the special
347Congress in September 1920. But the CKC went ahead with 
the preparations. It probably hoped to carry the public 
opinion once non-co-operation was underway.
The policy of the Government of India, in spite of
348the fact that anxiety had caused Chelmsford neuralgia,
remained unchanged. Even when the Nizam, who had in his
own dominions clamped down restrictions on the Khilafat 
349activity, coaxed him that ’time for preventive measures 
350has surely come', and strong provincial governors rattled 
351at him, he preferred to wait at least until after August 1. 
In any case the Government of India's hands were tied by 
the joint opinion of the Advocate General and the Standing 
Counsel, Bengal, that it was doubtful whether a case would 
stand against Gandhi and Shaukat Ali under ordinary 
criminal law before the Khilafat movement had reached its 
second or third stage, i.e., relinquishment of civil
352appointments or withdrawal from the army or the police.
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All through the month of July 1920, Gandhi and
Shaukat Ali, accompanied by Kitchlew, Agha Safdar,
Saraladevi Chaudhrani (1872-195^ +) and others, went up
and down Northern India to explain the non-co-operation
353programme and to wxn support for it. Towards the end 
of the month, the Non-Co-Operation Committee of the CKC 
issued instructions advising full hartal on August 1.
Mill hands were not to participate without the employers1 
permission, nor were persons engaged in essential services
- hospital workers, sanitary men and dock workers - required 
to abstain. The Day was to be devoted to prayers and 
fasting. Meetings were to be held throughout the country 
where resolutions urging revision of the Turkish peace 
terms were to be passed and sent to the Viceroy for 
transmission to the Imperial Government. The Committee 
made it clear that since the campaign was not civil 
disobedience, there were to be no processions or unrestrained 
speeches of any kind. All police and Government instructions 
and regulations, such as the Seditious Meetings Act, were
to be 'strictly and scrupulously obeyed'. The Committee
expressed its hope that all title-holders, Honorary
Magistrates, Justices of Peace, Members of the Legislative
Councils, 'who feel about this important question affecting
the well-being of millions of Muslims', would renounce
35^1*their titles and honorary posts on that day.
Such was the situation in India at the end of July 
1920. From a limited protest of the educated classes the 
Khilafat movement, despite the divisions among the Muslims, 
had become a mass agitation. It drew its support both 
from the illiterate masses and the educated elite, though 
initially the latter were more vehemently vocal. Its 
centre of gravity, which of course shifted from time to 
time was both in Muslim minority and majority provinces
- the U.P., Bombay, the Punjab and Bengal. The religious 
appeal was the most dominant, but it was not the only 
reason which attracted all that sustenance for the movement.
353
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In fact the agitation ran at two different levels.
Whereas, with the illiterate it was mostly a religious 
issue, for the politically-minded it was both religious 
and political in as much as they could whip the Government 
with it. The traditionally moderate politicians and the 
propertied blite were apprehensive too, but they were 
not prepared to go to extreme lengths in making the 
Government accede to their demands. The significance 
of the Khilafat movement lies in the fact that it drew 
into its fold the whole galaxy of Muslim leadership, 
counting in its ranks some of the most influential 
politicians, ulama, financiers, journalists, and professional 
men from all walks of life. The participation of the 
Hindus, though on a very limited scale, also added to its 
strength. The CKC itself became the most powerful 
political body in India, even more comprehensive than 
either the Muslim League or the Congress.
But the Khilafatists, inevitably, were heading 
towards a clash with the Government. The failure of the 
British Government to accede to any of their demands had 
turned despair into reckless emotionalism which was held 
in check only by the restraining influence of Gandhi,
Ajmal Khan,Ansari, Chotani and other leaders of their 
stance. But their hold was precarious. The situation 
could have been saved by a sympathetic attitude of the 
British Government but unfortunately the interests of the 
imperial policy clashed with those of the subject people.
Thus, for the Khilafatists non-co-operation seemed to be
the only alternative. The stage had been set for the
opening of a new chapter in the history of Indian nationalism.
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CHAPTER III
THE HIJRAT
In the summer of 1920, when the Khilafatists were still
considering the final course of action, thousands of Indian Muslims,
under severe emotional stress, began to emigrate to the neighbouring
Muslim country of Afghanistan. Believing that India was no longer
1safe for Islam they had sought refuge in the hi.jrat or voluntary 
withdrawal as the only course left open to them.
In a country like India, where the rulers were Christian, the
whole matter according to the sunni ulama hinged upon the question
whether India was dar al-harb or dar al-Islam. The controversy began
with the famous fatwa of Shah Abdul Aziz (1748-1824) declaring India
2under the British dar al-harb; it had continued to raise its head
1
Voluntary exodus is not peculiar to Islam. Other notable examples 
are those of the Plebeians to secure rights from the Patricians of 
Ancient Rome, the planned flight of the Israelites, the withdrawal 
of the Puritan Fathers from England and the emigration of Doukhobors 
from Russia. For the hi.jrat of 1920 see Map I.
2
What had disturbed the Delhi alim was the progressive interference 
by the British with the inherited tradition and practice of the 
Islamic law. Shah Abdul Aziz issued Ms ruling on the ground that 
the country was being ruled not by the orders of the * Imam-ul-Muslimin1 
but those of the Christian rulers. His attitude becomes clearer when 
his ruling is contrasted with his approach towards the Hindu Marathas 
under whom India was dar al-Islam, as they had not replaced the 
Islamic legal system by one of their own. With regard to India under 
the British, the ruling of his disciple, Abdul Haiy (d. 1828), was even 
more specifics it was 'the country of the Enemy', for 'no recourse is 
made to our holy law*. Both Abdul Aziz and Abdul Haiy, believed in 
encouraging the, hi.jrat, should it become necessary. But these rulings 
were mere angry protestations of academic theologians trying to 
satisfy the religious qualms of those forced to live under Christian 
rule. For Shah Abdul Aziz's fatwa see Fatawa-i-Azizi, I, Calcutta, 
1906, pp. 32-35* For his approach towards the Marathas see Aziz 
Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-1964« London,
1967> P* 19* Abdul Haiy's ruling is quoted in W.W. Hunter, The 
Indian Musalmans, London, 1871, p. 140. For their views on the hi.jrat 
see Aziz Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment, 
London, 1964? P* 215. For the analysis of Abdul Aziz's fatwa also 
see P. Hardy, Muslims of British India, Cambridge, 1972? p. 51*
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3
over the years. Most often the solution had been sought in the 
classical interpretation of the Islamic tenets which prescribe 
.jihad or hi.jratClassically, the dar al-harb includes those 
countries where the Muslim law is not in force in the matter of 
worship and the protection of the 'Faithful' and the zimmis.
When a Muslim country does become a dar al-harb, it is incumbent 
upon all Muslims to withdraw to a dar al-Islam and reconquer the
3
Rashid Ahmad Gangohi is reported to have fought against the 
British in 1857s but by 1898 he was preaching loyalty in their 
favour (Se’e above,, p. 19 ). In the. collection of his fatawa 
published later in 1924? he, however, appears non-committal.
See Fatawa-i-Rashidi.yya, I, Muradabad, 1906, pp. 76 & 87* The opposite 
views were more explicitly expressed during the revived Mu.jahidin 
excitement of 1870s by Karamat Ali Jounpuri, Syed Ahmed Khan and 
Obeidullah Obeidi Suhrawardy, who denied that India was dar al-harb.
See Abstract of the Proceedings of the Mahomedan Literary Society 
of Calcutta. Lecture by Moulvi Karamat Ali (of Jounpore) on a question 
of Mahomedan Law Involving the Duty of Mahomedans in British India 
towards the Ruling Power, Calcutta, 1871J Syed Ahmed Khan, Review 
on Dr. Hunter's Indian Musalmans, Benares, 1872? and Sir Hassan 
Suhrawardy, 'India', in A.J. Arberry and R. Landau, ed#, Islam To-day, 
London, /194?7» P* 204* Also see Maulvi Cheragh Ali, The Proposed 
Political, Legal, and Social Reforms in the Ottoman Empire and 
other Mohammadan States, Bombay, 1883, pp. 23-25? Abdur Rahim, The 
Principles of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, London, 1911, p. 397? 
Maqalat-i-Shibli, I, Azamgarh, 1930-34? PP« 182-87? and Shams-ul- 
Ulama Syed Muhammad Nazir Hussain Muhaddis Dehlavi, Fatawa-i- 
Haziriyya„ II, Delhi, 1918, pp. 39? 41? 47 and 472-73* For Shia 
views see Hunter, op. cit., pp. 115-19? and for Ahmadi views see 
Khwaja Kamal-ud-din, Attitude of Muslims of India Towards British 
Government and other Muslim and non-Muslim Powers, Lahore, 1912, 
pp. 10-11. It is interesting that the controversy still exists in 
India to-day. The known opinion of the ulama, especially of 
Maulana Saeed Ahmad Akbarabadi of the Aligarh University, is, 
however, in favour of regarding India dar al-Islam. Their argument 
is that Muslims share in the running of the government and that they 
enjoy religious freedom. As a corollary, Pakistan's war with India, 
as in 1965 and 1971? is not considered a jihad. See 'Jihad', A.j Kal 
(Delhi), XXX, Ho. 6, Jan. 1972, pp. 8-10.
4
Notable examples of jihad and hi j rat in India were the Mu.jahidin 
movement of Saiyid Ahmad of Bareilly, the Faraizi movement of Haji 
Shariatullah (1781-1840) of Bengal, the participation of the ulama 
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For a legal and religious discussion of the .jihad see M. Hamidullah, 
Muslim Conduct of State, Lahore, /194.57, pp. 150-59? and Majid 
Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, Baltimore, 1955? PP*
51-82.
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c
dar al-harb, erstwhile dar al-Islam. When in 622 A.L. the Prophet 
performed the hi.jrat to Medina with his followers , he returned to 
Mecca eight years later as a conqueror. The supporters of the
hi.jrat of 1920, in advocating emigration to Afghanistan, had this
, . . 6very end an view.
The question arose whether in the circumstances, when their 
rulers were endangering the Khilafat, Muslims should leave the 
’unholy country' of India and go to some other land under Muslim 
rule. Such views had already been expressed by the Ali brothers 
in their memorial to the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, in April, 1919s
When a land is not safe for Islam a Muslim has only 
two alternatives, Jehad or Hijrat. That is to say, 
he must either make use of every force God has given 
him for the liberation of the land and the ensurement 
of perfect freedom for the practice and preaching of 
Islam, or he must migrate to some other and freer 
land with a view to return to it when it is once more 
safe for Islam....In view of our weak condition, 
migration is the only alternative for us....This step, 
which we shall now have to consider with all the 
seriousness that its very nature demands, will be
perhaps the most decisive in the history of our
community since the Hi.jrat of our Holy Prophet.7
Other Khilafatists held somewhat similar views. Abul Kalam
Azad, for instance, believed that hi.jrat was an important
constituent of the five pillars which firmly held the structure
of the Islamic society, i.e., .jamaat or adherence to the Caliph,
assama or rallying to his call, taat or obedience to him and
.jihad or religious war. To him the hi.jrat wa3 a sacrifice of
inferior gains for nobler objectives. It was noble because it
8inculcated a spirit of sacrifice. Though the Khilafatists in
9
general held the same opinion, the Ali brothers were the principal
5 Shorter Enolyolopaedia of Islam, ed., H.A.R. Gibb and J.H.
Kramers, Leiden, 1953, P* 69
6
V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 667, Aug. 13, 1920, CP.
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8
Shorish Kashmiri, ed., Khutbat-i-Azad, 3*kl ed., Lahore, 1944? PP*
pp. 220-28
9
See, e.g., Zafar Ali Khan1 s views in Taqarir-i-Maulana Zafar Ali 
Khan, n.d., pp. 36 and 50. For Ataullah and others see G.H. Sokhta,
Lastan-i-Hi,jrat, Amritsar, 1921, p. 4*5 and ICBPP, Aug. 1920, Pro. No.71.
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advocates of an actual exodus. Their speeches at the Amritsar
Khilafat Conference in December 1919? and later during their tour
of the Northern India in January and February 1920, bordered closely
11on calls to jihad and hi.jrat.
If any incitement was needed, it was provided by Amir Amanullah
Khan (1892-1960) of Afghanistan, who had been trading on the
excited state of the Indian Muslims. In the call for hi.jrat, the
Amir found an excellent opportunity to embarrass the British. In
a speech delivered at Kabul on the anniversary of the murder of
his father (February 20/21, 1920) the Amir undertook to welcome all
those Muslims and Hindus who intended to migrate. He even offered
to sacrifice his own life for the Faith and for the defence of the
Khilafat, vehemently opposing any suggestion for the settlement of
12the Khilafat question by 'infidel powers'.
A further weight to the earnestness of the Amir's offer was
lent by the professed support for the Khilafat movement and Turkey
by the Afghan delegation, which had arrived in India in April 1920,
for negotiations with the Government of India on the resumption of
friendly relations}^ Mahmud Tarzi (1866-1955)? the Afghan
Foreign Minister who was heading the Mission, was reported to have
remarked on April 16 in a speech after the Friday prayers at the
Landour mosque near Mussoorie, that the principal object of the
delegation in coming to India was to secure just and favourable
treatment for Turkey}^ He referred to the Amir's speech of the
preceding February reassuring his audience that the Amir would
15welcome Muslims who felt compelled to leave India.
10
Iqbal Shaidai's memoirs, Imroze (Lahore), May 4? 1969.
11
See Shaukat Ali (Alig.), ed., Mohamed Ali, Lahore, 1922, p. 58? 
and V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 82, Feb. 2, 1920, CP.
12 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 426 - S, April 12, 1920, PSSF, P. 7020/20 
with 1061/19, XI.
15
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14
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15
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1967, p. 155.
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The gesture was in fact never meant seriously by the Afghan
Government. Their motive in encouraging the hi.jrat was to
embarrass the British and thereby to strengthen their own bargaining
position at the Mussoorie talks^ But the 'invitation' evoked
great response in India. The Indian Muslims were led to believe
that the Afghans would welcome them with open arms. The asylum
given by the Afghans in the past to Indian pan-Islamists,
17revolutionaries and runaway students had further encouraged them 
in this belief. Impressed by the attitude of the Afghan Mission,
T O
a number of Khilafatists got in touch with the delegates. The
Khilafat Workers Conference which was being held at Delhi at that
time welcomed the Afghan offers and emphasised the necessity of 
19pihad or hi.jrat. Even the CKC, not realising that the Afghan
overtures were merely a propaganda stunt, released to the press
20a summary of the Amir's promises. The speech received wide
publicity and considerable enthusiasm was exhibited for the hi.jrat
21in various parts of the country.
In the furore that followed, the ulama were approached to
express their views on hi.jrat and thus give a lead to those who
22were planning to migrate. But the ulama were divided. The
16
Zafar Hassan Aybek, Aao Biti, I, Lahore, /l96f[7> PP* 202-4.
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Abdul Qaiyum (1066-1957) that his Government could easily get rid 
of the Indian revolutionaries and the Bolshevists 'if it were made 
worthwhile1. See PSM, A. 190, p. 7*
17
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18
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Conference at Mussoorie, PSSF, P. 7382/20 with IO61/19, II.
22
Siyasat (Lahore), May 21, 1920, PNNR 1920, p. 107.
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protagonists of the hi.jrat argued that religious injunctions were
absolutely clear on the points the countries under non-Muslim
domination fell under the category of dar al-harb and those under
Muslim rulers were dar al-Islam. Moreover, the Prophet had already
set an example and the Muslims should follow it. The hi.jrat from
India could be easily managed as there were sympathisers abroad who
could look after the muha.jirin. The emigration of a few lakhs out
of a population of several crores would cause no calamity. The chief
supporters of this argument were Muniruzzaman Islamabadi of Bengal
and Azad Subhani of Cawnpore, but others like Abdur Razzaq of
Malihabad (1895-1959)? Pir Mahbub Shah of Sind, Ahmad Ali (1877-1962)
and 2afar Ali Khan of Lahore, Mohyuddin of Kasur, Muhammad Abdul
Abu Turab, Ataullah (1891-1961) and Baud Ghaznavi of Amritsar and
Muhammad Ishaq, Muhammad Irfan (d. 1959) and Abdul Ghafoor of the
23
Frontier were more or less of the same opinion.
On the other hand, there were those who were disinclined to 
launch a mass migration, even though they believed that the 
unfriendly attitude of the British towards the Khilafat question 
had made India uncongenial for Islam. Even Abdul Bari, who had
2 A
recently debated with Azad in favour of .jihad and hi j rat. * thought
it more expedient to regard India as dar al-Islam and to reject
25
the idea of an exodus. He maintained that though Shah Abdul Aziz 
had declared India dar al-harb, he had not pronounced the hi.jrat 
to be mandatory. In any case, he preferred to wait until such time 
that the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama had given its verdict?^ Even when the 
supporters of the hi.jrat accused Abdul Bari of fickleness and
25
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Bari, n.d., Hueush (Lahore), CIX, April/May, 1968, p. 198; Sokhta, 
op. cit., pp. 3-4? A.H. Khan, ed., Mard-i-Momin, Lahore, 1964?
J&P, 5259/20, 5446/20, 6728/20 and 6882/20; ICHRP, Aug. 1920, Pro,
Ho. 71? and various other documents in CP and GP.
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brought pressure to bear upon him to revise his views he remained 
27firm. All he would do was to advise reflection and deliberation
28before embarking on the hi.jrat. The ulama of Deoband too remained
cautious and those of the Ahl-i-Hadis, especially Sanaullah, tried
to wriggle out of the difficult situation by making non-committal
29pronouncements. Others still maintained a mysterious silence.
The hesitancy on the part of the majority of the ulama spurred
those who liked to strike at the British from abroad. When in
April 1920, over an appeal from Delhi to the intending muhajirin,
Abdul Bari issued his advice they deliberately misinterpreted it
as a fatwa enjoining the hi.jrat with a view to freeing India and 
30Khilafat. As a matter of fact Abdul Bari had repeatedly
31rejected the idea of the hi.jrat. But since the excitement had
reached fever pitch, he hesitated to correct the interpretation put
32upon his statement. When he eventually got round to do it, 
thousands had already left for Afghanistan.
About the same time, Abul Kalam Azad, who a short time before
had argued that the hi.jrat was not possible as Muslims had no place 
33to go to, now issued a fatwa advocating the hi.jrat. He declared
27
Muniruzzaman Islamabadi to Abdul Bari, n.d., above, n. 23; 
and Abdul Bari, Khutba-i-Sadarat, p. 26.
28
Sokhta, op. cit., p. 3* Kor the views of Farangi Mahal also 
see Raza Ansari, ed., Fatawa Farangi Mahal, Farangi Mahal, 1965, 
pp. 81 and 175-76.
29
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30
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1920, above, n. 20; Jhang Sial, April 30, 1920, PNNR 1920, 
p. 188; Habibur Rahman to Hakim Barham Gorakhpuri, May 12, 1920, 
in M.M. Yasin Chiriakoti1, Attanqid Alai Khilafah, Gorakhpur, 
/I9227, p. 78; Sokhta, op. cit,, p. 3; Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, 
Pathway to Pakistan, Lahore, 1961, p. 56; and Maqbool Ahmad, 
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that for the Indian Muslims there was no shari alternative to 
hi.jrat. Before the War the hi.jrat was commendable, but now it 
was mandatory. But Azad admitted that it was neither possible nor 
desirable for the entire Muslim population in India to migrate. 
Those staying behind were advised to take part in the struggle 
for the Khilafat and to non-co-operate with the Government. He 
suggested that the exodus should be planned and organised in a 
proper way and that baiat be performed before embarking on the 
venture. He, therefore, advised those 'seeking righteousness' to 
get in touch with him or obtain instructions from Abdul Qadir and 
Mohyuddin of Kasur, Baud Ghaznavi of Amritsar and Abdur Razzaq 
of Malihabad?^
The pro-hi.jrat Khilafatists, thus armed with the fatwa and
emboldened by the Afghan overtures, worked up an active hijrat 
35campaign. Hi.jrat committees were set up at a number of places in 
the country to provide facilities to the intending muhajirin.
Corps of volunteers were enlisted to assist in the work. Efforts 
were also made to familiarise the masses with the religious aspects 
of the hijrat and jihad. The propaganda was launched in those 
provinces where the response seemed to be visibly strong or the 
organisers themselves enjoyed considerable influence - the U.P., 
Sind, the Punjab, and later the Frontier. Propaganda leaflets 
were widely circulated and preachers appointed to spread the 
campaign. Mosques were frequently utilised for this purpose. 
r^l^ie maulavis preached from the pulpit that the Muslims who did not
34
The exact date of the fatwa is not known. But from internal 
evidence it appears that it was given in April or May 1920. The 
fatwa was published by the Ahl-i-Hadis (Amritsar), in its issue 
of July 30, 1920. See Ghulam Rasul Mihr, ed., Tabarkat-i-Azad, 
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migrate would become infidels. Writers stirred popular emotions
through prose and poetry. The vernacular press published rosy
accounts of life in Afghanistan. The people were told stories of
red carpet receptions which awaited the mahajirina that the Amir
had promised them a tract of fertile land in Jabal-us-Siraj; that
they would be helped and fed by their Afghan co-religionists; and
that for three months they would have to do no work at all. The
other aspect of this propaganda was more sinister, although the
Khilafatists do not seem to have been directly responsible for this.
Through the inventiveness of scandal-mongers, wild rumours were spread
that Mecca and Medina were in British occupation and that the Kaaba
had been destroyed; that the study of the Quran was being prohibited
in India; and that Sunday, and not Friday, was to be fixed as the
day for prayers. This had great effect on the simple-minded peasantry 
36and the illiterate.
But though the appeal to the hi.jrat was based primarily on
religious injunctions, other factors had combined to make it
effective. Among these was the desperate economic condition of the
Indian peasantry. There were some people who were attracted by the
37prospects of improving their lot in Afghanistan. The hijrat was
thus most widely accepted in those areas - the II.P. (in the early
stages), Sind and the Frontier - where the economic condition of
the peasantry was particularly bad. In the Punjab, where their lot
was comparatively better, the rural areas were much less affected.
There were also some militant Muslims who wished to go to Turkey
via Afghanistan in order to fight for the Caliph^ Yet others
found in the hijrat an opportunity to go abroad and, with the help
of a friendly foreign power, find some way of striking at the British 
39power in India. Thus, not unnaturally, the 'extremists’ among the 
hijrat leaders encouraged the venture with the ultimate view of
36
Ibid. Also see Haji Ahmad, Dard-i-Khilafat, Aligarh, 1921 (in 
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overthrowing British dominance in India by paralysing the Government!^
Whatever the reasons, the hi.jrat received a fair impetus!^ -
The Zemindar of May 7? 1920, announced that 1338 persons, corresponding
to the number of the Muslim hi.jra era, were ready to proceed at once 
42to Afghanistan. Consequently, a number of the muha.jirin began to
arrive in Peshawar, mostly from Delhi and Lahore and a few from 
43Bhopal. And already some enthusiasts had secretly started crossing
the border!^ Early in May 1920, the Political Agent, Khyber, reported
that forty persons had reached Jalalabad through routes other than 
45the Khyber. But the hi.jrat as an organised exodus may be said to 
have begun on May 15? 1920, - the day the peace terms with Turkey 
were published in India - when the first qafila of some eager
muha.jirin crossed the border for Kabul 'with great happiness and
14^  success'7
But the exodus was slow. Though large numbers had enrolled
themselves, the number of the actual emigrants was small. By the
end of June 1920, only about 133 persons, mostly from the central
Punjab districts, Delhi, Bhopal, Bikaner and Peshawar, had emigrated 
47to Afghanistan!' Earlier that month, the Viceroy, giving his reasons
40
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41
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for this slow progress, had reported to the Secretary of States 
'The prospect Jot the hijrat/ is not attractive5 there is to be no
return from emigration and those wishing to emigrate cannot receive
A
any financial help'7 But the more important factor in this connection
was the reluctance of the CKC and the Jaraiyat-ul-Ulama to patronise
the hijrat. At their meetings at Allahabad, in the first week of
June 1920, both the organisations, despite Azad's fatwa and Shaukat
Ali's pleadings, had pronounced the hijrat optional and decided that
there was to be no emigration en masse. Only the common people were
to embark on the venture, the real workers staying behind to carry on 
49the work7 Primarily, the reason for this decision was the 
preoccupation of the CKC and the Jamiyat with the proposed 
inauguration of the non-co-operation programme. Until that had been 
launched and practised they could not think of taking up another 
venture like the hijrat. Besides, the hijrat was encountering strong
opposition from prominent Khilafatists and moderates like Ajmal
50 51 52 53 RAKhan, Kitchlew, Jrnnah, Shafi, Fazl-i-Husain, Iqbal and others.
They honestly believed that the venture was not in the best interest
of the community and did all in their power to stem its tide.
Similarly, Bashir-ud-din Mahmud Ahmad of Qadian strongly protested
48
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C (T
against the venture. Even Mahmud Hassan, after his return to
56India, did not seem to be enthusiastic about it.
A more important influence on the CKC was the opposition from
57the Hindu Press and Hindu leaders.' Gandhi himself was utterly
opposed to the hi.jrat though he did not venture to condemn it 
58publicly. He argued that Muslim withdrawal from India was not
a practical step as ’we cannot think of bringing pressure on the
59Government through it’^  Therefore, he pressed for the hi.jrat 
being held over until the last stage of non-co-operation had been 
gone through^0 The Khilafatists had realised that if they were to 
retain Hindu support, they must remove the fear of an invasion from 
the tfee North-West which the hi.jrat campaign seemed to have
encouraged. Thus, it is not surprising to see Shaukat Ali agreeing 
to the decision of the CKC to discourage the hi.jrat. In a statement 
issued in the first week of July 1920, he reaffirmed that so long
55
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as non-co-operation was not pushed to its logical conclusion, it
would be unwise to take up the hijrat as it was likely to divide
61attention and mar the unity of action.
But the set-back to the hijrat campaign was only temporary.
As the Muslim Deputy Commissioner of Hissar (Punjab) had observeds
’Whatever may be the fate of the emigration movement, the hijrat
62of men’s mind towards Kabul has commenced'. Prom early July 1920,
as a result of fresh efforts, the enrolment of the muhajirin
63increased and more and more began to proceed on the hijrat. But
it was in Sind that the hijrat activity was most conspicuous.
The Bombay Government, which was anxious not to precipitate trouble
by provoking the excited Muslims, allowed a special train to be
arranged through the railway authorities. Eventually, in the first
week of July 1920, about 750 muhajirin, far fewer than the twenty-
five thousand originally announced, accompanied by their families,
left for Peshawar under Jan Muhammad Junejo (d. 1920), a leading
Sind barrister^ Attempts to stop them at the behest of Abul Kalam
65Azad did not succeed.
The news about the Sind contingent produced a wave of
excitement in Upper India and gave a fillip to the hijrat,
66particularly in the Punjab. Their arrival in Peshawar spurred 
the campaign in the Prontier, since the province was already sullen 
over the killing of a muhajir by a British soldier in a fracas at
67Katcha Garhi, a small railway station between Peshawar and Jamrud.'
Hindu, July 8, 1920.
62
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The official communique on this tragedy, which had laid the entire
68 69 blame on the muha.jirin, had inflamed feelings still further.
By the end of July 1920, the hi.jrat had become fairly intensive
in the Frontier. Most seriously affected were the rural areas in
the Peshawar and the Mardan districts, particularly the Doaba and the
Hashtnagar tracts of the Charsadda sub-division. The peasants
gave up their agricultural pursuits and abandoned their lands in
70anticipation of joining the hijrat! Crafty landlords and speculators,
mostly Hindus, exploited the ignorant and encouraged them to emigrate
in order to buy up cheaply the property and crops of the intending 
71muha.jirin! As a result, the poor peasants were forced to sell
their belongings at very low prices. At some places in the Frontier
land valued at Rs. 10,000 could not fetch even Rs. 100. Cow
buffaloes worth Rs. 200 were offered at Rs, 40. Crops and houses
72were similarly undervalued!
Gradually, the whole of the Frontier came under the surging
tide of the hijrat. The excitement spread to Kohat, Hazara and
the Tribal areas. The hijrat of large numbers, particularly through
the Mohmand country, produced an unsettling effect on the Afridis
73and the tribes north of the river Kabul! The maulavis used this
74opportunity to stir up anti-Government feelings! Twice in August
1920, the tribesmen attacked the British post at Oghi but they were 
75repu-lsed! In retaliation the Government resorted to aerial 
bombardment; but it took time before the situation returned to 
normalcy, especially because of the adamant attitude of the
68
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tribesmen!®
The hi.jrat propaganda, combined with the non-co-operation
campaign, had also penetrated the services. Its effect on the army
77was specially disturbing to the military authorities. Most of the
muha.jirin came from areas from where recruits were drawn. Muslim
soldiers, already agitated over the rumours of the desecration of
the kaaba, now were extremely disturbed by alarmist letters from
home reporting that some of their near relations were emigrating!®
The Punjabi battalion serving in the Khyber was considerably alarmed 
79by the propaganda. The military detachment in Sukkur was also 
80affected, A serious situation developed among the 127th Baluchis
at Multan; General Woodyatt, the brigade commander at Ferozepur, had
81to rush to the scene. By early August, the number of Muslim
soldiers who had proceeded on the hi.jrat was equivalent to one
82complete company with its Indian officers. One qafila of the
85muha.jirin included a havildar and six sepoys. More were still
resigning and desertions were also reported?^
The Government of India and the Local Governments, which had 
been following a policy of cautious watchfulness, now became extremely 
apprehensive, particularly in view of the close historical connection
76
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85"between the hi.jrat and .jihad. As a precautionary measure Safar Ali
86Khan’s entry into the Frontier was prohibited. In order to check 
the concentrated flow of the muha.jirin, the Government of India, at 
the recommendation of the Frontier and the Punjab Governments, withdrew
o7
the facilities of providing special trains to the muha.jirin and
88attempted to persuade the Muslims to drop the campaign altogether.
But instead of taking any overt action, the Government encouraged the
89local officers to dissuade people from going. Care was also taken
through publicity officers to let the Muslims know that Hindus were
90profiting at the expense of the muha.jirin. As regards the government
servants intending to proceed on the hi.jrat, the Frontier authorities
had, as early as May 1920, warned them that they would be refused
91re-employment if they decided to return. Efforts were also made to
check disaffection in the army. But no restrictions were put on
persons wishing to resign lest it should be interpreted as an
interference with their religion. Short leave was liberally granted
to the soldiers whose families were proceeding on the hijrat to
enable them to put their home affairs in order, for if leave were to
be refused this would have provoked discontent without stopping 
92desertions. The disaffected units were posted away from the Frontier
85
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93for the time being. To forestall panic among Muslim soldiers 
serving abroad their military commanders were directed to pacify 
them?^
Meanwhile, endless streams of intending muha.jirin kept descending
on Peshawar from various parts of India, as far as Bhopal and South
India, but mostly from the Frontier, the Punjab and Sind. In many
cases whole families, and in some, whole villages had set out for
the hijrat. By August 3? 1920, the number of the muhajirin who had
crossed into Afghanistan, had reached 13,000. Less than a week
later, it shot up to over 20,000 and more were still crossing the 
95border; At the outset, the Frontier muhajirin came from humble 
classes, but as the excitement increased, some wealthy Khans of
96good landowning families also began to emigrate in large numbers;
97The more wealthy financed the passage of their poorer companions;
The Sind muhajirin, like those of the Frontier, also came from the
poorer classes with a sprinkling of well-to-do people. Most of the
leading men, however, did not go beyond Peshawar and then returned -
except for a few, like the barrister, Jan Muhammad Junejo, who
98migrated with a large party of supporters. Unlike those from the
Frontier and Sind, the muhajirin from the Punjab were mainly from
99towns, owning no land and included no men of prominence. The rural 
areas of the Punjab seem to have been affected but little, due 
perhaps to the powerful influence of the loyal landowning classes
93
General Woodyatt to GOC, Murree, Tel. P., 88-1-1. A., Aug.
19, 1920, above, n. 81.
94
CGS, India, to GOC, Baghdad and repeated to other GOCs abroad, 
Tel. P., No. 1435 - 7 M.O. 3-» Sept. 18, 1920, J&P, 6882/20.
95
C/C, N.W.F.P., to Foreign Secy., Govt, of India, Tel. P., No. 
285-N., Aug. 3, 1920? and C/c, N.W.F.P., to Foreign Secy., Govt, 
of India, Tel. P., No. 314-N., Aug. 9, 1920, J&P, 6728/20. Also 
see F.S. Briggs, op. pit., p. 165#
96
Ibid.
For instance, a Frontier chief, Arbab Muhammad Ghulam Raza, Khan 
of Matha Khel, migrated with 500 followers and defrayed the entire 
expenses of the ninth qafila of the muhajirin. See Vakil, July 6, 
1920, republished by Muslim Outlook, Aug. 19, 1920, J&P, 1676/20.
96
Secy, to the Govt, of Bombay, Special Dept,, to Secy, to Govt* of 
India, Home Dept., Tel. P., No. 723-S.D., Aug. 2, 1920*, I CUPP, Nov. 
1920, Pro. No. 45,   ~
99
V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 661, Aug. 13, 1920, CP.
- 135 -
and because of the efforts of the moderates like Shafi and
-n. i • it • 1 0 0Fazl-i-Husam.
The procedure adopted by the Peshawar Hijrat Committee for the 
onward transmission of the muhajirin to Afghanistan was quite 
effective. On arrival in Peshawar, the muhajirin were met by the 
representatives of the local hijrat committee who took them to 
various sarais which had been set up for their stay. During their 
stay in Peshawar, the muhajirin were supplied board and lodging by 
the committee. A corps of two hundred volunteers had been raised 
to look after their needs. The intending muhajirin then registered 
their names with the committee which sent the list to the Afghan 
Agent for the issue of the passes. This having been arranged, 
the muhajirin then proceeded to Jamrud, some miles from the Afghan 
border. They stayed at Jamrud on Thursday nights preparatory to 
their departure to Afghanistan through the Khyber pass on Fridays. 
They proceeded weekly and only on regular caravan days^'1'
The majority of the muhajirin being poor, they set out either
on foot or in bullock carts and tongas all the way to Kabul, a
distance of nearly 200 miles from Peshawar. To their economic
misery were added the hazards of the journey. The muhajirin had
to pass through barren mountainous .country in the heat of Indian
summer. Food and water were scarce. Once they left the Indian
territory their trek turned into a nightmare, Jalalabad was the
first major Afghan town on way to Kabul, where the tired muhajirin
could stop for some time. But Jalalabad was a small town and had no
102facilities to offer. In spite of the Amir's promises to furnish
the muhajirin with the necessaries of life and to recompense them
103with concessions in land and in revenue, very little was done.
100
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101
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General Nadir Khan (1880-1933)? the Afghan Commander-in-Chief, had 
appointed officials at Kanur, Dakka and Jalalabad to look after the 
muhajirin^^ but he did not have enough resources to cope with the 
increasing numbers.
In Kabul the muha.jirin were accommodated in a few tents as were
available at the Chaman Hazuri. No suitable arrangements being
available for all, the majority of them were left at the mercy of
105the Afghans and had to undergo incalculable hardships. y The leading
Indians in Kabul like Obeidullah Sindhi and hr. Abdul Ghani did all
in their power to help thenn^ An unofficial welfare committee, the
Anjuman-i-Muhajirin, was formed to look after the immigrants'
107interests. But in view of the sheer numbers and the unsympathetic 
attitude of the Afghan Government the Anjuman could not make much 
headway.
The muhajirin themselves were disunited politically and
ideologically. The main groups were two in number: the pan-Islamists
108and the Bolshevik sympathisers. Obeidullah Sindhi and his 
pan-Islamic associates, supported by the Afghan Government, encouraged 
the muhajirin to move on to Jabal-us-Siraj and take up residence there. 
In this way the Afghan Government wished to relieve Kabul of congestion 
and at the same time hoped to control the muhajirin effectively.
Among the pan-Islamists themselves, a group led by Maulvi Abdul Haq.
(d, 1925) was in favour of proceeding immediately to Turkey to fight 
for the Caliph. On the other side, Abdur Bab Peshawari, an Indian 
revolutionary who had come over from Russia, encouraged the young 
muhajirin to go to Bolshevik Russia. But because of the explicit 
orders of the Amir, a large number of the muhajirin had to proceed 
to Jabal-us-Siraj, where they went through another round of hardships. 
Many died through disease or the rigours of climate!^ others became
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weary of the idle life. They held meetings in Kabul and delivered 
an 'ultimatum' to the Afghan Government to provide them with jobs 
or else face the consequences'!^
Alarmed by these developments the Afghan Government tried to
contain the discontent. But, by early August 1920, the number of
111the muhajirin in Afghanistan had grown to more than 40,000.
Even this estimate was not accurate, as large numbers of the
muhajirin had been emigrating without the assistance of the hijrat
committee and many had not even bothered to notify the Afghan
authorities. Besides, a number of the muhajirin had wound their
way through routes other than the Khyber, notably through the
Mohmand country and the Tochi pass. On top of this, the hijrat was
still in progress and the muhajirin were pouring in at the rate of
seven to eight thousand a week. Quite justifiably, the Afghan
authorities panicked and decided to stop further emigration.
They manoeuvred the Anjuman-i-Muhajirin into petitioning the Amir
112to issue orders to that effect.
On August 9, 1920, the Amir issued a farman, promulgating that 
only after the previous muhajirin had been absorbed, would any 
fresh emigrants be allowed into Afghanistan. In future the 
muhajirin were to be admitted piecemeal on a fixed quota. They 
were first to obtain passports from the Afghan officials at Peshawar 
and on entering the Afghan territory, they were to become Afghan 
subjects. If they wished to go out of Afghanistan, they could do 
so only on the Afghan passport. A new colony for the settlement 
of the muhajirin was to be set up in Katghan in the Afghan Turkistan. 
The Afghan Government promised financial assistance to those 
muhajirin who were keen to start vocations in trade, industry and 
education. Those who wished to serve in the army were free to do 
so, but on the condition that they could be stationed to any place 
the Afghan Government chose. At Kabul three regiments of the
110
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muhajirin were to he enlisted in the regular army and were to he
governed by its rules and regulations. The young muhajirin of good
families ('Khansadas') were to be allowed to enter the military
college and, after the completion of their training, were to be
appointed in these regiments. Military training to the muhajirin
was to be given in their respective colonies (such as Jabal-us-Siraj
and Katghan) by Afghan instructors, but they were to be considered
as volunteers and entitled to no pay. Teachers, doctors and skilled
workers were to be employed according to the requirements of the
various departments. Those who desired to proceed to Anatolia 'for
the purpose of Islam and in the interests of India', were allowed
to send an enquiry party to explore the possibilities of an eventual
113emigration to that place.
These were commendable arrangements, but were never implemented.
The whole scheme had been in fact devised to stop the immigration
completely. The Amir sent a message to the muhajirin that they were
at liberty to proceed onward or return to India^^ implying that
they were not wanted any longer in Afghanistan. The Afghan attitude
was a direct result of the Anglo-Afghan talks at Mussoorie in the
early summer of 1920. When the Anglo-Afghan relations seemed to be
115improving, the Afghans became indifferent to the muhajirin. ^
Moreover, economically it was impossible for a poor country like
Afghanistan to stand the influx of such a multitude of unskilled and
destitute people; especially when she had not been able to settle her
own people, the powindas, who were forced to emigrate to India every
116winter m  search of subsistence,
113
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The Afghan Government took immediate steps to publicise the
postponement. Copies of the farman were sent to the Afghan Agent
117at Peshawar for transmission to Muslim leaders in India. On
August 12, 1920, the Amir's decision was officially communicated
to the British authorities. To his embarrassment Sir Hamilton Grant
(1872-1937)? ike successor of Roos-Keppel in the Frontier, found it
very difficult to get the farman promptly communicated to the public.
For if he had done so it would have been at once discredited as a
Machiavellian device of the Government to stop the hi.jrat by
exploiting the Amir's name. So he chose to make the contents known
118through the provincial Khilafat committee. On their part the
officials of the committee were reluctant to invite the wrath of the
intending muha.jirin. However, on August 14, under Grant's pressure,
they reluctantly sent telegrams to all the Frontier Khilafat
committees informing them of the Amir's decision. Copies of the
119proclamation were also printed and distributed. The CKC too
advised the intending muha.jirin to wait and not make hurried
120preparations till further notice.
In spite of the precautions, rumours spread that the Government
had paid a large sum of money to the Amir as a bribe to stop the
hi.jratj that the Frontier Hijrat Committee had been bribed too; and
121that the Amir's farman was a forgery, Nevertheless, the Committee 
managed to persuade the majority of the newly-arrived muha.jirin in 
Peshawar to return to their homes except for a qafila of over seven 
thousand which had already left for Jamrud on August 12. They 
refused to turn back when asked by the Peshawar Hijrat Committee and 
became violent. The Afghan Agent at Peshawar, who himself proceeded 
to Jamrud to try persuation was stoned and had to return. The 
Afghan officials though determined to stop this new influx, if 
necessary by force, were unnerved by the overwhelming number and
117
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the threatening attitude of the muhajirin and were forced to admit
122them on the condition that they should bear their own expenses.
The incident is indicative of the alarming heights to which
passions had been aroused. The postponement order was either
disbelieved or ignored and several thousand more muhajirin, mainly
from the Frontier and Sind, had in the meantime gathered in 
123Peshawar. With difficulty the authorities were able to send
them all back except for fifty emigrants from Sind who said that
they were fleeing because of the Government1s interference with
their religion and the suffering caused by the alleged stoppage of 
124the canal water. Similarly, another two thousand muhajirin had
assembled at Bannu and pressed to go to Afghanistan via the Tochi
pass. They agreed to disperse on the condition that their
deputation should be allowed to go to Khost to enquire into the
128possibility of immigration there,  ^ This, however, does not seem 
to have materialised.
It took some time before the Afghan postponement order had
its effect. Already, the muhajirin had started to return. They
consisted chiefly of muhajirin from Gharsadda, Swabi, Sind, Amritsar,
126Gujranwala, Sialkot and Lahore, Some of them had returned from
Kabul while others from Jalalabad and included some of those who
had emigrated as late as August 13* They were extremely incensed
127at their cold reception and bad treatment in Afghanistan. But 
their sympathetic reception in India and the news that they would 
be resettled on their lands relieved them of their anxiety. Those
122
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who had held back for fear of punitive measures now returned too.
The flow of the returning muha.jirin increased and reached
129
approximately to two hundred per day. In order to stem fresh
emigration, the British authorities delayed the returning muha.jirin
at every large halting place long enough so that they could tell
130their hardships to those who were still thinking of emigrating.
131Among the notable muha.iirin who returned were Ahmad Ali, President
of the Lahore Khilafat Committee and a nephew of Obeidullah
Sindhi, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1891-) of Utmanzai^2 and Jan
133Muhammad Junejo of Sind. According to Junejo about five thousand
muha.jirin were still stranded in Afghanistan due to the non-availability
134of transport and money and were anxious to return.
Help was, however, forthcoming from the Government. Free food
shops were opened for the immediate relief and free railway warrants 
135
were issued. Special efforts were made to publicise that the'..Afghans
136were turning back the muhajirin at the point of gun and bayonet.
The authorities also made arrangements for safeguarding the property
rights of the muhajirin and settling land disputes speedily under
137Frontier Crimes Regulations rather than under the ordinary law.
In the worst affected areas special officers were appointed to look
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after the interests of the soldiers and their families. An
unofficial relief fund was instituted to facilitate the re-
139 140settlement. x Takavi advances were given where required.
This sympathetic manoeuvre on the part of the authorities was
intended to help restore normal conditions quickly and prevent a
recrudescence of the campaign But some difficulty was experienced
in the re-settlement work as most Hindus would not return the
142property they had acquired so cheaply.  ^ Nevertheless, hard hit as 
the returning muha.jirin were, they expressed genuine gratitude at 
the relief measures undertaken "by the Government.
But, the hi.jrat9 though discredited, had not yet died down 
completely. There were renewed efforts in Delhi, Bihar and Orissa 
and the Frontier to revive the venture. The CKO also decided to 
step in and, despite some opposition from Chotani, it resolved in 
the middle of August 1920, to control, supervise and finance the 
hijrat. A sub-committee was recommended to take up the matter. 
Subsequently, the CKC corresponded with the Afghan Envoy in India 
asking him to obtain from the Amir clear and definite instructions 
as to the number and class of men whom shelter could be offered in 
Afghani s t an •
The patronage of the hijrat by the CKC at this late stage was, 
however, a cover for something more stupendous. When Mohamed Ali
138
C/C, N.W.F.P., to Foreign Secy., Govt, of India, Tel. No. 895-P.? 
Aug. 22, 1920, J&P, 6882/20.
139
C/C, N.W.F.P., to Foreign Secy., Govt, of India, Tel. No. 875-P.j 
Aug. 19, 1920, above, n. 123.
140
C/C, N.W.F.P., to P/SV, Tel. P., No. 382-N., Sept. 2, 1920, CP.
141
C/C, N.W.F.P., to Foreign Secy., Govt, of India, Tel. No. 875-P»? 
Aug. 19, 1920, above, n. 123.
142
■ Rushbrook Williams, The State of Pakistan9 p. 19.
143
V to S/S, Tels. P., Nos. 698, 716 and 211, Aug. 21 and 28 and 
Sept. 15, 1920, CP.
144
V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 698, Aug. 21, 1920, CP.
145
Bombay Chronicle9 Aug. 20, 1920.
- 143 -
went to Europe at the head of the Khilafat delegation, he met Talaat 
Pasha, the former Turkish minister, at Territet in Switzerland early 
in August 1920, and there they prepared a plan for the invasion of 
India'l'^  According to the scheme, the invasion was to he carried 
out by an army raised in Afghanistan from amongst the Afghans, the 
muhajirin and the tribesmen on the Indian frontier. Funds for the 
organisation of this army and for stirring up the tribes on the 
Indian frontier were to be provided, among others, by the CKC.
But, since Turkey was weak, the organisers were to rely on a concerted 
action of the Afghans and the Bolshevists who were believed to have 
promised independence to India. The Bolshevists were expected to 
make peace with the Poles, knock out General Wrangel of the White 
forces, and then mass their armies for an offensive in Asia. The 
projected invasion of India was to synchronise with a rising within 
the country. For the proper execution of the plan, Talaat Pasha 
was to move to Moscow? Enver Pasha, another fallen hero of pan- 
Islamism, was to go to Tashkent? and Jemal Pasha (1872-1922), the 
former Turkish general, was to raise the army of invasion in 
Afghanistan. Mohamed Ali was expected to 'try to start a revolution' 
in India}^ (See Chart i).
Thus, when towards the end of August, 1920, Junejo returned 
from Afghanistan, he was reported to have brought the news that
146
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Jemal Pasha was on his way to Kabul. The Khilafatists were anxious
to form a direct liaison with Jemal and the Indian revolutionaries
and pan-Islamists in Kabul, such as Mahindra Pratap, Barkatullah, and
Obeidullah Sindhi, But in order to cover up their real object, the
Khilafatists invented the excuse of reviving the hi.jrat. Early in
October 1920, Shaukat Ali approached the Afghan Envoy at Simla
requesting him to obtain facilities from the Amir for the resumption 
149of the hi.jrat. The Envoy agreed to receive Yakub Hasan and Abul
Kalam Azad in Kabul but when the Government of India took a strong
exception to the Envoy's 'gross impropriety', the Afghans became 
150cautious. The Government of India directed the Baluchistan and
the Frontier authorities to prevent the delegation from crossing 
151into Afghanistan. When in December 1920, Shaukat Ali tried to 
152revive the matter, the Government of India instructed Sir Henry
Dobbs (1871-1934), the Secretary of the Foreign and Political
Department, who was then in Kabul in connection with negotiations for
a treaty of friendship, to press Mahmud Tarzi to cancel the Amir's
153invitation to the CKC. ' But since the Afghans were unwilling to
154withdraw the invitation, the Government of India chose not to 
accord the necessary permission to the delegation to proceed to 
Afghanistan.
148
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155Despite these hurdles, the plan was not dropped. Jemal
Pasha established himself in Kabul and, aided by the Bolshevists
and to some extent by the Afghans, started to work in collaboration
156with the Indian revolutionaries. Enver Pasha set himself up in
157Bokhara for similar anti-British activities. Eunds were secretly
158despatched from India. The Bolshevists, on their part, despatched
M.N. Roy (1886-1954)? a member of the Central Asiatic Bureau of the
Communist International, to Tashkent in the winter of 1920, to
supervise the raising of the 'Army of Liberation' from amongst a
residue of several hundred disaffected muhajirin which had arrived
159in the capital of the Russian Turkestan from Afghanistan.
Mohamed Ali was back in India from Europe, fervently intensifying 
the non-co-operation campaign. He had already been in communication 
with the Bolshevists through Chadhopadhaya (1883-1937)? the 
revolutionary brother of the Indian leader Mrs. Sarojini Naidu 
(1879-1949), and was reported to have received funds from them.
He was also reported to be under offer of money from Mustafa Kemal
160for propaganda work in India.
But, owing to various factors, the project fell through. A 
significant reason for its failure was the collapse of the hi.jrat.
155
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About seventy-five per cent, of the muha.jirin had returned to India.
Others had either chosen to stay in Afghanistan or moved on to Baku
and Tashkent or had perished through exhaustion or disease. Prom
among those who remained in Afghanistan, about five hundred were
enlisted in the Afghan army. Others were driven off by the Afghan
Government towards Panjshir, Katghan, Badakhshan and the Afghan
Turkestan and were reported to be in dire straits as they had no
Xmeans of subsistence. Those muha.jirin, who had gone to Baku in
Azerbaijan to fight for the Turkish Nationalists, were dismayed to
2find themselves unwanted and slowly trekked back to India. Prom
amongst those who had gone to Tashkent, a large number found
Bolshevism unpalatable and returned to India at the first 
163opportunity. Another reason was that the Bolshevists, on whose
support the project largely depended, were not really interested in
'liberating' India by armed action!"^ Indeed, it has been suggested
that the Bolshevik help to M.N. Roy and other Indian revolutionaries
was nothing more than a device to strengthen Soviet Russia's
165bargaining position against the British.  ^ Whether or not the 
Bolshevists had ever been serious, it is a fact that by the middle 
of 1921, they had no intention of military conquest and had decided 
instead to infiltrate India with underground movements and secret
161
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agents. Furthermore, though the Afghans had toyed with the idea 
of invading India, they were suspicious of the Bolshevists and in
•l C 17
the end refused to play their game. In March 1921, Jemal Pasha
168was compelled to leave Afghanistan for Moscow, Anglo-Afghan
relations had also improved and, as a consequence, in October 1922,
Obeidullah Sindhi and his associates were forced to leave Kabul for
169Russia and other countries. The project also suffered because of
the disappearance of its chief leaders, Talaat Pasha fell victim to
an Armenian assassin in Berlin in March 1921; Jemal Pasha was
assassinated by an Armenian nationalist in Tiflis in 1922; and Enver
170Pasha died fighting against the Bolshevists in August 1922.'
In retrospect the hi.jrat of 1920 remains a curious phenomenon.
In a way it reflects the depths of Muslim frustration. The Khilafat 
movement had made the Indian Muslims desperate and the hi.jrat was 
the result. But in spite of the fact that the object of the campaign 
was clearly anti-British and the excitement ran high, the muhajirin
166
The military school at Tashkent was abruptly closed and the 
remaining muha.jirin were taken to Moscow and given intensive training 
at the ’Communist University of the Toilers of the East’. They were 
then despatched to India. But these agents were caught, tried and 
convicted by the Govt, of India at the Peshawar and Cawnpore Bolshevik 
Conspiracy cases of 1922-24. Thus, in their immediate object these 
Communist muha.jirin accomplished little but later they provided good 
leaders to the socialist movements. Fazle Elahi Qurban (b. 1901) 
played an important role in the Communist Party of Pakistan and 
Shaukat Usmani (b. 1900), Shafiq Ahmad, Ghulam Husain and Rafiq Ahmad 
became foremost leaders of the Indian communism. See Madras Mail,
Nov. 27, 1922; the experiences of sauhajir Abdul Qadir in The Times, 
Feb. 26 and 27, 1930? the narrative of a muhajir in Sirdar Ikbal Ali 
Shah, The Tragedy of Amanullah, London, 1933, pp. 150-56; Communism 
in India, 1924-1927* pp. 9-10 and 70; Muzaffar Ahmad, op. cit., 
pp. 34-54 and 90-91? Shaukat Usmani, I Met Stalin Twice, Bombay,
1953? PP. 21-22; and Druhe, op. cit., p. 35*
167
The information was supplied by a nephew of Dr. Abdul Ghani to 
Grant. See Chelmsford to Montagu, Aug. 25, 1920, CP. Also see the 
The Times, Aug. 17, 1920; Aybek, op. cit., I, pp. 226 and 228-33? 
and M.N. Roy, op. cit., pp. 403 and 443-44*
168
Aybek, op. cit., I, p. 230.
169
Adamec, op. cit., pp. 157-59? and Aybek, op. cit., I, pp. 249-67*
170
See The Times, March 16 and 17, 1921 and Oct. 22, 1922; and Aybek, 
op. cit., I, p. 226.
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remained completely non-violent. The whole campaign looked artificial. 
No doubt the hi.jrat, in the context of classical Islamic juristic 
interpretations and Indian political developments, was neither 
illogical nor an isolated event, but it was ill-conceived, 
miscalculated and ill-organised. It ignored all economic and 
political realities. The advocates of the hijrat were in fact 
tricked into involvement by the machinations of the Afghan diplomacy. 
Once the Afghan relations improved with Britain, they disowned any 
responsibility. The ulama who made the hijrat mandatory and the 
leaders who encouraged it, in a moment of extreme anti-British 
temper, closed their eyes to its consequences. In theory, it was 
all very well that Muslims should leave India and .then reconquer it? 
but accomplishment of this in practice depended largely on the 
assistance of the Bolshevist®, the Afghans and the Turks. However 
pious the organisers' intentions may have been, they unconsciously 
pushed the Indian Muslims into a disastrous adventure.
The hijrat caused considerable disruption for large numbers
of people in a number of areas. In addition to the 40,000 muhajirin
estimated by the Afghans, over 7?000 had emigrated after the Amir’s
postponement order. Besides, small parties had gone to Khost as
late as September 1920, and a large number of the muhajirin had wound
their way to Afghanistan through routes other than the Khyber. The
total numbers involved may safely be estimated at between fifty and 
171sixty thousand. The areas most affected, from which the bulk
171
The number of the muhajirin has been variously estimated between 
18,000 and two million. A muhajir in his account states that at one 
time in Kabul alone, the number had reached 1,25,000 and more were 
coming. Another muhajir puts the total at 23,000, while a third 
believes it was 36,000. According to the Govt, of India's estimation 
approximately 30,000 muhajirin had emigrated to Afghanistan, PP,
1921, ( 202 ), Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress
and Condition of India During the year 1920, Fifty-sixth Number, 
p. 52; Briggs, op. cit., p. 165; Sokhta, op, cit,, p. 31; Abdul 
Qadir’s memoirs, The Times, Feb. 25, 1930; Usmani, Peshawar to Moscow, 
p. 2 Met Stalin Twice, p. 2; Y to S/S, Tel. P., No, 698, Aug.
21, 1920, J&P, 6882/20. However, the figure 50,000/60,000 seems more 
plausible.
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of the muha.jirin came, were the Frontier, especially Peshawar
district, followed in turn by the Punjab, Sind and other places of
India. Personal suffering was enormous. The road from the Frontier
172to Kabul was dotted with graves of the muhajirin, not to mention
those who perished in Afghanistan or in Russia. According to an
173
eye-witness the Khyber pass was littered with corpses. It took
174a long time for the people involved to recover from the disaster.
172
The Times, Nov. JO, 1920.
175
Rushbrook Williams, The State of Pakistan, p. 19.
174
Years later, Husain Ahmad Madni compared the sufferings of the 
hi.jrat with the hardships undergone by the Muslim refugees in 
1947 &s ^  argument against the partition of India and the creation 
of Pakistan. See Madni to M. Siddique, n.d., in Najmuddin Islahi, 
ed., Maqtubat-i-Shaikh-ul-Hind, II, Peoband, 1954* PP* 262-63.
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CHAPTER IV
TI1E NON-CO-OPERATION EXPERIMENT
Tlie hi.1 rat fever was still gripping the North Indian Muslims
when on August 1, 1920, no revision of the Turkish peace terms having
"been announced, the CICC formally launched the non-co-operation
campaign hy observing a Khilafat Hay - the third since the inception
of the movement. Those among the Khilafatists who honestly believed
that the launching was premature or that they should wait for the 
1
Congress verdict, also decided, at the last moment, to abide by the
CKC's order. Fairly complete hartals were observed in many parts of
the country, with Hindus, especially in the Punjab and the Frontier,
2
generally participating unwillingly. Public meetings advised non-
co-operation and resolved to continue it until a modification of the
peace terms, consistent with Muslim sentiments and Islamic law, was 
3
secured. On the day of the inauguration and subsequently, a number 
of leading Muslims and Hindus returned their medals, renounced 
titles and resigned from honorary posta, seats in the legislatures 
and law practices,^ The Khilafat movement, fused with the Punjab 
'wrong1, emerged through non-co-operation, as a forceful drive 
towards the political reconstruction of India.
1
J&P, 7220/20.
2
See V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 635, Aug. 6, 1920, CP.
3
Bombay Chronicle, Aug. 2, 1920; and Madras Mail, Aug. 2 and 
3, 1920.
4
Shah Sulaiman Phulwari resigned his Honorary Magistracy. Gandhi 
returned the medals awarded him for his loyal services in South 
Africa. Nurul Hasan resigned his Membership of the Bihar Legislative 
Council and Sheriff Hewjee Canjee his seat in the Bombay Legislative 
Council, Haji Osman Sait resigned his Councilship of Mangalore.
Yusuf Ali, who replaced Yakub Hasan in the Madras Council, also 
resigned, Saraladevi Chaudharani sent back her War broach, Maulavi 
Zahid Husain of Madras and Shah Badruddin of Phulwari renounced their 
titles of Shams-ul-Ulama. Mrs, Naidu returned her Kaiser-i-Hind 
medal. See K.K. Hatta, ed., History of the Freedom Movement in 
Bihar, I, Patna, 1957? P* 3015 Gandhi to Chelmsford, Aug. 1, 1920,
CP; Bombay Chronicle, Aug, 2, 3, 13, 18 and 30, 1920; Englishman,
Aug. 2, 19201 and Mrs. Naidu to Chelmsford, Sept. 1, 1920, CP.
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Following the inauguration of the non-co-operation campaign,
the CKC made a determined effort to organise propaganda in the
districts with the help of the provincial committees. But in order
not to afford the Government an excuse to smash the movement 
5
prematurely, the CKC instructed its subordinate organisations to 
maintain non-violence in speech and action in the campaign.^ The
main task of campaigning fell on the shoulders of Shaukat Ali who,
since his release in 1919? had emerged as the most powerful leader 
among the Khilafatists. Chotani, the President of the CKC, was 
merely a figurehead. Abdul Bari, his preceptor, was no propagandist 
and had chosen to remain unobstrusively behind scenes. Mohamed Ali 
was still in Europe with the delegation. Abul Kalam Azad, Ajmal 
Khan, Ansari, Mohani and others who were leaders in their own right 
had to be content with a second place. At Shaukat Alifs side was 
also Gandhi, who, after Tilak’s death on August 1, and the power­
lessness of the Congress leaders to oppose him, had been left the 
chief figure among the Hindus. Both Shaukat Ali and Gandhi were 
conscious of their power and influence and also that the Government 
was afraid to touch them, and used these advantages with remarkable 
skill. Their own interdependence was extraordinary. None could do 
without the other. Shaukat Ali pretended to follow Gandhi and his 
non-violence and called him Bapu - though the age difference was only
four years. Gandhi owed much of his power to the Khilafatists under
Shaukat Ali and could not afford to forsake him. In order to lead 
he had to follow. No wonder that when Malaviya appealed to Gandhi 
to suspend the campaign till the Congress had given its verdict, the 
latter declined to ’prove untrue to the Mussalman brethren*. With 
them, he said, non-co-operation had become a religious duty and
they could not wait for the Congress decisions ’In matters of
7conscience the Law of Majority has no place'.
5
At some places in Northern India individual agitators were 
getting out of hand. In Lucknow, for instance, Hakim Abdul Qavi, 
in a speech on Aug. 1, even justified the declaration of jihad 
'in order to make the world safe for Islam*. Haqiqat (Lucknow),
Aug. 20, 1920, UPNNR 1920, pp. 501-2.
6
Indian Annual Register, 1921, ed., H.N. Mitra, Calcutta, 1921,
Part I, p. 48*
7
CW, XVIII, pp. 112-13 and 123.
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All through the month of August 1920, Shaukat Ali and Gandhi,
accompanied by their entourage, went about their whirlwind tour
of the country, particularly parts of the Madras Presidency, which
0
had been the stormy petrel of politics in recent months. But in
spite of their efforts, the outcome of the non-co-operation
experiment was still uncertain. The pockets of resistance even
among Muslims were quite strong. There were still many who objected
to the specific items of non-co-operation like the boycott of
professions, services and Councils. In Madras, for instance,
Kuddus Padshah, the President of the provincial Khilafat committee,
and his brother Abdul Aziz Sahib were refusing to renounce their 
g
titles. In the U.P., Syed Zahur Ahmad of Lucknow insisted that
these specific boycotts amounted to ’political suicide of backward
minority community particularly when non-Muslims /were/ not boycotting
them’^  In Bombay Mirza Ali Mohammed Khan was actively working to
make the Reform Scheme a success^ In the Punjab Fazl-i-Husain and
12Iqbal were leading the resistance. And in Bengal Fazlul Haq's
enthusiasm against the triple boycott led him to take up his 'crusade' 
13in the press. There were others who rejected the entire non-co- 
operation scheme. They no doubt regretted the Allied decision over 
Turkey and the British attitude towards the Punjab affair, but were 
against resorting to an extreme measure. Among them the Raja of 
Mahmudabad, Umar Hayat Malik, Shah Nawaz Bhutto (b. 1888) and Sir 
Abdur Rahim (1867-1952), along with several other Hindu-Muslim 
Members of the Imperial Legislative Council, publicly dissociated 
themselves from the non-co-operation campaign^ Others like Syed
8
HFMI, III, Part I, pp. 313-20.
9
Ibid., pp. 314-15.
10
Ibid., p. 306.
11
Times of India, Aug. 23, 1920.
12
Azim Husain, FazI-i-Husain, Bombay, 1946, p. 106j and A.H. 
Albiruni, Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India, Lahore, 1950, 
P • 177•
13
Englishman, Aug. 24, Sept. 2 and 3? 1920.
14
Times of India, Aug. 30, 1920.
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Rawab Ali Chowdhuri (1863-1929), Maulana A.L. Ahmed of Cossipore
and Rawab Habibollah of Dacca objected to the scheme on personal,
15religious or political grounds.
The CKC was not at all complacent about the Muslim dissident
groups, but the Hindu attitude concerned it more. Without the support
of the majority community the Khilafatists felt insecure. Since the
Allahabad Conference of June 1920, there had been hardly any change
in the attitude of the Congress leaders. Rather, their hostility
towards non-co-operation had increased after the inauguration of
the scheme. The moderates in particular, saw it as 'bizarre in its
conception and utterly impracticable'^ Specially distasteful to
them was the boycott of the Reformed councils, which not only
threatened to deprive them of any share in the enhanced power and
prestige, but also endangered the early realisation of Home Rule for
17India. Understandably, Mrs. Besant called it ’a Rational suicide'.
Sir P.S. Sivaswami Aiyer (1864-1946) considered it an 'ill-advised'
18campaign 'fraught with disaster to the country'. V.S. Srinivasa
19Sastri thought it was illogical and harmful, Srinivasa Iyengar
(1874-1941) pronounced the third and fourth stages as definitely
20illegal and unconstitutional. The same was the opinion of
15
Syed Rawab Ali Chowdhry, Views on Present Political Situation 
in India. Calcutta, 1920, p. 12, cited in J.H. Broomfield, Elite 
Conflict in a Plural Society, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968, p. 157. 
For A.L, Ahmed see Englishman, Aug, 31? 1920. For the Rawab of 
Dacca see Statesman, Aug. 31? 1920, and Times of India, Sept. 9, 1920.
16
Dinshaw Wacha to Chelmsford, Aug. 21, 1920, CP.
17
Annie Besant, ed., Gandhian Ron-Co-Operation or Shall India 
Commit Suicide?, Madras, 1920, p. v.
18
S. Aiyer, 'The Khilafat Situation', ibid., pp. 7-8*
19
S. Sastri, 'Ron-Co-Operation', ibid., p. 10. As early as April 
1920 he had feared the Khilafat movement becoming violent. See his 
letter to Sir P.S. Sivaswami Aiyar, April 13, 1920, in T.R. Jagadiaan, 
ed., Letters of the Right Honourable V.S. Srinivasa Sastri, London, 
1963, p. 65.
20
V to S/S, Tel. P., Ro. 667, Aug. 13, 1920, CP.
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Malaviya. Some like Narayan Chandavarkar (1855-1923) and Jamnadas
Dwarkadas (1890-) questioned it on grounds of religion and 
22practicability. Others dubbed it as 'a weapon of revenge and 
23retaliation’. About a dozen non-official Members of the Imperial
Legislative Council issued their public disapproval - they included
Surendranath Banerjea (1848-1925), Sundar Singh Majithia (1872-1941),
R.D. Tata and were joined later by Dinahaw Wacha (1844-1936), S.M.
Chitnavis (1863-1931), and S. Sinha (1871-1950)?^ The moderates were
so strongly opposed to non-co-operation that when invited to attend
the forthcoming Special Congress at Calcutta in September 1920,
Banerjea reacted by explaining the uselessness of attending a Congress
25where the acceptance of the scheme was a foregone conclusion.
The 'extremists' too were still divided. In July 1920, Lajpat
Rai had advocated the boycott of the reformed Councils^ but though
the Non-Co-Operation Committee had quickly incorporated his suggestion
27in its programme along with the boycotts of schools and courts, the
28Punjab leader himself had proved undecided, Motilal Nehru was 
concerned about, among other things, the spread of violence as 
exhibited by the murder of R.W.D. Willoughby (Deputy Commissioner 
of Kheri in Oudh) by a Muslim fanatic in August 1920?^ The Bengalis
21
J.B. Kirpalani, 'Madan Mohan Malaviya', in N.L. Singh, ed., 
Mahamana Malaviyaji Birth Centenary Commemoration Volume, 25th 
December, 1961, Varanasi, 1961, p. 43*
22
Bombay Chronicle, July 30, 1920. Also see N.G. Chandavarkar, 
Non-Co-Operation in its Historial and Political Aspects, Bombay,
1920, pp. 18-19.
23
'Vencam1, 'Pacts Unveiled1, published by K.N. Shanker, Bombay
1920, p. 8.
24
Englishman, Aug. 30, 1920.
25
Hindu, Sept. 2, 1920.
26
Indulal K. Yajnik, Gandhi as I knew him, Bombay, /l9337? P* HO.
27
Ibid., pp. 111-12. Also see CW, XVII, p. 13,
28
Lajpat Rai, The Agony of the Punjab, Madras, 1920, pp. 127 and 
129-31.
29
Reference in Abdul Bari to Motilal, n.d., Nuqush (Lahore), CIX, 
April/May, 1968, p. 9.
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and the Maharashtrians - C.R. has, B.C. Pal, Byomkesh Chakravarty 
(1855”1929)j G.S. Khaparde, N.C, Kelkar, Vithalbhai Patel and others - 
were as sceptical as ever. They agreed that non-co-operation was a 
perfectly constitutional weapon in a political struggle against the 
Government, but v/ere loath to its extension to the new legislative 
bodies, which they believed needed to be boycotted from within.
They were also against its application to schools and law courts. 
Besides, their personal rivalry with Gandhi and a sense of deep- 
seated cultural and temperamental differences with him prevented
30them from making a tame submission to the non-co-operation scheme.
No less important was the reluctance of the Hindu leaders to
31support an essentially Muslim campaign; True, non-co-operation
had been the brain-child of Gandhi, but it was an item of the
Khilafat programme, formulated solely to redress the Khilafat
'wrong1. In its final workable form it had been shaped and developed
32by the Khalifatists themselves, with a religious overtone imparted 
to it first by Syud Hossain and Azad and then by Abdul Bari and
"Z 7j
Mahmud Hassan. No doubt the Punjab issue had been yoked with it to 
make it more acceptable to Hindus, but the direction of the campaign, 
despite Gandhi's efforts to the contrary, had remained in the hands 
of the Non-Co-Operation Committee of the CKC of which Gandhi was 
just one member. It must have been even more disconcerting to the 
Hindus to find Gandhi claiming himself to be a Khilafatist and
30
B.C. Pal, Non-Co-Operation, Calcutta, 1920, pp. 19-21; R.
Chowdhury, Ploughboy to President, Calcutta, /193£/1 PP* 35-65 
Broomfield, Elite ..Conflict, p. 157^  r^ he Non-Uo-Oporation
Decision of 1920s A Crisis in Bengal Politics', in D.A. Low, ed.,
Soundings in Modern South Asian History, London, 1968, pp. 225-60; 
and Al. Carthill, The Lost Dominion, Edinburgh and London, 1924,
P. 277.
31
See, e.g., the Bengal leaders' antipathy towards the Khilafatists.
Broomfield, Elite Conflict, p. 157; and Al. Carthill, op. cit., p. 277°
52
Gandhi himself acknowledged this. Hindu, Sept. 16, 1920.
33
See above pp. 79 and 88 , For Abdul Bari see Naqush, CIX, p. 13; 
and for Mahmud Hassan see Hazrat Shaikh Mahmud-ul-Hassan /sic/ ka 
ek Zaruri Khat, issued by Masud Ali Nadvi on behalf of the Khilafat 
Committee, Azamgarh, n.d.
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touring the country on the finances provided from the Khilafat 
34-funds; Such being the case, the majority of the Hindu leaders,
despite the inclination of some provincial Congress committees to
accept the non-co-operation principle, preferred to wait a decision
35by the Special Congress.
The policy of the Government of India was generally one of
watchfulness, with isolated attempts at repression. Except in the
case of Pir Mahbub Shah of Sind, Zafar Ali Khan of the Punjab and a
36
few others who were jailed, the action was confined to insignificant
local agitators. The contemplated action against the Executive of
the Non-Co-Operation Committee was dropped when the Advocate-General
37of Bombay advised that the case would not stand against it. Some
provincial governors, particularly Ronaldshay (1876-1961) of Bengal
and Willingdon (1866-1941) of Madras, reeled at the Government of
38
India's 'masterly inactivity1 and had wished to proceed against
39Shaukat Ali and Gandhi but Chelmsford, taking an all-India view 
of the situation, bided his time. He was optimistic that 'this most 
foolish of all foolish schemes' would be repudiated by the 'thinking 
people'. If not, he maintained, 'the Government is bound to and 
will use all the resources at its disposal'1^ On September 4> 1920, 
the Government of India issued a circular letter to the Local 
Governments explaining its position and justifying the policy of
34
cw, xx, p. 523.
35
For the attitude of the Congress leaders and the provincial 
Committees between August 1 and the Special Congress see J.M.
Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power, Cambridge, 1972, pp. 251-61.
36
J&P, 5446 and 5259/20. Action against Zafar Ali Khan was 
prompted no less by the Nizam's coaxing than by bis political 
activities. See the Nizam to Chelmsford, July 8 and Aug. 12, 1920, 
and Chelmsford to the Nizam, July 19 and Sept. 4? 1920, CP.
37
J&P, 6763/20.
38
See Ronaldshay to Montagu, Aug. 17 1920, MP. Also see Willingdon 
to Montagu, Aug. 8, 1920, MP.
39
IgHPP, Aug... 1920, Pro. No. 127.
40
PILC, LIX, 1920, ppi 4-5. Also see ICHPP, Aug. 1920, Pro. No. 128,
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caution. The pith of the argument was that it was expedient to wait 
and see rather than risk escalation by hasty repression. But the 
Government of India agreed that the Local Governments should take 
vigorous action and prosecute all incitements to violence^
Early in September 1920, the Khilafatists, aided by Gandhi,
descended upon Calcutta to capture the Special Congress, Special
42Khilafat trains were arranged to take the delegates to Calcutta;
The opposition too, came determined to give a concerted battle. But 
Motilal Nehru, the man who had counselled the opposition to put up 
a united front, himself paused and reflected, and coaxed by his son 
Jawaharlal (1889-1964)? went over to the other sidef^
In order to show their strength to the Hindus, the Khilafatists
held their Conference (September 5) before the Congress took up the
discussion on non-co-operation. Gandhi and other Hindu leaders were
also invited. In the absence of the indisposed Mahmud Hassan of
Deoband, the presidential chair was occupied by Abdul Majid of
Badaun. Amidst wild enthusiasm, the Khilafat Conference unanimously
reaffirmed its stand with regard to non-co-operation as an absolutely
binding religious obligation and resolved to continue incessant
agitation against the Turkish peace terms until Muslim demands were
accepted. The Conference appealed for at least thirty lakhs of
rupees and urged the provincial Khilafat committees to organise
volunteer corps^ Under extreme pressure from Shaukat Ali and
other Khilafatists the Muslim League also felt that it could not stand
aloof. In spite of Jinnah's advice 'to weigh pros and cons of the
45question before you arrive at a decisoon'7 the League decided to 
follow the CKcl6
41 
J&P, 6763/20.
42
Speeches and Writings of M.K. Gandhi, introduction by C.F. Andrews, 
Madras, 1922, p. 46.
43
Kanji Dwarkadas, Gandhiji Through My Diary Leaves, 1915-1948, 
Bombay, 1950? P* 25. Also see B.R. Nanda, The Nehrus, London, 1962, 
pp. 183-85.
44
Bombay Chronicle, Sept. 7? 1920.
45
Englishman, Sept, 8, 1920.
46
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When the proposition of non-co-operation was brought before
the Congress it was debated for three days in the subjects committee
before being finally accepted by a narrow majority? 144 'votes to 132,
The Muslim dominance had swung the balance in favour of non-co-
operation. The discussion in the subject committee was so heated
that at one point 'Shaukat Ali threatened to lay violent hands on
Jinnah', the solitary Muslim opposing the motion, and 'was only
prevented from doing so by the physical intervention of other 
47delegates*7 The opposition subjected Gandhi to considerable
Af\
heckling, but he resisted all pressure to abandon the campaign.
When he found that the feeling was running high against him, ho 
threatened to go ahead with it whether or not the Congress accepted
When the resolution was moved in the open Congress on
September 8, Gandhi refused to admit that non-co-operation would
lead to violence or bloodshed, maintaining that if it were adopted
and practised in the manner he had presented it 'you can gain your
50Swaraj m  one ye,ar'. B.C. Pal of Bengal tried delaying tactics by
proposing that before embarking on non-co-operation they should
approach the British Prime Minister by a delegation with regard to
their demands. In the meantime they should re-examine the question
51of non-co-operation and participate in the elections; Pal was
supported by Malaviya, Jinnah, C.R. Das and Baptista, but, in the
end, his motion was thrown out. Gandhi's resolution, managed by a 
52juggle and toned down with regard to the boycott of schools and
47
Ronaldshay to Montagu, Sept. 22, 1920, MP.
48
V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 789? Sept. 26, 1920, CP.
49
Ibid,
50
Englishman. Sept. 9? 1920.
51
Bombay Chronicle, Sept. 9? 1920.
52
The voters were asked to vote either for Gandhi*s motion or 
Pal's amendment and those who were totally opposed to non-co-operation 
were given no chance to express their opinion. Moreover, Omar Sobani 
and Shankarlal added over a hundred 'delegates' from the streets on 
the day of the voting. See Kanji Dwarkadas, Gandhiji Through My 
Diary Leaves, p. 25.
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53 54courts, was accepted on September 9 by 1826 votes to 884.
Thus, the Congress was compelled to adopt the whole programme
of the CKC, even though the character of its decision had been
advisory and not mandatory and the acceptance due more to estrangement
from the Government and to the personal influence of Gandhi than to
the intrinsic soundness of the programme. Partly, the acceptance was
due to pressure from the Khilafatists who successfully swung the
balance in the subjects committee and then influenced the decision in
the open Congress, The Muslim dominance was so visible that at one
point Joseph Baptista accused Gandhi of ’handing over the Congress to 
55the Mahomedans’. How deeply the Congress was committed to the
restoration of the Khilafat is a matter of conjecture,but the Calcutta
decision gave the Khilafat movement the semblance of being a truly
national movement. The acceptance of non-co-operation a month later
by the Sikh League made the movement even more widespread. The
opposition was gradually pushed into the corner, the most prominent
56victory having been the capture of the Home Rule League; Jinnah,
57with eighteen others, resigned his membership and refused to come
back 'for I am fully convinced that it /non-co-operation/ must lead 
58to disaster'.
The CKC and the Congress now pooled their resources for a 
vigorous campaign for non-co-operation. When early in October 1920, 
Mohamed Ali returned from Europe with the delegation, 'lie took upon 
himself the larger share of the burden. He and the other 
members of the delegation were now fully convinced that real work
53
A third adjective, 'gradual', was added to the clause recommending 
'non-violent' and 'progressive' non-co-operation.
54
V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 747, Sept. 10, 1920, CP. The voting 
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XVIII, p. 260; Englishman and Bombay Chronicle, Sept. 10, 1920; and 
Hindu, Sept. 16, 1920.
55
V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 789? Sept. 26, 1920, CP.
56
Bombay Chronicle, Oct. 5? 1920.
57
Text of the letter of resignation in M.R. Jayakar, The Story of 
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59had to be done in India itself. In the areas, such as the Eastern
Punjab where the Sikhs were numerically strong, the task was shared
by the Central Sikh League. The activity was not limited to urban
areas but the rural areas were also involved. More or less the same
pattern was followed in all the provinces. Particular attention was
paid to opening branches in important mufassil centres and to
conducting the campaign through deputations and social and economic
ostracism^ In largercities effort was directed towards industrial
labour. The wide-spread economic discontent due to the widening gap
between prices and wages and the industrial unrest were just ideal
for the non-co-operators to exploit. Within the span of a few
months there had been over a dozen strikes in different parts of the
country, ranging from the Post and Telegraph strike in Bombay to the
Police strike in Bengal. The CKC appointed paid itinerant lecturers,
coached by its Propaganda Committee, to disseminate propaganda^
There were also a number of other secret workers and emissaries spread
63all over the country for the same purpose.
Another instrument for gaining control of the movement was the 
corps of volunteers, recruited by the provincial Khilafat, Congress 
and Sikh organisations. Volunteer organisations were not new to 
India. They had been fairly conspicuous during the 'revolutionary*
59
Hindu, Oct. 14, 1920. Also see Sulaiman Nadvi to Abdul Bari,
Aug. 26, 1920, in Syed Sulaiman Nadvi, Barid-i-Farang, Karachi, 1952, 
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activities in Bengal between 1905 and. 1908. But the new volunteers
assumed a somewhat different character, developing a tendency to
initiate military methods with identical ranks. Every evening
Muslim volunteers drilled and paraded in the streets of major towns
in Turkish military uniforms and incorporated the Egyptian and Irish
64-militancy in their methods. The results were not comparable with
those in Ireland, but the non-co-operators were able to utilise the
volunteers quite effectively as a potent instrument of social boycott
6 5against those who refused to subscribe to non-co-operation.
Particular targets of ostracism were the Qadiani Ahmadis against 
whom feelings ran very higbn^ This militant attitude of the 
volunteers afforded the Government an opportunity to ban the volunteer
f\ 7
organisations. But even then these corps remained operative in 
most parts.
Equally important in the propaganda campaign was the utilisation
of the press media. Every day the nationalist newspapers and journals
carried a number of articles in favour of the non-co-operation
campaign. Marmaduke Pickthall was especially brought out from Britain
68and entrusted with the editorship of the Bombay Chronicle. Later, 
the Khilafat, the official organ of the CKC, was also handed over to 
him. Part of the propaganda appeared in the form of an endless
64
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number of pamphlets, poems and polemics (besides magazine and
newspaper articles) by writers of all sorts. The bulk of this
material, both in the vernacular and in English, was meant to arouse
public feelings by exploiting the usual theme of 'Islam in Danger'
or the 'machinations' of the Christian Powers and directly preached
non-co-operation with the Government until their demands were met.
Some of the pamphlets were so inflammatory that they were proscribed
69
and confiscated by the Government.
Attention was also paid to collecting huge subscriptions for
the national funds. The public collections for the Khilafat funds
had begun from January 1920. Previous to that most of the items of
expenditure were borne personally by Chotani. The Second All-India
Khilafat Conference at Bombay in February 1920, fixed the target
as thirty lakhs of rupees. The funds were classified under two
heads - the Khilafat Fund and the Smyrna Fund. The first was
utilised for the movement in India. Some provision was also made
for the assistance of those who were willing to give up Government
services under non-co-operation, and were anxious to seek private
employment. The families of the Khilafat workers, who were subjected
to official repression and went to jail, were given some financial
support. At one stage it was contemplated to support national
70education and new trades and industries! The Smyrna Fund was meant
for the aid of the Turks. Eventually in September 1921, a third
fund, known as the Angora Fund, was started to help Mustafa Kemal
and his Turkish Nationalists. For all practical purposes the
71Smyrna Fund was then merged with the Angora Fund! Besides.the 
provincial Khilafat committees had their own funds, part of which 
was regularly surrendered to the CKC. The collections were normally 
placed as trust with dependable men and never deposited in the banks
69
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72for fear of the funds being frozen by the Government.
Apart from direct appeals for funds, the CKC issued 'paper
currency' in the form of one-rupee receipts resembling a one-rupee
note in shape and size but superscribed in Urdu with quotations from
the Quran, The ’currency’ obtained a considerable circulation,
73reaching as far as Rangoon in Burma! Its success prompted the
Khilafatists to propound schemes for the provision of minting
Khilafat rupee, pi’ofessing to be of slightly greater value than the
standard rupee. They were to be banked at the Khilafat offices and
74issued in exchange for note issues. The Congress too had resolved
in October 1920, to start a national fund of one crore rupees called
Tilak Swaraj Fund and invited the provincial Congress committees to
73make arrangements for the collection.
In the fund raising campaign the major donations came from 
the wealthy Indian commercial community which was incensed at the 
Government for fixing the rupee exchange rate at a ratio (10 rupees
r j / T
to a gold sovereign) unfavourable to Indian interests! Within a
few years the rupee exchange had shot up from Is. in the beginning
77of 1917 to 2s. 46-. in December 1919* 4s the new rate had 
synchronised with a marked fall in the American rate for sterling, 
within few days of its announcement the exchange advanced from
n o
2s, 4i« to 2s. lid, and continued to rise! The Indian market was
72 ,
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79demoralised and business seriously handicapped. A belief became
current that the policy was designed 'to sap the prosperity of India,
/and/ to stimulate Britain's export t r a d e H o  wonder the Indian
commercial classes poured huge amounts into the anti-British
nationalist movement. It was this combination of the fall in exchange
81and in rupee prices which later intensified the swadeshi campaign.
In order to strengthen religious appeal to the non-co-operation
programme already formalised by Abul Kalam Azad and Abdul Bari, the
CKC mobilised .the Jamiyat-ul-TJlama-i-Hind. In their support for
non-co-operation, the ulama generally had been attracted by the same
'tactical' reason as the politicians, i.e., to press the Muslim
demands on the Government. But there was more to it. The ulam also
wished to use non-co-operation against the growing secularism; the
legislative bodies would be replaced by a committee of ulama, the
'infidel' law courts by shari courts and Government schools by dar-ul- 
82ulum. Consequently, the Jamiyat met at Delhi on November 19-21,
1920, under the chairmanship of Mahmud Hassan, and drew up a fatwa
mainly on the lines of the one issued in October by the chairman 
83himself. The fatwa, attested unanimously by about 120 prominent 
ulama, supported the entire non-co-operation programme, item by item,
79
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8A
on the basis of the Quranic text and the sayings of the Prophet.
But the proceedings of the Jamiyat were Kept secret for the time 
being and it was not until the following year that the Muttafiqqa 
Fatwa, as the decision came to be known, was published. In the 
meantime, the leaders concentrated their energies on achieving such 
amount of success as would compel the forthcoming Congress at Nagpur 
in December 1920, to confirm the acceptance of the non-co-operation 
policy.
Meanwhile, in spite of Gandhi's claim that the campaign had
85passed 'the stage of ridicule1, the success, particularly in the
field of titles and honorary posts, was nominal, (See Table III),
Later in February 1921, it was calculated that only twenty-one out
86of a total of over 5*000 title-holders had renounced their titles, 
whereas each half-year there were at least a hundred ready acceptances 
of new titles. But the non-co-operators were themselves not treating
on
this aspect very seriously. Their shock came with regard to the
lawyers. Litigants had been urged not to go to the law courts for
88the redress of their grievances. Alternatively, a well-graded
system of national arbitration, with the age-old institution of the
89panchayat as its basic unit, was proposed to decide the cases.
Some efforts were made to put it into practice and lawyers were 
directed to induce parties not only to refer disputes to arbitration 
but also to withdraw the pending cases from the Government courts and
84
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90to submit them to the national courts'. Even sanada were granted to
91counsels and petition-writers on payment of an annual fee.
Financial aid was offered to those lawyers who were affected by the
92
loss of their legal practice. But the experiment of national courts
was a failure. The cases brought before them were few and mostly
93pertained to divorce or the recovery of lost women. Failure to
enforce their decisions was the chief hurdle and the remedy of social
boycott was never effective. Most often the findings were ignored,
94.Therefore, hardly any cognisable cases were dealt with by them.
Some barristers, vakils and mukhtiars, counting such prominent names 
as Rajendra Prasad (I884-I963)* T-A.K, Sherwani, Asaf Ali (1888-1953) 
Motilal, C.R. Das, Khaliquzzaman (1889-1973)* did suspend their legal 
practices, but few could discontinue for an indefinite period. The 
official figures show that upto February 1921, only 99 lawyers 
throughout India had given up their practices-.^ (See Table IV).
The only striking outcome of the boycott was the refusal of the non- 
co-operators to defend themselves when tried in the Government courts
Having failed to achieve much in the spheres of titles and
boycott of law courts, the non-co-operators directed their attention
to the boycott of Government-aided and -controlled schools and
colleges. They had been quick to perceive that the educational
institutions were best-suited for disseminating non-co-operation
doctrines. In order to win support the non-co-operators launched an
attack against the entire educational system. They argued that the
96system was alien and irrelevant and that it was degrading to accept
90
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97it after the Khilafat breach and the Punjab 'wrong'. Though there
was difference of opinion among the non-co-operators as to how a new
98system was to be instituted, the campaign was facilitated by the
readiness of the student community to breakaway from the Government
system. By doing so they imagined to be helping the national cause
in some obscure way. Besides, there was among the students a steady
recognition that the course of education imparted to them was not
99
helpful in terms of career. Thus, the political appeal was 
strengthened by the economic factor. Added encouragement came from 
a fatwa to the effect that in such matters filial disobedience was
xoonot contrary to the Islamic religion. At a time when the whole 
system was reacting to the political unrest the economic discontent 
of the low paid teachers rendered the position particularly 
vulnerable
The first target of the educational non-co-operation was the
Mahomedan Anglo-Oriental College, Aligarh in the U.P., planned and
established by Syed Ahmed Khan in 1877* The College, though not a
Government institution, was dependent on the Government for its
sustenance and its patronage for appointments. Encouraged by
102firebrands among the Aligarh students, the Ali brothers and Gandhi 
descended upon Aligarh on October 11, 1920. A letter signed by the 
Ali brothers and six other Trustees was addressed to the general body 
of the Trustees and the students of the College, advising them to undo
97
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Government interference and transform their institution into a
National "University by renouncing Government grant, disaffiliating
the College from the Allahabad University, and refusing the expected
charter of the Muslim University. The non-co-operators called upon
the students that if by October 29 the demands were not accepted by
103the Trustees they should withdraw themselves from the College.
The students were persuaded to pass a similar resolution}^ Gandhi
too addressed a letter to the Trustees advising action against the
105'satanic1 Government.
The Trustees were compelled to approach the parents and the
Old Boys of the College to intervene and save the only Muslim
institution of repute from being destroyed}^ The Government also
mobilised its forces to counter the Khilafatists who had gathered
at Aligarh. Butler, the Lt.-Governor of the U.P., 'whipped up’ a
107number of Trustees to reach Aligarh. 1 The Begum of Bhopal, who was
one of the principal financial supporters, despatched her son,
Nawabzada Hamidullah Khan (1894-1960), himself an Old Boy of the
108College and a Trustee, 'to do his bit1. She, like the Nawab of
Rampur, also temporarily withdrew the Bhopal students and even
threatened to stop the grant-in-aid to the College if the Trustees
109succumbed to the Khilafatists' demands. Dr. Zia-Uddin Ahmad 
(1879-1947)* the Principal, pointed to the possibility of losing 
over one and a half lakhs of rupees annually in case the Government 
grants were refused. He also warned that the land on which the
103
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College building stood would revert to the Government if the
institution was nationalised}"^ As a result, the opposition to the
non-co-operators grew strong. A number of parents and Trustees
111arrived in Aligarh to help the College authorities.
On October 27, 1920, a crucial meeting of the Trustees was
held at Aligarh, The Ali brothers and their fellow signatories of
the 'ultimatum' were also invited. After a heated discussion, the
Trustees successfully resisted the non-co-operators and rejected
112their demand by a majority of 4® to 11* But the non-co-operators,
refusing to admit defeat, occupied part of the College building and
on the expiry of the 'ultimatum* on the 29th announced the
establishment of the National Muslim University. The College
authorities called in the police and ejected the Ali brothers from
the premises. The latter, with a hundred and fifty students, moved
out and pitched their camp in the immediate vicinity of the College
113in a couple of hired bungalows and some tents. The inaugural 
ceremony of the 'National University*, or the Jamia Milliya Islamiya 
as it was called, was performed on October 30, 1920, by Mahmud 
Hassan of Deoband}^ Ajmal Khan became the Amir-i-Jamia and Mohamed 
Ali, on Iqbal’s refusal, the Shaikh-ul-Jamia. A Foundation Committee 
of 100 members and a Syndicate of 16 were nominated and educationists 
from different parts of the country offered their services to teach 
at the new institution. The CKC sanctioned a sum of Rs. 10,000
110
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115annually for the upkeep of the Jamia.
Contrary to popular misconception the attack on Aligarh was
not intended to wreck the College. In fact the idea was to involve
the pre-eminent Muslim institution in the nationalist movement and
thus break the official hold over the Muslim community through their 
117acolyte. The establishment of a separate national university was,
therefore, intended to be a temporary measure. The idea was to reunite
the Jamia ultimately with the Aligarh College when it was finally 
118captured. Therefore, there were no clear-cut aims and objects of
the National University except that it ventured 'to fuse three ideals
119into a unity - Western Education, Islam, and nationalism'. ' For the
present, therefore, on Mohamed Ali*s suggestion, all educational
activities were suspended and the Jamia was turned into a school
for propagandists. The students were given, along with those from
other colleges - 200 to 300 in all - practical training in propaganda
techniques and then in batches were spread all over India to further
120the Khilafat movement and to preach non-co-operation.
To counter the non-co-operatore as well as to prevent the
Aligarh funds from falling into their hands, the Government decided
121to speed up the grant of university status to Aligarh. The
115
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University Act had already been passed in the Assembly in September 
1221920, but owing to administrative slowness its enforcement was
delayed. The timing was now used as a calculated political weapon.
The writ was declared operational on December 1, 1920, with the Begum
of Bhopal as the Chancellor and the Raja of Mahmudabad as the Vice- 
123Chancellor. Ironically, it was the non-co-operating Khalifatists 
who had hastened the achievement of a Muslim university.
At other places also, attempts were made to influence the
students. Gandhi turned towards Benares the moment he realised that
some Muslims were suspecting him of destroying Muslim institutions
124without touching the Hindu University. But here too the possibility
of a success was remote owing to the influence of Malaviya, the
Vice-Chancellor. As. expected the attempt was successfully resisted
125by the University Court and Gandhi was compelled to abandon it.
On October 20, Gandhi went to Lahore and conferred with the students.
As a result students from many colleges came out on strike. Dr.
Kitchlew with some squatters occupied a part of the Islamia College
and demanded that the Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam, the body governing
the College, should join the non-co-operation campaign. But the
126Anjuman was able to weather the storm. At Amritsar the non-co­
operators faired better. The students of the Islamia School and 
Dayanand Anglo-Vedic and Khalsa Colleges went on an all-out strike.
The managing committee of the last named was also in favour of doing 
away with Government control in the management but, when it failed
to renounce the Government aid, twelve professors resigned en bloc as 
127a protest. The campaign was also strong in Bombay. At Nadiad 
one aided school and at Ahmedabad three unaided but recognised
122
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schools renounced connections with the Government. At the latter
place a national college was opened, in the middle of November with
128Gandhi as Chancellor and Gidwani as Principal. Another national
school, called Tilak Mahavidayalayfi, was opened at Poona. A strike
129was also reported in the Calcutta Madrassa.  ^Elsewhere, the campaign 
was not much of a success and few students left their institutions.
Meanwhile, preparations were underway for the elections to the
eight Provincial Councils and two Chambers of the Indian Legislature.
As the elections approached, the non-co-operators intensified their
pressure on the candidates to withdraw their candidature and the
voters to abstain from voting. Every kind of tactic - from gentle
persuasion to coarere ostracism - was used to achieve the object and
130the appeal was taken right into the villages. Leaflets were
circulated warning Muslims that anyone standing for Councils or
131voting for them would cease to be a Muslim. Hindu mendicants were
reported to he going up and down the country warning the Hindus that
failure to boycott the elections was equal to killing one hundred 
132kine. Gandhi issued a manifesto to the voters that they should
sign a declaration that, until the Khilafat and the Punjab 'wrongs'
were righted and swaraj obtained, they did not wish to be 
133represented.
The Government countered the boycott by rallying together the
moderates, the communalists, the landed aristocracy and the Europeans.
To guard against the intimidation by the non-co-operators it
publicised widely the penal sections providing penalties for undue
134.pressure on voters or candidates.  ^But in spite of these precautions,
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the non-co-operation propaganda was fairly effective. Finding that
the CKC and the Congress were unyielding, few nationalists could dare
to stand for elections. Others who had wished to contest stepped
down out of deference to these bodies. Yet others who had little
135chance of success at the polls were glad to retire with dignity.
(See Table V).
The result was that out of 774 contested seats 239 went
uncontested and, in six cases, there were no candidates at all and
136the seats had to be filled through bye-elections. However, the
position varied considerably from province to province, the largest
number of uncontested seats and the smallest total number of candidates
being in the C.P. It is significant that in all the provinces the
absence of candidates was most conspicuous in Muslim constituencies,
particularly in the urban areas, more especially in the Punjab and 
137Bombay. The same variation existed in the voting pattern,
though non-co-operation was not the only reason. Other factors, such
as the floods in Madras and the widening of the franchise generally,
had also affected the turn-out. In any case, the pattern of voting
varied from constituency to constituency - from 8 per cent, in
Bombay City, where the non-co-operators were most successful, to 70
138per cent, in some urban constituencies of the Madras Presidency.
Here again the lowest polls were generally recorded in the urban
rather than in rural constituencies and, more particularly, in Muslim 
139constituencies. In some constituencies - in about half a dozen to
135
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a dozen cases - the non-co-operators were successful in throwing 
ridicule at the Government by electing to the Councils men of straw, 
like an illiterate coolie in Madras, a sweetmeat-seller in Delhi and 
a mochi in the Bengal Presidency!^ But the non-co-operators failed 
to prevent the Councils from being filled. In all there were 1,719 
candidates for the 535 contested seats - an average of over three per 
seat. There were still many Indians who had come to the rescue of 
the Government. The more important among those who sought the 
elections successfully weres Pandit Hridayanath Kunzru (b. 1887),
C.Y. Chintamani, Syed Raza Ali and the Raja of Mahmudabad in the 
U.P., Sardar Mehtab Singh, Umar Eayat Malik, Chaudhri Shahab-ud-din 
(d. 1949), Sikandar Hayat Khan (1892-1942), Feroz Khan Noon (1893- 
1970) and Mian Ahmad Yar Khan Daulatana (I896-I948) in the Punjab, 
Surendranath Banerjea, Nawab Ali Chowdhuri, the Nawab of Dacca and 
Abdullah al~Mamun, Hassan (1884-1946) and Kuseyn Shaheed (I893-I963) 
of the Suhrawardy family in Bengal, C.P. Ramaswami Aiyer (1889-1966), 
Sivaswami Aiyer, Srinivsa Sastri, K.V. Ranga Swami Iyengar (b. 1886) 
and R. Srinivasa Iyengar in Madras, S. Sinha in Bihar and Orissa,
Dr. U.S. Gour (1866-1949) and G.S. Khaparde in the C.P., and Sir
C.H. Setalvad (1866-1947), Jamnadas Dwarkadas, G.M. Bhurgri, Shah 
Nawaz Bhutto, Ebrahim Haroon Jaffer and Ghulam Husain Hidayatallah 
(1878-1940) in Bombay and Sind}^
In its policy, the Government of India was still cautious.
It believed that the people would themselves realise the ‘folly' of 
142non-co-operation. At any rate, it was anxious to keep things quiet
until after the elections. Then if the Government used force 'it
will have at least the acquiescence of the Moderates' who would be
143in possession of the Councils.  ^ The lesson of the Punjab 'wrong' 
had also made the Government more cautious!^ Therefore, Chelmsford,
140
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Ignoring all pressure, hesitated to proceed against Gandhi lest it
145
should alienate the moderates. As regards the Executive of the 
CKC, the proposed prosecutions were once again negatived by the 
advice of the Advocate-General, Bombay}^ However, in view of the 
unexpected spread of the non-co-operation campaign, the Government 
had felt it necessary to make a fresh declaration of its policy.
On November 6, 1920, the Home Department issued a resolution which 
declared that although the campaign was 'unconstitutional1 they had 
hitherto refrained from taking proceedings against those of its 
promoters 'who have advocated simultaneously with non-co-operation 
abstention from violence1. However, action was to be taken against 
those who had 'gone beyond the limits originally set up by its 
organisers and have by speech or writing openly incited the public 
to violence or have attempted to tamper with the loyalty of the 
army or of the police'. At the same time, the Government called upon 
those who had 'the good of India at heart' to organise themselves 
and 'assist the cause of law and order by active opposition to 
/the non-co-operation/ movement'
Indeed, there was in existence a strong body of opinion which 
was frightened by the increasing militancy of the non-co-operation 
campaign. The moderates had kept up a fairly constant fusillade in 
the presss R.P. Paranjpe (1876-1966), C.R. Ramaswami Aiyer and 
Mrs. Besant in the Servant of India; A.C. Mozumdar, Sir A. Chaudhuri 
(1860-1924), S. Bose, J.N. Roy, J„ Chaudhuri (1895-) and B.C. Chatterji 
in the Bengalee; G.A. Natesan (1875-1949) in the Indian Review; and 
N.M. Samarth in the Asiatic Review. The opposition to non-co- 
operation even among Muslims was still quite strong. Men like Jinnah, 
Hasan Imam, Bhurgri, Raza Ali, Pazlul Haq, the Nawab of Dacca, Nawab 
Ali Chowdhuri, Mirza Bashir-ud-din Mahmud Ahmad of Qadian, the 
Taluqdars of Oudh and certain Muslim associations, were as usual,
145
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149actively opposing the campaign. There would have been even stronger 
mobilisation of the anti-non-co-operation elements to the side of the 
Government if a bridge had been provided in the form of a reasonable 
modification of the Treaty and a more emphatic pronouncement regarding 
the Punjab legacy. Mrs. Besant, Setalvad and other moderates, in an 
attempt actively to combat non-co-operation propaganda, tried to
strike a bargain with the Viceroy through George Lloyd, the Governor
150 151of Bombay. But the terms for a compromise which they advanced
152were turned down by Chelmsford as 1 disappointing' and thus he 
lost the opportunity of playing his cards.
During December 1920, the focus of attention was the Congress 
session at Nagpur, for on its outcome depended the future attitude 
of the bulk of the Hindu community towards the Khilafat movement.
The majority of the moderates chose to stay away from Nagpur and, 
instead, decided to meet hundreds of miles away in Madras under the
i
maternal care of Mrs. Besant, The 'extremists1 among the opponents 
of non-co-operation, the Bengalis and the Maharashtrians in particular, 
came determined to reverse the Calcutta Special Congress decision of 
September 1920. The non-co-operators had not been sitting idle 
either. They had been concentrating on the opposition, especially
149
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the Bengal contingent. The Bengal Provincial Khilafat Committee had
154even provided a special train for the delegates' trip to Nagpur.
Mohamed Ali successfully used his personal influence with C.R. Das
155and 'proselytised' him to non-co-operation.  ^ A compromise was
reached in the subjects committee between the opposing factions and
Gandhi agreed to whittle down the boycott of schools and the surrender
156of practice by lawyers. The boycott of the Councils was already a
dead issue after the elections. Das himself then moved the non-co-
operation resolution in the open Congress on December 30° Other
opponents were silenced without much difficulty. The moderates of
Nagpur were not heard, Jinnah was howled down, Malaviya's efforts
were nugatory, G.S. Khaparde and Dr. Moonje (b. 1872) were brushed
157aside and Lajpat Rai wobbled and then became silent.
The resolution was passed with an overwhelming majority which
reaffirmed the Calcutta Congress advice on non-co-operation with
intention to enforce whole or any part of the programme at a time to
158be determined by the Congress or the AICC. At Motilal's insistance,
the Congress creed was remodelled to harmonize it with the spirit of
the new movement. The object of the Congress now became the attainment
of swara.j 'by all legitimate and peaceful means' with or without
159British connections. The more militant among the Muslims wanted 
to go even further and, with the full sympathy of the Ali brothers, 
tried to introduce proposals such as complete independence and the 
establishment of a republic, but were checked by Gandhi}^
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With the Congress solidly behind them and the Muslim League
1firmly under their control, the Khilafatists1 position was -
remarkably strong. The proceedings of the Khilafat Conference
which opened on December 29, 1920, under Abul Kalam Azad, were
defiantly uncompromising. Sir Frank Sly (1866-1928), the Governor
of the C.P., reported that the Muslim delegates at Nagpur were
exceedingly bitter and their speeches 1 considerably more violent
than even those at the Congress1 and those of the Ali brothers were
162'practically veiled threats of rebellion'. The Khilafat Conference 
reiterated its previous stand and refused to modify its original 
demands
The Khilafatists had been able to capture the vast machinery
of the Congress and all its funds, including the Tilak Swaraj Fund,
for the cause of the Khilafat. A period of intense campaigning
followed the Nagpur sessions. In the beginning of the new year,
Chotani addressed a letter to the Congress and the Muslim League
leaders in which he urged 'the necessity of these two bodies ceasing
to be merely deliberative and of forming themselves into executive *1 .
organisations1. He suggested the appointment of standing
committees with sub-committees or boards to control finance, national
165education, national industries and commerce, and propaganda. It is 
not known what response Chotani got on these specific proposals but 
soon a massive drive towards non-co-operation was underway. On 
January 23, 1921, the viceroy gloomily reported to the Secretary of 
State for India that the situation had 'undoubtedly worsened1 in
161
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many parts of the country}^
The first result appeared in the form of renewed non-co- 
operation among the students. The activity was fairly strong in 
the Punjab, Bombay, Bihar and Orissa and the C.P. At some places, 
like Nadiad and Ahmedabad, even the Municipalities renounced Government 
grants for education}^ But it was most intensive in Bengal, due
16q
mostly to the personal influence of C.R. Das. At his bidding
practically all the students in Calcutta deserted the schools and
colleges, but mostly private. University examinations were also
interfered with and out of 600 law examinees only about 150 satl^
But though the whole of Bengal was affected, the campaign was more
intense in Hindu-majority We stern-Bengal than in Muslim-dominated 
170Eastern-Bengal. In Rajshahi and Chittagong in particular, the 
Muslims resisted the non-co-operators. Perhaps the experience of 
1906-1908 agitation had made them wiser.
But before long the storm blew itself out. The closure of
the institutions was to a great deal responsible for defeating the
boycott. The Government also tried to solidify the anti-non-co-
operation feelings of the parents, roused as a result of the closure
171of the schools and colleges. The more serious among the students 
themselves began to realise the effects of the boycott on their 
careers.
As regards the number of students actually withdrawn, the 
Report on Indian Education for 1920-21 shows a marked decrease in 
the total number of students in the public institutions. The 
percentage of decrease in English arts colleges and high and middle 
schools were 8.6 , 5*1 and 8 .1 respectively against increases of
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3.3? 2.4 and 2 of the preceding year. The total loss was 1.7
172per cent, as compared to 1919-20. But it is almost impossible 
to establish a precise numerical figure because the fall in 
attendance, though primarily due to non-co-operation, was also 
affected by various other factors, particularly the high cost of 
living. Moreover, the girls schools were almost entirely unaffected. 
However, an assessment can be made from Table VI. The position 
becomes even clearer when one compaies these figures with the improved 
attendance in 1922-23 which signifies a sharp recovery from the 
effects of non-co-operation. (See Table VII).
So far as the national schools are concerned no exact assessment 
of their number or financial position is possible. But some idea can 
be formed from Table VIII which shows the number of the national 
schools and colleges, the number of students in attendance, and the 
approximate effect of non-co-operation on certain recognised 
institutions. The CKC, besides supporting the Jamia Milliya,
173financed a number of schools and colleges throughout the country.
So did the Congress and a number of individual wealthy businessmen.
One Bengali enthusiast was said to have collected Rs. 1,000 by
174begging in the streets of Calcutta. Though the number of political
resignations among the educationists was relatively small, a number
of teachers, professors and professional men like lawyers and doctors
offered themselves to lecture in the national colleges. The attempt
was not altogether unsuccessful as the Government was compelled to
recognise the defects of its own education system and to suggest 
175improvements. But the practical difficulty of effectively replacing 
the 'imported* system of education contributed, to a large extent, to 
shattering the non-co-operators1 dream. They had been able only to
172
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1 7 fi
make a dent and cause some financial loss to the Government, but 
otherwise they were themselves disappointed with the unsatisfactory 
results^
The increased political activity in the early months of 1921
was not limited to the students. The non-co-operators showed great
astuteness in exploiting the genuine economic grievances of the
peasantry* The lot of the kisan in India had never been good
but in Malabar and Oudh it had been particularly desperate. Here
zamindari oppression - burdensome rent, high exactions and exorbitant
178nazranas - was present in its worst form. Half-hearted attempts
by the British, as in 1912 and after, to improve the system and
protect the tenant, had foundered as the Government was reluctant
to antagonise the zamindars 9 the only class that was solidly behind 
179them. In some provinces, as in the Punjab, the situation had
been rendered worse by, among other factors, the return to villages
of a large number of disbanded soldiery. Crop failure, plague and
disease were other contributory factorsThus, besides a general
desire for tenancy reform, there was considerable unrest prevailing
among the rural masses which had led early in 1920, to the
101establishment of Kisan Sabhas or peasant associations.
Though young Jawaharlal Nehru had been taking interest in the
182Kisan Sabhas since the summer of 1920, it was not until the end
176
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of that year that the non-co-operators had turned their attention
towards the rural masses. Consequently, they were reported to be
working up anti-Government feelings with exaggerated promises, such
as, free railway travelling passes, rent-free land, cheap clothes, 
183and cheap food. Gandhi and the Ali brothers themselves visited 
the U.P. a number of times to stir up the Sabhas. The Sabhas were 
at first divided about non-co-operation, but their failure to get 
their representatives elected to the Councils had made them more
1 aA
receptive. The Kisan Congress which was held in December 1920,
accepted non-co-operation and pressed for the complete deletion of
the ejectment laws from the Statute Book, repeal of mortage and sole
185right m  peasant holdings. This was the first significant attempt 
to turn the kisan movement into political channels.
The strength of the revolutionary agrarian movement was fully
demonstrated in the post-llagpur period when at many places the
Government servants, while on tour, were socially boycotted and 
186refused supplies. The trouble culminated in the violent anti-
zamindar and anti-Government riots in Bareilly and Fyzabad in the 
187
U.P. The provincial authorities answered the riots by repression 
and countered non-co-operation by launching an active anti-non-co- 
operation campaign with the help of the zamindars and the Liberals. 
Aman Sabhas or 'anti-revolutionary leagues' were established to
1 88
whip up support for the Government against the non-co-operators.
But the experiment was short-lived and before long the Liberals
183
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withdrew their support as a protest against the Government's .
189repressive policy. On the other hand, the success of the non-co-
operators was exhibited from the fact that an anti-zamindar movement
190was turned into an anti-Government movement. The non-co-operators'
success is also evident from the fact that the Kisan Sabhas
established their own pancha.yats and, except in a few cases, settled
191the disputes themselves. More important than that, the zamindars 
and the Government were compelled to recognise that they would have 
to make concessions to the kisans and to revise the Oudh Rent Act 
of 1QQ6}^2
Equally probing was the attempt of the non-co-operators to win
the industrial workers whose importance' they fully realised and who,
193 aunlike the April 1919 agitation days, ' seemed quite responsive. A
little more effort could evoke an enthusiastic support. The rank and 
file of the labour movement were led by their own leaders - Fabians 
N.M. Joshi (1879-1955) Joseph Baptists and committed communist 
S.A. Range (1899“)^^- but the non-co-operators like Lajpat Rai had 
also taken a leading part in organising the All-India Trades Union 
Congress (hereafter referred to as AITUC) in July 1920^^ As early 
as October 1920, the Bombay Government had reported that it was 
likely that the labour disputes would be utilised by the non-co­
operators and that a lead in this direction was expected from the
189
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196AITUC at the end of that month. Consequently, the AITUC, m  order
to counter the effect of the business community in the reformed
Councils, had pressed for the claim of the labour to have
197representatives m  the Councils.
Then came the utilisation of the labour unrest for political 
purpose. Early in 1921, the Government received a joint ultimatum 
from the Indian Telegraph Association and the Railway Workmen's 
Association stating that unless their demands for fresh revision of
pay were accepted by February 28, they would not be responsible for
198the resulting disorganisation of the services. Similarly, the
Tramway workers decided that in order to obtain the recognition of
199unionmen they would, if necessary, go on general strike. The
Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway workmen went on strike.
The one at the Oudh and Rohilkhand Railway resulted in disorders?^
There was also trouble in sugar mills in Samastipur in Bihar leading
to a riot in Giriditu^ In Assam, the non-co-operators excited the
202labour in the tea gardens.
There is no direct evidence to show as to how far the non-co-
operators were helped by the Bolshevik agents in their efforts to
arouse the labour movement. The Communist muhajirin, like Shaukat
Usmani, who were sent by Moscow for this purpose, reached India when
203the non-co-operation experiment v/as already failing. No doubt some 
of the front rank Khilafatists and Congressmen, like Hasrat Mohani
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and B.C. Pal, were serious Bolshevik sympathisers'^^ but the middle- 
olass Khilafat/Congress leadership was on the whole inimical to 
communismo In the final analysis, therefore, the Indian nationalist 
movement, during the period under review, seems to have 'remained
largely unaffected in its actual policies and progress by the October
205Revolution'.
The non-co-operators also exploited the Akali Sikhs who were
incensed at the Government for supporting the hereditary Mahants in
their dispute over the control of Gurdwaras. The Punjab Government
had reported dissemination of political propaganda amongst the rural
classes, particularly in the recruiting areas, A committee with
Lajpat Rai as president had been entrusted with this job?1^  But
the militant spirit of the Sikhs did not remain confined to anti-
British channels. They also clashed among themselves over the
Gurdwaras, resulting in such tragedies as at Nankana Sahib later in
February 1921, when about 130 Akali 'Reformers' were butchered and
207burnt to death by the rival group.
The rapid progress of the Khilafat movement with its multi­
pronged non-co-operation campaign had already begun to stagger the 
Government of India, Its anxiety was enhanced by the fact that the 
movement had penetrated the lower strata of the Muslim population 
which had hitherto been apparently uninterested. Prom this the 
Government of India concluded that the army and the police must also
pQO
be ultimately affected by the 'virus' of the Khilafat movement. 
Besides the depressing situation in India, some external factors 
too were causing anxiety to the Government. Particular factors of 
disquiet were the activities of the Rationalist Turks and the 
reported suggestion at the recent Baku Conference (September 1920)
204
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to offer the Khilafat to a ruler, like the Amir of Afghanistan,
who would be less amenable to European pressure. The Government of
India apprehended that the bitterness of the Khilafatists was such
209that they might accept the Amir's selection as caliph. But one
hopeful sign for the Government was that there was evidence that if
the freedom of the Holy Places was secured and King Hussain was
persuaded to accept the Caliph's suzerainty over Arabia, even the
210ulama would be willing to make peace with the Government. There
were also signs that the ulama, particularly of Deoband, were at
variance with the political leaders for the latter's supposed
211subordination of religion to Hindu-Muslim unity.
Compelled by these multiple developments, and perhaps by the 
militants' boycott of the visit of the Duke of Connought (1850-
2i2
1942) early in January 1921, the Government of India opened fresh 
209
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discussions with Whitehall for a revision of the Turkish Treaty.
An opportunity still existed as the ratification of the Treaty had
213
not yet taken place. Recent efforts in this regard had failed,
hut when the rise of the Turkish Nationalists under Mustafa Kemal
forced the Allies to call a conference in London in the last week 
214of February 1921, Chelmsford lost no time in pressing Montagu to
secure permission for a small delegation of non-official Indian
Muslims at Government expense to place their views before the Peace 
213Conference. The Viceroy's intention was, as he later explained 
to Montagu, to prompt 'a split between the Extremist Mahomedans and 
Gandhi. The former would then find themselves isolated and detested
2
by both their Hindu allies and all Moderate and sensible Mahomedans'.
217Montagu at once obtained Lloyd George's consent and hurriedly
on February 19 a delegation, consisting of Hasan Imam, the Aga Khan
218and Chotani, was despatched from India. Dr. Ansari accompanied
213
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the delegation as Chotani*s advisor and interpreter and Abdul
219
Ghaffar as his secretary. Later, Ansari too was given official
status and made a full member of the delegation in order to eliminate
220the Shia majority of two to one. Kidwai also joined to assist them.
The British Government's consent to receive a delegation was viewed by
the Khilafatists as a victory. They increased the pressure to drive
home their advantage, A series of Khilafat conferences were held at
several places emphasising that if the settlement was inconsistent
221with their demands it would be unacceptable to them. At Ityzabad,
Mohamed Ali even threatened to sever connections with the British 
222Government. This may have been a hollow threat but on the Turkish
issue the Khilafatists were fully supported by, besides Hindus, the
loyal and moderate Muslim opinion. The matter was raised in the
Council of State by Bhurgri and a joint representation of the Muslim
members of the two Houses of the Central Legislature was conveyed to
223the British Prime Minister. Deputations of the Muslim members of
224-several provincial legislatures waited upon the authorities and
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225the Shias expressed their solidarity with the Sunnis. The Begum 
of Bhopal also urged on Chelmsford the importance of dealing with 
the Khilafat question in accordance with the wishes of the Muslim
• j. 226community.
The Indian delegation arrived in London on March 7? 1921, when
227the Conference was nearing its end. ' Nevertheless, it was given the
opportunity to present its case to the British Government. The
delegation met Montagu at the India Office on March 11 and, on March
12, had an interview with the Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street.
Lloyd George was impressed by Hasan Imam’s presentation of the case
but the interview did not last longer than 45 minutes. However, the
delegation was asked to furnish the Prime Minister with a memorandum
explaining the objections to the Treaty which they wanted to put
228before the Supreme Council of the Allies, But the fact of the
matter is that the proposals for the modification of the Treaty had
already been approved by the Allies on March 10 and were handed to
the Turkish and Greek delegations at St. James’s Palace on the very
day the Indian delegation had its interview with the Prime Minister.
The London proposals were substantial concessions, especially with
229regard to capitulations, finances and armed forces, but unfortunately 
they did not at all cover the points by which alone the Muslims of 
India could be satisfied, i.e., restoration of Smyrna and Thrace to 
Turkey and the Sultan-Caliph’s suzerainty, no matter how nominal, 
over the Holy Places in the Hedjaz. Of the last two not even a 
mention had been made. On the other hand, the French scored a 
diplomatic point by almost simultaneously announcing the evacuation
225
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226
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227
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228
For the official report of the interview with Lloyd George see 
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of Cilicia in vivid contrast to the failure of the British to 
fulfil their pledges.
Naturally, the Indians were not at all happy and at a dinner
at the Savoy Hotel in London on March 15, Hasan Imam bitterly
230attacked the proposals. The position could have been retrieved
if Angora had been inclined to accept them. But she was not. The
proposals were not considered as coming anywhere near her 
231expectations. However, the matter had not been closed. Montagu
flew his kite for a compromise but Hasan Imam would not agree to any
232surrender of their demands. Nevertheless, on March 24 the Indian 
delegation was given another oioportunity to explain its case to the 
Prime Minister, Lloyd George appeared to be sympathetic but was 
totally unyielding on any point with the possible exception of the 
evacuation of Constantinople. He talked about the pledges to the
233Jews but conveniently forgot his own pledges to the Indian Muslims.
The delegation was utterly disappointed and considered the 
234visit futile. They were even more bitter when King Hussain's son
Emir Faisal (1883-1933) pretendod to them that the Arabs were quite
willing to accept Turkish suzerainty over the Holy Places but Lloyd
235George would not agree to it. Ansari and Hasan Imam returned to 
India and the Aga Khan went to the Continent. But Chotani and Kidwai, 
in spite of the disappointing result, stayed on in Britain to continue 
the pressure. With the help of Ispahan!, Jinnah and other Muslims in 
Britain, as well as the British Turkophiles, they launched a vigorous 
propaganda campaign, Chotani, a businessman by profession, established
230
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231 "
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232
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contacts with the business community in Britain and sought to enlist 
236its support. In effect, however, these efforts were nugatory.
The failure of Chotani*s mission falsified the intentions of
the Government of India to effect a split between the Khilafatists
and Hindus by detaching from the agitation the amenable section of
the Muslim opinion. On the contrary, it increased the bitterness.
The Khilafatists did not conceal that the acceptance of non-violence
by them had been a matter of policy and were impatient to take up
jihad. The ulama were restless because the threat of non-Muslim
237control in the Hedjaz still existed. This had left no room for
compromise, which only a short while before seemed so feasible.
The Jamiyat-ul-Ulama drove the last nail and at a meeting at Bareilly
on March 24 and 26 declared for the complete independence of India.
It resolved to concentrate all efforts to achieve this object and to
punish the opponents of non-co-operation through religious 
238tribunals. The Government, on its part, increased the repression.
The Local Governments, in response to the Government of India’s
instructions of January 1921, were resorting to a more vigorous action.
Section 144 was frequently used to prohibit public meetings. The
police and military were often used to break up processions and
moveable columns of the army were paraded through towns to strike
terror. The nationalist press was gagged and leaders were put in
239jail or threatened with prosecution.
In this atmosphere of repression and agitation ended the term 
of office of Lord Chelmsford, one of the most unpopular viceroys of 
India, The feeling against him was so intense that few Indians were
236
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prepared to give him a public farewell. Dejected and heart-broken^^
Chelmsford left India on April 2, 1921. The same day Lord Heading
(1860-1935)? the new Viceroy, arrived in India. Despite the
Government repression and, notwithstandihg the desire of the more
desperate Muslims to offer active resistance, the non-co-operation
leaders decided that time was not yet ripe for civil disobedience.
This, it seems, was motivated as much by the state of unpreparedness
as by the expediency of giving the new Viceroy time to evaluate the 
241situation. The AICC which met at Bezwada on April 1, and the 
Khilafat Conference, which was held at Meerut on April 7-10, both 
seemed to agree to this viewpoint. As an alternative to civil 
disobedience they decided to concentrate on the task of strengthening 
the movement before the end of June 1921. The new programme included 
the enlistment of ten million members each for the Congress and the 
Khilafat organisations, the collection of ten million rupees for the 
national cause, and the introduction of two million charkhas into 
Indian homes?^
But with the change in the Viceroyalty there was no obvious
change of policy. Reading's assessment of the situation was based
on the assumption that the agitation was largely concentrated upon
the demand of complete swaraj and that it was 'an attempt to create
243a spirit of nationalism which will make for independence1. His 
policy, therefore, as he had explained to Montagu, was 'to detach
240
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241
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the more reasonable of the non-co-operationists and to weaken the
movement'? 44 It was basically the same as Chelmsford's. The
Khilafatists, who were expecting a change of heart with the coming
of the new Viceroy, approached Reading to call a Round Table
245
Conference for a suitable settlement. But Reading did not agree.
He thought that such a conference would lead to nothing unless the
P/1 fl
non-co-operators made very substantial changes in their programme.
The leaders were disappointed. They decided to redouble their
activities. Consequently, the reports from the provincial governments
for the months of April and May showed a marked increase in agitation,
leading to a stampede of many thousands of oppressed coolies from the
tea gardens of Assam and a simultaneous strike in the Assam-Bengal 
247
Railway. But this increased activity often resulted in outbreaks 
of mob violence, as at Malegaon in Bombay and Giridih in Bihar, causing 
great racial bitterness?48
The Government retaliated by increasing repression and gave
carte blanche to the officials to fight non-co-operation and rally
249
the moderates to their side. But the Viceroy was extremely worried 
about Muslim attitude and the leadership of Mohamed Ali whose growing 
influence was very disquieting to him. As he later informed Montagus
It is idle to underrate the importance of Mahomed 
Ali's position as the head of the Khilafat movement; 
it is useless merely to denounce him as a braggart 
and a wily unscrupulous politician and a hater of the 
British. He is a real factor in the situation; he is
244
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the ostensible link between Mahomedan and Hindu.
If trouble comes between him and Gandhi it means 
the collapse of the bridge over the gulf between 
Hindu and Mahomedan... .My* survey of the position 
on my own behalf and as the result of advice is 
that he is at the moment a far more dangerous 
factor to peace than Gandhi...,! prefer the power 
to be in his /Gandhi's/ hands to the hands of Ali
brothers.250
In order to create rift between Gandhi and the Ali brothers, or in
general terms, between Hindus and Muslims, the Government exploited
the Hindu fear of an Afghan invasion. Efforts in this direction had
already been afoot under Chelmsford when Sir William Vincent (1866-
194l)» the Home Member, started the Afghan hare by digging up the
old accusation that the Ali brothers wanted Afghanistan to invade
251India and desired a Muslim rule in the sub-continent. In reply 
Mohamed Ali, with Gandhi's approval and in his presence, tried to 
clarify his position in a speech at Erode in Madras on April 2, 1921. 
But in doing so he muddled up the whole thing. Whereas he offered 
to oppose an Afghan invasion if it was intended to subjugate India 
he was also willing to assist the invaders in every possible way, 
including the use of force, if the purpose was a jihad against the 
British?-^
It was the reflection of that familiar issue of primary
loyalty to India or to Islam which had been recurring during the
Khilafat movement. But taken in conjunction with the declared
objectives of the hijrat, the mounting 1 jihad' raids of the Tribes
on the Indian territory, the slow progress of the Anglo-Afghan talks
on the treaty of friendship and the increasing Bolshevik and Turkish
influence in Afghanistan, the speech created alarm in some Hindu
circles. Speculation arose as to what might happen if the Afghans
really invaded India. A section of the Anglo-Indian and the moderate
253press took pains to spread alarm and suspicion. Much was made also
250
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of a story by Shraddhanand about an alleged Afghan spy meeting the
Ali brothers and getting from them an assurance of support in case
254the Afghans invaded India, In spite of Mohamed Ali's assurances
255that he had not meant what had been insinuated, and despite
256Gandhi's explanation that the speech had been misunderstood, some
of the Hindu leaders like Malaviya, B.C. Pal and Lajput Rai were
not satisfied?^ Even C.E. Andrews (1871-1940)? who defended the
principle of non-co-operation, thought that Gandhi was unwittingly
258inviting the Afghans to invade India and condoning violence.
As soon as signs of rift appeared, the Government decided to
prosecute Mohamed Ali* Harcourt Butler was persuaded to 'bell the 
259cat1. But Shafi, the Education Member, advised Reading that the
proposed action was 'entirely inopportune', likely to start a chain
of violent disturbances in the country and that they should wait for
a psychologically suitable moment?^0 All the three Indian Members
of the Viceroy’s Council - Sapru, Shafi and Sarma - counselled
Reading that there was just a possibility that Gandhi might be
261desirous of coming to some arrangement, Reading agreed. Gandhi
TCawnpore)', May 7? 19215 Aj (Benares), May 8 and 11, 1921? Swadesh 
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was persuaded through Malaviya to come to Simla.
Beginning with the first on May 13, there were in all six
263interviews which altogether lasted about thirteen hours. During 
the discussion the Yiceroy brought up the subject of the Ali brothers 
and the proposed prosecutions. Gandhi was emphatic that he had never 
heard Mohamed Ali urge violence in any form, otherwise he would have 
confronted him with it. Reading told Gandhi that he was determined 
to proceed with the prosecutions, which could be withheld if a 
satisfactory assurance was given that speeches inciting to violence 
and defying authority would not be repeated, and an expression of 
regret was also tendered by them for having made them in the past. 
Gandhi found himself in a delemma. He had risen to his present 
heights through the Khilafatists under the Ali brothers. He could 
ill-afford to lose the Ali brothers unless he was going to give up 
the movement entirely and with it his leadership. On the other hand, 
if he had secured a pardon for them in return for an apology it was 
certainly to be held suspect as Simla-inspired. But this was the 
only alternative for him. Gandhi promised Reading that he would get 
an assurance from the Ali brothers. But, in order to make his task 
easier, Gandhi drafted the proposed statement in the form of a 
declaration of the non-co-operation policy. Reading at once objected 
to the draft, emphatically demanding a document intended as a public 
expression of regret and a promise of good conduct for the future. 
Thereupon, Gandhi redrafted the statement without qualifying sentences 
in accordance with Reading’s wishes and took it to the Ali brothers?^
The Ali brothers accepted Gandhi's advice and signed the 
document with some minor alteration. The ’apologia’ appeared in the
262
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265national newspapers on May 30, 1921. The same day a Government
communique announced that in view of the 'apology1 the prosecutions
pending against the Ali brothers had been suspended. Should the
undertaking be flouted, the Government of India would be at liberty
266to prosecute them for their past speeches. The same evening, the
Viceroy, at a dinner given in his honour by Shafi at the Simla
Chelmsford Club, gloated over his achievement in securing the 
267'apologia*. The Anglo-Indian press made the most of the incident
268and advertised it as the Ali brothers' surrender and collapse.
It is not known what Gandhi had told the Ali brothers when
269he got them to sign and issue the statement. The evidence, however,
suggests that he had accepted Reading's interpretation of the 'apologia'
as an unconditional apology but played it down to the Ali brothers.
The latter had definitely taken the document in a light different from
that intended by Reading. They held that they had accepted Gandhi's
advice 'without accepting his interpretation of even unintentional
incitement' and that the document was intended merely to allay the
270'unwarranted' suspicions of certain Hindu leaders. Therefore, when
265
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the news of the Viceroy's speech reached Mohamed Ali at Baroach, he
271immediately repudiated the 'apology'.
The repercussions were far reaching. For weeks together the
Indian press was full of articles and references to the incident.
Gandhi's position became extremely difficult. On the one hand he
was sneered at by Hindu leaders like C.R. Das and Motilal for his
interviews with the Viceroy as being a direct negation of the
272principle of non-co-operation, and on the other, he was assailed
273by Muslims for giving away their leaders. The anger in Muslim
circles over Gandhi's 'betrayal' was so intense that, at a secret
meeting of the CKC at Bombay in June 1921, the motion was proposed
that the Committee should part company with Gandhi and the Hindus.
It was with great difficulty that the Ali brothers succeeded in
274.preventing the resolution from being passed.' Gandhi knew that he
had landed himself in trouble and did his utmost to regain his -
position. He even repudiated the 'apology' and began to support the
275Ali brothers' interpretation of the document. The volte-face was
276 277puzzling to Reading' and to Malaviya,11 who had acted as •
intermediary, but if Gandhi were to save his position as a leader and
keep the Muslims at his side he had to do it. Nevertheless, Reading's
manoeuvring nearly succeeded in splitting the Khilafat/non-co-operation
leadership. A contemporary opinion regarded the incident as the
278first break in the non-co-operation solidarity. Mohamed Ali himself 
admitted that for some time Reading's plan of discrediting them had
271
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succeeded and it was with difficulty that the people were convinced
279of 'the pettifogging lawyer's chicanery'.
One result of the Gandhi-Reading talks had been that Gandhi
was mellowed. His subsequent speeches were despondent and without a
reference to the 'satanic Government'. As promised to Reading, he
directed his attention to completing the Bezwada and Meerut programmes
before the end of June. But Reading, inexperienced in Indian affairs
as he was, negatived his advantage by pressing his victory too hard.
This prevented any further attempts for a compromise. Ajmal Khan and
280Dr. Ansari, who were expected to meet Reading decided not to do so.
Further, the repression that he had unleashed hardened the opponents.
But what stirred the Khilafatists most was the rumoured possibility
of the British Government rendering military assistance to the Greeks
against their hero Mustafa Kemal in the renewed Graeco-Turkish 
2SXhostilities. Opinion was expressed by the ulama, notably Abul
Kalam Azad and Abdul Bari, that it had become religiously imperative
to help save the Kemalist party. Non-violent non-co-operation was a
useful weapon, but they had never committed themselves to adhere to
this principle for all time. They must reconsider and revise their 
282policy. Evidently, the ulama and the militants were getting weary 
of the irritating condition of non-violence.
This encouraged the CKC to action. On June 16, 1921, it met at 
Bombay and directed its standing Non-Co-Operation Committee to submit
279
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280
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281
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13, 1921? Bamford, op. oit., p. 1685 and V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 517? 
June 21, 1921, RP.
- 200 ~
a report at the Khilafat Conference at Karachi early next month on
the steps to be taken in the event of the British involvement in the 
283war* In the meantime, some efforts were made in Britain by Chotani, 
Jinnah and other Indian and British sympathisers to dissuade the
OO A
British Cabinet from helping Greece. Reading, whose intervention
285had also been solicited by Chotani,  ^in view of the forthcoming
Karachi Conference, lost no time in urging on the Home Government the
necessity of avoiding involvement, ’For then', he warned, ’we should
286have to face very troublesome agitation’.
Apparently, the British did not help the Greeks. Nor was the
Non-Co-Operation Committee able to furnish its recommendations in
time. But, as planned, the Karachi Conference took place on July
8, 1921, under Mohamed Ali’s presidency. It was generally expected
that the Ali brothers would do something reckless in an attempt to
rehabilitate themselves in the public eye. Therefore, Gandhi, with
the more cautious Khilafatists like Ajmal Khan and Dr, Ansari, had
chosen to stay away. As expected, the proceedings of the Conference
were wilfully uncompromising. On Mohamed Ali’s motion, the Conference
on July 9» passed the fateful resolution emphatically declaring that
it was religiously unlawful for any Muslim to serve in the army or
help or acquiesce in the recruitment. It further decided that ’if
the British Government directly or indirectly, openly or secretly
fight the Angora Government, the Muslims of India will start civil
disobedience and establish their complete independence at the next
sessions of the Indian National Congress to be held at Ahmedabad
287
and hoist the flag of the Indian Republic'.
283
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The declarations in the resolution, contingent as they were
on the reopening of hostilities by the British against Angora, had
already been voiced at Belgaum and at Bombay less than a month 
288before. The clause on the army was just a repetition of the 
Muttafiqqa Fatwa issued as early as November 1920. But its acceptance 
by the Khilafat Conference, at a time when Gandhi and the cautious 
Khilafatists were unwilling for a confrontation with the Government, 
was a victory for the militants. It was the first of a series of 
attempts to revoke non-co-operation on strictly Gandhian lines.
Gandhi was unnerved. He was also under pressure from certain Hindu
sections to give an assurance that there would be no departure from
289 290the policy of non-violence. Gandhi did issue a re-assurance
but bided his time. His chance to channel Muslim fury came when the
Non-Co-Operation Committee of the CKC met to consider the adoption of
civil disobedience. He took advantage of the loophole that the
Committee had been appointed to deal with non-co-operation matters
only and that it had no authority to consider any other means outside
it. Consequently, he was able to prevail upon the other members of
the Committee - Shaukat Ali, Kitchlew and Khatri - to await a decision 
291
by the AICC, where he hoped easily to circumvent the issue.
And it happened exactly like that. When the AICC met at Bombay
in the last week of July 1921, it obediently postponed, under
Gandhi’s instructions, the initiation of civil disobedience until
after the successful completion of the programme of boycott of foreign
cloth and swadeshi. However, as a concession the AICC allowed the
right of individual civil disobedience, provided the Working Committee 
292approved of it.
288
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If the militant section of the Khilafatists was angry at Gandhi’s
retarding manoeuvres, it did not express its feelings in public. For
the moment, the cautious counsels seemed to have prevailed and the
attention was diverted to the crusade against drink and boycott of 
293foreign cloth. All other items of non-co-operation were relegated 
to the background. Partly, the diversion had been the result of a 
realisation that the campaign of non-co-operation was failing. Several 
non-co-operating lawyers, including Kidwai, had resumed practice. 
Arbitration courts had almost vanished. Attendance at Government 
schools and colleges was also returning to normal. But a positive 
impetus to the swadeshi campaign had come from the successful 
collection of over a crore of rupees for the Tilak Swaraj Fund before 
the target date of June 31? 1921?^
The boycott of the foreign cloth was already underway but
officially it was launched on August 1, the first anniversary of the
non-co-operation campaign. An appeal was issued to the merchants to
give up trading in foreign cloth and take to selling khaddi, the
295Indian spun and woven cloth. But they were given two months to
clear stocks of foreign cloth and cancel purchase orders, after which
296their shops were to be picketted. The Indian piece-goods merchants,
who had incurred heavy losses as a result of the fall in the exchange
297rate eagerly joined the.campaign.
293
For the course of the temperance and swadeshi campaigns see 
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294
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Since the Indian contributing centres were already overstocked the 
shipments of goods purchased at high prices seriously worsened the 
situation. The leading piece-goods merchants' associations hoping 
that the rupee would still rise to a two-shilling level, refused to
- 203 -
It is difficult to establish the extent to which non-co-operation
affected the imports, as a number of other factors were responsible
298for the general depression in trade. But the importation of foreign
cloth fell considerably. The consumption was limited almost entirely
to minimum clothing requirements and even there the bulk of the goods
bought was of grey (unbleeched) variety. (See Table IX). The total
imports of cotton manufactures decreased in value from Rs.102 crores
in 1920-21 to Rs.57 crores in 1921-22, The decrease and its subsequent
recovery in the following year are shown in Table X and Graph I.
On the other hand the campaign for swadeshi, helped by the seriously
reduced purchasing power in the country generally, spread swiftly.
This aspect was also reflected in the increased importation of the
type of yarn more suitable for hand weaving than yarn spun from Indian 
299cotton. Though the effect of swadeshi and boycott of foreign cloth
was felt throughout India, the campaign was more successful in Bombay,
Madras, Bengal and the IJ.P^^ A feature of this campaign was the
’sacrificial fires’ of foreign cloth wearing apparel and piece-goods
all over the country 'as a token of our determination never to touch 
301foreign cloth'. The Muslims were, however, allowed to collect
foreign cloth and, instead of making bonfires, send it to the Smyrna
sufferers. Gandhi agreed that the purpose would be served even if the
302Hindus handed over their stock to be sent along with it. He was
confident that the campaign was ’the sole remedy for the Khilafat,
303for removing evils and for helping Angora’; But like other items
■Buy’and even imposed fines on the recalcitrant merchants. See 
Commercial Intelligence Department, India, Review of the Trade of 
India in 1921-22, Calcutta, 1923, p. 2.
298
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of non-co-operation it could not achieve the desired target. Its 
effect on Lancashire was not very deep^^ The burning of imported 
cloth before India was able to replace it by local manufacture had 
considerably reduced the campaign's chances of success.
In their impatience, the militants once more demanded an immediate
initiation of civil disobedience by the CKC and the Congress. A
particular pocket of hardliners was in Lucknow where Salamat Ullah
of Farangi Mahal voiced the public feelings that the British attitude
305over Angora was becoming unbearable. ' Gandhi admitted the force of
the argument but retorted that swaraj was the quickest method of
righting the Khilafat 'wrong'. Any thoughtless outburst of violence
might give vent to pent-up rage but could bring no relief to Turkey,
while repression might arrest the success of the movement. He was
convinced that the country was not yet ready for the adoption of civil
disobedience on an extensive scale. They must first work for a
complete boycott of foreign cloth and promote s w a d e s h i It was
partly to check this impatience and partly to eliminate all political
organisations in the country other than the Congress, that Gandhi had
been trying to transfer the control of the non-co-operation campaign
307and the swara.j movement from the Khilafat Committee to the Congress. 
Already, the Bengal Congress leaders had attempted a merger of the 
Khilafat committees with the district Congress committees but the 
Khilafatists had refused^^ Gandhi's manoeuvre failed. On the 
contrary, the Congress was compelled to acquiesce In the Khilafatists' 
organised campaign of tampering with the Indian army.
The Khilafatists had been busy in this connection for quite sotae 
time. As early as summer 1920, intercepted letters from Indian Muslim
304
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soldiers serving in Mesopotamia written to Chotani and Shaukat Ali
309had revealed that the propaganda was not limited to India. Reports
had also suggested that the troops had apparently responded to the 
310campaign. The record book of the CKC, seized by the police in
September 1921, showed that the copies of the Muttafiqqa Fatwa,
declaring service in the army haram, had been secretely distributed
311during the months from February to May 1921. Wow this proscribed
Fatwa was reissued in the form of leaflets with the signatures of 
312425 ulama and distributed among many units of the Indian army.
The Local Governments tried to s top their circulation and in August
the offices of the Jamiyat-ul-Wlama in Delhi were searched and over
313800 copies confiscated. It was also reported that a huge amount of
314the Khilafat Fund was being utilised for bribing the soldiers.
There were indications that at certain places the Indian troops were
displaying their sympathy with the non-co-operating mobs against the 
315police. The Government was forced to deploy British soldiers more 
often and even to shelve the reduction of the British troops as
309
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316recommended by the Military Requirements Committee,
The Khilafatists did not leave the matter there. Apart from
attempting to dissuade Muslim soldiers from fighting Angora in any
future war, they tried, on Chotani*s instructions from London, to
raise a loan of about 3 crores of rupees to purchase arms for Mustafa 
317Kemal. The scheme had been prompted by the Supreme Council’s
decision in Paris on August 10, 1921, to lift the arms embargo on
318the Turkish and Greek belligerents. The realisation of such a
319colossal amount was out of question, but, nevertheless, a regular
Angora Fund, ostensibly for the relief of Turkish sufferers, was
created, Eventually by early 1923? the remittances to Angora amounted
320to about £160,000 apart from other articles, most of which was
321utilised to pay the Nationalist army;
The British and the Indian Governments were disinclined to
322interfere with the arms purchase scheme but they could hardly ignore 
the tampering with the Indian troops even though the number of 
disafections had been small - 30 in 1920 and 02 in 1921^^ Early in 
August 1921, the Bombay Government, in consultation with the 
Government of India, decided to push the prosecutions of the Ali 
brothers along with Dr. Kitchlew, Pir Ghulam Mujaddid, Husain Ahmad
316
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Madni (1879-1957)? Nisar Ahmad, and a Hindu called Shankar Achariya
of Shraddhapidh, for their support of the resolutions passed at the
Karachi Khilafat Conference declaring enlistment or service in the 
324Indian army haram. Consequently, Mohamed Ali was arrested at
Waltair in Andhra on September 14 when he was heading for Malabar with
Gandhi to pacify the Mappilla rioters, who had nearly wrecked the
325Hindu-Muslim entente. On September 17 he was released but at once 
re-arrested by the Bombay police who had, in the meantime, arrived 
with a proper warrant. The other accused were rounded up at
326different places and by the 20th all were in custody at Karachi.
524
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The arrest of half a dozen front-rank Khilafat leaders for
endorsing the Fatwa of the Ulama was a tactical error on the part
of the Government, Apprehensions arose in Muslim circles that the
Government which had so blatantly disregarded and proscribed the
F&twA, subscribed by nearly five hundred ulama, could also one day
327invent an excuse 'to suppress the Quran itself'; When on September
21, 1921, the CKC and the Jamiyat~ul-Ulama met at Delhi in camera,
angry speakers led by Hasrat Mohani demanded an immediate adoption of
civil disobedience as the only course left open to them. Ajmal Khan,
who was always inimical to taking any action independent of the Hindu
compatriots, pleaded with the militants to await the Congress decision.
He successfully reasoned with them that action by one community was
bound to fail unless it was supported by the other. If they were to
328achieve success then they must first secure the Hindu support.
The Congress, however, was in no mood to run the risk. Gandhi
had made up his mind that civil disobedience had better be postponed
and should be adopted only 'when we are ready to carry it to the 
329bitter end1. On September 24, 1921, he issued an appeal to the
Muslims that they should remain patient and non-violent, though not
passive, and maintained that boycott of foreign cloth and swadeshi
230could yet achieve swara.i within the year. Hut anxious as he was to
satisfy Muslims that he stood by the Ali brothers, Gandhi arranged a
meeting of Hindu-Muslim leaders at Bombay on October 4, where, in
spite of some Hindu opposition, a manifesto, supporting the Karachi
resolution, was drafted and issued the following day under 48 
331signatures. But It was evident that the Congress was not prepared
327
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to agree to the launching of civil disobedience, except individual
civil disobedience under the strict supervision of the provincial 
332committees. Thus, the CKC was prevented from taking action, even 
though the provincial Khilafat committees were pressing for permission 
to launch civil disobedience.
The trial of the Karachi accused, which had begun on September
26, ended on November 1 with the conviction of all of them except for
Shankar Achariya who was acquitted. All were given two years'
333rigorous imprisonment. With various other Khilafat leaders already
in jail, the trial and conviction of the Ali brothers embittered the
334Muslim feelings still further; They were particularly angry at
335Gandhi for remaining free while their leaders were in jail. To 
satisfy Muslims and Hindu hot-heads Gandhi had to do something. On 
November 4 and 5? 1921, a meeting of the AICC was convened at Dr. 
Ansari's house in Delhi. After a heated debate in which Gandhi's 
hesitancy and timidity to launch civil disobedience was questioned, 
the AICC passed a resolution, hedged round with various conditions, 
allowing the provincial committees to undertake restricted civil 
disobedience, including non-payment of taxes, on their own 
responsibility?^
Azad Subhani, Kelkar, Mrs. Naidu, Abbas Tayabji, Y.J. Patel, Y. Patel, 
Jayakar, Omar Sobani, Rajendra Prasad, Hasrat Mohani, Jamnalal Bajaj, 
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332
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The watering down of civil disobedience waw liked neither by
the militant Khilafatists under Hasrat Mohani, nor by the Congress
337'extremists’ like the Maharashtrians. But the fact that Gandhi had
announced his intention of starting civil disobedience under his own
direction at Bardoli Taluk of the Surat District in Bombay Presidency
338for others to imitate, helped ease the situation. Fortunately also 
for Gandhi, the Khilafatists who were guiding the affairs of the CKC 
after the Ali brothers' imprisonment - Chotani, Ajmal Khan and Ansari 
were cautious men and they managed to keep the militants under 
restraint. The Government of India, for its part, bound by the advice 
of the Standing Counsel and the Advocate-General, Bengal, was with­
holding action until a definite move was made by one or more of the
339parties of the civil disobedience resolution.
In this charged atmosphere Edward (1894-1972), the Prince of
Wales, later King-Emperor Edward VIII, came to India on a visit.
Since May 1920, the Khilafatists had been threatening to boycott the
Prince's visit?^ They thought that it would make the authorities
'more nervous than other forms of non-co-operation, for they /the
British/ are very touchy where the King's son is concerned'?^ The
Government did not postpone the tour lest it should be taken as a
342victory by the non-co-operators. But it had endeavoured through
Maharaja Madho Rao Scindhia (I876-I925) of Gwalior and other
influential men to obtain from Gandhi a promise that he would not
343
bring the visit in the domain of non-co-operation, Gandhi refused 
any undertaking. He was adamant, and quite justifiably, that the 
Prince was being used by the Government as a political weapon 'for
337
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advertising the "benign" British rule in India «'^ 4
On November 17, 1921, the Prince landed at Bombay. His arrival
was heralded by complete hartals not only in Bombay, but also in
345several other important cities of India; At Bombay it resulted
in a collision between the co-operators and the non-co-operators,
who were mostly Muslims, and led to many casualties?^ Gandhi, who
never really wanted to launch civil disobedience, found in the Bombay
riots an excuse to suspend his projected inauguration of the campaign 
347in Bardoli. Hurriedly, he called a meeting of the AICC at Bombay 
on November 23 and manoeuvred it into accepting the postponement?^ 
The Khilafatists were left high and dry, but realising the futility 
of going ahead on their own, acquiesced in the decision of the 
majority community.
But in spite of the decision to call off civil disobedience, 
the situation remained tense. On November 23,Butler, the Governor 
of the U.P., reported to Readings
I think it is quite clear that non-co-operation 
movement will not die down. Gandhi has no doubt 
called off civil disobedience? but the matter is 
now largely in the hands of Musalmans, and they 
are determined to go through with it....My ministers 
think that a Musalman rising is imminent.349
Even Gandhi lamented that he could wield no influence over the
3,44
COT, XXI, p. 350. There is no doubt that the Govt, used the Prince 
to further their political ends. For instance, the opening of the 
Shivaji Memorial by the Prince at Poona was designed to encourage the 
Marathas to breakaway from Gandhi. See V to s/s, Tel. P., No. 49-C., 
Oct. 28, 1921, Rp. Also see Lloyd to Seton, Jan. 13, 1922, SP.
345
Hindu, Nov. 24, 1921.
346
Times of India, Nov. 18, 19& 21, 1921. For details of the 
Prince's visit see L.P. Rushbrook Williams, The History of the Indian 
Tour of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, 1921-22, Calcutta, 1922? Sir 
Herbert Russell, With the Prince in the East, London, 1922? and The 
Duke of Windsor, A King's Story, London, 1951.
347
See his statement in Times of India, Nov. 19, 1921.
348
Bombay Chronicle, Nov. 24, 1921.
349
Butler to Reading, Nov. 23, 1921, BP.
~ 212 -
350Muslims and acutely felt the absence of Shaukat Ali". His own
co-religionists, C.R. fas and the Maharashtrian leaders in particular,
were chafing under his dictatorship and were angry at his apologies
and tergiversations. They were reported to be manoeuvring a collision
with the Government which would compel Gandhi either to retire or to
be arrested by the Government. They would thus be free to recast the
whole Congress policy* adopting Tilak’s ’violent co-operation’ by
entering the Councils and making the Government impossible from 
351within. Here were the germs of the future Swaraj Party, though 
for the present the faction was suppressed under Gandhi’s overwhelming 
power o
In spite of this apparent change of tactics on the part of the
leaders, the Government was not satisfied with the trend of the events.
Specially irritating to them were the volunteer organisations which
had imparted to the movement a cohesion and discipline. Their power
had been demonstrated by the success with which they had effected the
hartals on November 17, especially in Calcutta. The humiliation
felt by the Government at the non-co-operators' success and the outcry
in Anglo-Indian and European circles for severe action convinced
Reading that the time had come 'when we must really exert a firm hand
352to maintain authority'. The Local Governments were accordingly
353given a free hand. The Bengal Government had already reacted by
declaring unlawful the volunteer associations of the Khilafat and
Congress, The police swooped upon the provincial Khilafat offices
35 4xn Calcutta and made hundreds of arrests.
The Congress resolution of November 23 regarding the welding 
of all volunteer corps - Khilafat, Congress and Akali - into one
350
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351
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355 356National Volunteer Corps, though accidental, had come quite in
time. The Bengal leaders decided to defy the Government notification
and to continue the volunteer corps and thus force the Government to
make arrests in access of jail accommodation. Appeals were issued
357to the public to enrol as volunteers'. The Government answered by
increasing the repression. Hundreds were arrested each day who, in
turn, were replaced by others pledged to disobey Government orders
358and to court arrest.
Following Bengal's example the Governments of the Punjab,the
U.P., Bihar and Assam (and later the Frontier) issued similar
359restrictions on the volunteers, and when challenged, reacted
angrily. People were arrested on flimsy charges. Wearing of Khaddar
became an offence. Then began the weeding out of all tall poppies -
Abul Kalam Azad, Akram Khan and C.R. Das in Bengal, Asaf Ali and
Shankarlal Banker in Delhi, Salamat Ullah, Harkishan Nath Misra,
Mohanlal Saksena and Khaliquzzaman in Lucknow, Motilal, Jawaharlal,
Abdul Halim Sharar, Purshottamdas Tandon (d. 1962) and George Joseph
in Allahabad, Muinuddin and Abdullah in Ajmer, and Lajpat Rai, Agha
Safdar, Dr. Satyapal, Malik Lai Khan and S.E. Stokes in Lahore. In
Calcutta even ladies were arrested but, because of the tumult this
created, were quickly released^^ There were cases of abuse of power,
of 'regrettable action', of ill-treatment by the military and the 
361police. Even Reading admitted that 'the tendency is to swing the
362pendulum too far in the direction of enforcing law'. During the
355
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356
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last half of December 1921, the total number of arrests since November
17 had reached 3*230 in Calcutta alone, out of which 1,515 were
363effected in the week ending Christmas Day.
The repression had just the opposite effect than that intended.
Instead of strengthening the hand of the Government it weakened its
position. Many moderates shocked by the repression placed themselves
in opposition to the Government. On December 10, 1921, Syed Raza Ali
made a strong protest to the Viceroy against his policy and advised
364him to use conciliation. Reading’s own Indian Councillors - Shafi, 
Sapru and Sarma - were pressing him to stop prosecutions and call a
365Round Table Conference. Similar pressure came from other prominent 
moderates and several Liberal organisations?^
T~The Viceroy was staggered at the outcry which his policy had
367evoked in Indian circles. He was also bewildered at the success
with which the non-co-operators had organised the boycott of the
Prince of Wales' tour in the U.P. In Allahabad in particular, the
Prince had been greeted by 'shuttered windows and ominous silence
along the troop-lined deserted streets' ?^ Reading was bitter and
369depressed and almost had a nervous breakdown. He became desperately 
anxious to stop all trouble while the Prince was in Calcutta. An 
unpleasant reception here was likely to affect the public mind in 
Britain and in India far more than the Allahabad incident. He started 
a two-way effort. On the one hand he begged Montagu to secure a 
definite announcement of British intentions towards the Turkish problem
365
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J 0
in order to detach the Muslim element from the agitation^*^ and on
371the other, he started a hectic bargaining with the non-co-operators.
He himself moved to Calcutta. Sapru was directed to bring the
372'extremists' to the conference table. If they agreed to call off
the boycott of the Prince's visit, the Viceroy would withdraw the
notifications against the volunteers and release all the prisoners
373convicted under that order. He was also said to have made a verbal
374promise to concede considerable constitutional changes-.
375Sapru, with Reading's full authority, elicited the help of
Mrs. Besant and Malaviya. They then despatched Jamnadas Dwarkadas
and Hridayanath Kunzru to Ahmedabad to Gandhi either to persuade him
to attend a conference with the Viceroy at Calcutta on December 21
or at least to find out his conditions for taking part in the
discussions^^ But the plan misfired. Gandhi first agreed^^ but
378later, under pressure from some ulama and such Hindu leaders as
379 380Motilal, Lajpat Rai and Vithalbhai Patel, he became impervious.
370 ,
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Perhaps the lingering bitterness of the Simla talks with Reading was
a sad reminder. He refused to suspend non-co-operation or to waive
hartal until the fatwa prisoners, including the Karachi ones,
381were released.. Malaviya and Jamnadas Dwarkadas were bewildered at
382Gandhi's volte-face and pleaded with him to come to terms. -But
Gandhi declined to give any undertaking and declared that non-co-
383operation could cease only after a successful conference; "
The Viceroy's position, as he himself later admitted, was very
z Qyi
difficult? YHien on the morning of December 21 a deputation led by
Malaviya waited on him he made no promise of a conference?^ However,
the negotiations continued and when Malaviya met the Viceroy again on
the 22nd, he had with him a document signed by C.R. Das and ten other
leading Bengal non-co-operators making reasonable terms for a
settlement?^ But by this time the Cabinet had vetoed Reading's idea 
387of a conference and the majority of the Local Governments had
also advised a^ainsi it?^ On the pretext that 64ndhi. had re^ectpd the.
389overtures, Reading'’broke off the negotiations; Attempted 
clandestine arrangements between the Bengal non-co-operators and
381
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390Ronaldshay, the Governor of Bengal, also proved abortive.
In the meantime, the Government's position had improved. The
Viceroy's assurances to the moderate deputationists at Calcutta on
December 21, had steadied their slide towards the non-co-operators.
When the Prince arrived in Calcutta on December 24., the Government
391managed to secure a reasonable reception; This made Gandhi's
position extremely delicate as he was assailed from many quarters.
C.R. Das, in particular, was furious at losing 'the chance of a 
392
lifetime'. Gandhi displayed signs of an irritated man under pressure
but his firmness was undoubtedly prudent. The conference was negative
in purpose, intended to hear arguments only and would have achieved
nothing. The viceroy was not prepared to recommend any immediate
393advance for political concessions;
Towards the closing days of the year 1921, the scene shifted
from Calcutta to Ahmedabad where the Khilafat Conference, the Congress
and the Muslim League were holding their annual sessions. The
militants among the Muslims and Hindus led by Hasrat Mohani, came
to Ahmedabad determined to force a clash with the Government. Thus,
the chief worry of the more cautious leaders was to try to pacify the
militants. YYhen the Khilafat Conference opened on December 26,
Ajmal Khan, the President, made a determined effort to catch the 
394moderate support. Here he found himself completely out of tune
with the majority. The defiance was exhibited when the subjects
committee adopted, by a majority, Mohani's motion urging all Muslims
and other communities to endeavour conjointly 'to destroy the British
imperialism' and obtain complete independence 'in order to secure
395permanent safety of the Khilafat and the prosperity of India';
390
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Ajmal Khan and Dr. Ansari endeavoured to defeat the motion in the
open session. During the night, when the Conference adjourned,
they manoeuvred to muster support. When the conference reassembled
the next morning, they managed to effect a split with the help of
Gandhi and other Hindu leaders. When Mohani stood up to move his
resolution, a member of the subjects committee, as arranged, raised
an objection that, according to the constitution, no motion which
contemplated a change in the creed could be taken as adopted, unless
it was voted for in the subjects committee by a two-third majority,
Ajmal Khan at once upheld the objection and ruled the independence
motion out of order. Mohani was furious and protested without avail
that the President had disallowed a similar objection by the same
member in the subjects committee, while he had upheld it in the open
session. Ajmal Khan's ruling created angry scenes and accentuated
such bitter criticism that he left the pandal. Y/hen the Conference
concluded Mohani appealed to the delegates to stay and pass his
resolution. About half the number stayed and declared their full
39 6support for complete independence.
The mooting of the independence question and the support it
aroused indicates the depth of Muslim feeling. Mohani did not leave
the matter at that and alternatively tried to get his resolution
397accepted by the Congress and the Muslim League. But in this he
failed. The Congress was also hedging in to win the moderates and
398was, therefore, hesitant to take an extreme step; The Muslim League
did not wish to take a step which the Khilafat Conference and the
399Congress had rejected. The fact, however, remains that Mohani
396
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carried many with him and the resolution, even in the Congress, 
was rejected, not for its inherent unsoundness, but on the ground 
of its being inexpedient. A good number of leaders was evidently 
tired of non-violence and wished to precipitate a direct clash with 
the Government. But with the militant section defeated, the Khilafat 
Conference and the Congress confined themselves to reaffirming their 
previous policies - the continuance of the agitation to the bitter 
end, the enlistment of volunteers and collection of funds. But they 
did allow the initiation of civil disobedience provided the provincial 
and the central organisations were satisfied that there would be no 
likelihood of breach of peacef^
As the year 1921 closed, swaraj was as distant as ever and most 
of the prominent leaders, except Gandhi, Abdul Bari, Chotani, Ajmal 
Khan, and Dr. Ansari, were in jail. Yet the progress of the movement 
had been beyond the expectations both of the nationalists and the 
Government. At the dawn of the new year the agitation stood at its 
zenith. Its main achievement, from the nationalists' point of view, 
had been the removal of fear of the- Government and the inculcation of 
a national self-respect among the Indians,
In the early days of 1922, the non-co-operators concentrated 
their energies on executing the Ahmedabad resolutions. The main 
activity was centered round the recruitment to the outlawed volunteer 
corps and the picketting of liquor shops, as it was almost the time 
for the annual auction of excise licenses, Side by side, they 
attempted to secure a unity of action In view of the impending arrests 
of the leaders. The Congress had already vested Gandhi with the full 
powers of the Working Committee!^ Y/hen the CKC met at Bombay on 
January 12 and 13 it also decided to empower its Working Committee, 
of which Gandhi was a member with five others, to exercise in 
urgency, all the powers of the CKC, in addition to those already 
vested in it^^ A manifesto issued about this time under the
400
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signatures of Chotani, Ajmal Khan, Dr. Ansari, Dr. Syed Mahmud 
(1889-1971) and Khatri, advised the Muslims to remain unshaken in 
their endeavours. Together with 'our Hindu brethren', 'we will win 
Swaraj - a Swaraj that will enable us to secure justice for Islam'. 
Until such time, they must concentrate on the collection of fifty 
lakhs of rupees for the Angora Fond, court arrest, preserve non­
violence and Hindu-Muslim unity, and follow Gandhi ' unflinchingly'^^
But the militants, though temporarily overshadowed at Ahmedabad,
were not inactive. Early in January 1922, Butler had warned Reading
thats 'Gandhi may relent and avoid the final plunge. But Mussalman
fanaticism will not be held back by any political considerations'1^
In fact, the feelings against the British at this time were at their
worst. The exacerbation was, partly, the result of the facilities
which the British Government was reported to be giving the Greeks for
floating a loan in Britain^”^  and the rumoured British intention of
controlling or purchasing the Hedjaz Railway1°^  The Muslim press
became more bitter than ever and constantly harped on its favourite
407theme of the destruction of the ’enemy of Islam'7 The Muslim 
ladies, notably 'Bi Amman', Begum Mohamed Ali and Turkish-born 
Begum Atiya Faizi (1881-1966), also became prominently active, adding 
strength to the m o v e m e n t - so much so that even the CKC, under 
militant pressure, began to threaten the Government with abandoning 
non-violence and repudiating loyalty
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It was disquieting for Gandhi to see the movement slipping out 
of his control. The local Khilafat and the Congress committees were 
the only ones that counted, but their restraining influence was 
•uncertain. It became almost impossible to preserve non-violent 
atmosphere. The Governor of the U.P. reported that the assassination 
of Europeans was openly preached and they were afraid of invasion by 
night. The European Superintendent of Police at Ilardoi was shot at 
but escaped with a flesh wound, 'There is no doubt', Butler had 
concluded, 'that the Musalman rowdy element is out for murder and 
any kind of v i o l e n ceNoisy demonstrations had become a daily 
occurrance and, at some places increased to a hundred a week. The 
spirit of defiance led to collisions at various places between the 
mobs and the police, especially in the U.P. and Bengal. Police 
stations and other government buildings became special targets of 
attaokl^
Though there had been as yet no systematic inauguration of
civil disobedience in any definite area, preparations were afoot
in many parts of the country. The most likely places were Chittagong,
parts of Assam, many districts of South India, notably Guntur, and
more especially Bardoli in Surat, where Gandhi was personally
supervising the preparations. Non-payment of taxes was openly
preached. In Assam the swara,j programme placed before the villagers
in Kamrup, included abolition of all taxes except land revenue which
412was to be reduced by 75 Pe^ cent. In the U.P. assurances were given
to the people that under swara,j peasant families would have to pay no 
413tax whatever. Naturally, the collection of revenue became a matter 
of great difficulty for the Government. In Bengal the campaign against 
Ohaukidars and non-payment of chaukidari tax was a serious feature 
of the situation in the mufassil and three districts reported that 
their police could not be relied upon in an emergency!^
410
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Amidst the mounting excitement, Jinnah and M.R. Jayakar (1873-
4151959), following their abortive attempt at Ahmedabad! tried once
more to bring the non-co-operators and the Government to the conference
tablef"^ Gandhi also seemed receptivel^ But the attempt did not
succeed!^ The Government, convinced of a moderate supportf^ was
in no bargaining moodf^ Moreover, the Cabinet had left Reading with
421no other alternative and most of the provincial governors,
particularly Lloyd, were pressing against the holding of such a 
422conference? Gandhi, disappointed by the Government and pushed by
the militants, reluctantly decided to go ahead with civil disobedience.
On January 30/31, 1922, the AICC, under the presidency of Ajmal Khan,
423at its Surat meeting, authorised Gandhi to start the campaign?
On February 1, Gandhi sent an 'ultimatum' to the Viceroy couched in
415
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minatory terms that, if within seven days of the publication of the 
manifesto the Government did not retract its policy, he would launch 
civil obedience. At the request of Jayakar, Gandhi waited for three 
days before releasing it to the pressf^
In reply, the Government of India issued on February 6 a
communique explaining its position and maintaining that the
contemplated civil disobedience was an alternative between lawlessness
425on the one hand and the maintenance of law and order on the other?
On February 7? Gandhi issued a rejoinder from Bardoli that the
alternative was not, as the Government maintained, between lawlessness
and repression but 'between mass civil disobedience with all its
undoubted dangers and lawless repression of lawful activities of the
people* But hardly had the rejoinder been despatched to the press
when the dreadful nev/s was received of violent collision between the
police and the mob on February 4 at Chauri Chaura, a small district
in Gorakhpur in the U.P., which resulted in the death of 21 police 
427and chaukidars.
424
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brickbatted the police who first fired blank and then into the crowd. 
When the mob realised that the police were running short of ammunition 
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into the building. The thana building v/as set on fire. In all 21 
police and Chaukidars were killed. A little boy servant of the Sub- 
Inspector was also murdered. Only one constable and one Chaukidar 
managed to escape. Enquiry by the I.G. of Police showed that most of 
the policemen were battered to death with sticks and brickbats and 
many dead bodies bore marks of spear thrusts. Most of the bodies 
were found at varying distances from the police station, one being 
found a mile away from the thana. Only one body was found actually in 
the police station. After the tragedy the mob tore up the raihway 
line between Chauri Chaura and Gorakhpur, cut the telegraph wires and 
fled and scattered, deserting the town. See the Statement of the 
escaped constable and the report on the enquiry held by the I.G., 
police in Hindu, Feb. 17, 1922; Joint Report of Enquiry held by
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The Chauri Chaura massacre and, to a lesser extent, the serious
APR
rioting that occured in Bareilly on the following day, shocked the
opinion in the country. Azad Subhani and Jagat Jivan Lai, who had
hastened to Gorakhpur, at once disbanded the volunteers and stopped
429all non-co-operation activities elsewhere in the district? Kidwai
telegraphed to Gandhi urging him to postpone mass civil disobedience
or else be prepared for more violent outbreaksf^ Ajmal Khan, Dr.
Ansari and Devdas Gandhi (1900-1957) were also reported to have wired
431Gandhi to the same effect? The civil disobedience was to start
on February 12 when the 'ultimatum' to the Viceroy expired. With all
the news that Gandhi had received from different part of the country
about the violent attitude of the people, the Chauri Chaura news acted 
432as a final straw? Gandhi had always hesitated to take the final
plunge and when he was driven into it, he immediately pulled back and
called off the projected civil disobedience sine die. Probably he
had felt that the response was not strong enough to make it succeed.
433The matter was referred to the Working Committee? The AICC met at 
Bardoli on February 11 and 12, 1922. Opposition to Gandhi was strong 
but, with Malaviya's help, he was able to persuade the Committee to 
suspend mass civil disobedience, courting of arrests and other negative 
activities and to substitute a 'constructive programme1 of spinning, 
temperance and social and educational worki^
Pandit Kunzru, Maulavi Subhanali, C.K. Malaviya in Hindu, March 3? 
1922? Leader,'Feb. 10, 1922; V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 329, Feb. 9, 1922, 
RP; The Times, Feb. 14, 1922; the proceedings of the Chauri Chaura 
trial in Hindu, April 6 , 1922; and PP, 1922, Cmd. 1586.
428
At least three rioters were killed and the District Magistrate 
was injured. See V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 329, Feb. 9, 1922, RP.
Also see Hindu, Feb. 17, 1922.
429
Hindu, Feb. 17, 1922.
430
Ibid.
431
Ibid.
432
Gandhi to Jawaharlal Nehru, Feb. 19, 1922, in Jawaharlal Nehru, 
ed., A Bunch of Old Letters, pp. 23-4 ,
433
See Gandhi's confidential letter to the members of the Congress 
Working Committee dated Feb. 8, 1922, CW, XXII, pp. 350-1.
434
Statement» Feb. 14, 1922.
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The Bardoli decision accentuated feelings of extreme resentment
against Gandhi, who was assailed from all sides by civil disobedience
enthusiasts, especially the younger people. Their disappointment was 
435really great. The Executive of the Cawnpore Khilafat Committee
unanimously resolved on February 17? 1922, to urge the CKC to adhere
to the non-co-operation programme, irrespective of Gandhi or the
Congress decision, until a satisfactory settlement of the Khilafat
question was secured^^ The Bengal and the Maharashtra leaders were
437also reluctant to accept the decision! Lajpat Rai and Motilal sent 
Gandhi angry letters from prison for taking action on the basis of 
a single incident!^8 The intensity of the criticism grew so strong 
that it was felt that the Bardoli decision might be thrown over.
But Gandhi remained unshaken and summarily dismissed the
439criticism of his action! As always, when in a tight corner,
Gandhi sheltered himself behind a penance fast of five days. To his 
good fortune many leaders came forward to his rescue. On February 
17 Ajmal Khan issued a statement declaring that the Bardoli decision 
was in the best interest of the c o u n t r y T h e  Ali brothers and Dr. 
Kitchlew, who were in jail, declared their full support for the
See Salamat Ullah to Abdul Bari, Jan. /sic Feb/7 31? ./l92_27, 
Huqush, CIX, p. 172. Also see Krishnadas, Seven Months with 
Mahatma Gandhi, I, Madras, 1928, pp. 371 ff, ?, and I.K. Yajnik, 
op. cit., pp. 220-30.
43S~”~
Hindu, Feb. 24, 1922,
437
Ibid.
438
See Lajpat Rai’s interview from jail published in Bande Matram 
and reported in Hindu, March 3? 1922. Also see his letter to the 
members of the Congress Working Committee in V.C. Joshi, ed., Lala 
Lajpat Rai. Writings and Speeches, II, Delhi, Jullundhar, 1966,
pp. 88-96.
439
Gandhi to Devdas, Feb. 12, 1922. He wrotes ’/To start civil 
disobedience/ I*1 an atmosphere of incivility is like putting one’s 
hand in snake pit1. See CW, XXII, p. 397* Also see Gandhi to 
Jawaharlal, Feb. 19? 1922, above, n. 432.? and Gandhi's interview 
in Hindu, March 3? 1922.
440
Hindu, Feb. 24, 1922.
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postponement?^ From Calcutta jail Abul Kalam Azad advised the 
Muslims to adhere loyally to the lead given by Gandhi?^ The 
provincial Khilafat and the Congress committees had also decided 
to issue orders to stop all activities (such as public meetings and 
picketting) except swadeshi?^ When the AICC met on February 24 and 
25 at Ajmal Khan's residence in Delhi, opposition to Gandhi was 
strong. But, in the end, the Bardoli resolutions were confirmed, 
though Gandhi had to make a compromise and allow the right of 
individual civil disobedience. Non-co-operation was, however, to 
continue unabated?^ The CKC, which met at Delhi on February 25 
and 26 under Chotani's presidency, also accepted the fait accompli 
and reaffirmed its adherance to non-co-operation as being the only 
means of securing the Khilafat demands. In a bid to preserve Hindu- 
Muslim unity and save the Khilafat movement from collapsing, the 
CKC advised the Muslims to work in co-operation with the Congress 
and fixed a line of action. Henceforth, the CKC was to confine its 
activities to the 'religious duty' of upholding the Khilafat. The 
emphasis was to be on the collection of the Angora Fund, the enlistment 
of Khilafat members, the boycott of British goods, and if possible, 
to revive the hijrat in consultation with Mustafa Kemal?^
The Government of India had so far been withholding action 
against Gandhi for reasons of political expediency?^ But it could 
ill-afford indefinitely to ignore public outcry in England and
441
Bombay Chronicle, Feb. 20, 1922„
442
Ibid.9 Feb, 28, 1922. Also see Abul Kalam Azad, Paigham-i-Azad, 
Bijnor, 1922, pp. 16-1S*
443
Hindu, Feb, 24, 1922. Also see Bombay Chronicle, Feb. 17, 1922.
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Bombay Chronicle, Feb. 27 and 28, 1922. Also see Hindu, March 
3, 19227" ^ ^ -----------  ----------
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V to S/S, Tel. P. & En Clair, No. 277, March 11, 1922, RP. Also 
see Bamford, op. cit., pp. 191-92.
446
See, e.g., Reading to Montagu, Jan. 5s 1922, RP. Reading was 
waiting for secure and sure evidence to prosecute Gandhi, such as 
civil disobedience, which he regarded as 'the best battleground for 
us'. See V to s/s, Tels. P., Nos, 75 186, Jan. 25 and Feb. 14?
1922, RP.
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Anglo-Indian circlesl^ Nor could the Viceroy disregard his senior
Governors, Lloyd and Willingdon in particular, who were threatening
A A R
to resign if Gandhi was not arrested. The India Office and the
Cabinet were anxious toof^ The Delhi decisions of the leaders to
continue the programme of non-co-operation had rendered it quite easy
for the Government of India to proceed against Gandhi. Consequently,
on March 10, Gandhi was arrested at Ahmedabad and on March 18 he was
sentenced to six years1 simple imprisonment^^ With Gandhi safely
in jail, the Government of India instructed the Local Governments
to institute proceedings without hesitation against other leading
451non-co-operators, if prosecutions could be secured. In this way 
it expected to see an immediate collapse of the agitation. The 
prospects in this direction were, however, still remote.
In the final analysis the non-co-operation experiment, as 
envisaged by its prophets, was a political failure. The Treaty of
447
For the comments of the British papers see Hindu, Feb. 9* 1922. 
The hardening of the British public opinion was partly due to the 
treatment of the Prince of Wales. See Lord Islington's speech in 
the House of Lords on Feb. 8, 1922. PP, 1922, Hansard, II. L., I, 
cols. 61-62. Also see the debate on India in the House of Commons 
on Feb. 14, 1922. PP, 1922, Hansard, 150 H.C. 5 S., cols. 865-972. 
For the European opinion in India see the proceedings of the 
European Association at Calcutta on Feb. 14, 1922, and the 
proceedings of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce at Calcutta on Feb.
28, 1922. Englishman, Feb. 15 and March 1, 1922.
448
See Governor of Bombay to V, Tel. P., No. 255, Feb. 14, 1922,
RP; Lloyd to Montagu, Feb. 17 and March 5, 1922, MP; Willingdon 
to Butler, Feb, 15, 1922, WP; and Willingdon to Montagu, Feb. 22,
1922, WP.
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S/S to V, Tel. P., No. 198, Feb. 6, 1922, HP.
450
Bombay Chronicle, March 20, 1922. For Govt, of India's policy 
towards Gandhi and his subsequent arrest and imprisonment also see 
HFMI, III, Part I, pp. 475-580; The Historical Trial of Mahatma 
Gandhi, Karachi, 1922; E.S. Hadley, ed., The Trial of Mahatma Gandhi, 
London,  ^and D.A. Low, 'The Government of India and the First
Non-Cooperation Movement-1920-1922', pp. 254-55»
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Sevres remained unchanged, the Punjab 'wrong1 was still unrighted,
and swaraj nowhere near realisation,, Nothing could be a more befitting
epitaph than what Mrs. Besant wrote sometime in 1922s ’It is the
queerest Revolution that ever was,...has had the queerest leader, and
452has now the queerest collapse'. The reasons for the failure lay 
partly in the negative bearings of the programme and partly in the 
diversity of a plural society. To be successful against a Government 
which was so firmly entrenched, the programme required the united 
support of the whole country. This was never gained. Opposition, 
either to the whole programme or its specific items, was strong and 
persistent. First, the Hindus stood aloof and had to be coaxed and 
manoeuvred into acceptance. Then there was a constant tussle between 
Gandhi and the militant Khilafatists over violence and non-violence, 
as well as over the question of civil disobedience. Furthermore, the 
Khilafatists utilised Gandhi as much as Gandhi utilised the 
Khilafatists. There was no inherent unity of purpose. The only thing 
which bound them together was a combination of mutual consent and the 
synchronisation of other interests. These circumstances could not 
last. The Government of India first watched and waited, then 
capitalised on the nationalists’ mistakes, and, finally, by a policy 
of repression, brought them down. But, in spite of all their drawbacks 
and failings, the Khilafatists and Gandhi had been able to build up 
an agitation never before experienced in India.
452
Annie Besant, The Future of Indian Politics, Adyar and Benares, 
1922, p. 259.
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CHAPTER V 
THE DECLINE OP THE MOVEMENT
The Congress decision of February 1922, to postpone the
contemplated civil disobedience, took the sting out of the non-co-
operation campaign and weakened the Khilafat movement j but there
was no immediate Hindu-Muslim breakaway or cessation of political
activities. The CKC still professed the same course as the Congress
and Hindu-Muslim unity was still the basis of the nationalist struggle
for swaraj. But there is no denying the faot that disappointment
was general. The reports from various provinces for the month of
February showed that the people, Muslims in particular, were sullen
and discontented. The despondency was not limited to the ’extremist1
section. Even the moderate and loyal Muslims were equally agitated
over the Turkish question and wanted the British Government to set
2things right in this connedtion.
The fluid political situation in the country, together with 
the worsening Graeco-Turkish relations in the Near East, had been 
causing grave anxiety to the Government of India. The provincial 
reports had indicated that the recurring violent disturbances in 
the country were 'largely attributed to the fanatical and turbulent
3
element among the Mahamedans'. Of the total political prisoners, 
at least 75 or 80 per cent, had been Muslims.^ This was enough to 
convince Lord Reading that the Muslim attitude in relation to the 
Treaty of Sevres was of the utmost importance. Therefore, he was 
anxious to impress upon them that his Government was doing all in
1
See the weekly telegrams on the internal political situation in 
India from the Viceroy to the Secy, of the State for India for 
February and March 1922 in RP.
2
This was evident even in the outlying areas of Baluchistan. See 
BSSF, P. 1695/22 with 4995/19, IV. Also see J.T. Gwynn, Indian 
Politics. London, 1924, pp. 19-20,
5
V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 282, March 13, 1922 (for the Prime Minister), 
RP.
4
See Reading to Peel, June 8, 1922, RP. This refers to earlier 
events.
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its power to present their views to the Home Government as forcibly 
5
as possible.
Early in February 1922, when Reading learnt that an Allied
foreign ministers' conference was to be held at Paris next month, he
at once suggested to Montagu that a joint representation from his and
the Provincial Governments about a 'reasonable' modification of the
Treaty might strengthen his hand.^ Accordingly, on February 28, 1922,
7with the concurrence and support of the Provincial Governments, 
Reading sent his fateful telegram to Montagu formally requesting the 
British Government for the revision of the Treaty of Sevres. The 
grounds of his request were the prevailing intensity of Muslim 
resentment and the services they had rendered during the War. With 
due provisions for safeguarding the neutrality of the Straits and the 
security of the non-Turkish population, Reading urged for the 
evacuation of Constantinople, the recognition of the Sultan's 
suzerainty over the Holy Places, and the restoration to Turkey of 
Smyrna and Thrace, including Adrianople. With this representation 
the Viceroy added a stern warning that 'the bitter and sullen 
resentment, which has already led to serious disorders and bloodshed, 
will be intensified by failure to allay Muslim feeling over the 
revision of the Treaty and will lead to dangerous results in India'
The telegram reached Montagu on March 1. At once he sent it 
to the Cabinet for circulation as Reading had asked for permission 
to publish parts of the despatch. Unfortunately, however, the 
telegram was not circulated until March 3° To make matters worse, 
on March 4> when Montagu was out in the country for the week-end,
8
he received another telegram from the Government of India pressing
g
for an early reply. Little did he know that the Home Department, 
worried as it was about the possibility of a Muslim outbreak at
5
V to s/s, Tel. P., Ho. 282, March 13, 1922, RP.
6
V to S/S, Tel. P., Ho. 162, Feb. 9* 1922, RP.
7
For the views of the Provincial Govts, see PSSF, P. 1695/22 with 
4995/19, IF. All of them except Burma concurred.
8 V to S/S, Tel. P. & R., Ho. 266-S., Feb. 28, 1922, RP.
V to S/S, Tel. P., Ho. 285-S., March 4? 1922, RP.
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Gandhi's imminent arrest, had sent this telegram without even the
Viceroy's knowledge}0 Montagu,, convinced of the urgency of the matter,
authorised the publication of the despatch without consulting either
11Lloyd George or any other member of the Cabinet.
When the pro-Muslim despatch was published in India on March 8,
it won the Government of India the gratitude of many but it embarrassed
the British Government in its conduct of negotiations at the forthcoming
Paris Conference. The French Government was already pro-Turkish and
the parading of the divergent views of the British Government and the
Government of a part of the Empire could make the Turks unduly
intractable. Curzon was embarrassed and rightly annoyed. In fact
the Italian Government lost no time in protesting to the British for
this indiscretion. Lloyd George was furious. Montagu was compelled
12to resign, though Reading was spared.
The Indian Muslims were shocked by the unexpected exit of Montagu 
and did not wait to protest very strongly against his alleged sacrifice
10
V to S/S, Tel. P., No, 292, March 15, 1922 (for Lord Privy Seal),
RP.
11
Montagu alleged that in the meeting that took place on March 6 
in the absence of Lloyd George, he had privately informed Curzon of 
his authorisation. But the latter maintained silence and the matter 
was not discussed at all. Thus, an ample opportunity was lost, 
deliberately or otherwise, of stopping the publication. See The 
Times, March 13, 1922.
12
In this connection see Montagu to Lloyd George, March 9? 1922,
LGPi Lloyd George to Montagu, March 9? 1922, LGPg Lloyd George to 
Curzon, March 9? 1922, LGPs Curzon to Lloyd George, March 9? 1922, 
LGP; S/S to V, Tele. P., Nos. 376 and 388, March 13 and 15, 1922, RP; 
PP, 1922, Hansard, 151 H.C. Deb. 5S., cols. 1489-90, and H.L., XLIX, 
cols, 467-68; Morning Post, March 10, 1922; The Times, March 13, 1922; 
Hindu, March 17, 1922; Harold Nicolson, Curzong The Last Phase, 
1919-1925i London, 1934? PP* 267-68; Lord Beaverbrook, The Decline 
and Fall of Lloyd George, London, 1963? PP* 154-55? Earl Winterton, 
Orders of the Day, London, 1953? P* 112; The Marquess of Reading,
Tfoifus Isaacs, The First Marquess of Reading, II, London, 1945? PP* 
227-29; S.D. Waley, Edwin Montagu, Bombay, 1964? PP* 271-84; and S. 
Sardar Ali Khan, The Earl of Reading. London, 1924? PP* 141-42.
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13to anti-Khilafat intrigues. Because of Curzon*s anti-Turkish
outburst they also feared that their interests at the Allied
Conference would not be fully represented. They therefore, brought
further pressure to bear upon the British Government^ But at the
same time the Indian Muslims fully realised that the Government of
India was earnest in its advocacy of their views. The moderates
were particularly delighted because it seemed to vindicate their
faith in the policy of co-operation with the Government. As a result
a feeling grew among Muslims generally that there was much to be
]R
gained by supporting the Government,
Some of the Khilafatists too felt gratified. Abdul Bari and
Mushir Hosain Kidwai in particular were full of appreciation for the
Government of India’s efforts with regard to the Turkish Treaty.
This made them to reflect on the relative merits of non-co-operation^
In fact Abdul Bari, like Hasrat Mohani, had already begun to question
the advantages of continuing the non-co-operation programme with the
result that Gandhi, shortly before his arrest, had to rush to Ajmer
17to beg him to reconsider his position. The publication of the
Government of India's despatch hastened that process of separation
between the Muslims and Gandhian programme. Abdul Bari and Kidwai 
pleaded with Chotani and the CKC to drop the agitation and achieve
13
See the statements of Fazlul Haq and Dr. A. Suhrawardy in 
Statesman, March 11, 1922. Also see the extract from the Mahommedan 
in ibid. 5 and the protest telegram from the Muslim Members of the 
Indian Legislature to Lloyd George, dated March 11, 1922, in 
Englishman, March 14, 1922.
14
See the proceedings of a protest meeting at Delhi on March 
19, 1922, in Englishman, March 20, 1922. Also see the telegram 
from the Members of the Bombay Provincial Council to S/S, dated 
March 18, 1922, in PSSE, P. 1206/22 with 4995/19s IV; and memorial 
from the official Members of the Punjab Legislative Council in PSSE, 
P. 1672/22 with ibid. The signatories included Muharram Ali Chishti, 
Eeroz Khan Noon "(later the Prime Minister of Pakistan) and Ahmad 
Yar Daulatana.
15
Note by Sir Muhammad Shafi, April 20, 1922, enclosure, Reading 
to Peel, April 26, 1922, RP.
16
Ibid.
17
Hindu, March 24, 1922. For Mohani see HFMI, III, Part I, p. 466.
their demands through 1 constitutional methods 1,
The CKC was, however, less appreciative of the Government of
India's efforts. In its opinion the despatch fell far short of
their irreducible minimum for Reading had not committed himself in
respect of Arabia, Palestine and Mesopotamia. The CKC was also
anxious about the mandates and the status of Egypt, and it demanded
the evacuation of Constantinople and Adrianople before the Turks
were asked to sign a new peace treaty}^ Thus, when on March 26 and
27, 1922, the Working Committee of the CKC met at Bombay to consider
the situation, it confirmed its previous policy and advised the
completion of the Bardoli-Delhi non-co-operation 'constructive
20programme1 by the end of May 1922.
There was, however, in spite of the decision, no resurgence
of active agitation. The disorganised state of affairs following the
imprisonment of some of their important leaders and the despondency
felt at the failure of the non-co-operation campaign had negatived
any possibility in this direction. In the event, the Khilafatists1
strategy was confined to sustaining such propaganda as would exert
enough useful pressure on the Government. Thus, when the Paris Peace
21
proposals (published in India on March 29), in spite of their being
an improvement on the Treaty of Sbvres, came nowhere near the
22declared Muslim demands, there was an immediate protest. Chotani, 
in a telegram to Lloyd Geroge, repudiated the Proposals as being in
18
Shaft's note above, n. 15. Also see Kidwai's letter to the 
Leader quoted in P.C. Bamford, Histories of the Non-Co-operation 
and Khilafat Movements, Delhi, 1925, PP« 193—951 and V to s /s ,
Tel. P., No. 373, April 30, 1922, RP.
19
Bombay Chronicle, March 21, 1922. The CKC’s statement was issued 
in amplification of the one issued earlier by Ajmal Khan and Dr. Ansari. 
See Bombay Chronicle, March 20, 1922.
20
Bombay Chronicle, March 31, 1922.
21
For the Paris Proposals see PP, 1922, Cmd. 1641, Pronouncement 
by Three Allied Ministers for Foreign Affairs Respecting the Near 
Eastern Situation, Paris, March 27, 1922.
22
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direct variance with Muslim 'religious obligations’ and all war-time 
23
promises. The Working Committee contemplated despatching another
2 Adelegation to Europe to represent the Indian Muslim view, but it
never materialised. However, the CKC, in a statement issued on April
18, 1922, indicated that as the British policy was still anti-Turk it
23would not drop the agitation. For the Khilafatists the outstanding 
grievances had remained unsolved?^
But though the situation in April and May of 1922 remained
fluid, there was no fresh spurt of active agitation. However, events
soon favoured the Khilafatists. Provocation came from the renewed
27
official repression in several provinces. By midsummer the number
of political prisoners in India, exclusive of Mappillas, had reached 
283,815. Among the convicted were such prominent names as Dr. Mahmud,
Hasrat Mohani, Jawaharlal Nehru, Shoaib Qureshi ('1891 “1962.) and '
29many others. This was enough to force the leaders to devise some 
means to counteract Government repression, A meeting of the CKC was 
convened at Lucknow from June 7-9? 1922.
The majority of the delegates present at Lucknow were intent on 
taking up civil disobedience immediately. But the difficulty was that
Chotani to Lloyd George, Tel. March 31, 1922, PSSE, P. 1419/22 
with 4995/19, IV.
24
Hindu, April 6, 1922.
25
Ibid., April 20, 1922.
26
Syud Ilossain, ’What India Wants1, New York Times, April 9, 1922, 
in Blanche Watson, e:d., Gleanings from the American Press, Madras, 
1923, pp. 204-25,
27
See the report prepared by Jawaharlal Nehru and Motilal Sexana 
on the allegations of Courts of Wards, the Police and others in 
Sitapur Distt. and the Congress Enquiry Report on Repression in 
the Santhal Parganas. Hindu, June 8, 1922. Also see K.K. Datta, ed., 
History of the Ereedom Movement in Bihar, I, Govt, of Bihar, Patna, 
1957? PP* 564-69.
28
Hindu, July 20, 1922.
29
Ibid., April 20, June 15 and 22, 1922, Also see V to s /s , Tels.
P., Nos, 164, 358 and 489? Eeb. 10, April 12 and May 5? 1922, RP.
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the AICC, owing to a very sharp difference of opinion in the Congress 
ranks on this question, had already postponed the matter until its 
next meeting in August 1922. In the meantime, at the instance of
Moonje, it had appointed a seven-man Civil Disobedience Enquiry
30Committee to ascertain the opinion in the country. Therefore, Ajmal 
Khan reasoned with the militant Khilafatists that, without the Hindu 
support, Muslims alone would not be able to take up civil disobedience
successfully. This subsided the excitement and the CKC adopted a
31resolution similar to that passed by the Congress. Accordingly,
a Khilafat Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee, consisting of
Chotani (President), Ashfaque Ali (Secretary), Abdul Majid Badauni,
Sulaiman Nadvi (who was later replaced by Nawab Ismail Khan of
Meerut), Abdul Qadir of Kasur, T.A.K. Sherwani, Moazzam Ali and Zahur
Ahmad, was appointed to tour the country with the Congress deputation
32and submit its report on or before August 15, 1922.
The Lucknow decision, however, did not satisfy the supporters 
of violence who lamented the inaction of the Congress and the CKC.
Two of the maulavis were reported to have put forward a proposal to 
the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama that fidais or secret assassins should be 
appointed on the system of Hasan-i Sabbah of the Ismailia sect in
“Z "Z
Alamut (Iran) in the late 11th and early 12th centuries. An
unconfirmed report from the Punjab also told of a suggestion for a
34similar Muslim society in that province. Such proposals, however, 
did not materialise. The front rank Khilafatists, and not many had 
escaped imprisonment, were restrained in their criticism fearing
June 9 and 10, 1922. Also see Pioneer June
10, 1922 and Hindu, June 15, 1922, The members of the Committee 
were? Ajmal Khan "(Chairman), Motilal, Rajagopalachari, Ansari, 
Vithalbhai Patel, S.K. Iyengar and Chotani (who was unable to take 
part).
31
Hindu, June 15, 1922. Also see Bamford, op. cit., pp. 201-3.
32 ‘
Hindu, July 6 and 27, 1922. Ajmal Khan and Ansari, who had been 
appointed to the Congress Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee, 
were also requested to take part in the deliberations of the Khilafat 
Enquiry Committee,
33
V to S/S, Tel. P. & En Clair, No. 522, July 3, 1922, RP.
34
Ibid.
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that civil disobedience might develop into a suicidal policy. Yet, 
some of them seem to have been completely disillusioned with the 
Gandhian non-co-operation. They were partisans of Gandhi so long as 
his programme promised some results. YvTien it failed they joined his 
critics and condemned him. The truce of the preceding March between 
Gandhi and Abdul Bari had by now broken down.
By means of Non-co-operation /wrote Abdul Bari to 
Chotani in June 1922/ we cannot prevent the Allies 
from giving help to the Greeks,... So far no impression 
has been created on the Allies.... As far as I can 
make out the Non-co-operation movement is dying down.
Many people think the same thing.... Let us see whether 
we have still to cling to this movement or some other 
way is found out of the difficulty.55
Kidwai's disillusionment was even greater. He ridiculed charkha 
and attacked the inaction of the Congress-Khilafat leadership.
'If such coldness is shown towards the Khilafate /pic/', he 
declared in a letter to Chotani in August 1922, 'I will shortly 
raise a standard of revolt against the Khilafat Committee and the 
Congress. Even if the Hindus do not stand by us we would not give 
up the Khilafate /sic/'.'''0
But since the dissident Khilafatists considered a Muslim
37breakaway from the Congress as harmful to the community, they
joined that section in the Congress whose ideology also sprang from
a dissatisfaction with the Gandhian programme after Bardoli.
Already, C.R. Das had expressed the need of a new approach, a change
of tactics, and canvassed for the policy of applying non-co-operation
38from within the Councils. Lajpat Rai too was of the opinion that
39absolute non-co-operation was an impossibility. Similarly, among
35
Quoted in Bamford, op. cit., pp. 204-5°
36
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the Maharashtra leaders, a powerful group led by N.C. Kelkar was 
openly favouring Tilak's policy of 'responsive oo-operation'
The idea caught on and many, including Motilal Nehru, began to lend 
their support. Prominent among the Khilafatists, besides Abdul Bari 
and Kidwai, were Sulaiman Nadvi, T.A.K. Sherwani, Zahur Ahmad and
41later Ajmal Khan. Some like Khwaja Abdul Majid joined because
they thought that the boycott of the Councils by the Muslims alone
42might injure the interests of the community. The 1 pro-changers1
were quick to discern that the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama's fatwa of 1920,
prohibiting Council entry, was the main hurdle for most Muslims
seeking elections. So they proceeded to bring pressure to bear on
the Jamiyat to secure a revision of the fatwa. For this Motilal
43solicited Abdul Bari's support. The latter agreed that 
theologically a revision was possible.^ But the 'pro-changers' 
preferred to bide their time, until at least the result of the 
Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committees was known.
August 15, 1922, came and passed but the Enquiry Committees, 
owing to the insufficient time at their disposal, were unable to 
finish their reports. The delay was inevitable. But they were, 
during their tours, able to stir up some public enthusiasm. However, 
it was the events in the Near East rather than the affairs at home 
that brought about the revival of the agitation. Lloyd George's 
pro-Greek policy was primarily responsible for this. His assurances 
of support had led the Greeks to launch on the night of August 18/19, 
a fresh attack on the Nationalists. But the plan back fired. The
40
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hostilities resulted in a complete rout of the Greek forces who
were driven across the Straits into Europe. Within a fortnight
Greece was begging the Allies to negotiate an armistice. By
September 8, Mustafa Kemal’s forces occupied Smyrna and their
4-8pacification of Anatolia was practically complete. The news of 
Mustafa Kemal’s victory was received in India with great jubilation.
In spite of the perfunctory participation of the Hindus and their 
complete aloofness in the Punjab, celebrations were held throughout 
the country with great enthusiasm. Muslims of all shades of opinion 
flocked in together and vied with one another in lauding the services 
of Mustafa Kemal, 'a hero at the head of a band of heroes’, who had 
saved the Khilafat from ignominy and shame.^
But very soon the rejoicings turned into despair when news 
arrived of a possible British intervention on behalf of the Greeks. 
What had happened was that the Nationalists' pursuit of the retreating 
Greek forces had brought them to the 'neutral zone' (protecting 
Constantinople, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles) at Chanak which 
was held by the British troops. An Anglo-Turkish clash became 
imminent. The British Cabinet issued a strong warning to Mustafa 
Kemal, drawn up mainly by Winston Churchill (1874-1965) with the 
assistance of Lord Birkenhead (1872-1950)? asking him to respect 
the ’neutral zone'. At the same time an appeal was addressed to 
the Dominions to render assistance. The French, refusing to be 
drawn into the conflict, withdrew their forces from Chanak and the 
Italians assured the Turks of their neutrality. Peace hung on a
45
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47thread.
The threat of British intervention in the Graeco-Turkish
Aft
conflict infuriated the Khilafatists and the moderate Muslims alike;
But since they were conscious of their inability to put an effective 
restraint on the British policy they attempted to forestall the use
49of Indian troops against Angora m  any impending Allied operations.
On September 20, 1922, Abul Kasem, the ex-deputy leader of the Khilafat
delegation to Europe in 1920 and now enjoying the confidence of the
Viceroy and his Government, tabled a motion in the Imperial
.Legislative Assembly that the Indian forces should be removed from
the territories that were formerly within the Turkish Empire.
However, he withdrew the motion a few minutes before the Assembly
opened its deliberations and instead decided as a more expedient
90course to take a deputation to the Viceroy, The same evening a 
twenty-five-member deputation of the Muslim Members of the Indian 
Legislature met Reading at Simla and discussed with him informally
Lloyd George later admitted that ’It was not a bluff. I certainly 
meant to fight and I was certain we should win'. See his The Truth 
About the Peace Treaties, II, London, 1938? P* 1349* For the Chanak 
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51the Near Eastern situation. But Heading expressed his inability
to do anything except lay their views before the British Government.
The deputationists well understood his predicament and in spite of
52their anxiety preferred to exercise restraint. Among the moderates
only G.M. Bhurgri went to the length of resigning his seat in the 
53Council of State.
The militants were not so restrained. They forged a plan to
raise a corps of Muslim volunteers to fight for the Turkish 
54Nationalists. An appeal was issued in the nationalist press for
R R
the formation of an 'Angora Legion'. Chotani lost no time in 
hinting to Lloyd George the possibility of volunteering unless
56Constantinople and Thrace were immediately restored to Turkey.
The CKC too authorised the organisation of the Angora Legion and
appealed to the country in general and Muslims in particular to join
57it as a 'sacred national and religious duty'. But all enthusiasm 
evaporated when the Government of India took recourse to the Foreign
58Establishment Act of 1870 which viewed such volunteering as illegal.
To the great relief of all, the events in the Near East took a
59turn for the better and hostilities were prevented. The Nationalists
51
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were at long last persuaded to agree to a conference at Mudania which 
took place on October 3? 1922. After several breakdowns Angora 
accepted the Allied terms and an Armistice wTas 3igned on October 11. 
Under the terms of the agreement the Greeks were to evacuate Thrace 
but the Turks were not to occupy it until a final settlement. A 
conference for the negotiation of a treaty to replace the Treaty of 
Sevres was then preposed to be held at Lausanne in November 1922.^
Prospects from Indian Muslim point of view brightened still
further when on October 19 Lloyd George resigned and the Coalition
Government fell apparently as a result of the final debacle of the
Premier’s Near Eastern policy.For four years he had mismanaged
the foreign affairs. The educated Muslims were frankly jubilant at
his humiliation. They saw in his fall signs of the end of British
pro-Greek policy. The Khilafatists especially, welcomed the news as
62promising the termination of 'British pan-Hellenism'.
But the overall effect of the Near Eastern crisis on Muslim 
politics in India had been regressive. The advantages gained by the 
publication of the Government of India’s despatch of the last February
absence. Nevertheless, he moved to Paris and with great difficulty 
was able to persuade PioncarS to join with the British in arranging 
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were largely negatived. It ruled out the possibility of compromise 
between the Khilafatists and the moderate Muslims (towards which 
Shafi had been striving) to end the agitation and further Muslim 
interests by more constitutional means and co-operation with the
63
Government. The Viceroy was terribly disappointed. 'Had we had 
no Hear East crisis at the moment', he had ruefully wired to Montagu's 
successor Lord Peel (1867-1937) 011 September 21, 'we might have 
expected a definite split between Mahomedan and Hindu extremists 
and difference of opinion among the former which would have weakened 
their potentialities for mischief
The expected collapse of the Khilafat movement did not come.
But fortunately for the Government the Khilafat-Congress leadership 
was too tangled in its own schismatic squabbles to take advantage 
of the situation. This was revealed rather more glaringly when in 
late October and early November 1922, the Congress and the Khilafat 
Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committees issued their respective 
reports. On the immediate issue of civil disobedience both the 
reports were tamely unanimouss that its introduction was premature.
But as a face-saving tactic they were constrained to leave the right 
of individual and restricted mass civil disobedience to the discretion 
of the provincial committees. They also seemed to adopt more or less 
an identical hard-line attitude with regard to the boycott of British 
goods, law courts and schools. But then these items had already been 
tried, found not very successful and had been relegated to the 
background. It was the more important issue of Council entry which 
let loose bitter factionalism.
In the Congress report a group of three, consisting of Ajmal 
Khan, Motilal and Vithalbhai Patel, was of the opinion that the non­
co-operators should contest the election on the issue of the redress 
of the Punjab and the Khilafat 'wrongs' and immediate swaraj, and
65
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oppose the Government from within the Councils, On the other hand.
Dr. Ansari, Rajagopalachari (1878-1972) and Kasturi Ranga Iyengar 
(1859-1923) maintained that the frittering away of energies was useless 
and hence there should he no change of the Congress programme in 
respect of the boycott of the Councils. In the Khilafat report also 
there was a note of dissent by Zahur Ahmad in favour of Council entry, 
but in this case, unlike the Congress, the report tried to cover up 
the differences. It declared that the Council controversy was rather 
premature as long as the leaders were in jail,and, therefore, it 
postponed the matter for the present lest it should distract public 
attention.
0
But the matter did not rest there. The Enquiry reports had 
opened the floodgates of incessant controversy among the leaders - 
almost all the old guards of the Congress, the CKC and the Jamiyat-
ssul-TJlama on one side and the 1 pro-changers> on the other. The
latter were also joined by leaders like S.E. Stokes, M.S. Aney (1880-
1968), M.R. Jayakar and Malaviya who stood for co-operating where
beneficial and obstructing where desirable. ^  Jinnah also lent his
support though he was opposed to the 'purely destructive programme'
68of obstructing the Councils. The 1 pro-changers1 were emboldened by 
the support they had won. Through Abdul Bari and Sulaiman Nadvi they 
renewed their pressure on the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama to revise its fatwa. 
Initially the Jamiyat was not prepared to oblige, but in order to 
prevent a further split, it agreed to effect a compromise. On 
November 12, 1922, the Working Committee of the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama met 
at Delhi and permitted the contesting of the elections on the 
condition that the elected members, in conformity with the principle 
of non-co-operation and the policy of wrecking the Councils, would
66
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69vacate their seats without taking the oath of allegiance.
This was not exactly what the 1 pro-changers' wanted? hut it
encouraged them to continue their efforts. Towards the end of
November 1922, the CKC and the Congress met at Calcutta to consider
the reports of the Enquiry Committees. They were unable to reach a
decision on Council entry and the matter was deferred for the Gaya
sessions in December 1922. They did* however, accept the other
recommendations of the Enquiry Committees, and postponed the re-
introduction of civil disobedience. The younger leaders recently
released from jail made impatient pleas for stronger measures, but
these were lost in the controversial exchanges of the 'pro-1 and
70•no-change' factions.
Thus, the revival of the agitation in autumn 1922 proved to be 
short-lived. In effect, it had been dampened by the failure of its 
own leaders to sustain it. An equally damaging blow was delivered 
by external factors over which the Khilafatists had no control.
During the time when the Khilafatists were trying to find some 
effective means to fight for the Khilafat, the Turks in Angora were 
busy depriving the institution of its temporal power. There had been 
a prolonged friction between the puppet Sultan Vahid-ed-Din Muhammad 
VI at Constantinople and the de facto Government of Turkey under 
Mustafa Kemal at Angora, and the latter finally decided to deprive 
the Caliph of his potentially menacing temporal power. The matter had 
been precipitated by the Allied action in extending separate invitations 
to Constantinople and Angora to attend the forthcoming Peace Conference 
at Lausanne. This gave Kemal his long awaited chance to settle the 
old score with the Sultan. On November 1, 1922, he forced the Grand 
National Assembly to appropriate the ultimate powers of the Government 
of the country. The Khilafat still remained in the House of Osman, 
but the right to select a Caliph v/as invested with the Assembly. Thus, 
the Turkish Government was made to act as the chief bulwark of the
69
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Khilafat.^
More concerned about his safety than the loss of power, the
Sultan, through the help of General Sir Charles Ilarington (1872-1940),
the Allied Commander-in-Chief at Constantinople, took asylum on board
72a British battleship, H.M.S. Malaya, and was escorted to Malta. On
the contention that the fugitive monarch had forfeited his position
by taking refuge with a non-Muslim power, the National Assembly on
November 18, on a fatwa from the Commissar for Religious Affairs,
proclaimed the deposition of Muhammad VI as Caliph and elected his
cousin Abdul-Mejid (1868-1944)> a 54 year old son of the late Sultan
73Abdul-Aziz, as his successor with 'spiritual' powers only.
The Angora law of November 1, 1922, may be defensible from the 
Turkish Nationalists' point of view, but it was misleading 
theologically as it suggested a dualism which does not exist in 
Islam* Politically it was risky, and, though in the end the gamble 
came off, it provoked strong reaction among the Indian Muslims and 
brought into focus the extreme contradiction between the Indian and 
the Turkish points of view on the question of the Khilafat. The 
demands of the Indian Muslims, the terms in which they Virere formulated 
and the grounds on which they were based, were in complete disharmony 
with the Turkish National Pact of January 28, 1920. The three-fold 
claim which the Khilafatists had formulated for the redress of the 
Khilafat 'wrong' was based apparently on the religious necessity of
71
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preserving an institution which united in itself both temporal and 
75spiritual powers. The Turks on their part were fighting not for 
any higher religious principles but for their existence as a nation.
To achieve their objective, they had renounced the claim over the 
Jazirat-ul-Arab and the Holy Places which formed an essential part of 
the Indian demands. Again, after 1920, the Nationalists were fighting 
not to restore the temporal power of the Caliph but to establish the 
national sovereignty of the Turkish nation against all enemies,
including the Sultqn-Caliph Muhammad VI alongside the Allies and the 
Greeks.^
Complications arose when in their enthusiasm the Indian Muslims
presumed that the Turks were inspired by the same religious zeal as 
77themselves. They could not believe that the Turks who appeared to
be fighting for the elevation of the Khilafat could be instrumental 
78in destroying it. Therefore, not unnaturally, the idea of depriving
the Khilafat of its temporal power was received with consternation
79by the orthodox Indian Muslim opinion. Prom the theological point
of view, their objection was not to the election of a new Caliph -
rather they welcomed the introduction of the elective principle which
00
to them symbolized a return to the days of the first four Caliphs
but to the election of a Caliph without temporal power which they
81thought was repugnant to Islam. The consensus of opinion required 
the Caliph, the Defender of the Faith, to be in his person not only
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the 'spiritual' leader, but also a strong and independent monarch,
82powerful enough to safeguard the prestige of Islam.
The Angora action was especially embarrassing to the Khilafatists
because its religious and political implications had touched the
professed basis of the Khilafat movement. Therefore, they secretly
tried to persuade the Nationalists to reconsider their action. Abdur
Rahman Siddiqui and Qazi Abdul Ghaffar were sent to Lausanne
(Switzerland) with a message for Ismet Pasha (l884-)» then attending
83the Lausanne Conference, for transmission to Angora.  ^ But as a
quarrel with the Nationalists over this issue would have benefitted
none but their opponents, the Khilafatists quickly forged arguments to
prove that the Angora action in no way affected the prestige of the
Khilafat as such but rather would enhance it. To satisfy the
conscientious qualms of the devout Muslims they took the line that
the Sultanate had not been abolished because the temporal power was
still vested in the Caliph, as the Assembly had announced that the
8A
Turkish Government would be the chief bulwark of the Khilafat.
In other words the change was not at all inconsistent with the aims
85of the Khilafat movement and they should tamely accept the decision.
The Khilafatists* volte-face is an example of undisguised 
political opportunism - indefensible^ because only a few days before 
the Angora decree the CKC had expressed alarm at the reported speech
of Refat Pasha (1881-) suggesting deprivation of the temporal power
86 8 Yof the Khilafat. Critics denigrated them in exaggerated terms,
and the Khilafatists* only justification can be that all along their
real aim had been the maintenance of a strong Turkey as a bulwark of
Islam. Moreover, they had, since the rise of Mustafa Kemal, committed
82
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themselves so deeply to the policies of Angora that they could not
now withdraw their support. This attitude was confirmed by Chotani
in his interview with the Associated Presss '“What the National Assembly
89at Angora decided must be conclusive for the Muslim world at large*.
Thus, in spite of the Turks* departure from the traditional 
concept of the Khilafat, the CKC and the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama not only 
unreservedly endorsed the Angora decision but strained every nerve in 
reassuring and reconciling the Indian Muslims to the present or any
89future action of the Angora Nationalists with regard to the Khilafat.
The CKC directed all subordinate Khilafat committees to arrange the
substitution of Abdul-Mejid*s name in the Khutba along with the 
90customary titles.
In spite of the fact that the orthodox opinion was reluctant to
abandon the traditional doctrine and to accept the divorce of the
91Sultanate from the Khilafat, the instructions were carried out.
The reports from the Provincial Governments indicated that Abdul-
92Mejid II was accepted as the new Caliph with his new status. Only
93in Bombay did the CKC face temporary defiance. Those who interpreted
the shariat in stricter terms, while not raising any specific objections
to the election of the new Caliph, overcame the difficulty by omitting
the name of the Caliph from the Khutbag reference was made to the head
94of the Faith by his title only, i.e., Khalifat-ul-Muslimin. r On the
88
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whole the Angora decision was accepted in India as a fait accompli,
as in the rest of the Muslim world (except perhaps in the Hedjaz,
Syria and Persia)^ and on December 8, 1922, the accession of the new
96Caliph was formally celebrated with enthusiasm. Religious objection 
had been to a great extent subordinated to political expediency.
The annual sessions of the Khilafat Conference and the Jamiyat-
ul-Ulama opened at Gaya alongside the Congress in the last week of 
97December 1922. Rot surprisingly, in the context of the Turkish
developments, they were tame affairs. The Jamiyat refrained from
giving any theological exposition. It merely contented itself with
expressing full confidence in Mustafa Kemal and the Angora Assembly,
hoping that in future 'along with safeguarding Turkey, Islam and
Islamic nationalities from personal and bureaucratic rule, /they/
would keep intact the real prestige and power of the Khalifa as
98enjoined by the Shariat*.
The Khilafat Conference closely followed the Jamiyat in 
recognising 'Sultan* Abdul-Mejid II as the new Caliph and reiterated 
its previous stand of full confidence in Mustafa Kemal and the Angora 
Assembly, ^  But in the midst of these devotional expressions there 
arrived, on December 30, the news of the impasse at Lausanne. The 
negotiations between the Turks and the Allies, which had started on 
November 20, were suddenly on the point of breaking down. The news 
caused such consternation in the Khilafat camp that all other 
controversies were dropped and the leaders assembled to discuss some 
effective means of assisting the Turks. Several speakers delivered 
highly emotional speeches, warning the British Government and demanding 
practical steps to demonstrate their sympathy for the Turkish cause.
95
FRO, F.O., 371/9135 and 371/9136.
96
V to S/S, Tel. P., Ro. 1717, Nov. 24, 1922, RP.
97
The Muslim League decided to meet at Lucknow.
98
Hindu, Jan, 4? 1923»
99
Ibid. Kemal was bestowed the titles of Saif-ul-Islam and 
Mu.iaddid-i -Khilafat.
100
Ibid.
- 250 -
Though Hindu and Sikh speakers assured the Muslims of their
support'^ '*' and though the Congress did call for a united action)-^
the excitement was not fully reciprocated by the Congress leaders.
Opinion prevailed in Congress circles that the victory of Mustafa Kemal
had changed the entire aspect of the Khilafat question. Some of the
Khilafat demands had already been fulfilled and the others would be
realised by the time the Lausanne Conference had finished its 
105deliberations. The moderates of the National Liberal Federation too 
were of somewhat similar opinion. They held that the grounds for 
agitation against the Government, namely the Khilafat and the Punjab, 
were no longer valid. The first because of the Lausanne Conference and 
the second because of the 'punishments' meted out to the guilty officers. 
Moreover, the Khilafat movement lacked justification since the Angora 
Turks had themselves shorn off all the powers of the Khilafat.
Therefore, the agitation must stop. Further agitation would only be 
a pretence to defend the power and prestige of the Angora Government}^
The Khilafatists were obviously unwilling to accept these prudent 
arguments and before the Khilafat Conference adjourned on January 1,
1925, a resolution was passed which stateds
That in the event of war with Turkey due to 
the unjust attitude of the Allies, particularly 
British, the Muslims of India would immediately 
launch civil disobedience with a programme 
which would include spreading their propaganda 
among the Police and Army, stoppage of fresh 
recruitment, refusal to subscribe to war loans, 
recruitment to the Angora legion, picketing of 
foreign cloth and liquor shops and preventing 
export of food grains.^5
101
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102
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Such resolutions were, however, hollow threats. It is doubtful
whether in the event of a war in the Near East the Khilafatists would
have been able to render any active assistance to Turkey. The
KhiLafat movement had come to be confined to academic discussions and
unproductive resolutions. Energies were being frittered away in
factionalism, particularly on the question of Council entry.
Nevertheless, the CKC, the Jamiyat and the Congress continued to
treat the Councils with contempt. The Jamiyat even vetoed the
November compromise of its own executive and reimposed a total ban
on Council e n t r y T h i s  unbending attitude forced out the 'pro-
changers1 - on New Year's Day 1925? they formed themselves into a
Congress-Khilafat Swaraj Party, though they did not dissociate
107themselves completely from the parent organisations. C.R. Das 
was elected president, Motilal Nehru general secretary and
108Khaliquzzaman and Sherwani additional secretaries of the new party.
The rise of the Swaraj Party with an active programme and the
subsequent tug of war between it and the majority parties within the
parent bodies complicated the situation still further. Abul Kalam
Azad, after his release in January 1923? tried to bring about a
settlement between the factions, but his efforts failed to have any 
109permanent effect. The result was that during the whole of the first 
half of 1923, little attention was paid to the Khilafat issue. The 
movement was at its lowest ebb. Some half-hearted attempts were made 
to follow up the Gaya resolutions by appeals for a million rupees and 
50,000 men for the volunteer corps, but there was no revival of 
organised agitation. Meetings were few and ill-attended. Fund raising
106
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activities also met with little success. And irreparable damage was 
done to the movement by the acute Hindu-Muslim disunity.
The Hindu-Muslim entente to which the political agitation owed
much of its strength was essentially a combination of parties whose
real aims were divergent. It had never been more than superficial and
cracks had appeared even in the midst of the non-co-operation fervour
in 1921. Causes such as the Hindu fears of an Afghan invasion and a
possible Muslim ckmination, the Muslim apprehensions of Hindu domination
after the attainment of swara,j, the unfortunate Mappilla excesses of
1921, the ever-disputed question of cow-killing, clashes during the
religious festivals and celebrations, playing of music before the
111mosques, all combined to widen the breach. But it was the reaction, 
consequent upon the failure of the non-co-operation experiment, that 
really tore the communities apart. The religious overtones of the 
Khilafat movement and the policy of 'Hinduising' the Congress espoused 
by Hindu leaders like Malaviya, Moonje, Shraddhanand, Lajpat Rai and 
others, had unwittingly laid the foundations of Hindu-Muslim discord.
The Hindus and Muslims were united so long as their aims seemed
attainable. But when the promised swara,j remained as distant as ever
and the Khilafat issue unsolved, the entente broke down. The Hindus
began to question the wisdom of supporting a professed religious 
112movement and the Muslims grumbled that they had made greater
113sacrifices without deriving any corresponding advantage. The feeling 
of distrust spread. The Hindus resurrected the Mappilla issue and 
complained that the Muslim leaders had not expressed enough sympathy
110
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for the Hindu sufferersThe Muslims attacked Hindu sincerity and
the motives of their co-operation and alleged that they were out to
115destroy Islam in India, Old fears reappeared - the Hindus
apprehending the increase in the Indian Muslim power and prestige as
ll6a result of Turkish victories, and Muslims fearing that if they did
not protect their communal and political rights against the Hindus
117they might be 'swept out of existence', Cow question again became 
prominent.
The bitterness between the communities was further accentuated
by disputes among Hindu and Muslim co-operators over 'the loaves and 
119fishes of office'. This was most acute in the Punjab. There the 
policy of the Education Minister, Fazl-i-Husain, regarding the
114
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redistribution of posts in local bodies and other spheres, aroused the
bitterest- opposition from urban Hindus ~ opposition which culminated
in an unsuccessful censure motion against him in the Council in March 
1201923. Other incidents, which would have passed unnoticed in normal
times, enhanced common distrust. Mutual recriminations led to communal
riots, some of them very serious, especially those in the Punjab and
Bengal on the occasion of the Moharram mournings of 1922. The most
terrible was the one that took place in Multan in the Punjab where
arson and looting were accompanied by desecration of temples and
mosques. The tension that was bitter in 1922, increased to a
lamentable extent in 1923. In March and April there were serious
riots in Amritsar, Multan and some other places in the Punjab. These
were followed by a further riot in the same province in May and
another in Sind. The next two months witnessed riots in Muradabad
and Meerut as well as in the Allahabad district of the H.P., and a
serious riot at Ajmer. Panned by the vernacular press the communal
hatred created by the riots spread over an area far more extensive
121than that involved in the actual outbreaks.
Additional provocation to heighten the tension was provided by
the religious propagandists of both communities who in their reforming
zeal surpassed the limits of moderation. Especial bitterness was
caused by the militant Sangathan movement of Dr. Moonje, aiming at
122binding together the Hindu community, and the so-called Shuddhi
movement of Shraddhanand, launched to reclaim to the Hindu fold certain
. . 123communities which had passed to Islam. This led to the Muslims
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124forming their counter organisations of Tanzim and Tabligh.  ^ Preacher
of both religions then started to raise funds in the Punjab and the
125U.P. and elsewhere to combat each other. Tension was accentuated 
still further by the emergence, after April 1921, of the Hindu 
Mahasabha, the militant communal organisation with its emphasis on 
physical culturel^
The growing Hindu-Muslim discord and the recurring communal 
riots set the nationalist leaders to find a way to resolve the 
differences. An attempt in this direction was made at Gaya in 
December 1922, when Dr. Ansari proposed the drawing up of a 'National 
Pact', defining swara.j, safeguarding the rights of the communities,
and providing for a settlement of the questions leading to communal
127strife. Ansari argued that real unity was impossible unless both
communities decided to adjust their differences in a frank and liberal
128spirit. The Gaya sessions failed to arrive at a definite decision
but the leaders met again at Lahore in the middle of April 1923? &nd 
entrusted the question of a 'National Pact’ to a smaller committee, 
consisting of the Presidents of the Congress, the CKC, the Muslim 
League, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak 
Committee of the Sikhs, with two members each from the three
among the Malkana Rajputs near Agra and in the Punjab where Hindu 
'missionaries' made efforts to convert various classes of Muslims to 
Arya tenets. See Qureshi, The Muslim Community, p. 281.
124
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communities. Prominent among those appointed were Ajmal Khan, Abul
Kalam Azad, Abdul Qadir, C.R. Das, Motilal Nehru and Sirdar Mehtab 
129Singh. But apart from this, no effective agreement was reached due 
to divergent interests and the talks lapsed into a stalemate. The 
situation remained one of extreme inter-communal hostility.
No less important a factor contributing to the decline of the
Khilafat movement was the dissensions within the Khilafat organisation.
130Apart from personal recriminations, the difference of opinion among
the Khilafatists had first developed over non-co-operation and then
took shape over the question of the attitude which the CKC should
maintain towards the Congress. There were not wanting sections of
Muslim opinion to express the fear that the CKC was subordinating
itself to the Congress. This question which came up for discussion
time and again manifested itself in the frequent arguments that took
place over certain issues like that of the Mappilla excesses and the 
131cow killing. Another deflection, as already seen, had occurred
shortly after the publication of the Government of India’s dispatch
of February 1922, when certain Khilafatists, notably Abdul Bari and
Kidwai, had temporarily adopted a friendlier attitude towards the 
132Government. The anti-Turk policy of the British Government had, 
however, prevented any serious split among the leaders. No less 
instrumental in creating dissensions was the discovery that the 
various Khilafat funds, amounting to several lakhs of rupees, had been 
mismanaged.
Allegations of misappropriation of the Khilafat funds had 
appeared as early as 1920 when Mohamed Ali, owing to his pre­
occupations, was delayed in submitting the accounts of his delegation
129
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153to Europe. Anti-non-oo-operatiomsts pounoed upon the opportunity
and the charges against the Khilafatists in this connection increased
134in the following year. This moved Abdul Bari to write to Shaukat
135Ali asking him to state the facts. Then in summer 1922, rumours
spread of serious deflections not only in the CKC but also in various
provinces. Between 40 and 50 thousand rupees were said to have been
136embezzled in the Punjab alone. This prompted enquiries and when
in July 1922, the Working Committee of the CKC learnt that a balance
of over 16 lakhs of rupees of the Angora Fund was still lying with
Chotani, whose firm acted as treasurers it demanded that he remit ten
137lakhs of rupees immediately to Angora. But, even after repeated 
requests, Chotani did not comply with the order. Suspicions of 
misappropriation of funds prompted reprimands to Chotani from Ajmal
138Khan and Abdoola Haroon who also solicited Abdul Bari*s intervention.
But Chotani was still evasive and in October 1922, he issued a
statement to the press unsuccessfully attempting to refute the
139allegations which had excited public controversy.
In spite of Chotani's denial, feeling against him ran exceedingly 
high. In the middle of October 1922, the CKC constituted a sub­
committee to hold enquiries and report on the state of various
133
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Khilafat funds }^ The report was submitted to the CKC at the end 
of 1922. The contents were kept a secret. But it was established 
that Chotani had diverted the balance of Angora Fund to his business 
in order to make good the serious losses he had suffered owing to 
his being deprived of all Government contracts through official 
vindictiveness}^ The Working Committee pressed Chotani to settle 
the matter. But while this was being arranged the CKC*s position was 
rendered untenable by the mysterious publication in March 1923? in 
the columns of anti-CKC journal, the Aligarh Gazette, and the 
Statesman (Calcutta), of a funds report of the CKC allegedly revealing 
extravagance and mismanagement}^
The scandal caused such a stir in the country, especially in 
143Bengal, that the CKC had to make a feverish effort to retrieve its
position. First it issued a denial that there had been any misuse
of funds^^ and then persuaded three out of the five signatories of
the Funds Committee report to disown the contents that appeared in 
145the press. Dr. Syed Mahmud, one of the Secretaries of the CKC, 
rushed to Calcutta, loaded with two big trunks full of account books, 
files and vouchers, and invited leading Calcutta journalists to 
interview him and examine the papers}^
Though the journalists and the auditors who examined the
147papers found the accounts quite in order the scandal hastened 
the fall of Chotani. Clearly he was guilty - at least technically »
140
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of embezzlement of funds. There ensued a protracted correspondence
and conversations between the representatives of the Working Committee
and Chotani, who finally came to terms and accepted valuation of his
property made by Omar Sobani. By the agreement Chotani transferred
to the CKC his two saw mills together with their machinery plants,
tools and the stocks. He also agreed to pay all costs incidental to
the CKC. The value of the property offered was insufficient to
cover the amount due to it, but the CKC, taking into consideration
all circumstances, accepted the settlement. A board consisting of
Omar Sobani, Dr. Ansari, Maulavi Muhammad Ali, Moazzam Ali and T.A.IC.
1 A ft
Sherwani, was appointed to take charge of the property. Chotani, 
who once enjoyed the honorific title of Nasir-ul-Islam for his services 
to the Khilafat cause, was compelled to resign from the Presidentship 
of the CKC, and was succeeded by Shaukat Ali.
The effect of the scandal was that the recriminations among
the Khilafatists increased manifold. The CKC fell in disrepute.
M.H. Kidwai, on whose suggestion the Khilafat committees and the
Khilafat funds had been started, appealed for the abolition of both.
He alleged that the funds and the organisation were 'being exploited
for personal and Party purposes, ignoring the vital interests of
Islam1. In so far as the Khilafat was concerned it was 'safe in
the hands of the militant Turksf and 'the Indian Muslims will do
well now to turn their attention away from the Khilafat and Angora 
149to their own home'. But Kidwai only earned the ill-will of the 
militant Khilafatists who dubbed him as a 1 disappointed and
irresponsible individual with defective understanding and mean
150 intellect'7
The net result of these deflections was that the Khilafat 
movement, which had already suffered considerably owing to the 
Hindu withdrawal and the communal tangle, received a serious blow.
148
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The CKC, and with it, the provincial and local organisations, ceased
to command public respect or even much attention. Subscriptions to
the Khilafat funds fell considerably. Only the shadow of the
Lausanne Conference, where the negotiations for a peace settlement
151were proceeding with alternate gusts of hope and despair, prevented 
a collapse of the movement.
In conclusion, it appears that the Bardoli fiasco had no 
immediate effect in disenchanting the Muslims generally with either 
the Congress or the non-co-operation programme. Most of the 
Khilafatists had accepted the postponement of civil disobedience 
and the few sceptics, that there were, had been prevailed upon to 
tone down their opposition. The CKC and the Congress still professed 
to follow a joint course of action until swaraj was attained for the 
country. The possibility of a split occurred in March 1922, when the 
Government of India deliberately published its pro-Muslim feelings 
on the Turkish issue. But whatever advantages the Government obtained 
by publishing the fateful despatch were negatived partly by the 
repression it unleashed in the summer of 1922 and partly by the 
threat of British intervention in the renewed Graeco-Turkish conflict. 
But though the Khilafatists were able to sustain some public 
enthusiasm, the movement had been gradually on the decline. The 
disorganised state of affairs following the arrest of some 
prominent leaders and the increasing squabbles among those still 
free, especially over the questions of Council entry and civil 
disobedience, had obviated any possibility of rejuvenating the 
waning agitation. A crucial factor in the process of decline Was 
the failure of the Khilafat-Congress leadership to give a vigorous 
lead to the country when it was most needed. Equally significant 
was the Angora attitude towards the Khilafat which, in spite of 
the Khilafatists' explanations, had dampened the Muslim enthusiasm.
151
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In these circumstances, the reappearance of communal disharmony and the 
the dissensions within the Khilafat organisation dealt a severe blow 
to the movement. But even then the agitation, though much reduced 
in intensity, still lingered on, with intermittent spells of 
activity, when the Government resorted to repression or the situation 
in the Near and the Middle East became provocative.
\-  262 -  
CHAPTER VI 
THE LAST PHASE
The Khilafat movement entered its final phase when the Treaty 
of Peace between the Allies and Turkey was signed at Lausanne on 
July 24? 1925. By this Treaty, Turkey retained Constantinople and 
Thrace upto the Meritza line with the control of the Straits, subject 
to certain restrictions. Capitulations were abolished, humiliating 
economic clauses modified, and the disputed question of Mosul was 
left to separate negotiations between her and Britain.^ Though 
Turkey had lost her vast empire yet by this Treaty she managed to 
emerge once more as the chief power in the Near East.
The conclusion of the Peace Treaty brought a genuine
exhilaration to Muslim India. The occasion was enthusiastically
celebrated all over the country on July 26, 1923? as the victory
of the Turkish arms. Despite the strained relations between Hindus
and Muslims, the leaders managed to whip up a reasonable
fraternisation. There were processions, illuminations, displays
of fireworks and special prayers in mosques and temples. Resolutions
were passed at public meetings congratulating the Caliph and Mustafa
Kemal, and reiterating demand for the freedom of the Jazirat-ul-Arab
2from non-Muslim control.
But in spite of all the enthusiasm, the Treaty of Lausanne 
marked the final descent of the Indian Muslim agitation against the
British until the abolition of the Khilafat by Angora in March 1924>
took the wind out of its sails. On July 26, 1923? Reading observed 
to Peels
I have a feeling of profound satisfaction 
that we have at last made the peace which 
will enable us to recover the lost ground 
with the Mahomedans in India, and, indeed, 
elsewhere.... Now I believe that among the
vast majority there will be a desire once
1
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more to associate themselves with the 
■Government, to seek their protection and 
give them support.... From purely Indian 
considerations, I have no hesitation in 
saying that the peace will assure us of 
the support of all but the extremists 
among the 60 or 70 million M&homedans 
in India and will help materially to , 
strengthen the British position in India.
Reading’s observations were prophetic. Influential sections of 
Indian Muslims vrere indeed inclined to accept the Peace Treaty as 
the final solution of the Turkish problem. They were grateful to 
the Government of India for placing the Indian Muslims' views before 
the British Government and bringing the Turkish peace negotiations 
to a successful conclusion- On July 26, 1925? & delegation of 
twenty-five Muslim Members of the Indian Legislature specially
waited upon the Viceroy at Simla to express the community's
4 5gratitude. Similarly, the Nizam of Hyderabad, Mir Ali Nawaz Khan
(1884-1955) of Khairpur^ and the Members of the Indian Legislative 
7
Assembly conveyed their appreciation and satisfaction to the 
Viceroy. The Aga Khan in a statement emphasised the desire of the 
Allies to establish friendly relations with Islam and urged the
Q
Indian Muslims to help the new state of Turkey. The Peace Treaty
was also gratefully received by the Indian Muslim communities in
9Rangoon, Durban and throughout South, East and Central Africa.
The only question about which Muslims were still concerned was the
5
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4
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freedom of the Jazirat-ul-Arab from non-Muslim control, but its
solution was considered simply a question of time'P The continuance
of the agitation, therefore, seemed to them totally absurd. After
the Treaty they were also less inclined to join the Hindus against
the British. In fact they decided to counteract the hartals at
Lahore, Amritsar and Lucknow, proclaimed for August 27, 1925? to
mark India's indignation and sense of humiliation by reason of the 
11Kenya decision. On the whole the tendency of the Muslims seemed
to be to range themselves more and more on the side of the 
12Government.
With the majority of the Muslims gradually becoming disinterested
in the Khilafat movement, the Khilafat leaders found the ground was
cut from under their feet. But even then they were determined not
to make peace with the Government for they believed that the Treaty
had solved the Turkish problem only partially. Until the complete
freedom of the Jazirat-ul-Arab was secured and India had attained
13her swaraj the agitation must be continued. Therefore, they 
desperately groped to rouse Muslim feelings on the cognate questions 
of the Jazirat-ul-Arab and PalestineM The problems facing the 
Khilafatists were, however, enormous.
The faction-ridden Khilafat organisation, like the disorganised 
Congress\ was struggling hard to preserve unity in its ranks. Though 
the CKC still paid a lip-service to the Gandhian brand of non-violent
10
See the address presented to the Viceroy by the Muslim Members of 
the Indian Legislature on July 26, 1923. Times of India, July 27, 1923. 
11
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12
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13
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14
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non-co-operation, the Khilafat movement had come to he the concern
mainly of the Muslims. And Khilafat work had suffered a set-hack.
Some of the notable Khilafatists like the Ali brothers, Abul Kalam
Azad and Kitchlew were still in jail. Others like Ajmal Khan,
T.A.K. Sherwani and Khaliquzzaman were mainly interested in the '
politics of the newly established Swaraj Party. Still others had
either dissociated themselves from the organisation or were thinking
of leaving it. Khilafat funds were almost non-existent, and the
salaries of the Khilafat workers were in arears. There was little
co-ordination between the CKC and its subordinate branches. However,
as Shaukat Ali later recalled, 'the bonds /had/ loosened but the links 
15yet remained'. A semblance of unity was somehow preserved as both 
the central body and its branches were still in existence.
In August 1923? when Mohamed Ali was released at Jhansi on
earning remission of his sentence^ it fell to him to grapple with
the problem of reorganisation. The difficulty was that those
Kh-ilAfatists who had joined the Swaraj Party far from dissociating
17themselves from it, as has been claimed, were determined to carry
out their plan of Council entry. This was being done in open
defiance of the fatwa of the Jamiyat-•'Ul-TJlama and the accepted polioy
18of the CKC. Mohamed Ali regarded this as a betrayal of the cause,
especially in view of the religious obligations entailed by the 
19
Jamiyat!s fatwa. But in order to maintain unity he glossed over
their action. In September 1923? supported by Dr. Ansari, Abul
20Kalam Azad, Dr. Mahmud and Jawaharlal Nehru, Mohamed Ali played
a leading part in bringing about the Delhi Congress compromise which
21he regarded as 'a necessary evil’. This compromise allowed such
15
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16
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Congressmen, as had no religious or concientious objections, to
22stand as candidates or to exercise their right of voting.
Among the Khilafatists some of the ulama - Abdul Bari, Sulaiman
Nadvi and Husain Ahmad Madni - had been themselves trying to secure
23a revision of the Jamiyat's fatwa against Council entry. But the
Jamiyat, instead of taking a prompt decision, referred the matter
24to a sub-committee for further investigation. This, however, did
not deter the Swarajist-Khilafatists from contesting the elections
25
and consequently a good number was returned to the Councils. In
these desperate conditions, there was hardly any hope for
reorganising the Khilafat work and, despite Shaukat Ali's pleadings
26for 'a clear and forward and brave policy1, the matter had to be 
shelved until the Khilafat Conference at Cocanada in December 1923*
In the meantime the Khilafatists were confronted with fresh 
complications.
When the Turkish Nationalists had separated the Khilafat from
the Sultanate in November 1922, the Indian Khilafatists had
27expediently accepted the fait accompli. Muffled protests both in
28Turkey and India had since been ignored. But one step led to 
another. On October 29, 1923, Turkey, striding along the path of
22
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24
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25
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new nationalism, declared herself a republic with Mustafa Kemal as
the President. This resulted in the loss by the Caliph of all his
secular powers and administrative functions. It also rendered his
status completely anomalous. At first this momentous decision
attracted little notice in India and the Khilafatists continued to
press for the restoration of the Jazirat-ul-Arab to Turkey. The
Bombay Chronicle was perhaps the first to point out that agitation
for the Jazirat-ul-Arab was useless, as its evacuation by non-Muslim
troops was only a matter of time. In order to satisfy those demands,
29the Caliph's rights must first be re-established and clearly defined.
But the Khilafatists were not prepared to embarrass Angora
particularly when the question of the Jazirat-ul-Arab was still
unsettled, They had supported the Nationalists so consistently
that an open rupture with them would have looked ridiculous. This,
however, did not deter those who had been following the events in
Turkey with apprehension, from speaking out their minds. The Aga
Khan and Ameer Ali were among such people. On November 24, 1923,
they addressed from London a joint letter to General Ismet Pasha,
the Prime Minister of Turkey, entreating the Turks to reconsider
their decision with regard to the Caliph and maintain 'the religious
and moral solidarity of Islam' by re-establishing the powers of the
30sunni Khilafat-Imama^.
Through an oversight of the Aga Khan's secretary the original
letter and its copies to the Turkish press were despatched 
31simultaneously. Thus, the letter appeared in the Constantinople
press on December 5? 1923? before it was placed on Ismet Pasha's 
32table in Angora.. The manner of publication and the mystery that 
surrounded it alarmed the Angora Government. It was hinted in some 
quarters, Ismet Pasha reportedly among them, that a British intrigue
29
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30
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31
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33was behind the letter and its publication*. The Aga Khan and 
Amaer Ali were described as 'the heretics of heretics' and pawns 
in the hands of the British. On December 8, the National Assembly 
was convened in a secret session and a 'Counter-Revolutionary Court' 
constituted to deal with the reported 'intrigues'. Consequently, 
some prominent journalists were arrested along with Lutfi Fikri Bey, 
a reputable lawyer-politician, and Ekram Bey, second military A.D.C. 
to the Caliph^
Though, in the public trial which began on December 15, the
journalists were acquitted and only Fikri Bey got penal servitude,
the Aga Khan and Ameer Ali were appalled at the Angora insinuations
36of their being 'the real criminalsT. The Nationalists were
justifiably concerned about the safety of their nascent state because
there was in existence in Constantinople an opposition party with
the Caliph as the rallying-point, but they misconstrued a frieiidly
letter as a sinister plot on the non-proven assertion that the
37British were the instigators. In confusion the Nationalists ignored 
all the past services rendered to their cause by these two stalwarts 
and, without any regret, scarred for ever a long-standing friendship.
The Khilafatists were embarrassed by the letter incident. But 
since they were intent on continuing the agitation whether or not 
the Caliph's status was certain, they quickly disowned the action
33
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38of the Aga Khan and Ameer Ali. At the Cocanada Conference which
opened on December 27, 1923, Shaukat Ali, the President, strongly-
condemned the Aga Khan and Ameer Ali for being completely out of
touch with the Indian situation and reaffirmed confidence in Angora,
Shaukat Ali warned the Muslims that any slackening of the movement
'will prove our cowardice, ficklemindedness and stupidity'. 'Our
39enemies will laugh at us'. His brother, Mohamed Ali, took the 
opportunity to defend the retention of the Khilafat committees 
whose raison d'etre after the Lausanne Treaty had been under public 
criticism for some time. He argued that the Treaty had only given 
the Turks their 1 swara,j' \ it had not solved the real^  Khilafat issue 
which was the freedom of the Jazirat-ul-Arab„ Por that the need of 
the Khilafat organisations was greater than ever. He admitted that 
the Khilafat funds had not been well-managed but argued that the 
affairs should not deter Muslims from subscribing for a. rightful 
cause. Mohamed Ali made a frantic appeal for the continuance of 
agitation until the Khilafatists had achieved their purposed
The Ali brothers carried the day. The Conference laid down 
that the original Khilafat demands were four in number, i.e., complete 
freedom of the Turkish Empire % restitution of Thrace 5 restitution of 
Smyrna and the coast of Asia Minorp and freedom and safeguard of the 
Jazirat-ul-Arab. While the Lausanne Treaty had decided the first 
three demands, the fourth,'which from the religious point of view of 
the Mussalmans is the most important clause of the Khilafat demands',
still remained to be solved. Therefore, the Conference, with the
42full support of the Jamiyat7 'in clear terms and for the last time', 
declared that unless the whole of the Jazirat-ul-Arab was freed and 
was safe in the real sense, the Islamic world 'shall continue the
38
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43
struggle with all its might1. A resolution embodying the future 
programme of the organisation was passed. This involved? entrusting 
the Working Committee with the work of reorganisation of the Khilafat 
Committees 5 appealing for funds; and reorganising the corps of 
Khilafat volunteers under the CKC. Another resolution reiterated 
that the attainment of swaraj was 'not only a political and national 
but the foremost Islamic duty'1^
But before this programme could be implemented the inevitable
happened. When the republic was born the Khilafat had lost its 
45reason to exist! And, indeed the Aga Khan-Ameer Ali letter of 
the preceding November had the unintended effect of precipitating 
the disappearance of the institution. In the context of Turkish 
national politics the Khilafat had come to mean an 'anomalous and 
anarchronistic' institution, which Mustafa Kemal regarded as a 
constant nuisance and a perpetual danger to the Turkish republic. 
Turkey, he argued, was no longer in a position either to afford 
military adventure or to claim the power to defend the rest of
46
Islam! The Khilafat and religious institutions, therefore, must
41be' dealt with in a radical manner. By abolishing the Khilafat the 
Angora leaders also hoped to allay British suspicions of pan-Islamism
A O
and thereby soften their attitude towards the question of Mosul!
By February 1924? the Angora leaders had definitely decided to
49abolish the Khilafat and expel the Imperial house-hold from Turkey!
43
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On February 26 Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pasha had long consultations
with Mustafa Fevzi, the Minister of Religious Affairs. On March 2
the draft laws on the abolition of the Khilafat were considered and
endorsed by the Peoples' Party (Balk Firkasi), which was determined
to go through with its professed philosophy of nationalism and 
50secularism; The bills as approved by the Party were finally passed
by the Assembly on March 3? 1924? after a heated discussion in which
51a small opposition was shouted down; In its final form the law of 
abolition was a compromise between the Government proposal simply to 
declare the caliphal office abolished and the counter-proposals to 
declare it vested either in the National Assembly or in the Presidency. 
The material clause concerning the abolition maintained that since 
the idea of the Khilafat was contained in the meaning and significance 
of the words 'Government' and 'Republic' the institution was
superfluous. The office of the Caliph was, therefore, abolished and
52the Caliph deposed;
Within hours of the decision the Caliph was asked to leave the
53country. In the .small hours of March 4 Abdul-Mejid II, tears in his 
eyes, accompanied by a son, a daughter and two wives, was first 
bundled off in a motorcar to the Chatalja and then placed on a train
50
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54for Tirritet in Switzerland. The Nationalists then secured the 
expulsion of the rest of the Imperial dynasty with the utmost 
harshness and efficiency. Thus vanished suddenly from Turkey the 
great House of Osman which, lamented a Turkish paper, *for many 
centuries had reigned in Turkey and had lifted the country to the
55height of those glories it once possessed'.
The abolition of such an old institution as the Khilafat once
more brought to the fore the fundamental differences between the
Turkish Nationalists and the Indian Khilafatists. By their action
the Nationalists had challenged and then eliminated ideologically
the political power of the Muslim ummat as an instrument of 
56solidarity. The news came as a rude shock to the Indian Muslims
who could hardly believe that the Khilafat could be done away with
by the very people who had added to its strength in the past. Abul
Kalam Azad called the abolition a great blunder. He held that the
Turks alone were not competent to do away with the Khilafat; it was
5 7
a question for the entire Muslim world to decide; Mohamed Ali's
condemnation of the Angora action was even stronger. In anguish he
declared that there could be no sympathy 'with such irreligious
people as may want to break the ties of Islam ... and hanker after
58Europe's recognition of their progressiveness'; Some were angry
that the Indian Muslims, who had made so many sacrifices for Turkey
and were responsible for extracting from the Entente Powers favourable
59terms for her at Lausanne, had been so ungratefully ignored; Others 
asserted that the Indian Muslims had sympathised with Turkey because
54
The Times, March 5 and 6, 1924.
55
Shpresa Kombetare (Scutari), March 19, 1924* Extract in PRO, P.O., 
37*1/10218. What followed in Turkey in the domain of reforms can be 
studied in Leon Ostrorog, The Angora Reform, London, 1927, pp. 70-79.
56
G.E. Von Grunebaum, Modern Islam, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962, 
p. 138.
57
Englishman, March 6 , 1924.
58
Hindu, March 13, 1924*
59
See the statements of Sait Moosa and Abbas Ali Khan, Members of the 
Madras Legislative Council in Madras Mail, March 8, I924.
- 273 -
of their attachment to the Caliph? the Khilafat gone, they had now 
no interest left in Turkey^
The indignation was by no means limited to the politically- 
minded. Even the illiterate appear to have been moved, for it was 
the Caliph as a temporal ruler that had appealed to them and they 
could not bear his disappearance. People were actually seen 
weeping. The commonly-held view was that the Angora Assembly or 
any other Government, had no right, jurisdiction or power to abolish 
an institution which, during the past fourteen centuries, had become 
an integral part of the religious institutions of the Sunni world. 
The action was arbitrary, sacriligious and ultra vires and one 
against which the Indian Muslims had every right to protest^
To evaluate the Indian Muslim reaction to specific development®
in Turkey, it is essential to keep in mind their peculiar attitude
towards the breakdown of old ideas and customs that had long been
considered indispensable for Islam. Plainly the Indian Muslims,
excepting a few, were practically unaware of the intellectual life
of modern Turkey, reinforced and broadened by modem philosophical
63ideas and concepts even in the Ijtihad. Thus, the CKC, in spite
of the advice of some prudent men like Sahibzada Aftab Ahmad Khan
6Athat the Angora action was based on prudence and foresight, 
decided to plead with the Turks. On March 7? Shaukat Ali sent a
cable to Mustfa Kemal begging him 'to do your utmost to uphold the
6 5Khilafat and Islam'. But for Mustafa Kemal the Khilafat had ceased
60
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to be a potent instrument of Turkish foreign policy. His reply
was firm: the Khilafat meant Government which meant State. The
existence of a separate caliphal office with the Turkish Republic
had proved disturbing to the foreign and internal political union
of Turkey. Moreover, the original idea of the Khilafat had fallen
to the ground and, therefore, there was nothing contrary to Islam
in the action taken. The real bond between Muslim nations lay in
the significance of the Quranic verse innamul mominun ikhwan (all
66Muslims are brothers in Faith).
Though Mustafa Kemal had made it particularly clear that the 
caliphal office had ceased to exist, the Khilatists were not satisfied. 
On March 9? 1924? a special joint meeting of the Working Committees 
of the CKC and the Jamiyat was convened at Aligarh. It was decided 
that the Presidents of the two bodies should jointly make another 
representation to the National Assembly through its President. The 
Shaukat Ali-Kifayatullah telegram apprehended that the abolition 
'would open the door to the mischievous ambitions of hosts of 
underserving claimants' and begged the Assembly to reconsider their 
decision and give an opportunity to an Indian delegation which
S' ry
desired to make fuller representation on the subject.
The telegram had implied that the Khilafatists would gratefully
welcome a decision by Mustafa Kemal himself to assume the Khilafat.
An influential section of Muslim opinion, including Azad and some
60other ulama, strongly favoured this, and it was also supported by
69a section of the Muslim press. Even Mohamed Ali later declared
66
Ibid., March 13, 1924*
67
Ibid.
68
See Azad's letter to Haqiqat, n.d., UPNNR, No. 20 of 1924? p. 1- 
Again in a series of seven well-reasoned articles in the Zamindar 
he maintained that the Islamic Khilafat was still existent and 
that the Turks had done away with only that office which they had 
created in November 1922. The President of the Republic was in 
fact the Khalifat-ul-Muslimin. See Ghulam Rasul Mihr, ed., 
Tabarkat-i-Azad, Lahore, £ 19597? PP* 214-60. Far the views of 
Subhanullah of Gorakhpur and FaElur Rahman of Patna see Pioneer, 
March 19, 1924 and Mansur, n.d., UPNNR, No. 21 of 1924? p. 2,
69
See, e.g., Zamindar, March 8, 1924, PNNR 19245 Ziafat Punch, 
March 11, 1924, ibid; and Muslim Outlook, March 14, 1924, ibid.
- 275 -
that he would not oppose Mustafa Kemal becoming 'Caliph should he 
so desire 1°
The Turks had no such intention. To them the Khilafat had
become useless and obsolete. Thus they had completely undermined
the Khilafatists who were faced with the unpleasant dilemma of
having to disown either the Angora Nationalists, with whom they
were in political sympathy, or the Khilafat, 'whose defence they
had declared from scores of platforms for the last five years to
71be their most sacred religious duty'; Their position was untenable.
The critics like Fazlul Haq derided them, and perhaps rightly too,
that although they knew that Mustafa Kemal and his followers cared
nothing for Islam, still they were continuing the Khilafat movement,
'an agitation hollow and unnecessary1, and 'a dishonest propaganda’
72against the British!. For some it seemed that the event should
73'serve as an eye opener', but the Khilafatists, still under the 
Illusion that things would settle ultimately their way, decided to 
adopt face-saving tactics.
On March 12, 1924? OKC and the Jamiyat issued a joint
statement which urged the Muslims to pursue the agitation with
greater energy and determination rather than be upset by the
abolitions 'for on the continuance of our efforts depends the
realisation of national and Moslem hopes and aspirations.' The
future course of action depended on their communications with
Turkey and in the event of unsatisfactory result their first step
would be to convene a general conference of the Muslim world at some
74suitable centre to discuss and find a solution.
An exchange of telegrams between the Ali brothers and the 
deposed Caliph had already taken place - the brothers conveying 
personal devotion and allegiance and an assurance on behalf of 
Indian Muslims that they were determined to maintain the sacred
70
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Khilafat, and the ex-Caliph conveying his 'fatherly appreciation'
75of the co-operation of Indian Muslims m  defence of the Khilafat.
Now Sahukat Ali, in spite of his serious illness and other family 
76mishaps, issued a circular that, pending a settlement with Angora,
Abdul-Mejid1s name should continue to be mentioned in the Friday
77 78Khutbal' Abdul-Mejid was also banking on the Indian support and
79the Turkish flag still fluttered on his Territet hotel. But the
ex-Caliph's appeal to the Muslim world that the Angora decision was
'incompatible with the spirit of Islam' and, therefore, an inter-.
00
Islamic conference should decide the issue, appears to have fallen
flat, except in India. The dejected ex-Caliph had to spend the
rest of his life on a stipend from the Nizam of Hyderabad, donations
from Indian Princes and magnates and funds from Ameer Ali's Red 
01Crescent Society.
Despite the Khilafatists ' insistence that the continuance of
the Khilafat, both from religious and political points of view,
was essential, there was no concrete proposal as to how this was
to be achieved. Moreover, an influential section among Muslims,
Iqbal and Khuda Bukhsh included, was defending the action of the 
82Turkish Assembly, Among the various suggestions, ranging from 
forcing Angora to restore Abdul-Mejid to electing as Caliph the
75
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Amir of Afghanistan or the Nizam of Hyderabad or even Mohamed Ali,
a suggestion for a conference of the Muslim world appealed to an
83overwhelming majority. The despatch of a Khilafat delegation to
Angora was, therefore, considered imperative?^ But the proposal for
a delegation was undermined by the Government of India and the India
Office who, thinking that the personnel would include men of extreme
85
views, refused to grant the passports.
Fresh complications arose when towards the middle of March 
1924, news arrived that King Hussain of the Hedjaz had proclaimed 
himself Caliph. Hussain, who had never forgotten the assurances of 
an Arab Khilafat once given him during the War by British
representatives?^ had unsuccessfully tried his luck in the winter
87 88of 1922/23;' For some time nothing happened. But a secret
campaign for his recognition as Caliph was already underway in
89Trans-Jordania since September 1923. Yfhen in March 1924, the Turks 
abolished the Khilafat, Hussain could resist no longer. He at once 
manipulated a request from leading Arabs at Amman that he should 
accept the Khilafat and then instructed Mecca to stage-manage a
83
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90 91similar demand. He accepted the assumption on March 5 and was
92
officially proclaimed Caliph on March 11 at Shuneh. He was
recognised in Jeddah^ Syria (despite the French opposition)^
95 96Demascus^ and Beirut. But in Egypt his assumption was disapproved
97and attributed to British intrigues,' However, it was in India that 
it encountered the strongest disapprobation.
With few exceptions, the Indian Muslims condemned Hussain's
action and refused to accept his assumption of the caliphal office.
A vast majority detested him for his alleged dependence on the 
98British, his betrayal of Turkey in the War and his mismanagement
99 100of the haj,j pilgrimage. The press were relentless. The Zamindar
went so far as to suggest that if Hussain laid claim to the Khilafat
it would be lawful for Muslims to kill hinn^ Only a few important
102Indian Muslims, Abdul Ban and Kidwai included, lent him support. 
Disgusted with the Angora attitude towards the Khilafat, Abdul Bari
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even sent a telegram to his old friend Hussain congratulating him on
assuming the Khilafat, ’which office you so deservedly assumed'}0^
But this support did no good either to the pretender or to his
105supporters, and instead exacerbated feelings
In this confused situation when the special Khilafat Conference
opened at Calcutta on March 19, 1924? opinion prevailed that the
abolition of the Khilafat did not in the least affect the Indian
Muslims, whether judged by the canons of the Islamic law or those
of sound policy}0  ^ nevertheless, they would try to find a solution
107in consultation with the Muslim world. But Hussain’s assumption
was unacceptable. He was ’a traitor to his predecessor and to the
Defender of the Faithful’, 'a friend of the British1, and unfit for 
108the high office. The agitation for the freedom of the Jazirat-ul- 
Arab from non-Muslim control was not only religiously essential but
also nationally important in order to keep up the movement for
swara.j, In turn the attainment of the swaraj, apart from being the 
goal of every Indian, was the best weapon for the Indian Muslims to
secure the restoration of their holy land and the safeguard of the
Khilafat} 09
Thus it would be seen that the agitation for the Jazirat-ul- 
Arab was no longer a subsidiary question but had become the principal 
aspect of the Khilafat movement. In his presidential address Mohamed 
Ali clearly stated that the restoration of the Jazirat-ul-Arab to 
Muslim control was a pre-requisite before the Khilafatists could make
103
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their peace with the Government. 'It may seem’, he justified his 
contention, 'that we are more Arabian than the Arabs and more Turkish 
than the Turks, but if our Islamic obligations are understood, it 
will be apparent that all that we are is Moslems. As Moslems we who 
are not Arabs cannot let the Arabs hand over the dominions of the 
Island of Arabia to non-Moslems, and as Moslems we cannot countenance 
the section of the Turkish nation disconnecting its national 
Government from the Khilafat'}'*'0
There is, however, no doubt that one great plank in the
Khilafatists' programme had rotted away. The contemptuous
indifference shown by the Turks had dampened their enthusiasm for
Turkey. The agitation for the Jazirat-ul-Arab was only a face-saving
device. In fact the Khilafat movement now possessed no reality.
Indeed the agitation, which had been progressively on the decline
since the Treaty of Lausanne, was already in a steep fall. Kidwai's
advice of summer 1923? to abolish the Khilafat committees and funds,
111was revived in certain Muslim quarters. The Hindu vernacular press
keenly encouraged the suggestion arguing that it would serve as an
incentive for the Muslims to join the Congress and would create
112friendly relations between Hindus and Muslims.
As in 1923> Mohamed Ali once again tried to defend the retention
of the Khilafat committees as being far more necessary than ever,
113but hrs advocacy for a strong Khilafat organisation met with
little approval}"^ There were among Muslims political realists who
honestly believed that India had nothing to do with the question of 
115the Khilafat, that the Khilafat committees were irrelavent and 
that there were other more pressing problems, such as the 
constitutional reforms and Hindu-Muslim relations, which required
110
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immediate attention. There was also a growing realisation that the
reform scheme had not worked to the advantage of the Muslims as a
community, and that, in order to safeguard their political rights,
they must reorientate their national programme. But the difficulty
of the situation was that the Muslim League, which in the past had
fought for Muslim rights, was lying dormant, having been pushed into
the background by the exuberance of the CEC. It had declined both
in its prestige and importance. Its provincial branches were
practically non-existent. Its membership had dwindled and the
attendance, even at the annual sessions, was usually meagre. Out
of the 1,093 members in 1922 only 23 had paid their annual
subscription}"^ Already a suggestion had been mooted by Abbas
Tayabji (1853-1936) that the League may be dissolved or merged with 
117the Congress. Thus, in the early days of 1924? the problem
before the League leaders, as Jinnah later explained, was to
organise Muslims not for a particular question, such as the Khilafat,
but with regard to the subjects relating to the internal politics 
118of the country. The solution was sought in the reorganisation of
the moribund League.
But already, in February 1924? after some earlier failures and
119opposition from the Khilafatists, the League leaders had decided
to reassert their position. On February 27, 1924, a meeting of the
Muslim members of the Legislative Assembly, including Jinnah, Abul
Kasem, Kidwai, Nawab Ismail Khan and Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum, was
held at Delhi. They moved that the League President should call a
120meeting of the Council at an early date. Consequently, on March 16, 
116
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the Council of the League met at Delhi under Jinnah1s presidency.
Many Khilafatists, including Mohamed Ali, Ajmal Khan, Dr. Ansari,
Azad and T.A.K. Sherwani, also attended. The militant Khilafatists,
realising that it was the beginning of the end of their hegemony,
attempted to capture the League by inducing it to accept their own
programme. This, however, was successfully resisted. After a sharp
argument with Jinnah, Mohamed Ali voluntarily withdrew from the
meeting. The Council then decided to hold the League session at
Lahore in May 1924, in continuation of the last session at Lucknow
121which had been adjourned sine die.
The revival of the Muslim League confronted the Khilafatists
with the dilemma of having either to accept the defeat and surrender
the leadership of the community or to fight back. An effective
come-back for them, however, seemed difficult as the revival of
122the League had been generally well received and in certain
quarters it was demanded that the Khilafat committees should be
123abolished and their funds handed over to the Muslim League.
In desperation some Khilafatists alleged that the hand of the
124Government was visible in the revival of the League. But the 
Khilafatists had realised that in order to survive they must 
reorientate the Khilafat organisations with a new and more dynamic 
programme. A few days before the opening of the Lahore session of 
the Muslim League Dr. Kitchlew called upon the CKC and the Jamiyat 
to meet in a special session and consider the situation and decide 
on’the advisability or otherwise of continuing without alteration 
the present programme of the Khilafat movement'. Asa suitable 
basis for future work, Kitchlew again outlined his socio-economic
121
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Tanzim programme embracing the whole phase of the life of the
community from volunteer corps to Muslim banks and cooperative 
125societies. And from Delhi Asaf Ali suggested the advisability of 
consolidating different Muslim organisations in India with identical 
or reconcilable aims into one organic body working in co-operation 
and harmony with the Congress for the speeding attainment of full 
Dominion status'^
Hurriedly, a meeting of the Working Committee of the CKC was
convened at Bombay about the middle of May 1924» to consider the
future of the Khilafat organisations in India in the light of the
new developments. The CKC unanimously agreed to extend the scope
of the Khilafat organisations and to make all communal work its
province. The CKC and the Jamiyat were asked to meet at Delhi in
127
the last week of June 1924? to thrash out the details.
But theisre antics did not deter the Muslim Leaguers. The Lahore 
session of the League, organised by the Punjab leader Pazl-i-Husain, 
was held on May 24 and 25 under Jinnah*s presidency. A large number 
of the Khilafatists and the Congressmen also attended. In the very 
first speech of the session a proposal was mooted by Agha Safdar, 
the chairman of the Reception Committee, that the Muslim League and 
the CKC should be amalgamated. Though the suggestion was not taken 
up the tendency of the delegates generally was to divert attention 
to domestic issues. Jinnah appealed to his countrymen ’to unite and 
organise all the resources of our immediate goal - that is, freedom 
of India1, but held that the issues of paramount importance were 
Hindu-Muslim unity and the amendment of the constitution of the 
Government of India. The latest trend in Muslim political thinking 
was clearly exhibited in the League’s resolutionss that communal 
representation in the legislatures and other elected bodies should be 
strictly on population basis| that ’the Muslim majority of population 
in the Punjab, Bengal and the Frontier Province should not be 
interfered with in any territorial redistribution’\ and that the
125
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Frontier Province should be placed 'in a position of equality'
with the major provinces of India. The question of separate
128electorates was left open. A committee of sixteen was appointed
to frame and place before the next session a scheme of the constitution
of the Government of India in consultation with the committee or
committees that might be appointed for the purpose by other political
organisations. Another Committee was appointed to confer with the
working committee of the CKC to frame a scheme for the purpose of
129organising various public activities of the Muslim community.
The revival of the Muslim League brought to the fore the
fundamental differences between the two sections of the Muslim
opinion - one represented by the Muslim League believing in
constitutional fight with the bureaucracy through the Councils,
the other represented by the militant Khilafatists having faith
150in a policy of obstructionism. These differences emerged not
only in the conflict of personalities of the two Alis, but also in
151a struggle for Muslim leadership. The Khilafatists were indeed
indignant at the prospect of the leadership slipping out of their
hands. The Zamindar lamented that the League had relapsed into the
hands of the 'loyalists' and after four year's struggle for freedom
Muslims were again being asked to resort to obsolete constitutional 
152methods. The Khilafatists decided to act at once.
128
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On June 25, 1924, a meeting of the CKC was held at Delhi, It 
is perhaps one of the most important turning points in the history 
of the Khilafat movement. After long deliberations, which were not 
open to the press, the CKC decided to concentrate all its energies 
on reorganising the Muslim community and accepted the proposals of 
the Working Committee of the previous month. The long-standing 
proposal of transferring the headquarters of the CKC from Bombay to 
Delhi was postponed sine die and the CKC resolved to undertake the 
entire responsibility of re-organising the political, social and 
economic life of the community by acquiring the services of full­
time workers and corps of volunteers in every city. The scheme 
involved the organisation of the Juma and other congregational 
prayers $ the opening of primary schools, night schools and technical 
and commercial colleges\ supervision of the Waqf, Sadqa and Zakat, 
and the proper administration of the proceeds on such undertakings 
as the training and education of Muslim orphans and the help of the 
Muslim widows| and the popularisation of the Khaddar. For the 
material improvement of the community, the CKC considered it 
essential to establish Muslim co-operative -credit societies and ,a 
Muslim bank for which purpose it invited the rulings of the experts
of Muslim law whether their establishment was permissable under the
133 shariat.
To finance the project the CKC entrusted its Working Committee 
with the raising of funds. The Working Committee was also authorised 
to establish liaison with the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama and the Muslim League 
and such other Muslim associations as it might choose. Another 
resolution expressed the CKC's determination to maintain the National 
Muslim University at Aligarh, as a permanent university and to 
improve and enlarge it^^
Clearly the CKC had shifted its emphasis - the Khilafat issue 
no longer figured prominently in its policy. But the Khilafatists* 
latest ruse encountered strong disapproval in some Muslim circles 
and active hostility from the Hindus who had been none too happy at
133
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135the revival of the Muslim League either. The Muslim objection
was that the widening of the scope of activities would jeopardise
the very existence of the Khilafat committees. Instead, they advised
136the strengthening of the existing committees. The Hindus under
Shraddhanand1s spell, who had been advocating since October 1923 a
complete severance of the Congress connection with the Khilafat 
137organisations, alleged that the ultimate goal of the committees
was proselytism. Therefore, Gandhi should emphatically protest
against the decision and all the Hindu, 'members of the CKC should
138resign on bloc unless the new programme was scrapped.
Looking objectively, the shift in the Khilafatists’ policy,
quite apart from their anxiety to retain the community's leadership,
was the result of a growing disillusionment with Hindu communalism.
The militancy of the Shuddhi and Sangatham campaigns and the failure
of the Congress leaders to condemn these activities had disappointed
139not only the League leaders but also the Khilafatists. In fact 
relations between the two communities, which had already been badly 
stra ined in the first half of 1923? had now worsened to a lamentable 
extent. Riots and arson had taken the place of amity and good-will. 
Unscrupulous journalism played on public hysteria and made it worse. 
The situation was so bad that Dr. Ansari, in a letter tO Gandhi, 
observed in disgusts 'Blind fanaticism and a reprehensible desire 
to run the other community down by every means has to-day become an 
essential part of the life of a vernacular paper of northern India' 
The Government tried to discourage communal polemics and took action
135
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against some of the journals']^ hut this had no effect. As time 
passed, riots increased in bheir frequency and intensity. In July 
1924? there were serious Bakr ’Id riots in Delhi, In the same month 
there was another outbreak at Nagpur and in August at Panipat. Then 
there was a crop of riots at Lahore, Lucknow, Muradabad, Bhagalpur, 
Rurki, Agra, Hanpar, Jampur, Meerut, Abmedabad, Pili Bhit, 
Shahjehanpur, Hardoi, Kalpi, Allahabad, Jhang, Gujrat and even at 
Gulburga in the Nizam's dominions. In September 1924? Sir Prank 
Sly, the Governor of the C.P. remarked to Readings
During my long service I have never known such 
acute tension of feeling between Hindus and 
Mahomedans .... Each community feels that with 
the advance of responsible government, they can 
no longer rely on an impartial governing au|hpjrity, 
but must each fight for their own interests.
The leaders tried in vain to restrain the fanaticism of their
co-religionists and a committee of three - Dr. Ansari, Lajpat Rai
and Sirdar Mehtab Singh - attempted to draft a 'National Pact1.
143
But the document which it produced was only a tentative agreement 
seeking to safeguard the religious liberties of the communities 
and recommending arbitration in cases of discord. Some of the 
vital questions splitting the two communities, particularly that 
of the communal representation in local bodies and Government service, 
remained unsolved. The more realistsic, towards which the CKC was 
much attracted, was C.R. Das's well-known 'Bengal Pact' that laid 
down specific proportional representation in all spheres for the
141
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two communities^^ However, the Pacts, particularly the latter,
aroused strong hostility from the Hindus of all shades of opinion
145including the Congress, and instead of improving the situation 
increased the bitterness.
The breaking-point in Hindu-Muslim relations was, however,
the harrowing riot of Kohat in the Frontier that took place in
September 1924» over the circulation by the Sanatan Dharam Sabha
of an anti-Islamic polemic containing especially a very objectionable
poem}^ The magisterial enquiry which the Government of India held
147weighed heavily upon the Hindus. The Hindu press and Hindu 
leaders like Malariya, Lajpat Rai and the Members of the Legislative 
Assembly started a systematic campaign of representing the Hindus
1 A ft
as the aggrieved party. Attempts were also made by them to
149instigate the Kohat Hindus to reject any settlement. Gandhi and
Shaukat Ali also fell out with each other on the point as to which
150community was responsible for the not. Gone were the days when
144
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151Gandhi was held in the highest esteem by Muslim leaders.
Kohat led to a dramatic twenty-one day 'penance1 fast by
152
Gandhi, who had been released on medical grounds in February 1 9 2 4 , 
and to a 'Unity Conference1 of the leaders. But the Conference,
153which took place at Delhi on September 26, 1924, achieved little.
Its resolutions remained pious wishes for, as soon as the Conference
adjourned3 the old rivalry reappeared. Before Gandhi could end his
fast, a serious riot took place at Allahabad, another at Jabbulpore
154and yet another at Madras. Communal strife had now become a 
permanent feature of Indian political life. The fine edifice of 
Hindu-Muslim unity which had so assiduously built up the Khilafat 
agitation into a mass all-India movement had crumbled down like a 
house of cards. The Khilafat movement already affected by a series 
of internal and external events was now wholly a Muslim concern.
The Hindus, as a community, had long ceased to be a party to it.
With the Hindus standing aloof, the Khilafat non-existent and 
the Turks determined upon a 'quasi-secularism']^ the natural
151
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Muslim 'bullying' lay underneath the Hindu-Muslim tension (Young 
India, 1924-26, pp. 26 and 176). In inter-communal relations Gandhi 
was certainly not the Gandhi of 1919-22. He had ceased to be an 
impartial leader of India.
155
For details of the Conference see Young India, 1924-26, pp. 138-73*
154
Daily Telegraph, Oct. 9, H  and 13, 1924*
155
In F. Rahman's opinion the Turkish attitude in breaking with the 
traditional conception of a politico-religious state was 'quasi­
secularism' because in spite of the separation of the state from 
religion and the dethronement of canon law, Islam had remained as the 
term of reference. See F. Rahman, 'Internal Religious Developments 
in the Present Century Islam', JWH, II, No, I, 1954, P* 8 7 6 .
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tendency of the CKC was to push through the programme of
reorganisation. But its progress was arrested by the developments
in the Hedjaz in autumn 1924? which led to the expulsion of King
Hussain by his old rival and adversary Ibn Saud (1880-1953)? the 
156Sultan of Nejd. Ibn Saud's success changed the whole aspect of
the Khilafat question. The CKC, which was still struggling for the
resuscitation of the Khilafat, began to dream of establishing in
157the Hedjaz a republic on the pattern of the early days of Islam.
Ibn Saud, pretending to agree with the Khilafatists, sustained and
158encouraged their optimism. But unfortunately the Ikhwan iconoclasm 
and puritanic zeal led Ibn Saud to order the removal of all domed 
structures from the graves of Muslims held sacred by the generality 
of the Muslims. This affected seriously Ibn Saud's popularity in
156
Though the Nejdi's attack on the Hedjaz would have materialised 
any way, as Hussain's assumption of the Khilafat had provided them 
with an excuse for 1 .jihad', Ibn Saud had been encouraged a good deal 
in his designs by the Indian Khilafatists' support. Ibn Saud himself 
acknowledged this fact. See Daily Telegraph, Sept. 22 and Nov. 12, 
1924? and Madras Mail, Nov. 26, 1924. Ibn Saud's success was instant. 
Hussain, dejected by his defeat and bitter at the British for disowing 
him, abdicated in favour of his eldest son Ali on Oct. 5? 1924? and 
retired to Aqaba. But Ali was also unable to hold the Nejdis and 
Mecca fell in the middle of Oct. 1924. He continued to rule at 
Jeddah until the fall of Medina in Dec. 1925? when he too abdicated 
the throne of the Hedjaz and renounced the title of the Khilafat and 
went to take up residence in Baghdad. See PP, 1924? Hansard, 177 H.C. 
Deb. 5 S., cols. 141-42J MacDolad to Bullard, Tel. No. 35 (R), Sept. 
28, 1924? PRO* P.O., 371/10014? H.C. Iraq to S/S Colonies, Tel. No. 
2113, Oct. 13, 1924? PSSP, P. 4156/24 with 3665/24, I; A.L. Kirkbird's 
report in PSSP, P. 4549/42 with ibid.% J. Benoist-Mechin, Arabian 
Destiny, London, 1957? PP* 156-50? Daily Telegraph, Dec. 21, 1925 and 
Jan. 1, 19265 and Tonbee, Survey, 1925, I, pp. 296-308.
157
See the CKCs cable to the Hedjaz National Party, Madras Mail,
Oct. 8, 1924. Also see Abdul Majid Daryabadi, Mohamed Ali% Zati Diary 
ke Chand Warq, I, Azamgarh, 1954? P* 220; and Abdoola Haroon, 
Khutba-i-Sadarat, Karachi, 1927? PP* 12-13.
158
See Appendix B. of the enclosure, Bullard to MacDonald, No. 102, 
Oct. 20? 1924? PRO, P.O., 37l/l0015. Also see Daily Telegraph, Nov.
5, 1924? Ghaffar? Hayat-i-Ajmal, pp. 362-66; Daryabadi, Mohamed Ali, 
pp. 227 and 326-28; and Haroon, Khutba-i-Sadarat, pp. 10-12.
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159India ' and, despite his assurances, divided the Khilafatists into 
pro- and anti-Ibn Saud factions,
It is difficult to classify these groups strictly since their 
religious and political affiliations mostly overlapped. But generally 
speaking, the supporters and detractors of Ibn Saud, motivated as 
they were by divergent and apparently irreconcilable opinions, 
aligned themselves to the main opposing factions - the Ghair- 
Muqallids and the Muqallids. The pro-Ibn Saud group included such 
stalwarts as the Ali brothers, Abul Kalam Azad, Ajmal Khan, Dr. Ansari, 
Zafar Ali Khan, Dr. Kitchlew, Sulaiman Nadvi, Abdul Majid Daryabadi, 
Ataullah Shah, Daud Ghaznavi, Habibur Rahman Ludhianvi and the ulama 
of the Nadwah and the Ahl-i-Hadis}^ Among the detractors of 
Ibn Saud the main attack was led by the ulama of Frangi Mahal (under
Abdul Bari) and Barei 1 ly+uiuLaiwiAliiuafl The anti-Ibn Saud
group also included Sajjadah Kashins, sufis and Shias, who were 
opposed to the Muwahhidun or the Ikhwan discipline and iaonoclasm. 
Prominent among these were Shah Sulaiman Phulwari, Shah Muhammad 
Jaffar, Shah Ghulam Hussain, Hassan Nizami, Hasrat Mohani, Abdul Majid 
Badauni, M.H. Kidwai, Baja Ahmad Ali Khan of Salimpore. 4n& Raja Nawab 
Ali Khan of Akbarpore^^
The press took a leading part in the controversy, which 
developed into a vigorous conflict. The antagonism between the two 
factions, the full force of which was exhibited in the next two years, 
reached such a pitch that both sides called each other heretics. 
Polemics and counter-polemics made their appearance and public meetings
j- o
159
So much so that Shaukat Ali had to ask Ibn Saud not to do anything 
to hurt Muslim feelings. See his telegram to Ibn Saud in Bombay 
Chronicle, Sept. 18, 1924.
160
The classification is based on various speeches, writings and 
statements of the leaders concerned, as well as on other sundry 
sources.
161
Same as above. The Ikhwan movement of Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud was 
an intensified form of 'Wahhabism' or Muwahhidun cult. The Ikhwan 
stood for the preservation of Islam in its original puritanic form 
and took the teachings of Islam quite literally. See G. Rentz, 
'al-Ikhwan', El, New Edition, III, pp. 1064-68; H. St. John Philby,
The Heart of Arabia, I, London, 1922, pp. xvi-xvii; and De Lacy 
O'Leary, Islam at the Cross-Roads, London, *1,923, pp. 40-41*
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and processions became almost a daily occurence* Former friends
became irreconcilable opponents. A war of wits and pens between
Mohamed Ali and Hassan Nizami surpassed all limits and became personal.
Differences arose between Mohamed Ali and the Raja of Mahmudabad and
others of his friends like Abdul Majid Badauni, Nisar Ahmad of
Cawnpore and most surprisingly Abdul Bari, his religious preceptor.
This was not all. A new organisation, known as the Khuddam-i-Haramain,
162sprang up to oppose the CKC's pro-Ibn Saud policy.
But the CKC, though pro-Ibn Saud and anti-Hussain, was 
nevertheless uneasy about the fratricidal war among Muslims and 
bloodshed in the most revered places of Islam, i.e., Mecca and Medina. 
Therefore, in the middle of December 1924, a Khilafat delegation, 
consisting of Sulaiman Nadvi, Abdul Majid and Abdul Qadir, was
163despatched to the Hedjaz to try to mediate between the belligerents.
The delegation reached Jeddah towards the end of the month and 
conferred with King Ali (1871-1935), ihe son and successor of Hussain 
who was still holding out at Jeddah and Medina, and corresponded with 
Ibn Saud. But it failed to effect a settlement}*^ The Belgaum
162
See Daryabadi, Mohamed Ali. I, pp. 228-322; Ashraf Ata, Maulana 
Zafar Ali Khan? Lahore, n.d., pp. 193-200? Arshi Amritsari, 'Mohamed 
Ali ki Nazar', Ali Bradran, ed., Rais Ahmad Jafari, Lahore, 1963, 
p. 51, S.M. Jafar Nadvi, 'Khuda Bakhshe.,.', Ali Bradran, p. 44? and 
Haroon, Khutba-i-Sadarat, p. 13. To mention a few polemicss (pro-Ibn 
Saud), Arshi Amritsari, Mazarat-i-Hed.jaz, Amritsar, 1925? Maulana 
Sanaullah Amritsari, Masala-i-Hedjaz par Nazar, Amritsar, 1925? — , 
Sultan Ibn Saud, Ali Bradran aur Motamar-i-Hedjaz, Amritsar, 1926? 
and M.M. Ismail, Ahla-ul-Haq-us-Sarih wa Afna-ul-Batil-il-Qabih, 
Bangalore, 1926. (anti-Ibn Saud), Tarikh Najdiyya yaani Haqiqat-i- 
Wahhabiyya, issued by Anjuman Hazb-ul-Hanaf, Lahore, 1924s Abdul Bari, 
Masala-i-Qubur wa Q.ubbajat, Parangi Mahal, Lucknow, 1925? Aasi,
Izalatur Rain wa main-un-Mushahidil Haramain-ish-Sharifain. Amritsar, 
1925? S.M. Hussaini, Fatawa-i-Ulama-i-Mominin wa Muslimin fi Raddi 
Fatawa-i-Ulama-i-Gher Muqallidin wa Wahhabin, Bungalore, 1926;
Maulana Nur-ud-Din Ajmeri, Pakki Qabron aur Qubbon ka Jawaz, Delhi, 
1926; Sultan Mahmud, Anwar-us-Sultani.yya fil Radd-ul-Wahhabiyya, 
Bungalore, 1926? Fatwas Masala-i-Iltawa-i-Haj,j ke Mutaliq Ulama-i- 
Kiram wa Mujtahaddin Uzzam ka Mudallal wa Mabsut Fatwa, issued by 
Jamiyat-i-Markazziyya Khuddam-ul-Haramain, Lucknow, 1927? and 
Masala-i-Hedjaz wa Tahrik-i-Iltawa-i-Haj.j, published by the Secretary, 
Khuddam-ul-Haramain, Lucknow, 1927*
163
Times of India, Dec. 19, 1924*
1 6 4
The Times, Feb* 10, 1925*
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Khilafat Conference, which had opened on December 24, 1924, under Dr»
Kitchlew, had also preferred to leave the settlement of the Khilafat
165question to a world Muslim congress. But the lingering trouble
in the Hedjaz enabled the Khilafatists to justify the retention of
the Khilafat organisations, for which they had been arguing so
desperately. However, in view of national exigencies, the emphasis
166of their policy shifted further towards domestic issues. There 
was a steady realisation on their part that the Khilafat movement 
was after all dead. A complete regression was only a question of 
time.
In the decade after 1924? the CKC gradually declined into
impotence. Por a few years its attention was continued to be
absorbed in the Hedjaz affair during which it endeavoured to enhance
Ibn Saud's popularity in India by organising successful pilgrimages
to Mecca. But Indian Muslim feelings against the latter had much
hardened. So much so that when in January 1926, Ibn Saud
proclaimed himself the king of the Hedjaz, even the CKC turned 
168against him. nevertheless, when in summer 1926, two separate 
world Muslim congresses were held at Cairo and Mecca to settle the 
Khilafat question, the CKC accepted Ibn Saud's invitation and not
165
Hindu, Jan. 1, 1925.
166
Ibid.
167
Once in summer 1925, Shaukat Ali had to be rescued from an 
infuriated mob for applauding Ibn Saud as the champion of Islam. 
Morning Advertiser, Aug. 29, 1925, PSSP, P. 2984 with
3665/24, IV? and Daryabadi, Mohamed Ali, p. 240.
168
Ibn Saud's Indian detractor®-, particularly Hasrat Mohani and 
Syed Habib Shah of the Khuddam-ul-Haramain, had previously 
criticised him for having entered into treaty relations with 
Britain. See Hindu, Dec. 31, 1925, &nd Sir Gilbert Clayton,
An Arabian Diary, ed., P.O. Collins, Berkeley and Los Angeles,
1969, P* 188, n. 31* Texts of the Bahra and the Hadda Agreements 
(November 1 and 2, 1925, respectively) between Ibn Saud and the 
British have been reproduced by Collins on pp. 271-279. Both 
Agreements were signed by Sir Gilbert Clayton on behalf of the 
British Government at the Bahra Camp of Ibn Saud.
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169that of the Cairo ulama. The Mecca Conference, which opened on 
170June 6, 1926, was, however, a failure. Ihn Saud had cleverly
excluded from the agenda any discussion of the Khilafat issue or
171even of international and Islamic politics. The Indian Khilafat
delegation, consisting of Sulaiman Nadvi (leader), Shoaib Qureshi
ailfi -53^ 0 brothers, returned to India disappointed
172and empty-handed.
With the Khilafat bogey already non-existent, the attitude of
Ibn Saud only confounded the already confused situation. The Ali
brothers and the CKC became involved in a bitter conflict with
173Zafar Ali Khan and other pro-Saudists. But at the same time the
process of the CKC's withdrawal from extra-territorial interests 
174was hastened. The situation in the country was also making a 
different demand. The balance of power after 1924 had shifted
169
The reason was that the Khilafatists suspected the Cairo 
Conference, and with some justification, to be an attempt of the 
Egyptian royalty to assume the caliphal office. They feared that 
a British vassal as the Caliph of Islam would indirectly enhance 
Britain1s 'power of mischief' in the Muslim world. (Allama) 
Inyatullah Khan Mashriqi (1888-1963) of the Khaksar Movement fame, 
who unofficially attended the Conference, vehemently opposed King 
Fuad's candidature for the Khilafat. See The Times, Feb, 5 a*id 
May 14, 1926j Madras Mail, May 12, 19265 Hindu, May 20, 19265 Elie 
Kedourie, 'Egypt and the Caliphate, 1915-1946', M S ,  Parts III &
IY, 1963, PP« 208-48? and Le Congrds du Khalifat et Le Congres du 
Monde Musulman, Paris, 1926, pp. 29-122,
170
Approximately seventy-five delegates representing Muslim 
communities in India, Russia, Java, Syria, Palestine, Nejd, the 
Hedjaz, Asir, Egypt, Sudan, Turkey, Afghanistan and the Yemen came 
to attend. The Jamiyat-ul-Ulama and the Ahl-i-Hadis sent their 
separate delegates. For full details see Le Congrfes du Khalifat, 
pp. 125-219. Also see Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah, 'The Mecca Conference’, 
CR, CXXXI, Sept. 1926, pp. 304-11,
171
The Times, June 17, 1926. Also see The Times, June 10, 1926? 
and Toynbee, Survey, 1925? I, p. 312.
172
Muhammad Sarwar, ed., Maulana Mohamed Ali, Lahore, 1962, 
pp. 246-47.
173
Arshi Amritsari, 'Mohamed Ali ki Nazar’, Ali Bradran, pp. 51-52.
174
This reflected the mood of the more realistic Khilafatists.
See, e.g., Abdul Halim Sharar, Miyar-i-Zindagi, Lucknow, 1926,
pp. 7-8.
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from the CKC to the Muslim League and the political struggle had
moved from public platform to the legislative assemblies. Moreover,
the communal strife had by this time spread over the whole field of
Indian politics and constitutional issues had become much more important,
leading to the Muddiman investigation of the scope for improvement
175within the existing Act. Already, the Khilafat Conference which was 
held at Delhi in May 1926, had changed its creed and had assumed 
responsibility for and trusteeship over all Muslim interests. The 
Khilafatists’ plea was that the Khilafat movement had worked for Islam
abroad and it must protect their religion when it was threatened in
-l r?/'
India by the ’high-handedness’ of the neighbouring communities. The
Conference had stipulated such actions that may be deemed necessary to
177safeguard the interests, lives and property of the Indian Muslims. ' 1
By early 1927, the CKC had definitely given up its pan-Islamic 
stand, though many Muslims continued to cherish this romantic
sentiment and some do even to-day - twenty-five years after the
175
For the Muddiman investigations see PP, 1925, Cmd. 2360, Report of 
the Reforms Enquiry Committee, 1924. The members of the Committee were 
Alexander Muddiman (Chairman), Muhammad Shafi, Maharaja of Burdwan,
Tej Bahadur Sapru, Arthur Froom, Sivaswami Iyer, H. Moncrieff Smith, 
M.Ao Jinnah, R.R. Pranjpye and H. Tonkinson (Secy.).
176
See Sulaiman Nadvi’s speech in Hindu, May 13, 1926. For the 
growing antagonism between the Khilafatists and the Hindus also see 
Irwin to Birkenhead, May 5, 1926, BdP.
177
The new creed was devised, among other things, to safeguard the 
religious, educational, social, economic and political interests of 
Indian Muslims. In this connection the Khilafat Conference directed 
the Khilafat committees to try first to remove Hindu-Muslim tension 
and achieve an ’honourable compromise’. If efforts at compromise 
failed, the committees were to do everything in their power to protect 
Muslim rights and interests and to employ the Khilafat volunteer corps 
for this purpose. The committees were authorised to raise special 
funds and, if required, to apply for aid to the provincial and the 
Central committees. The Provincial committees were advised to see 
that their subordinate committees carried out these instructions and 
were also asked to render them every possible help. See Hindu, May 
13, 1926.
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establishment of a separate 'Islamic' homeland, i.e., Pakistan.
In the period under review, such people were encouraged to pursue
their ideal by joining a body called the Motamar or the World
179Muslim Conference Indian Branch. The Motamar was, however, a 
non-starter and was never heard of again. But the Ali brothers 
were not discouraged. In the autumn of 1928, they made another 
attempt to settle the Khilafat issue with the Turks. Mohamed Ali
visited Angora on his way back from Europe, but, like Ansari in
180 181 1925, was disappointed with Mustafa Kemal's attitude. The Ali
brothers simply would not compromise their own ideal with the secular
X82nationalistic pull in other Muslim lands.
Yet, after 1927» On important Indian issues of Muslim concern, 
the majority of the Khilafatists, including the Ali brothers, found
178
As late as 1937> Kidwai believed that the Muslim states could 
prosper only through a pan-Islamic outlook with the Khilafat as its 
rallying-point. Similarly, in the 1940s, Chowdhari Rahmat Ali's 
Cambridge 'Pakistan' movement aimed at uniting the new state 
ultimately with an undefined pan-Islamic 'Pakasia'. The sentiment 
found expression in a more defined way after the establishment of 
Pakistan when the 1956 Constitution adopted the promotion of 'the 
bonds of unity among Muslim countries' as one of the 'Directive 
Principles of State Policy'. A number of Islamic conferences 
convened since 1949 at Karachi, Cairo, Mecca and at other Muslim 
centres (the most recent having been held at Mecca from Feb. 29 to 
March 4? 1972) depict an anxiety to co-ordinate the activities of 
the Muslim world. But the neo-pan-Islamism does not aim at the unity 
of the Muslim peoples under one central authority but only their 
co-ordination within the international community. See M.H, Kidwai, 
Pan-Islamism and Bolshevism, London, 1957? P* 88, 238-9; Chowdhari 
Rahmat Ali, The Millat and the Mission, Cambridge, 1942, pp. 1-18;
Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism, p. 169; The Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan, Ministry of Law, Government of Pakistan, Karachi, 
1956, Part III, Article 24, p. 17? W.C. Smith, Islam in Modem History1 
Princeton, p. 83, n. 71? and Majid Khadduri, 'Pan-Islamism1, EB,
XVII, p. 227.
179
Indian Quarterly Register. 1927« I, ed., N,JT. Mitra, Calcutta,
1927, p. 424.
180
See Ansari's letter to Irfan from Lausanne, July 1925>
Kuqush (Lahore), LXV, Kov. 1957> P* 405*
181
Mohamed Ali to Shaukat Ali, n.d. , ibid., p. 356.
182
See Mohamed Ali to Ghulam Bhik Kairang, n. d. /F 19227, Uuqush,
LXV, p. 362.
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themselves on the same side as Jinnah. First they fell in line
183with him in formulating the March 1927 Delhi proposals and later
in boycotting the Simon (Statutory) Commission, from which the Indians
1 ft/1
had been excluded. But the Khilafatists had lost much of their
appeal. Already riddled by factionalism, they split irreparably
when in the summer of 1928, the Hehru Report tried to determine the
principles of a constitution for India in answer to Birkenhead's 
185challenge. On the question of the system of electorate and Muslim 
share in the Punjab and Bengal legislatures, a strong group consisting 
of Abul Kalam Azad, Akram Khan, Zafar Ali Khan, Abdul Qadir Kasuri 
and others, was in favour of compromise with the Congress. The Ali 
brothers who wanted to have a solid support against the Report, could 
not bear to see the provincial Khilafat committees adopting a different 
attitude than the CKC, At their instance, the Working Committee of 
the CKC met at Calcutta in December 1928, and suspended the provincial 
Khilafat committees of the Punjab, Bengal and the Frontier. The 
action, to some extent, was the result of personal recriminations 
between the Ali brothers' party and the Abul Kalam Azad group - a 
legacy of the Khilafat Funds scandal of 1922/23'!'^
183
In essence, the proposals agreed to abolish separate electorates 
in response to Hindu overtures over joint electorates, provided Muslim 
demand of one-third seats in the central legislature by a joint 
electorate was not disturbed; seats were reserved according to 
population in the Punjab and Bengal; Sind was constituted into a 
separate province; and reforms were introduced in the Frontier and 
Baluchistan on the same footing as any other province. Times of India, 
March 22, 1927 
184
See the proceedings of the Khilafat Conference at Madras in Dec. 
1927, in Indian Quarterly Register, 19271 II, pp. 329-30. An account 
of the visit of the Simon Commission and its activities can be found 
in Edward Cadogan, The India We Saw, London, 1933.
185
See the proceedings of the All-Parties Conference at Lucknow 
(Aug. 28 to 31, 1928) in All Parties Conference 1928, Allahabad, 1928, 
pp. 164-65. General Muslim reaction to the Hehru Report can be 
followed in Waheed Ahmad, 'The Formation of the Government of India 
Act, 1935', Cambridge University Ph.D. thesis, I969, pp. 187-92; and 
G.W. Chaudhri, 'The Hehru Report', A History of the Freedom Movement, 
III, Part I, Pakistan Historical Society, Karachi, 1961, pp. 276-301. 
186
Indian Quarterly Register, 1928. II, pp. 405-75 Afzal Haq, 
Tarikh-i-Ahrar, 2nd ed., Lahore, i960, pp. 69-70; and Khaliquzzaman, 
op. oit., p. 97*
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The suspension of the three important Khilafat committees
led to a permanent split among the Khilafatists. As a protest
against the Working Committee1s action forty-five members of the
executive led by Ansari and including Dr. S.M. Alam (b. 1887),
T.A.K. Sherwani and Mujibur Rahman, who passionately supported the
Nehru Report, dissociated themselves from the executive. They
nominated their own members to represent the CKC at the All Parties
Conference, which was then taking place at Calcutta. Xn this way
the CKC came to be divided into two parallel sections, each claiming
187to be its real voice.
But if the Nehru Report split the CKC for ever, it also had the
effect of unifying the various wings of the Muslim community. The
Khilafat majority party led by Mohamed Ali closed its ranks with the
conservative and constitutional schools of Muslim thought, represented
by Shafi, A.K. Ghuznavi (1872-1939) and others. From Calcutta they
rushed to Delhi to join the All Parties Muslim Conference under the
Aga Khan and there on January 1, 1929, Mohamed Ali, in collaboration
with his former rival Shafi, moved the famous resolution formulating
Muslim demands on India’s future constitution in answer to the Nehru
Report. The resolution urged a federal constitution with complete
provincial autonomy and residuary powers vested in the constituent 
188provinces. The January 1 declaration is one of the most important 
and unanimous pronouncements by the Muslims on the constitutional 
problems and for a long time remained a bed-rock of their attitude.
After 1929, the CKC remained but no Khilafat conference appears 
ever to have taken place. Instead, the disunited and disorganised 
Khilafatists withered and scattered into various groups. The 
'nationalist’ Muslims - Ansari, Azad, Dr. Mahmud, Sherwani, Kidwai,
Asaf Ali, Akram Khan, Kitchlew, Dr. Alam and Khaliquzzaman - formed
187
Indian Quarterly Register, 1928, II, pp. 121-22 and 405-7.
188
Report of the All-India Muslim Conference held at Delhi on 31st 
December, 1928, and 1st January, 1929. Aligarh, n.d,; The Main 
Resolutions of the All-India Muslim Conference, Patna., /l930/j and 
PP, 1929-30» (170)9 Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material 
Progress and Condition of India During the Year 1928-29, Sixty-Fourth
Number, pp. 36-38*
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themselves into a Muslim 'Nationalist Party1, meeting as the 
All-India Nationalist Muslim Conference. In their political outlook 
they subscribed, like the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama, to the Congress scheme 
of a comprehensive and strong central government even at the cost 
of Muslim interests. Others like the Ali brothers, Shafee Daoodi 
(1879-1946), the new President of the CKC, Hasrat Mohani and Azad 
Subhani, formed the All-India Muslim Conference in association with 
the Muslim Leaguers. Yet others hovered uneasily between the Muslim 
League and the Congress’}*^
During the 1930s the CKC slumped into inertia. As it was no 
longer a popular organisation, there were not enough subscriptions 
even to keep it going. The publication of the Khilafat magazine 
had also to be stopped. Shaukat Ali, who was the binding link 
between different factions within the CKC on the one hand and 
between the CKC and the already ineffective subordinate committees 
on the other, continued to manage the affairs with the financial 
help of the Aga Khan and Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy}^ In 1931/32 
an attempt was made by Shaukat Ali to revive the pan-Islamic 
enthusiasm when he visited the Middle East before and after the 
Round Table Conference in London. In concert with al-Hajj Amin 
al-Husseini (1893-)? the Grand Mufti of Palestine, a World Muslim 
Congress was arranged in Jerusalem (December 7-17? 1931) to discuss 
certain subjects and projects which appealed to the interests of 
the Muslims in general. But owing to the international implications 
of the Congress, the question of the Khilafat, and with it other
189
For the above information and for a study of the incoherent 
pattern of Muslim and Indian politics during the late twenties and 
early thirties see Indian Quarterly Register, 1929, II, pp. 350-54? 
Jafari, 'Shaukat Ali', pp. 129-78? J« Coatman, Years of Destiny, 
London, 1932,, passim; S. Gopal, The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin,
1926-19519 Oxford, 1957? PP* 16-53? S. Abid Husain, The Destiny of 
Indian Muslims, London, 1965, pp. 58-79? Wahid Ahmad, op. cit., 
passim; and R.J. Moore, 'The Making of India's Paper Federation,
1927-1935'> In C.H. Philips and M.D. Wainwright, ed., The Partition 
of India, London, 1970, pp. 54-78.
190
M.S. Shaheed Farangi Mahalli, 'Khadam-i-Kaaba Maulana Shaukat 
Ali', Ali Bradran, p. 91. Also see Jafari, 'Shaukat Ali', 
pp. 136, 150 and 160.
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political matters, were excluded from the agenda. For a time the
Congress revived some pan-Islamic interest in India and other
191Muslim countries but this did not last very long.
Some attempts were made in 1935/54 to put the CKC's matters
192right and the Khilafat magazine was also revived, but things had 
gone beyond repair. The disappearance from the scene of some of 
the main leaders who had nurtured the CKC, also deeply affected the 
organisation. Abdul Bari had died in January 1926 and Ajmal Khan 
in December 1927* Mohamed Ali breathed his last in January 1931 
while in London in connection with the Hound Table Conference.
Dr. Ansari died of a heart attack in May 1936. Shaukat Ali dragged 
the carcass of the Khilafat organisation for some years more till 
his death in November 1938, but the organisation, which had had 
a meteoric rise in 1919 > first disintegrated and then disappeared. 
Only the Khilafat House in Bombay survives.
a
191
PSSF, 1449/1931? 371/15282, 15283 and 15284. Also
see H.A.R. Gibb, 'The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in December 
1931'» iu A.J. Toynbee's Survey of International Affairs, 1934> 
London, 1935> PP« 99-1095 aud J. Edwards, 'From Panarabism to 
Panislamism1 , _CR, CXLI, Marnh 1932, p. 5^0. The exclusion of the 
question of the Khilafat and other political matters was due to 
the fact that Turkey viewed with the utmost apprehension the revival 
of the Khilafat agitation, especially if the ex-Caliph was brought 
to Jerusalem. The Turks were also prone to suspect in Shaukat 
Ali's activities a design to link-up the ex-Caliph with the Indian 
Princes, especially through the proposed marriage between Abdul- 
Mejid's daughter and the Nizam of Hyderabad's son. The Hedjaz- 
Nejd Govt, regarded the Congress as obviously anti-Ibn Saud.
Italy resented it because it might criticise her action in Tripoli 
and generate anti-Italian propaganda. Yugoslavia and Spain also 
viewed the Congress with great misgivings. Similarly, the Zionists, 
who feared a mobilisation of Muslim opinion against their cause, 
voiced a strong opposition. See PSSF, 1449/1931? and PRO, F.O., 
371/15381.
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Jafari, 'Shaukat Ali', p. 131.
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EPILOGUE
The Khilafat movement was clearly the result of the strong pan-
Islamic sentiment and propaganda, reinforced by a century of political
developments and socio-cultural consciousness among Indian Muslims.
Viewed in this oontext, their involvement with Turkey and the Ottoman
Khilafat, despite its disputed content, was thus a natural phenomenon.
But, the symbolic adherence to the archaic fiction of a ’central'
Ottoman Khilafat aside, the feiment of the 1920s inevitably fits into
the total pattern of earlier Islamic movements - from the Wali Ullah
revivalism in the eighteenth century India to the Sarekat Islam and the
1
Muhammadiyya in the early twentieth century Indonesia. Originally, the 
Khilafat issue was raised by a small body of individuals well-known 
for their pan-Islamic sympathies* It was quickly seized by 
politicians of advanced views with the avowed object of rendering the 
existence of the British Government in India impossible* The delay 
by the Allies in settling a peace treaty with Turkey gave the 
Khilafatists a godsent opportunity to build up widespread support in 
their favour. In this, the Indian Muslim residents of Britain and 
their European Turkophile friends also played an important part. With 
the entry of the ulama the movement acquired strength. Gandhi’s 
participation widened its scope because it was through his influence 
that the Hindus were drawn into the Khilafat movement. The non-co- 
operation experiment and tho hi.1 rat witnessed a new phase of popular 
involvement in the political agitation. Never before had the Indians 
demonstrated such enthusiasm and capacity to suffer and sacrifice for 
their cause. The Khilafat movement was indeed a curiously remarkable 
agitation.
But in spite of its wide support and many-sided activities, the 
Khilafat movement failed to achieve its ostensible objectives, i.e., 
the preservation of the Ottoman Ehipire and the institution of tho 
Khilafat. Secret war-time treaties, a strong anti-Turk bias of the 
Allied Governments, and the inherent weaknesses of the complex
1
The vast expanse in between was filled in by the jihadis of 
Bareilly, the Paraizis of Bengal, the Revolt of 1857? the Mujahidin of 
Sittana, the Senusi of Libya (from 1881), the upsurges in the Central 
Asia ( from 1850s), the pan-Islamic activism of Jamal-ud-din ’Afghani* 
(from 1880s), and the Irani movements of the 1890s. This is an 
extension of W.C. Smith's argument. See his Islam in Modern History, 
Princeton, 1957? P* 52.
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movement itself, had combined to cause this failure. The demand for 
swaraj9 the other objective of the movement., too* did not materialise. To 
add insult to injury, the Turks, in March 1924? abolished the Khilafat 
which to them had become an anomalous institution in a nationalistic 
Turkey. In these circumstances, the tenuous Hindu-Muslim entente, 
which had been under considerable strain, broke down completely. Old 
rivalries reappeared and the movement collapsed in due course.
Behind these apparently simple events, however, dwell issues of 
great complexity and significance. To begin with, the Khilafat 
movement, though born of pan-Islamic ideology, was not just 'an
2adventure in altruism1 or merely 'the concomitant of romanticism1.
True, pan-Islamism as an ideal had romantic attraction for many, but 
the Indian Muslim involvement with the Ottomans was both a 
psychological as well as a political phenomenon. In fact, pan-Islaraism 
in India had come to acquire a nationalistic character - a means for 
the continuance of Islam as a national entity. What the Khilafatists 
were after was the salvation of Muslim sovereignty and power abroad 
and with it the security of the Muslim community in India. This dual 
concern became obvious when the Muslim League, at its Delhi session in 
December 1918, expressed its 'unmitigated' fear at the adverse influence 
the collapse of the Muslim Powers would have on the political 
importance of the Muslim community in India! It was to avert this 
situation that the Khilafatists claimed status quo ante bollum for 
Turkey and swaraj for India as prerequisites of a satisfactory solution 
of the Khilafat question.
In order to provide a mass base to the political agitation, the 
Khilafatists used religion. 'We can reach mob only through religion', 
Mohamed Ali is reported to have once remarked! In beating the 'big 
drum ecclesiastic' the ulama played a significant rSle. Their 
doctrinal submission to the ideal of a 'universal' caliphate was 
passionately sincere and classical in tradition. But whereas the 
politicians used religion to 'reach mob1, the motive force of the 
ulama's aotion was inherently intertwined in the two spheres of religion 
and politics. Basically, the Indian ulama were moved, as in the
2
This reverses the arguments of I.H. Qureshi (The Muslim Community 
of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent9 The Hague, 1962, Chapter XIII) and 
Moin Shakir (Khilafat to Partition; Hew Delhi, 1970? P* 64)*
J&P, 2272/19.
4
Mohamed Ali later denied this. See Sarwar, ed., Maulana Mohamed 
Ali9 Lahore, 1962, p. 277*
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nineteenth oentury, by a threat to the nomocratic ideal of Islam and 
a challenge to their own power within this system* They had tried in 
1917 to assert the rSle of the shariat in the administrative activity 
of the Government? hut the attempt had been a failure? This convinced 
the ulama that if they were to save Islam (as they understood it) and 
salvage their position? they must share the political leadership of 
the community* This point was calculatedly expressed by Abdul Bari? 
to whom goes the credit of imparting religious concept to a political 
movement? and was enthusiastically supported by other ulama9 one of 
whom agreed with him that 8
until the ulama take tho reins of
politics in their own hands and cross
their voices with those in authority? 
it will be difficult for them to 
establish their religious supremacy.
Moreover? the fulfilment of their 
higher aims ^ /i.e.? the protection of 
Islam/gwill remain merely an empty 
dream.
It was this motivation which drove most of the ulama to make 
common cause with the political elite? and it was tho same motivation
which led them to dream of an hierarchy of their own - a sort of a
'religious and jurisprudential imerium in imperio' under a shaikh-ul- 
Islam or Amir~i--Hind directly responsible to the Ottoman Caliph; But 
though this combination between the ulama and the politicians was 
formidable? it failed to rise above the immediate issues or to give a 
clear and definite lead to the Muslims of India. And yet? in spite 
of their failures and the follies like the hi,jrat9 the ulama and the 
politicians together imparted to the Khilafat movement a strength 
which turned it into one of the most eventful periods of Indian history.
Tho rSlo of the Indian Muslim residents of Britain has never been 
properly appreciated or even assessed. Tho fact is that the Khilafat 
movement in its embryonic stage was nurtured by these very people. In 
the first place it was Mushir Hosain Iddwai who had urged Abdul Bari 
to action and had kept him informed of the trends of events in the 
European capitals. The Central Information Bureau and other Muslim
5
See above? p. 51*
6
Mualana A.M.M. Sajjad to Abdul Bari? Dec. 4? 1918? Nuqush9 CIX? p. 91°
7
P. Hardy? 'The Ulama in British India*? paper read at the Centre of 
South Asian Studies? SOAS? London? July 1969* Also see his Partners in 
Freedom and True Muslims? Lund? 1971? PP* 32.-35.
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organisations such as the London Muslim League? the two Islamic 
Societies and even the Woking Mission of the Lahori Ahmadis? supported 
by the British Turkophiles? did the difficult job of high-lighting the 
Indian feelings on the Turkish issue. The secret and confidential 
files of the British Foreign Office and the India Office testify to 
the efforts made by these bodies in this connection. It was only 
after the tempo of the Khilafat movement became increasingly militant 
that the moderates among them? the Aga Khan and Ameer Ali in particular? 
began to take a cautious course.
As for the measure of support which the Khilafatists were able to 
win from the rest of the Muslim world there is no evidence of any overt 
expression. Indian pan-Islamism seems to have been largely a one-way 
process. In any case? since the last war? the Arabs and the Turks had 
been involved in their own immediate problems and could ill-afford to 
look askance in a changing world. Above all? the professed aims of the 
Khilafat movement were in direct contradiction of tho nationalistic 
aspirations of the Arabs and the Turks. On the contrary? the Turks 
tried to exploit the Indian agitation to their own advantage as an 
instrument of their foreign policy* So did the Afghans. Their attitude 
during the hi.jrat is a good example of their real intentions. The 
Bolshevists? too? exploited the Khilafatists though initially the 
Khilafatists themselves had invoked the Russian help for their 
grandiose anti-British scheme. At best the Bolshevik aid was illusory 
and v*as never given and the Khilafatists? except perhaps a few like 
Hasrat Mohani who sympathised with certain aspects of communism? were 
unenamoured of any ideological trappings. Even those few who got to 
Russia during the hi j rat and renounced the religion of Muhammad in 
favour that of Karl Marx (1818-83) were unable to influence the course 
of the Khilafat movement in India.
The Khilafat movement had also the co-operation of the Hindus for 
an ostensibly religious movement. But the process of unity was slow and 
it took almost a year before the Congress was finally persuaded to 
bless this collaboration. Gandhi? who had joined the movement at an 
early stage? was the key-man in this affair. However, the final 
Congress approval did not come until the Khilafatists had tacked the 
Punjab issue with the Khilafat question and had promised to observe 
strict non-violence in the campaign. But quite apart from the 'Punjab' 
as a bait for the Hindu oo~operation? the Khilafat issue had come to 
acquire a nationalistic significance. The Hindu leaders who 
collaborated with the Khilafatists in the struggle for swara.i were also 
moved by a desire to advance India's political interests. It v/as this
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synchronisation of political interests and politioal dependence on each 
other that more than anything else tied the two communities together.
In other words? it was a marriage of oonvenienoe and not a genuine 
rapprochement.
But in spite of the remarkable response which the movement evoked? 
the Khilafatists were unable to mobilise the whole of India. Apart 
from the ellusive support of the masses? large and influential sections 
even among the Muslims had kept themselves aloof or gave only verbal 
support. Some like Shafi? Fazl-i-Husain? Raza Ali? the Raja of 
Mahmudabad and others? rejected extremism of any kind and worked for a 
'reasonable* settlement of the Turkish question through co-operation 
with the Government. Some others questioned the Khilafatists* 
intentions or had strong ideologioal differences. The Shias and the 
Qadianis in particular questioned the Ottoman right to the Khilafat.
Yet others? like Khan Bahadur JSTabi Bakhsh? not only opposed the movement 
but with the help of some maulavis even launched a counter campaign.
The attitude of the Hindu-Muslim moderates was reflected even more 
clearly in their stance towards tho methods employed by the Khilafatists 
in extracting concessions from the Government. The particular subject 
of controversy was non-co-operation which they feared was too extreme 
a step. But then the 'extremists* themselves were not unanimous on this 
point? especially in regard to its extension to the educational 
institutions? professions and the Councils. Even within the Khilafat 
organisation a powerful group led by Chotani was constantly at 
loggerheads with the militants. This cleavage was especially witnessed 
at the Bombay Khilafat Conference (February 1920) over the question of 
subversion in the army and still later in the summer of that year when 
the Khilafatists decided to push the non-co-operation scheme with all 
its four stages. As time passed the differences widened and spread to 
such other issues as civil disobedience? Council entry? and? more 
important? to the question of violence and non-violence. The divisions 
among the leaders? in the end? spelled disaster to tho movement itself.
With the house divided? the Khilafatists failed to influence the 
British policy. The British Government of Lloyd George displayed no 
compassion for the Indian Muslim case. The Khilafat movement was 
summarily rejected as a 'fictitious* agitation. But then the Turkish 
problem involved the clash of interests of the Allied Powers. It also 
had some inherent contradictions - the conflicting ambitions of the 
Turks? the Arabs and even the Greeks. On top of this Lloyd George 
pursued his own anti-Turkish policies? constantly disregarding the
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Indian Government and the India Office, overriding the Foreign Office 
and ignoring the General-Staff. No doubt he allowed the Indian Muslims 
to represent their case to himself and to the Peace Conference, but in 
the final settlement with Turkey the Muslim pressure had little effect* 
Even when the Treaty of Sevres was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne 
in 1923s it was the Turkish aims rather than the Indian memorials that 
accomplished the feat*
But this did not mean that there was no concern in the official 
circles about the Indian Muslim attitude towards the Khilafat issue.
In fact the Muslim unrest was tho chief worry of the Government of India 
and tho India Office* Therefore, in spite of the narrow grooves of the 
Imperial policy within which they had to manoeuvre, the India Office 
under Montagu (and later under Peel) and the Government of India under 
Chelmsford and Reading* for reasons of expediency, tried their best to 
exert sympathetic influence in any final settlement with Turkey* The 
same tactical reason moved them to adopt, as far as the agitation was 
concerned, a policy of non-interference where it was useful and a policy 
of ropression where it was effective* The majority of the Local 
Governments would have preferred to use stronger measures - and often 
did so - but the Government of India, in search of uniform all-India 
policy and checked by its legal advisors, exercised a restraining 
influence on its satraps* But where the Provincial Governments exceeded 
limits, as in the Punjab in summer 1919 and in Bengal in winter 1921, 
it invariably upheld their actions, even if the measures employed had
g
been unsusually stringent* The India Office exercised but an exiguous
control over the policies of the Government of India. It generally did
not criticise it either as going too far in the direction of non-
9
interference, or as being unduly repressive* But the important factor 
is that the Government of India managed to come out relatively unscathed 
from the six troubled years of the Khilafat movement.
8
The policy pursued by the Government of India in relation to the 
Khilafat movement can best be followed from the instructions which it 
issued from time to time to the Local Governments^  more appropriately 
if they are studied in relation to the chronological background of the 
main stages of the movement they were defined to deal with. For 
details see J&P, 5273/20*
9
See ibid*
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The last phase of the Khilafat movement was marred by scandals, 
political factionalism, personal squabbles and, worst of all, Hindu- 
Muslim dissensions. As the famous Turkish author Halide Edib (1883- 
1964) points out, the Khilafat movement had ’two curiously 
contradictory results in Indias that of uniting the Muslems and Hindus 
around a. common activity;; and that of dividing them1.'1'0 Human 
failings, diversity of interests, inability to sustain a common effort 
and above all a reaction consequent to the collapse of the non-co- 
operation experiment had ended an entente which had been resting on 
weak foundations. But contrary to popular misconception the break-up 
was a slow process. Even the Mappilla exoesses had had no widespread 
communal repercussions. Nor did Gandhi’s action to postpone the 
projected civil disobedience in February 1922, result in any immediate 
Hindu-Muslim parting. In fact both tho communities continued to 
profess and follow the same course for quite some time. It was 
towards the middle of 1922 that relations began to worsen. It took 
a full year before the gulf widened and yet another year before it 
finally became unbridgeable.
Another very important point which emerges is that the Khilafat 
movement, did not ond with the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne in 
July 1923, which was the natural culminating point of the Turkish 
crisis. On the contrary the agitation continued on the secondary, 
and in fact flimsy, issue of the freedom of the Jazirat-ul-Arab from 
non-Muslim control. Even when tho Turks abolished the caliphal 
office in March 1924? the movement, though greatly reduced in 
intensity, did not terminate. The Khilafatists simply would not 
accept the fait accompli. This naturally takes one back to the 
earlier contention that the defence of the Khilafat was only a fapade. 
The real issue was the defence of the Muslim power abroad and with it 
the security of the Muslim position in India. But this was what the 
Khilafatists failed to achieve. Their failure lies in the fact that 
they were unable to find a synthesis between pan-Islamism and Indian 
nationalism, and to work out the community’s exact position in a 
future multi-national state. After the abolition of the Khilafat tho 
Khilafatists did try to divert their attention from extra-territorial 
matters to domestic issues, but they had no solution for the new 
situation. Besides, the Khilafat organisation was now so faction-
10 4
Halide Edib, Inside India, London, 1937? P* 30.
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ridden that it had lost its credibility. The All-India Muslim 
Conference and later the All-India Muslim League under Jinnah, seemed 
to be more suited to take up the new challenge.
But in spite of its failure,, the Khilafat movement has left its
mark on the history of the Sub-oontinent. The movement was the first
all-India agitation of the Indian Muslims with a central organisation
to guide its course. It trained them in political agitation and made
them conscious of their potentialities. It gave birth to new
political alignments* Provinces hitherto lagging in political
experience, such as the Punjab, Sind and the Frontier, responded side
by side with Bombay, Bengal and the U.P. which had established
political traditions. It brought the Hindus and the Muslims on one
platfom for the first and the last time. It also produced a
leadership which though concerned with the immediate issues was able,
with varying fortunes, to sustain the agitation for more than six
years. The Khilafat organisation which led the movement was more
militant than either the Muslim League or the Congress and it acquired
suoh importance and influence that at one stage even Dr. Chaim
Weizmann (1874-1952), the Zionist leader, was anxious to win its
11support in his relations with the Arabs. The CICC's influence, even
at the fag end of the movement, was evident from the part it played in
12the Hedjaz affair and the anxiety of Ibn Saud to please it.
In the final analysis, one can say that though the movement
failed, it unwittingly left a pattern of politics which the Muslims of
1 3India later tried to follow. After a few more years of experiments 
and frustrations they finally realised that the solution of their
11
Years later, in Jan* 1931? Shaukat Ali disclosed to the British 
High Commissioner in Palestine that during the Khilafat movement Dr. 
Weizmann had sent his brother to India to see Mohamed Ali. Weizmann 
had made an offer to the effect that the Jews would agree to the 
Muslims having Jerusalem and a corridor from Jaffa to Jerusalem if the 
Indian Muslims would agree to the Jews having the rest of Palestine 
and Trans-Jordan, and in fact, the whole of Arabia except the Hedjaz 
and Nejd. If such an agreement could have been made, the Jews would 
have agreed to finance Turkey, which was then in great straits. Note 
of the interview dated Jan. 24, 1931? in P&J (S), 1212/31.
12
See Report Numaindagan-i-Ma.1alis Khilafat-i-Hind9 Central Khilafat 
Committee, Bombay, /1926/.
13
K.K. Aziz is of the opinion that the Khilafat movement provided a 
base on which Muslim nationalism was strengthened. See his 'Some 
Thoughts on the Indian Khilafat Movement', Journal of the Research 
Society of Pakistan. Ill, No. 4? Oct. 1966, p. 121.
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problem lay neither in narrow nationalism nor in doctrinaire
’universal* Islamism* but in some kind of an Islamic ’League of
nations’. ’It was within the concept of this multi-national neo-
pan-Islamism’P writes Aziz Ahmad* ’that Iqbal evolved the theory of
Pakistan’* ^  It is in this same concept that the national motives
to-day in Pakistan are still deeply imbedded though the basic
contradiction between the classical and the modern nationalistic
15concepts remains somewhat unresolved.
14
Aziz Ahmad* Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan9 London*
1967* p* 140.
15
The existence of a ’World Muslim Congress’ with its headquarters 
in Karachi* and branches and affiliations in 42 countries in all 
five continents* reflects the unrealisable dream of a world-wide 
Islamic polity* For infoimation about the 'World Muslim Congress’* 
see Year Book of International Organisations9 ed** R.A. Hall* 13th 
ed#t Brussels* 1971? P« 751»
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MANIFESTO
ON BEHALF OF THE ALL-INDIA KHILAFAT CONFERENCE
I.-The Moslem Claim
The claim on behalf of Muhammadans of India in connection with the 
Turkish Peace Terms may be divided into two sections*-
(lj regarding the Khilafat? and
(2) regarding what is called ”Jazirar~tul-Arab” and the Holy Places 
of Islam.
The claim regarding the Khilafat consists in leaving the Turkish Ufopire 
as it was at the time of the war, with such guarantee being taken by tho 
League of Nations as may be necessary for the protection of the rights of 
Non-Moslem races living within the Turkish Enpire, consistently with the 
dignity of a sovereign state*
The second section of the claim consists in the sovereignty over 
”Jazira-tul-A.rab”, i.e., Arabia as defined by Moslem religious authorities, 
and the custody of Holy Places of Islam* Arabia as thus defined is bounded 
by the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, tho Persian Gulf, the 
Euphrates and the Tigris. The Holy Places include the three sacred Hamms, 
namely, Meoca, Medina and Jerusalem, and the Holy Shrines, namely, Najaf, 
Korballa, Sammarra, Kazimain and Baghdad. In reality this claim is included 
in tho first, but it is distinguishable from it in that custody of the Holy 
Places has ever since the establishment of Islam been under the Khilafat and 
unlike the boundary of the latter, whioh has fluctuated from time to time, 
has never suffered any diminution whatsoever. This claim does not exclude 
genuine Arab self-Government, but it does exclude the present arrangement 
because those who know, understand the unreality behind it. The claim now 
said to be made by Sheriff Hussain and by Amir Feisul is inconsistent in 
fact with their acceptance of even the spiritual sovereignty of the Khalifa.
II.-Argument
The claim is primarily based upon tho religious requirements and the 
sentiments of the Muhammadans of India in common with those of Muhammadans 
all the world over, and is supported, so far as tho Khilafat, the Harams 
and ”Jazira-tul-Arab” are concerned by testimony from the Quran, tho 
tradintions of the Prophet, and for the rest by other religious authority.
It is further supported regarding the Holy Places by the deliberate 
declaration of the Government of India on behalf of His Majesty’s Government 
as also the Governments of France and Russia of 2nd November 1914? which 
says?- MIn view of the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Turkey 
which to the regret of Great Britain had been brought about by the ill- 
advised, unprovoked and deliberate action of the Ottoman Government, His 
Excellency the Vioeroy is authorised by His Majesty’s Government to make the 
following public announcement in regard to the Holy Places of Arabia 
including the Holy Shrines of Mesopotamia and tho post /sic/ of Jedda, in 
order there may be no misunderstanding on the part of His Majesty’s 
Government in this war in whioh no question of religious character is 
involved. These Holy Places and Jedda will be immune from attack or 
molestation by the British Naval and Military Forces so long as there is no 
interference with pilgrims ffom- India to the Holy Places and. Shrines in 
question. At the request’of His",Majesty’s Government, the Governments of 
France and Russia have given them similar assurances”. The great regard paid 
in this declaration to the sentiments of His Majesty’s most loyal Moslem 
subjects is especially noteworthy. On the 5th January 1918, Mr. Lloyd 
George, claiming to speak in the name of the whole Empire, made the following 
remarkable pronouncement*— ”We are not fighting to deprive Turkey of
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Constantinople or the rich renowned lands ©f Asia Minor and Thrace which 
were predominantly Turkish racially’1 * President Wilson’s 12th point in his 
message to the Congress dated 8th January 1918 is in equally emphatic term* 
viz.? that the Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should ho 
assured of secure sovereignty? hut the other nationalities now under 
Turkish Rule should he assured security of life and autonomous developments.
Thus the reduction of the Muhammadan claim hy hair’s "breadth will not 
only he a violation of the deepest religious feelings of the Muhammadans? 
hut will also he a flagrant violation of the solemn relavant declarations 
and pledges made or given hy responsihlo Statesmen representing Allied and 
Associated Powers and given at a time when they were desirous of enlisting 
the support of the Muhammadan people and soldiery.
III.-Consequences
It is necessary to state the likely consequences of a wrong decision on 
the part of the Imperial Government or the Allied and Associated Powers. The 
claim is supported hy practically the whole of the Hindu population of 
India. It has assumed therefore an Indian National Status. The population 
of tho British Empire is predominantly Hindu-Muhammadan? as will appear 
from the following figures*-
Total population « . . .  435?000?000.
Hindus . . « . . . 243 millions.
Moslems . . . .  . . (in India) 72 millions and
(outside India? hut within 
the Ehipire) 30 millions.
The policy of the British Government has heen definitely stated to he 
that of making India an equal partner. Recent events have awakened India 
to a sense of dignity. In these circumstances the British Ehpire as one 
consisting of free nationalities can only hold together hy maintaining an 
attitude of absolute impartiality among the three chief communities - the 
Hindus? the Muhammadans and the Christians. It is therefore urged that the 
British Ministers are hound not merely to press the Muhammadan or rather 
the Indian claim before the Supreme Council hut to make it their own. If? 
however? for any reason whatsoever they fail to do so and the Supreme 
Council also fails to perform the elementary duty of giving effect to the 
declarations that brought about an Aimistice? it is futile to expect peace 
in India? and the Khilafat Conference will fail in its duty if it hesitated 
to warn His Majesty’s Ministers that an affront put upon the 7 crores of 
Muhammadans in India supported hy 23 crores of Hindus and others will he 
incompatiahle /sic7 with the expectation of blind loyalty. Beyond that? it 
is impossible for the conference to foresee the results. It may he added 
that even if the members of the Conference attempted seriously to passify 
the Muhammadan mind? it is futile to expect that they would succeed in 
healing the wound that would he made in the heart of Muhammadan India hy 
the denial of justice and breach of pledges in matter of vital importance 
to that community.
Sources Political and Secret Subject File P. 259l/20 with 38o/l9j VI.
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TABLE I
PROPORTIONAL STRENGTH OF THE MUSLIMS IN EACH PROVINCE M L  IN THE
STATES AND AGENCIES
Number per 10,000 of the population
1921 1911 1901 1891 1881
Ajmer-Merwara . . . . . . 2,055 1,63.6 1,510 1,369 1,255
Andamans & Nicobars . . . 1,515 1,731 1,707 • * * 0
Assam.......... 2,896 2,810 2,689 2,710 2,698
Baluchistan ........... 8,731 9,106 9,150 » • • *
Bengal................ 5 s 399 5,274 5,158 5,108 5,009
Bihar & Orissa. . . . . . 1,085 1,063 1,061 1,076 1,089
Bombay................ 1*974 2,046 2,026 1,871 1,836
Burma . . . . . . . . . . 380 347 323 333 • »
C.P. & Berar. . . . . . . 405 406 421 385 38,6
Coorg . . . . . . . . . . 795 751 756 732 703
Delhi ................ 2 ,904 - ■
Punjab. . . . . . . . . . 5,533 5,485 5,325 5,136 5,173
Madras....... . 671 662 643 631 623
N.W.F.P............. 9,162 9,286 9,221 9,230 9,212
U.P................... 1,428 1,411 1,4U 1,353 1,343
States & Agencies . . . . 1,343 1,331 1,376 1,176 946
Total for India (1921 figures)J
Total population.. 318,942,480 * Muslims.. 68,735,233
Total Muslim population of tho world (1906 figures)i
Asia (including Russia) • . . . . . . .  . 170,623,181
Africa................  5.B, 864? 587
Europe .  ...................     3? 410,402
Australia and America •  .......... . • 68,000
Totals 232,966,170
Sources3 Census of India. 1921» I, Part I, pp. 6, 40-43 and 122- 
23? and S.M. Zwemer, et al*, The Mohammedan World of 
To-day9 New York, 1906.
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TABLE II
TABLE SHQWIFG TERRITORIES PASSED PROM MUSLIM RULE TO IOT-MUSLIM CONTROL
Late Country or Province To Whom Ceded
I. Caucasus and Transcaucasus
1800
1813
1813
1828
1829
1878
Georgia from Persia. . . . . . .  ........ . . . .
Barband, Shirwan, Baku, Karadagh from Persia . « . 
Sovereignty of Caspian Sea from Persia . . . < > • •  
Erivan, Hakhejevan, etc., from Persia. . . . . . .
Poti, Anapa, and Circassian Coast from Turkey. • • 
Batum, Kars, Ardahan from Turkey................
Russia
9 9 
9 9 
9 9 
9 9 
9 9
II. Central Asia
1844
1864
1868
1873
1881
1891
Kirghiz. ...................... ................
Samarkand. . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .
Khokand and Bukhara........... . . . . . . . .  .
Khiva..........................................
Merv . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .
Part of Khorasan from Persia.........
Russia
9 9 
9 9 
9 9 
9 9 
9 9
III# Southern Asia
1799 Hizam’s Dominions, India . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Britain
1803 Mughal Efripire, India . . . . . .  .......... .. 9 9 9
1824 Straits Settlements. . . 9 9
1830 Butch Rule consolidated. . . . . . . . . . . . . Holland
1839 Aden and Arabian Coast . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . 9 Britain
1843 Sind, India. • ? 9
1849 Punjab and Kashmir . . . . . . .  ............ . 9 9
1856 9 9 9
1876 Baluchistan Protectorate............... 9 9
IV. Europe
1829 Greece and Serbia granted independence.
1853 Wallachia and Moldavia from Turkey ............ Rumania
1878 Bessarabia from Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . Russia
1878 Cyprus . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . 9 Britain
1878 Bosnia and Herzegovina (annexed 1908). . . . . . • Austria
1878 Greece, Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania enlarged.
1878 Bulgaria formed from Turkey.
1885 East Rumelia from Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . Bulgaria
1898 Crete autonomous from Turkey.
1912 Crete annexed. . . . . . . . . . . . . o . . . . • Greece
1912 Aegean Islands from Turkey............. Italy
1913 Parts of Macedonia, Albania, and Islands . . . . 9 Groeco
1913 Parts of Macedonia, Albania. . . . . . . . . . . 9 Serbia
1913 Parts of Macedonia and Thrace. ............ . . Bulgaria
1913 Parts of Albania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • Montenegro
1913 Albania made independent.
(Continued on the next page).
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(TABLE II. Continued)
V. Africa
1830 Algeria. . . . . . .  0   . . . . . . . .  Franco
1882 Tunis.   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ,,
1882 Egypt (annexed 1914) • .......  . . . . . . . . .  Britain
1884-89 British. East Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ,,
I884--89 German East Africa.........   Germany
1880-90 Eritrea, Somali Coast . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Italy
1884-98 Sahara and Western Sudan. . . . .  .......... . Franco
1898 Eastern Sudan. . . . . .  .......  . . . . . . . .  Britain
1909 Zanzibar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ,,
1910 Wadai. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  France
1912 Morocco...........................      ,,
1912 Morocco, part to . . . . . . . .   ................ Spain
1912 Tripoli and Cyronaica. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Italy
Sources S.G. Wilson, Modem Movements Among Moslems9 Few York, 1916, 
p. 219*
TABLE III
STATEMENT SHOWING THE NUMBER OF PERSONS IN THE DIFFERENT PROVINCES
WHO RENOUNCED TITLES9 RESIGNED PUBLIC OFFICES AND PUBLIC SERVICES
UPTO THE END OF DECEMBER 1920
Provinces Titles Honours Offices Services
Madras 7 • 9 3? • •
BonVbay 1 ♦ • 53 39
Bengal 1 4 10 9 •
U.P. 4 • « 12 9 0
Punjab v • 2 * 9 48
Bihar & Orissa 1 • « 2 * A
Burma • • • 0 9 0 • 9
C.P. • 9 • 0 6 9 9
Assam 9 9 9 0 4 1
N.W.F.P. 1 2 9 ♦ 162
Coorg • 9 • 0 2 • 9
Delhi 3 * 9 • « 3
Total* 18 8 121 253
Sources India Confidential Homo Political Proceedings., January 
1921? Pro. No. 234*
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TABLE IV
STATEMENT SHOWING OFFICIAL INEKWiATION REGARDING THE DUMBER OF THE 
PLEADERS WHO SUSPENDED THEIR PRACTICE IN PURSUANCE OF THE EON-CO­
OPERATION RESOLUTION UPTO THE FIRST HALF OF 1921
Province Number
Madras . . 0 0 . 0 D • • 5 ft
Bombay . . . « , « 0 0 0 0 • 23
Bengal , . , . . . « 0 0 • • ft 9
U. P • 0 0 . * 0 0 • * 0 ft • 0 5
Punjab o , 0 . . . 0 • a « O 17
Buima „ , , , , , 0 ■ 0 9 ft 0 Nil
Bihar & Orissa . . • 0 0 0 • ft 13
0 . P * 4 0 0 * 0 0 0 • • 0 0 « • 30
Assam . • » . . , - <■ ft 1
N.W.F.P. 0 , 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 6 * Nil
Coorg . . . .  0 0 » • ■> • ft » Nil
Delhi . . a . , . - • - <* • Nil
Administered Areas • * • • 9 ft 1
Totals 99
Sources Legislative Assembly Debates. Official Report, I? Part I,
1921, p. 795.
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TABLE V
STATEMENT SHOWING THE NUMBER OF PERSONS IN THE D I M M T  PROVINCES 
WHO WITHDREW CMBIMTLIRE FOR ELECTION II THE ASSEMBLY ARB COUNCILS 
UPTO THE M B  OF DECEMBER 192Q
Province Withdrawn
Madras 
Bombay 
Bengal 
UoP. * • » ° o
Punj ab ® • * •
Bihar & Orissa 
Buima ° • • •
C.P. . . . . .
Assam « * • •
N.Y/.F.P. • * . 
Delhi . » o o
• 0 * 0 * * o O
• 4 0 0
0 9 • •
41
27
35
21
21
8
3 
0
4
Ho candidates
o . 0
Totals 160
Sources India Confidential Home Political Proceedings? January 
1921, Pro. Ho. 234*
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TABLE VIII
pC
Approximate effect of 
Non-Co-operation 
on certain recognised 
institutions up to 
March 1921
Institutions Scholars Scholars Withdrawn Returned
Madras . . .  ....... 92* 5,072* 1,71,111 820 4
Bombay 189 17,100 42,416 2,350 239
Bengal . . . . . . . . 190 14,819 1,03,107 11,157 • ♦ •
United Provinces . . . 137* 8,476* 49,171 2,626 789
Punjab . . . . . . . . 69 8,046 1,11,078 1,309 481
Burma . * • . . . * • 92 16,218 36,875 13,031 747
Bihar & Orissa . . . . 442 17,330 23,190 1,826 4-
Central Provinces. . « 86* 6,338* 71,759 1,824 .454
A s sam.......... . 38 1,908 12,186$ 1,139 356
4* 120* 41,342 Nil * * •
Minor Administrations. 10 1,255 45,508 571 70
*0pened till 31st July 1921.
4-There was a general tendenoy to return. 
$Till January 1921.
National Schools 
Province and Collegesm
1921-22
Source* J.A# Richey, Progress of Education in India. 1917-229 Eighth 
Quinquennial Review, I? Calcutta, 1923.
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TABLE IX
TABLE COMPARING THE IMPORTS OF THE THREE IMPORTANT CLASSES Off 
PIECE-GOODS DURING 1913-23 IN MILLION YARDS
Grey Whit© Coloured,
(unbleached) (bleached) printed or dyed
Million yards Million yards Million yards
1913-14   1,534.2 793.3 831.8
1914-15   1,320.2 604.2 494.8
1915-16   1,148.2 611.4 358.7
1916-17   847 .0 589.8 454*9
1917-18   625.5 502.3 395*6
1918-19 . . . . .  5.83.4 286.6 227.3
1919-20   533.3 322.0 208.3
1920-21 . . . . .  580.2 421.8 489.3
1921-2,2 . . . . .  635.6 306.2 138.3
1922-23   931.0 402.5 243.8
Sources Commercial Intelligence Department, India, Review of 
the Trade of India in 1922-231 Calcutta, 1924, p. 4*
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TABLE X
PARTICULARS OF THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF COTTON MANUFACTURES M B  THEIR 
VALUES DURING 1920-23 AED THE PRE-WAR YEAR
Imports 1913-14 
(pre-war year)
1920-21 1921-22 1922-23
Twist and y a m .......... . R(lakhs) &( lakhs) l(lakhs) S(lakhs)
4,16 13,58 11,51 9,26
Pieoe-goodss-
Grey (unbleached) . . . . 25,45 26,45 22,65 30,44
White (bleached) • • • • » o 14,29 21,90 12,67 15,01
Coloured? printed or dyed. 17,86 34,57 7,59 12,60
Eents of all descriptions. 54 86 25 46
Total piece-goods. 58,14 83,78 43,16 58,51
Hosiery .................. 1,91 63 80
Handkerchiefs and shawls • . 89 47 10 16
Thread ............. .. a . . 91 72 TO
Other sorts. * . .......... 1,47 82 70
Grand total. 66,30 1,02,12 56,94 70,13
Sourcea Commercial Intelligence Department, India, Review 
Trade of India in 1922-239 Calcutta, 1924? p* 3*
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DIAGRAM I
DIAGRAM showing the PROPORTION of the PO PUL A TI ON  
Of I N D I A  fo l low ing  each  RELJG JON.192L
BUDDHIST
Per  10,000 of t h e  P O P U L A T I O N
HINDU 6856 TRIBAL R E L I G I O N S  309
MUSLIM 2 7 U  C H R IS T IA N  150
BUDDHIST 366 S IKH 103
OTHERS 4 2 .
Source; Census o£ India, 1921-, I, Part I.
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Sourcei Political and Secret Memorandum, B# 350.
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GRAPH I
Variat ions in the values of cotton manufac tures  in the 
Import Trade of Br i t ish India during 1920 - 2 3  as 
compared with averages of the pre-war  and war periods.
120
100
9 0
8 0
7 0
6 0
5 0
4 0
3 0
20
1 9 0 9 -1 4  1 9 1 4 -1 9  1 9 2 0 -2 1
(Average) (Average)
1921-22 1 9 2 2 -2 3
Sources Commercial Intelligence Departmant, India,
Annual Statement of the Sea-Borne Irade of British
CountriesIndia with the British Empire and
for the fiscal year ending 31st Marc
Calcutta, 1924i
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GLOSSARY
adm-i-taawuns to annul or rescind co-operation*
Ahl-i-Hadiss in the sub-continent, the school of theology which
professes to follow the Prophetic tradition in preference to the 
canonal interpretation of the four conventional schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence, i.e., the Hanafi, the Maliki, the Hanmbali, and 
the Shafii*
Ahrars the mainly Punjab-based political party which emerged in the 
wake of the Khilafat movement.
Amii^i-Hinda the ’chief1 or ’lord* of Indiap a title of the proposed 
religious dignitary.
Amir-i-Jamias a vice-chancellor.
Amir-ul-Mominins ’the Commander of the Faithful’? a title of the Sunni 
caliph or a sultan.
Anjumans a Muslim association.
baiats the act of swearing allegiance5 submission, homage, fealty§
initiation as a disciple of a saint or a religious goldeg to take 
the oath of allegiance.
Bohras the mainly Shia trading community of Western India.
Bapus 'fatheralso a term of respect used for an elderly man among 
Hindus.
Chaukidars a watchman, a police or custom peon.
Chaukidaria a tax levied to defray the cost of a town or village watch 
the foes or wages paid to the town or village watchman.
croros one hundred lakhs or ten millions,
dar al-harbi 'the land of warcountry not under Islamic rule or law.
dar al-Islams 'the land of peacecountry under Islamic rule or lawji 
classically, a properly consituted or functioning Islamic state,
dar-ul-ulums 'the house of learning'^ a Muslim establishent for higher 
learning.
dastur-ul-amalt rules of practice, regulations.
farmans an order, a oommand, a decree of ruler.
fatwa (pi. fatawa)§ a ruling on a point of Islamic law given by a 
mufti or a learned alim or a body of ulama (q.v.).
fez s a red, brimless felt hat with or without tassel worn in Egypt 
and Turkey.
fidai1 one who devotes himself or sacrifices himself for a cause, one 
who volunteers or risks his life in any perilous service.
Ghair Muqallids a term commonly applied to the Ahl-i-Hadis (q.v.) in 
the sub-continent.
Gurdwaras a Sikh temple.
hadiss an account of what the Prophet Muhammad said, did, or tacitly 
approved.
ha.i.js annual pilgrimage to Mecca*
harams forbidden by religion.
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hartala closure of shops and markets as a gesture of protest.
hi.irat i voluntary withdrawal on religious grounds from a dar al-harb 
to a dar al-Islam.
Id a a Muslim festival, especially Id-ul-Fitr. celebrated to mark the 
end of the month of Ramazan, and Id-ul-Azha9 to commemorate the 
sacrificial tradition of Prophet Ibrahim.
I.itihads in Islamic jurisprudence, the use of individual reasoning.
Ikhwana the brotherhood founded by Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, an intensified 
form of Muwahhidun (q.v.)«
Imams a supreme loader of the Muslims? in Shia doctrine the hsreditary 
claimant to the headship of the community through the Prophet's 
daughter Fatima and son-in-law Ali.
ishtirak-i-amals co-operation in governmental or professional activity.
jamaats a party, a group, a community or an association.
Jamiyats an association, or a body of people.
Janmii a landholder, the original owner or proprietor by hereditary 
right.
jihad8 'the utmost endeavour', mainly used for taking up aims in a
religious cause or in the defence of the dar al-Islams a holy war.
Jumas Friday, the day of congragational prayer for Muslims.
Junud Allaha 'Army of God' 5 name given to the projected pan-Islamic 
'army' in the 'Silk Letter Conspiracy'.
Kaabas the supreme Muslim shrine at Mecca, enclosing the famous black 
stone kissed by all pilgrims.
kafirs unbeliever, used for non-Muslims, especially not the 'people 
of the Book*.
khaddar or khaddi 3 a kind of a coarse hand-spun and -woven cotton cloth.
Khadim-i-Haramain-ish-Sharifain1 'the Servant of the Holy Places’? a 
title used for the caliph.
Khalifas a successor, a vicegerent, or deputy? the supreme head of the 
Muslim community, the Imam (q.v.), as vicegerent of the Prophet 
he is vested with absolute authority in all matters of state, 
both civil and religious, as long as he rules in conformity with 
the laws of the Quran and hadis (q.v.).
Khalifat-ul-Muslimin3 'the Caliph of the Muslims'? a caliphal title.
Khilafata the office of the Khalifa (q.v.).
khutbas public sermon, especially that delivered after the Friday or 
the Id congregational prayers in which the ruler is prayed for.
This constitutes a symbolic acknowledgment of the ruler's 
sovereignty.
kisang a peasant, a cultivator.
Kisan Sabhas an association of the cultivators.
lakhs one hundred thousand.
Madrassas same as dar-ul-ulum (q.v.) but means especially a 
collegiate mosque.
Mahdia the Messiah of the Muslims whose reappearance is expected 
just prior to the end of the world.
Marathag in a general sense, inhabitant of Maharashtra.
Marwariss natives of Marwar in Rajputana, but scattered throughout India 
as business communities*
Mualanas title applied to scholars of Islamic religious sciences.
maulavi3 title applied to a Muslim scholar.
millats a community, especially the religious community of Islam. 
Motamars congress, conference.
muha.jlring pi. of muhaqir, one who performs the hi.irat (q.v.).
Mu.i addid-i-Khilafat % ’the renewer of the Khilafat' % title given to 
Mustafa Kemal by the Indian Khilafatists.
Mu.iahidins pi. of Mujahid? one who is engaged in jihad (q.v.).
mukhtiara an agent, an attorney, as employed in legal affairs.
Muqallids one deeming himself bound by the established doctrines of the 
four conventional schools of Islamic jurisprudence.
Muttafiqqa Fatwas 'unanimous decision1, as the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama's fatwa 
on non-co-operation was known.
Muwahhiduna orthodox Sunnis of the Hanmbalite school, the strictest and 
the least followed among the four schools os Islamic jurisprudence. 
They regard the cults of saints and tombs and the interjection of 
the saints to intercede with God on behalf of the worshipper, as 
idolatrous. The Muwahhidun v/ere called Wahhabis by the opponents of 
community after its founder Muhammad son of Abdul Wahhab (1703-87)*
Nasir-ul-lsiama ’Helper of Islam’? title given to Chotani.
Hawaba pi. of naib, 'deputy, vicegerent'? a style assumed by the
governors of the provinces in later Mughal period and continued 
by the British.
nazranas a gift, a present, ©specially from an inferior to a superior? 
a contribution in excess of usual revenue? a payment levied on 
peasants in professed cases of emergency.
panohayats an Indian court of arbitration consisting of five or more 
members.
panda,Is marquee.
Parsis a Zoarastrian of Persian origin chiefly settled in Western India. 
pir3 a sufi (q.v.) teacher, a spiritual guide or a religious preceptor* 
Powindass migratory Afghan tribesmen. 
qafilaa a caravan.
Qurans the revealed book of the Muslims. Its language is Arabic. 
raja sovereignty, rule, dominion.
Sabhas an assembly.
sadgas voluntary alms,,alms properly dedicated to pious uses*
Saif-ul-Islams ’the Sword of Islam'? title given to Mustafa Kemal by 
the Khilafatists.
Sajjadah Haskins an incumbent of a religious endowment.
sanacU a grant, a diploma, a charter, a patent.
Sangathans 'binding together'? the movement to knit the Hindus into a 
strong community.
sarai s a building for the shelter and accommodation of travellers, an 
inn, a caravanserai.
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Satyagrahas * soul-force*, 1 truth-force'$ Gandhian passive resistance#
sarkars the state, government, supreme authority.
Seths honorific title of a merchant, a hanker, or a trader.
Shaikh-ul-Islams an honorific title of a jurist par excellence, applied 
especially to the Mufti of Constantinople - the chief religious 
dignitary and fatwa-giver of the Ottomans. The office was later 
abolished by the nationalists in March 1924> along with the Khilafat.
Shaikh-ul-Jamias a principal of an educational istltution.
shariat 3 holy law of Islam.
Shias general name for the Muslims who regard Ali, the son-in-law of the 
Prophet, and his descendents as the only legitimate Imams (q.v.) of 
the Muslim community after the Prophet.
Shuddhis 'purification1? the name of the movement to reclaim Hindus 
from Islam.
shuhadafi pi. of shahoed9 a martyr in the cause of religion fighting 
against unbelievers.
sufis a Muslim mystic.
Sunnis the Muslim who is held to be conforming to orthodoxy in Islamic 
beliefs and practices.
swadeshi3 lit. 'of one's own country', the name given to the boycott 
of goods not made in India.
swaraj3 self-rule, self-government, independence.
takavis advances or loans of money made to the cultivators at the time 
of sowing or in bad season or to enable them to extend their 
cultivation, to be repaid when the crop is gathered.
taluks a subdivision, in Bombay, of a district, in the U.P., an estate.
Talukdars officer in charge of a taluq. (q.v.)? the holder of a 
proprietory estate.
Tanzims 'organisation1? the name of the movement to organise Muslims in 
all aspects of life as a reaction against the Hindu movements of 
Sangathan and Shuddhi (q.v.).
tark-i-mawalat3 'to withdraw co-operation'? Urdu (q.v.) equivalent of 
the teim 'non-co-operation'.
thanas a police-station.
tilaka coloured mark on the forehead used by Hindus. 
tongas a horse-drawn carriage.
ulamas pi. of alim9 a man of Islamic religious learning. 
ummats Muslim community.
Urdus language of Muslim India (to-day of Pakistan) foimed by a mixture 
of Arabic, Persian and Turkish words, upon a basis of Hindi and 
Sanskrit, written in Arabic characters.
vakils a pleader in a court.
waqfs a pious foundation.
zakats alms, alms tax.
zamindars landholder, paying revenue directly to the government. 
zimrois protected non-Muslim subject of an Islamic state.
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
ABBUL BARI, QATYAM-UD-DIN MOHAMEDs b. 1879? loading pir and pan-Islamist 
alim from Farangi Mahal, Lucknow? educ., Farangi Mahal and the Hodjas, 
whero ho developed friendship with Hussain ihn Ali, later Sharif of Moooa 
and King of the Hedjaz? travelled extensively in the Ottoman Empire before 
returning to India in 1908? same yoar founded the Madrassa Nizamia, Farangi 
Mahal? President, Majlis-i-Muid-ul-Islam, Lucknow, I9IO3 came under the ■ 
influence of M.H. Kidwai, 1912? President, Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba, 1913? 
involved in the Cawnpore Mosque affair, 1913? took loading part in 
organising the Lucknow Muslim Conference and the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind, 
1919? founder-member, CKC, 1919-26? opposed the hi.1 rat 9 1920? mellowed 
towards the Govt* of India after the Telegram incident, 1922? supported 
Hussain's assumption of the Khilafat,1924? opposed Ihn Saud during the 
Hedjaz crisis, 1924-26? d. 1926.
AGA KHAN, AGA SULTAN SIR MAHOMED SHAH* b. 1877? 3rd Hoad of the Nizari 
Ismaili sect of Shia Muslims? succeeded his father, 1885? educ., privately? 
M/ember/ I /mperi&lj/ Legislative/ C/ouncil/, 1902-4^ led Muslim (Simla) 
deputation to Lord Minto, 1906? President, A/llZ-l/ndia/ M/uslim/ L/eague/ 
1906-13? granted salute of 11 guns in recognition of loyal services during 
World War I? pleaded Indian Muslim case re the Khilafat before the Council 
of Four at Paris, 1919? opposed the non-co-operation experiment? member, 
non-official Khilafat delegation to Britain, 1921? d. 1957°
AHMAD, MIRZA BASHIR-UD-DIN MAHMUD* b. 1889? Head of the Qadiani wing of 
the Ahmadiyya Movement and son and 2nd successor of its founder Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad? educ., Qadian? succeeded, 1914? disputed the Ottoman claim 
to tho Khilafat and opposed non-co-operation? d. 1965*
AHMAD, SHAIKH ZAHURs barrister and politician from Allahabad? founder- 
member, AIMLs Joint Secy., London Muslim League, 1908? member, Council of 
AIML from 1910$ member, CKC, 1919-28.
AHMAD, SYED ZAHURs vakil and politician from Lucknow? foundeiwnember, AIML? 
member and Secy., Council AIML, 1919-26? member, CKC, 1919-28.
ALI, ASAFs b. 1888? Delhi barrister and politician? educ., Stephen's 
College, Delhi, and Lincoln's Inn, London? took leading part in the 
Khilafat movement, gave up legal practice and v;ent to prison? travelled 
extensively in Europe? d* 1953•
ALI, MAULVI MUHAMMAD* be 1874? Punjabi alim, journalist and Head of the 
Lahori faction of the Ahmadiyya Movement? educ., Kapurthala, Govt. College, 
Lahore (M.A., 1895) and Law College, Lahore (1897)? taught at Islaraia 
College, Lahore, 1897? same year accepted Ahmadiyya doctrine? taught at 
Oriental College, Lahore, 1897-1900? editor, Review of Religions (Qadian), 
1902? left Qadian over the question of succession and the doctrinal issue 
of finality of the prophethood of Muhammad, 1914? same year took up 
residence at Lahore and,, in association with Khwaja ICamal-ud-din and Dr. 
Yaqub Beg, formed a new organisation under the name of the Ahmadiyya 
Anjuman Ishaat-i-Islam with himself as the President? supported the 
Khilafat movement, d. 1951*
ALI, MOAZZAMs barrister and politician from Rampur? brother-in-law of the 
Ali brothers? educ., Rampur, M/ahomedan/ A/nglo/ O/riental/ College, 
Aligarh, and London? set up legal practice in Patna and then shifted to 
Muradabad, 1920? took leading part in the Khilafat movement and resigned
practice, 1920? succeeded Shaukat Ali as Secy., CKC, after the latter!s 
arrest, 1921? member, A/Tl/-l/ndia/ C/ongress/ C/ommittee/? member,
Khilafat Disobedience Enquiry Committee, 1922.
ALI, MOHAMEDs bo 1878$ leading pan-Islamist journalist and politician from 
Rampur and younger brother of Shaukat Ali? educ., MAO Cllege, Aligarh, and 
Lincoln College, Oxford? graduated, 1902? Chief Education Officer, Rampur, 
1902-4? Opium Officer, Baroda, 1904-10? founder-member, AIML? founder- 
editor of the English weekly Comrade (Calcutta - later shifted to Delhi),
1911-14? followed it up by an Urdu newspaper Hamdard, 1913? took part in 
the Cawnpore M0sque affair and led a two-member delegation to London, 1913? 
interned for pro-Turkish activities, 1915-1919? member, CKC, 1919-28? led 
the Khilafat delegation to Europe, 1920? interned for the famous Karachi 
Resolutions, 1921-23? President, i/ndian/ N/ational/ C/ongress/, 1923? 
delegate of the CKC to World MuslinfCongress, Mecca, 1926J d. 1931°
ALI, SHAUKAT* b. 1873? pan-Islamist journalist and politician from Rampur 
and elder brother of Mohamed Ali? educ*, MAO College, Aligarh? Sub-Deputy 
Opium Agent in Opium Dept, till 1912? founder-member, AIML? helped found 
Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba? 1913? interned with Mohamed Ali, 1915-19? Secy*, 
CKC, 1919-213 interned for supporting the Karachi Resolutions, 1921-23? 
President, CKC, with two interruptions, 1923-38? dolegato of the CKC to 
World Muslim Congress, Mecca, 19263 d* 1938.
ALI, (SIR) SYED RAZA* b. 1880? Muradabadi Shia lawyer and politician? educ., 
MAO College, Aligarh? started legal practice in Moradabad, 19083 M/ember/ 
L/egislative/ C/ouncil/, U.P., 1912-20? moved to Allahabad to practice at 
High Court, 1916? took part in the Khilafat movement but opposed non-co- 
operation? became independent in politics, 1920? M/ember/ C/ouncil of/ 
S/tate_/, I92I-263 headed two deputations of non-official Muslim MLAs to 
the Viceroy in connection with the Turkish peace terms, 1922 & 1923? 
President AIML, Bombay Session, 1924? d. 1949°
ALI, SYED AMEER* b. 1849? Calcutta barrister and judge? educ., Hoogley 
College, Calcutta, and Inner Temple, London? called to Bar, 1873? Lecturer 
on Mahomedan Law at the Presidency College, Calcutta, 1873-78? Magistrate 
and Chief Magistrate, Calcutta, I878-8I3 MLC, Bengal, 1878-83? MILC, 1883- 
85? Judge of High Court of Judicature at Port William in Bengal, 1890-1904? 
settled in Britain, 1904? helped found London Muslim League, 19083 Member, 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 1909-28? d. 1928.
ANSARI, DR. MUKHATAR AHMADs b. 1880? leading medical practitioner and 
politician from Ghazipur settled in Delhi? educ., Muir Central College, 
Allahabad, Edinburgh and London? after graduating in medicine, admitted as 
a Resident Medical Officer at Charing Cross Hospital and as House Surgeon 
to Lock Hospital? returned to India, 1911? became intimate with Ajmal Khan 
and the Ali brothers at Delhi? led Red Crescent Medical Mission to Turkey,
1912-13? member, AIML Council? founder-president, Home Rule League, Delhi, 
1917? Chairman Reception Committee, AIML Delhi session, 1918? member,
AICC for eight years from 1919? member, CKC, 1919-28? led Khilafat 
deputation to the Viceroy, 1920? member, non-official Khilafat delegation 
to Britain, 1921? President, Khilafat Conference, Gaya, 1922? member? 
Khilafat and Congress Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committees, 1922? d. 1936.
AZAD, ABUL KALAM MOHYUDDIN AHMED $ b. 1888? leading alim and pan-Islamist 
journalist settled in Calcutta? was born of an Arab mother at Mecca where 
his father, Khair-ud-din of Delhi, had taken refuge after the Revolt of 
1857? returned to India with his father, I89O3 educ., Dars-i-Nizamia, 
Calcutta, and Nadwat-ul-Ulama, Lucknow? travelled in the Middle East, 1906- 
7? editor, Vakil (Amritsar), 1907? editor, An Nadwa (Lucknow), I9H 3
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started weekly Al-Hilal (Calcutta), 1912? and on its suppression, Al- 
Balagh (Calcutta), 1913? interned for pro-Turkish activities, 1916-20? 
member, CKC and Jamiyat-ul-Ulama? supported the hijrat, 1920? member, Non- 
Co-Operation Committee of the CKC, 1920-21? interned, 1921-23? President, 
INC, 1923? President, CKC, 1925? supported Ibn Saud, 1924-26? d. 1958^
AZAD SUBHANI, ABDUL KADIR* b. 1882? pan-Islamist alim and politician and 
Head of Madrassa Al-Haya, Cawnpore? came to notice in connection with the 
Cawnpore Mosque affair, 1913? founder-member, Jamiyat-ul-Ulama? pressed 
for complete independence along with Hasrat Mohani, 1921? an exponent of 
'no-change* policy, 1922-23? d. 1957*
BAPTISTA, JOSEPHs b* I864? Home Ruler and Trade Union leader from Bombay? 
President, Indian Home Rule League (founded by Tilak)? went to Britain, 
1907? later became engrossed in Labour questions? Chairman Reception 
Committee, Ar-ITUC, 1920? President, Indian Seamen's Union, Bombay, 1923? 
represented Indian Labour at International Labour Conference, Geneva, 1924? 
President, Municipal Corporation, Bombay, 1925? d. 1930*
BESANT, (MRS.) ANNIEs b. 1847? British theosophist who lived and worked 
in India? headquarters, Madras? President, Theosophical Society and editor, 
New India and Commonwealg educ*, privately in Britain, Germany and Prance? 
took honours in Botany at London University? joined the National Secular 
Society, 1874? worked on Free Thought and Radical Movements led by Charles 
Bradlaugh, M.P., and for various other social and liberal societies, 1889? 
became a devoted pupil of Mmo. Blavatsky? founded the Central Hindu College 
at Benares, 1898, and the Central Hindu Girls* College, Benares, 1904? 
helped found the Hindu University and was at its Court, Council and Senate? 
do 1933°
BHOPAL, NAWAB SULTAN JAHAN BEGUM, THE BEGUM OP5 b. 18583 eighth in lineal 
descent from the famous Dost Mahomed Khan, founder of the dynasty? educ., 
privately? succeeded, 1901? received a salute of 21 guns within, and 19 
guns outside, the limits of her dominions? abdicated in favour of her only 
surviving son, Nawabzada Hamidullah Khan, 1926? first Chancellor, Muslim 
University, Aligarh, 1920? d. 1930.
BHURGRI, GHULAM MUHAMMAD* b. 18783 barrister and politician of a rich 
zamindar family settled in Sind from tho Punjab (Bhur Garh in Dera Ghazi 
Khan) 3 educ., Sind Madrassa? Karachi, MAO College, Aligarh, and London? 
called to Bar, 19083 set up practice in Hyderabad (Sind)? MLC, Bombay,1910- 
19? Gen.-Secy., INC, 1917? member, AIML deputation to Britain re Reforms 
and Khilafat, 19195 President, Bombay session of the Khilafat Conference, 
I92O3 opposed non-co-operation and successfully contested elections of 
192O3 later resigned his seat in the Council of State as a protest against 
the Govt, policy with regard to tho Khilafat question? President, Lucknow 
session of the AIML, 1923? M/ombor/ L/egislative/ A/ssembly/, 1923-24? 
d. 1924°
'BI AMMAN', ABADI BANG BEGUM* b. 1853? mother of the Ali brothers? 
nominally headed the campaign for the release of her sons, 1917-19? pulled 
in Gandhi to support the campaign, 1917 ? took part in the Khilafat 
movement and organised propaganda among women and raised subscriptions to 
the Khilafat Fund? d. 1924°
BIKANER, GANGA SINGH BAHADUR, MAHARAJA OPi b. 1880? educ., Mayo College, 
Ajmer? succeeded, 1887? assumed full ruling powers, 18983 military 
service and campaigns, 1900-14? World War I, 1914-15? °ue of tho three 
Reps, of India at the Imperial War Cabinet and Conference, 1917? and one 
of the1 two Reps, at the Imperial Cabinet and Peace Conference, 1919? 
d. 1943*
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BUTLER, SIR (SPENCER) HARCOURT* b. 1869? Governor of U.P.? educ., Harrow, 
and Balliol College, Oxford? entered I/ndian/ C/ivil7 S/ervice/, 1890? Lt.- 
Govemor of Burma, 1915-18$ Lt.-Governor of“U.P., 1918-21$ Governor of U.P., 
1921-23? Governor of Burna, 1923-27? d. 1938.
CHELMSFORD, FREDERIC JOHN NAPIER THESIGER, 3rd BARON & 1st VISCOUNT* b. 1868? 
Viceroy of India? educ., Winchester, and Magdalen College, Oxford? called 
to Bar, 1893? Governor of Queensland, 1905-9? Governor of New South Wales,
1909-13? Viceroy of India, 1916-21? First Lord, of Admiralty, 1924? d« 1933°
CHOTANI, SETH MIAN MUHAMMAD HAJEE JAN MUHAMMAD* millionaire timber merchant 
and pan-Islamist from Bombay? rendered signal service to tho Allies during 
the World War I by his gift of millions of tons of timber and contributions 
to war effort? closely associated with Abdul Bari through his (Chotani's) 
pir Syed Ibrahim Saif-ud-din, a friend of the- former? helped form the 
Bombay Khilafat Committee, 1919? made huge contributions to the Khilafat 
funds? President, CKC, 1919-23? member. Congress Working Committee, 1920- 
21? member, non-official Khilafat delegation to Britain, 1921? President, 
Khilafat Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee, 1922? resigned from the 
Presidency of the CKC owing to the funds scandal, 1923> and retired to 
live a secluded life with virtually no money.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON, GEORGE NATHANIEL CURZONs b, 1859? Secy, of State for 
Foreign Affairs? educ., Eton, and Balliol College, Oxford? M.P. for 
Southport, 1886-98? Und03>«Secy. of State for India, 1891-92? and for 
Foreign Affairs, l895~98? Viceroy of India, 1899-1905? Secy, of State for 
Foreign Affairs, 1919-24? d„ 1925°
DAQODI, SHAFEEs b. 1879? zamindar and lawyer from Patna? educ., Calcutta 
University? took part in the Khilafat movement and suspended legal 
practice in 1920? sentenced for one year, 1921? MLA since 1924? President, 
CKC, 19283 d. 1946.
DARYABADI, ABDUL MAJIDs b. 1892? prominent alim and journalist from 
Daryabad? educ., Canning College, Lucknow, MAO College, Aligarh, and St. 
Stephen’s College, Delhi? worked in Translation Bureau, Osmania 
University, Hyderabad, 1913-18? Fellow, Osmania University, 1919-23? 
member, CKC until 19283 vra,s associated with Hamdam (Lucknow) and Mohamed 
Ali's Hamdardg editor, Sidque (Lucknow), an Urdu journal of religion.
DAS, CHITTA RANJANs b. I87O3 Bengali lawyer and politician from Calcutta? 
barrister of Calcutta High Court? entered politics, 1917? first opposed and 
then allied himself with Gandhi, 1920-22? President, INC, 1921? leader of 
the ’pro-change’ faction and foimea with Motilal Nehru, T.A.K. Sherwani and 
Khaliquzzaman the Swaraj Party, 1923, d. 1925°
DWARKADAS, JAMNADASs b. I89O3 Liberal politician and Home Ruler of the 
Besant school from Bombay? educ., Bombay University? member, Bombay 
Corporation, 1917-21? member Council of Indian Merchants' Chamber, 1918-25? 
President, Bombay National Home Rule League? MLA.
FAZL-I-HUSAIN, MIAN (SIR)* b. 1877? barrister and politician from Lahore? 
educ., Govt. Collego, Lahore, and Christ's College, Cambridge? called to 
Bar, Gray's Inn, 1901$ practiced law at Sialkot, 1901-5$ moved to Lahore 
and practiced at High Court and Chief Court, 1905-20? Minister of the 
Punjab Govt, with short interruptions, 1921-30? d. 1936.
FAZLUL HAQ, ABUL KASEM* b. 1873? Muslim lawyer and politician from Barisal 
in Bengal? educ., Calcutta University? practiced law for some years? Govt, 
servant for seven years but resigned to resume practice? MLC, Bengal, 1913-
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20? Presidents Bengal Muslim League, 1916-21? Gen.-Secy., INC, 1918? 
Presidents AIML Delhi session, 19185 opposed non-co-operation, 1920-22? 
Minister of Education, Bengal, 1924? d. 1962.
GAIT, SIR EDWARD ALBERT? b® 1863? Lt*-Governor of Bihar and Orissa? educ., 
University College, London? entered ICS, 1882? career in Assam and Bengal 
until appointed Member, Executive Council, Bihar and Orissa, 1912-15? Lt.~ 
Governor, Bihar and Orissa, 1915-20? Member, Council of India, 1922-27? 
do 1950.
GANDHI, MOHANDAS KARAMCHANDs bo I869? Gujarati Banya barrister, journalist 
and politician? editor, Young India? educ., Rajkot, Bhavnagar and London? 
called to B&r, 1889? practiced as barrister in South Africa for seventeen 
years? gave up practice to lead 'passive resistance' campaign on behalf of 
Indian settlers, 1908? returned to India, 1915? leading figure of INC till 
his assassination in 1948.
GHAFFAR, QAZI MUHAMMAD ABDULa bo 1888? journalist and politician from 
Moradabad? educ., MAO College, Aligarh? for some time in Govt* service? 
resigned to join Mohamed Ali's Hamdard? founded Jamhur (Calcutta), and 
after its suppression, Subah (DeIbZ77~&ftd later, Payam (Hyderabad)? Gen*- 
Secy*, AIML, 1918? editor, Akhuwwat, 1919? Secy, to Chotani during his 
visit to Britain with the non-official Khilafat delegation, 1921? special 
Rep. of the CKC to Ismet Pasha in Switzerland to plead for th© restoration 
of the Caliph*s temporal power, 1922? d* 1955°
GOUR, (SIR) HARI SINGHs b0 1866? barrister and politician from Nagpur, C.P.? 
educ*, Nagpur, Downing College, Cambridge, and Inner Temple, London (LL.
D., 1905)? leader of the opposition, 1921-34* d* 1949*
GRANT, SIR (ALFRED) HAMILTON3 b. 1872? Chief Commissioner of the Frontier? 
educ., Fettes College, Edinburgh, and Balliol College, Oxford? entered ICS, 
1895? career in the Frontier until appointed Foreign Secy, to Govt, of 
India, 1914-19? negotiated Peace Treaty with Afghanistan, 1919? Chief 
Commissioner, N.VfoF.P., 1919-21? d. 1937*
HAQ, MAZHAR-UL-HAQUEa b* 1886? Bihari barrister and politician? called to 
English Bar, 1891? practiced at Calcutta and Bankipore? founder-member,
AIML and its President, 1915? organised Khilafat movement in Bihar, 1919- 
24? do 1930.
HARDINGE OF PENSHURST, CHARLES HARDINGE, 1st BARON3 b. I858? Viceroy of 
India and later Under-Secy, of State for Foreign Affairs? educ., Harrow, 
and Trinity College, Cambridgo? entered diplomatic service, 1880?
Ambassador at Petrograd, 1904-6? Pemanant Under-Secy, of State for Foreign 
Affairs, 1906-10 & 1916-20? Viceroy of India, 1910-16? British Ambassador 
to Paris, 1920-23, d* 1944*
EAROON, SETH HAJI (SIR) ABDOOLAs b. 1872? leading businessman and politician, 
from Karachi? organised the Khilafat movement in Sind? made hugo 
contributions to the Khilafat funds? President, All-India Muslim Conference? 
member, Council AIML? d. 1942.
HASAN, YAKUBs b. 1875? journalist and politician from Madras? educ., MAO 
College, Aligarh? came to Madras from Bungaloro in I90I5 conducted an Urdu 
weekly journal Kaumi Halchal and an English weekly journal Muslim Patriot 
for few years? visited Europe, 1912? nominated Member of Madras Corporation 
for several years? member, AIML deputation to Britain re Reforms and 
Khilafat, 1919? conducted Islamic Information Bureau and its journal, Muslim 
Outlook (London), along with KLdwai and Ispahani? returned to India, 1920? 
twice went to prison? d* 1940*
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HASSAN, (SHAIKH-UL-HIND) MAHMUDg b. I85I? leading pan-Islamist alim and 
Principal of Deoband? educ., Deobana? on graduation joined its teaching 
staff, 1873? became its Principal, 1890? launched an unobstrusive anti- 
British pro-Turkish political activity, 1911? moved to the Hedjaz with his 
associates to avoid arrest, 1915? arrested by Sharif Hussain at the instance 
of the British, 1916? interned at Malta, 1917-20? returned to India, June 
1920? joined the Khilafat movement and gave sanction to the non-co-operation 
experiment? d. Nov* 1920.
HASSAN NIZAMI, KHWAJA SYED MOHAMMAD ALIs b. 1878? Sajjadah Nasliin, Sufi pir 
and journalist from Delhi? educ., privately at Delhi and Gangoh? became pir 
after baiat'with Pir Mihr Ali Shah, 1908? founded the journal Nizam-ul- 
Mashaikhs travelled in the Middle East, 1911? took part in the Cawnpore 
Mosque affair, 1913? went to Meerut and founded Tauheed9 1913| returned to 
Delhi after the suppression of his journal by the Govt, but was kept under 
police surveillance, 1914-17? took part in the Khilafat movement and the 
Hedjaz affair, 1919—26? d. 1957*
HASRAT MOHANI, SYED PAZL-UL-HASANs b, 1878/80? pan-Islamist journalist, 
poet and politician from Mohan, Dist. Unao, U.P.? sttled at Cawnpore? educ., 
MAO College, Aligarh? founder-editor, Urdu weekly Urdu-i-Mualla9 1903? 
interned for political activities, 1908-9 & 1916-19? closely associated with 
Abdul Bari who was his preceptor? member, CKC, 1919-28? member, Non-Co- 
Operation Committee of the CKC, 1920-22? President, AIML, 1921? opposed 
CKC's pro-Ibn Saud policy, 1925-26? d. 1951*
HOSSAIN, SYUDs journalist and politician from Calcutta? the youngest son of 
Nawab Syed Mohammed of Dacca and Calcutta? was on the staff' of Bombay 
Chronicle, 1917-19? editor. Independent (Allahabad), 1919-21? married 
Motila^ Nehru's daughter (Vijaya Lakshami) but forced to divorce her at 
Gandhi s intervention? member, Khilafat delegation to Europe, 1920? settled 
in America and did not return to India untill 1946®
IMAM, SYED HASAN* b. I87I5 Bihari lawyer and politician? educ., Patna and 
England? called to Bar, Middle Temple, I892? practiced at Patna and Calcutta 
until 1911? Judge of Calcutta High Court, 1911-16? resumed practice at 
Patna? President, INC, 1918? President, All-India Home Rule League? member, 
non-official Khilafat delegation to Britain, 1921? d. 1933®
IQBAL, DR. (SIR) MUHAMMADg b. 1876? poot-philosopher, barrister and 
politician settled in Lahore? educ.. Govt. College, Lahore, Trinity College, 
Cambridge, and Munich University? joined staff of Oriental College, Lahore, 
1904? qualified Bar from London? joined staff of Govt. College, Lahore? 
resigned to practice lav* at Lahore High Court? MLC, Punjab, 1926? d« 1938.
IYENGAR, S. KASTURI RANGAs b. 1859? journalist and politician from Madras? 
editor, Hindu (Madras) since 1905? educ., Presidency College, Madras? 
practiced law at Coimbatore and at Madras, 1885-1905? member, AICC and 
President of Madras Provincial Congress Committee? d* 1923®
IYENGAR, S. SRINIVASAg b. 1874? Advocate from Madras? educ., Madras and 
Presidency College, Calcutta? Advocate and member, Bar Council, Madras,
1912-16? member, AICC? MLC, Madras? Advocate-General, 1916-20? d* 1941®
JAFEER, KHAN BAHADUR SIR EBRAHIM HAROONs b. 1881? Memon landlord, 
businessman and politician from Poona? educ., Deccan College, Poona? 
President and Trustee of various an.iumansg Special Magistrate, 1906-18? 
organised Bombay Presidency Muslim League, 1908? MLC, Bombay, 1916-19? 
President, All-India Muslim Conference, Lucknow, 1919? MILC, 1919-20? MCS, 
1921-25 and 1926-30? d. 1930.
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JAYAKAR, MUKUND RAMRAOg b, 1873? Bombay lawyer and politician? educ#, 
Elphinstone High School and College, Bombay? practiced as barrister at 
Bombay High Court? entered politics, 19163 leader of the Swaraj Party in 
Bombay Legislative Council, 1923-25? resigned from the Congress, 1925? MLA, 
1926-30? d. 1959.
JINNAH, MUHAMMAD ALIs b. 1876? barrister and politician from Bombay? educ*, 
Mission School, Karachi, and Lincoln's Inn, London? called to Bar, I896? 
practiced first at Karachi and then enrolled as Advocate at Bombay High 
Court, 1897? MILC, 1910? joined AIML, 1913? principal negotiator of Lucknow 
Pact with the Congress, 1916? President, AIML, 1916, 1920 & 1934-48? 
President, Home Rule League, Bombay, 1917-20? leader, AIML delegation to 
Britain re Reforms and Khilafat, 19195 first Governor-General of Pakistan,
1947-48? d. 1948.
KHALI QUZZAMAN, CHOUDHRYs b. 1889? lawyer and politician from Lucknow? ©due#, 
Lucknow, and MAO College, Aligarh? cam© ‘under, the influence of the Air 
brothers, 1909? member, Red Crescent Medical Mission to Turkey, 1912-13? 
took his law degree, 1916? started legal practico at Lucknow, 1917? member, 
AICC, 1917? Joint Secy*, AIML, 1918? gave up legal practice, 1920? interned,
1921-22? re-joined AIML, 1924? d. 1973*
KHAN, HAKIM AJMALs b. 1865? leading practitioner of unani system of medicine 
and pan-lslamic politician from Delhi? educ., privately? founder-member, 
AIML* helped strengthen political alignment between politicians and ulama. 
1906-19? President, AIML, 1919? Vice-President, CKC, 1919-25? President,
INC, 1921? member, Congress and Khilafat Civil Disobedience Enquiry 
Committees, 1922? travelled in Europe, and Near and Middle East, 1925-26? 
d. 1927«
KHAN, NAWAB ISMAILs barrister and politician from Meerut but settled in 
Aligarh? favourite son of Nawab Ishaq Khan, Secy., MAO College, Aligarh? 
educ., MAO College, Aligarh, and London? organised Khilafat movement in 
U.P.? President, U.P. Khilafat Committee? member, CKC, 1919—28? member, 
Khilafat Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee, 1922? d. 1958°
KHAN, SAHIBZADA AFTAB AHMADs b* I867? Kakarzai Pathan barrister and 
politician settled' in Aligarh? educ., MAO College, Aligarh, and Cambridge? 
called to Bar, 1893? started practice at Aligarh, 1894? Joined staff of 
MAO College, Aligarh, 1897? founder-member, AIML? MLC, U.P., 1909-12? 
opposed the Lucknow Pact, 19165 pleaded Indian Muslim case on the Khilafat 
issue before the Council of Pour, 1919? Member, India Council, 1917-24? 
Vice-Chancellor, Muslim University, Aligarh, 1923-27? d. 1930.
KHAN, ZAPAR ALIs b» 1873? Punjabi journalist and politician? editor,
Zamindar (Lahore)? educ., Wazirabad, Patiala, and MAO College, Aligarh? for 
some time worked on the staff of Times of India (Bombay)? afterwards served 
in Hyderabad state? visited Britain and Constantinople, 1913? interned at 
Kamabad for pro-Turkish activities, 1914-19? revived Zamindar9 April 1920? 
supported the hi.1 rat, 1920? sentenced to five years' imrisonment for 
'seditious' speeches, Nov. 1920? after release was involved in the Hedjaz 
affair and Hindu-Muslim factionalism, 1925-27? d. 1956.
KHAN (OP BAREILLY), AHMAD RAZAs Head of the Bareilly School of ulamag educ., 
privately? completed his studies, 1869? did baiat at the hand of Shah Aal— 
i-Rasul Marharwi, 1877? visited Mecca and other sanctuaries, 1878? opposed 
the Khilafat movement and its non—co-operation experiment? d. 1921.
KHAN (TIWANA), MALIK MOHAMMED UMAR HAYATs b. 1874? prominent Muslim land­
holder of the Punjab (Shahpur Dist.)? educ., Chiefs1 College, Lahore? 
served World War I, 1914-15 (Despatches six times)? Afghan War, 1919? MLC,
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Punjab for two terms? Member, Viceroy’s Council since 1910? opposed the non- 
co-operation experiment and successfully contested election for Council of 
State, 1920? d. 1944®
KEDWAI (OF GADIA), MOSHIB HUSAIN5 b. 18783 zamindar, barrister and pan- 
Islamist politician from Barabanki (U.Po)? educ*, Lucknow and London? Secy., 
Pan-Islamic Society of London, 1903-7? &nd later .of the Central Islamic 
Society, 1907-20? awarded by Sultan Abdul Hamid II the 'Usmania1 medal for 
his services to pan-Islamic cause, 1906? closely associated with Abdul Bari 
through his pir Haji Waris Ali Shah, a friend of the former? helped establish 
Anjuraan-Khuddam-i-Kaaba, 1913? conducted the Islamic Information Bureau and 
managed Muslim Outlook (London)? advisod the establishment of the Khilafat 
committees and funds in India? returned to India, 1920? President, Oudh 
Khilafat Committee since 1920? called for the abolition of the Khilafat 
committees after ..the funds scandal, 1923? supported King Hussain’s claim to 
Khilafat 9 1924°
KEFAYATULLAH, MUFTIs b. 1875? prominent alim of Ahl-i-Hadis and Head of 
Aminiya Madrassa, Delhi? first President of Jamiyat-Ulama-i-Hind, 1919? took 
leading part in the Khilafat movement and went to prison? d. 1952*
KITCHLEW, DRo SAIF-UD-DINs b» I884? barrister and politician from Anritsar? 
educ., India, Cambridge and Germany (Ph.D. Munster University, 1912)? 
started legal practice at Rawalpindi, 1913? moved to Amritsar, 1915? took 
prominent part in ’Rowlatt' Satyagraha9 1919? sentenced to life imprisonment 
by Martial Law Commission but released under Amnesty, Dec. 1919? tool leading 
part in the Khilafat movement and gave up practico, 1920? member, Non-Co- 
Operation Committee of tho CKC, 1920-21? interned for supporting tho Karachi 
Resolutions, 1921-23? conducted the Tanzim campaign, 1924-27? d. 1963®
KUNZRU, PANDIT HARIDAYANATHs b. 1887? Liberal politician from U.P. 3 MLC,
U.P., for several years? President, N^ /ational/ L/iberal/ F^ /oderation/*
LLOYD, SIR GEORGE AMBROSE (later 1st BARON LLOYD OF D0L0BRAN)s b. 1879? 
Governor of Bombay? educ., Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge? Hon. Attache, 
Constantinople? served World War I, 1914-18 (Despatches six times) 3 
Conservative M.P., I9IO-I83 Governor of Bombay, 1918-23? M.P., 1924-25? 
d. 1941*
LLOYD GEORGE, DAVID (later 1st EARL LLOYD GEORGE OF DWYFOR) 3 b. 1863? Prime 
Minister of Britain? educ., Llanystumdwy Church School and privately? 
solicitor, I884? Liberal M.P., 1890-31? President of the Board of Trade, 
1905-8? Minister of Munitions, 1915-16? Secy, of State ibr War, 1916? Prime 
Minister, 1916-22? d. 1945*
MACLAGAN, SIR EDWARD DOUGLAS? b. I864? Governor of tho Punjab? educ., 
Winchester, and New College, Oxford? enotered ICS, I885? Secy, to Govt, of 
India, Revenue and Agriculture Dept., 1910-14? and of Educ® Dept., 1915-18? 
Lt.-Governor of the Punjab, 1919-21? Governor, 1921-24? d, 1952°
MADNI, HUSAIN AHMADs b. 1879? Deobandi alim and an associate of Mahmud Hassan? 
educ., Deoband, 1891-99? joined its teaching staff on graduation? emigrated 
to Medina in the Hodjas and acquired Ottoman citizenship, 1902? joined Mahmud 
Hassan in his pan-Islamic schemes, 1915-16? arrested along with his leader 
and three other associates, 19-16? interned at Malta by the British, 1917-20? 
returned to India, 1920? joined the Khilafat movement and interned for 
supporting tho Karachi Resolutions, 1921-23? d. 1957*
MAHMUDABADs SIR MOHAMED ALI MOHAMMAD KHAN, RAJA (later MAHARAJA) OFs b. 1877? 
rich Shia landlord and politician from Lucknow? educ., privately? entered 
politics, 1909? MILC, 1909-20? President, AIML, 1913-18? Home Member, U.P.-,
1920-23? first Vice-Chancellor, Muslim University, Aligarh, 1920-23? d. 1931*
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MALAVIYA, PANDIT MABAN MOHANs b. 1861? U.P. lawyer and politician with 
pronounced Hindu feeling? educ., Muir Central College, Allahabad? enrolled 
as vakil Allahabad High Court, 1892? MLC, U.P., 1902-12? MILC, 1910-20? 
President, INC, 1909s 1918 & 1932? MLA, 1924-30? President, Hindu Mahasabha,
1923-25? d. I946.
MONTAGU, EDWIN (SAMUEL)a b. 1879? Secy, of State for India? educ., Clifton, 
City of London School, and Trinity College, Cambridge? Liberal M.P., 1906- 
22? Parliamentary Under-Secy, of State for India, 1910-14? Financial Secy, 
to Treasury, 1914-16? Minister of Munitions, 1916? Secy, of State for India,
1917-22? d. 1924.
NADVI, SYED SULAIMANs b. 18843 pan-Islamist alim and journalist from U.P. 3 
educ., Phulwari, Madrassa Imdadiyya, Darbhanga, and Nadwat-ul-Ulama,
Lucknow? graduated, 19063 influenced by Shibli in his literary style and 
political ideas? edited An Nadwa, 1912? founded Dar-ul-Musannifin, Azamgarh, 
1914? joined staff of Deccan College, Poona, 1915? member, Khilafat 
delegation to Europe, 1920? and of delegation to the Hedjaz, 1924-25? d. 1953*
NEHRU, PANDIT JAWAHARLALs b. 1889? Allahabad barrister and son of Motilal 
Nehru? educ., Harrow, and Trinity College, Cambridge? called to Bar, Inner 
Temple, 1912? Advocate, Allahabad High Court? Secy., Home Rule League, 
Allahabad, 19183 member, AICC since 19185 imprisoned on several occasions 
for political activities? d. 1964®
NEHRU, PANDIT MOTILAL2 b. 1861? lawyer and politician from Allahabad and 
father of Jawaharlal Nehru? educ., Muir College, Allahabad? practiced as 
vakil9 1883-95? enrolled as Advocate, Allahabad High Court, 1895? President, 
INC, 1919 & 19283 suspended legal practice in pursuance of non-co-operation, 
192O3 imprisoned for six months, 1921-22? formed with C.R. Das the Swaraj 
Party, 1923, MLA, 1923-24? resumed leagal practice, 1925, &• 1931*
NIZAM OF HYDERABAD, NAWAB MIR SIR USMAN ALI KHAN BAHADURs b. 1886? 
considered to be one of the richest men of the world? educ., privately? 
succeeded, 1911? granted title of 'Faithful Ally of the British Government1 
and hereditary style of His Exalted Highness, 19183 Chancellor of the 
Muslim University, Aligarh? d. 1967*
O'DWYER, SIR MICHAEL* b. 1864? Lt.-Govornor of the Punjab? educ., St. 
Stanislaus College, Tullamore, and Balliol College, Oxford? entered ICS,
1885? career in Northern and Central India until appointed Agent in Central 
India, 1910-12? Lt.-Governor of the Punjab, 1913-19? 194C*
PAL, BIPIN CHANDRAg b. 18583 Bengali journalist and politician and editor of 
Bands Matram3 educ.. Presidency College, Calcutta? joined Brahmo Samaj, 1877? 
joined INC, 1886? imprisoned for 'sedition', 1911? opposed-supported-opposed 
the Khilafat movement and its non-co-operation experiment? d. 1932.
PATEL, VALLABHBHAI JHAVERBHAla b. 1875? Patidar Gujarati lawyer and younger 
brother of Vithabhai Patel? educ., Nadiad and Bardwan? called to Bar, Middle 
Temple, 1913? practiced law at Allahabad? entered politics, 19163 Gandhi s 
confidant in Gujarat? d. 195°
PATEL, VITHALBHAI JHAVERBHAIs b. 1870? Gujarati barrister and elder brother 
of Vallabhbhai Patel? practiced law at Bombay High Court? MLC, Bombay, 1914? 
MLA, 1923? President, Legislative Assembly, 1925-30? d. 1933*
PEEL, WILLIAM ROBERT WELLESLEY PEEL, 1st EARL and 2nd VISCOUNTs b. 1867?
Secy, of State for India?' educ., Harrow, and Balliol College, Oxford? called 
to Bar, Inner Temple, 1893? M.P., 1900-12? Under-Secy, of State for War, 
1919-213 Minister of Transport (unpaid), 1921-22? Secy, of State for India,
1922-24 & 1928-29? d. 1937°
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PHULWARI, SHAH MUHAMMAD SULAIMANs b. l859| leading Qadariyya par and pan- 
Islamist alim from Phulwari and a close associate of Abdul Bari? educ®, 
Farangi Mahal, Lucknow, and the Hedjaz (1885-86), where famous Indian emigrS 
alim Haji Imdadullah was one of his teachers? visited Mesopotamia, 1920? 
took leading part in the Khilafat movement and non-co-operation? d. 1935*>
PICKTHALL, MARMADUKE WILLIAMS b. 1875? English Muslim pan-Islamist? son of 
Rev. Charles Grayson Pickthall, Rector of Chillesford in Suffolk? educ., 
Harrow-Neuchatel studying French? unsuccessfully tried to get into the 
British Foreign Office? travelled in Near and Middle East several times? 
conducted the Islamic Information Bureau with Kidwai and others until 1920? 
same year went to India to conduct propaganda at the invitation of the .CKC? 
editor, Bombay Chronicle, 1920-24? entered Nizam's education service, 1925? 
managed Islamic Culture (Hyderabad), 1926? d. 1936.
QURESHIs SHOAlBs b« I89I3 journalist and pan-Islamist politician from U.P. 3 
educ., MAO College, Aligarh, and Oxford? member, All-India Medical Mission 
to Turkey, 1912-13? was a link between Abdul Bari and the Ali brothers 
during the latter's internment, 1915-195 took part in the Khilafat movement 
and went to prison, 1921? editor, New Fra (Lucknow), and Young Indian . 
member, Khilafat delegation to the Hedjaz, 1924-25, and to the World Muslim 
Congress, Mecca, 1926? d. 1962.
READING, RUFUS DANIEL ISAACS, 1st MARQUESS OFs b. i860? Viceroy of India? 
educ., University College, London, and Brussels and Hanover? Bencher of 
Middle Temple, 1904? M.P., 1904-13? Solicitor-General, 1910$ Attorney- 
General, 1910-13? Lord Chief Justice of England, 1913-21? Special Envoy to 
Washington, 1917? & Ambassador to Washington, 1918-19? Viceroy of India, 
1921-26? d. 1935°
RAHIMT00LA, SIR IBRAHIM? b, 1862? Bombay businessman and politician? elected 
Member of Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1892? became its President, 1899?
MLC, Bombay, 1899-1909? MLC, 1912? Member, Education and Local Self Govt.,
1918-23? President, Fiscal Commission, 1921-22? President, Legislative 
Council, Bombay, 1923-28? d. 1942.
RAI, LALA LAJPATs b. 1865? Punjabi lawyer, Arya Smajist and politician? 
deported from India, 1907? returned to India, 1920? joined the non-co- 
operation campaign, 1920-22? President, INC (Special session), Sept. 1920? 
joined communal politics, 1923-28? d. 1928*
RAJAGOPALACHARI, C.s b. I8783 Tamil Brahmin lawyer and politician from Salem? 
educ., Central College, Bangalore, and Presidency College, Madras? 
participated in 'Rowlatt' Sat.yagraha, 1919? Secy., INC, 1920? and later 
member of its Working Committee? led the 'no-change' faction in support of 
Gandhian policy, 1923-26? d. 1972.
RONALDSHAY, LAWRENCE JOHN LUMLEY DUNDAS, LORD (later 2nd MARQUESS OF ZETLAND)* 
b. I8763 Governor of Bengal? educ., Harrow, and Trinity College, Cambridge? 
extensive travels in the East, 1898-1907? M.P., 1907-16? Governor of Bengal,
1917-22? d. 1961.
SANAULLAH AMRITSARI, ABUL WAFA* b. 1868? leading Ahl-i-Hadis alim from the 
Punjab and a pupil of Mahmud Hassan? educ., Beoband and Madrassa Faiz-i-Aam, 
Cawnpore? graduated, 1892? founded Ahl-i-Hadis (Amritsar), 1903? member, CKC,
1919-283 founder-member, Jamiyat-Ulama-i-Hind? and its President at the 
Calcutta session, 1925? 1° 1948.
SASTRI, V.S. SRINIVASA? b. 1869? Madras politician? educ., Govt. College, 
Kumbakonam? joined Servants of India Society, Poona, 1907? MLC, Madras, 1913? 
MILC, 1916-20? elected to the Council of State, 1920? opposed non-co- 
operation? do 19460
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SHAFI, KHAN BAHADUR SIR MUHAMMAD* b. 1869? Lahore barrister and politician? 
educ., Govt® College, Lahore, and Middle Temple, London? called to Bar,
1892? practiced law at Allahabad and Lahore High Courts? President, AIML,
1913 & 1927? MLC, Punjab, and MILC, 1909-19? Educ. Member, Viceroy’s 
Executive Council, 1919-22? Vice-President of the Coucil, 1922-24? Law 
Member, 1923-24? Pro-Chancellor, Delhi University, 1922-25? d. 1932.
SHERWANI, TASSADDUQ AHMAD KHAN1 leading barrister and politician from 
Aligarh? educ., MAO College, Aligarh, and London? Home Rule Leaguer, 1917? 
member, AICC, 1919? Councilor, AIML? member, CKC, 1919-28? gave up practice 
in pursuance of non-co-operation, 1920? courted imrisonment, 1921? founder- 
member and Additional Secy., Swaraj Party, 1923®
SIDDIQUI (SINDHl), ABDUR RAHMANs journalist and politician originally from 
Sind but spent his life-time in Calcutta and Delhi? educ., MAO College, 
Aligarh? member, Red Crescent Medical Mission to Turkey, 1912-13? member, 
AIML council since 1907? sub-editor, Comrade? editorial Board, New Era 
(Lucknow), 1916-17? and Muslim Outlook (London), 1920-21? special Rep, of 
CKC to Ismet Pasha to plead for the restoration of the Caliph’s temporal 
power, 1922? involved in business in Britain in 1920s and 1930s.
SINDHI, OBEIDULLAHs b. 1872? prominent alim associate of Mahmud Hassan and 
emigre pan-Islamist revolutionary? bom of Sikh parents he became a Muslim 
in 1887? educ., Deoband? worked for Jamiyat-ul-Ansar of Mahmud Hassan? left 
Deoband for Delhi to start Nazarat-ul-Muarif with Ajmal Khan and Nawab 
Viqar-ul-Mulk, 1912? hijrat to Kabul, 1915? joined Mahendra Pratap's 
'Provisional Government of India', 1915? ’Silk Letter Conspiracy', 19163 
member, Kabul Hijrat Committee, 1920? left Kabul for Moscow, 1922$ reached 
Turkey, 1923? visited Mecca, 1926? allowed to return to India, 1937? d. 1944®
SINHA OF RAIPUR, SIR SATYENDRA PRASSANO SINHAs 1st BARONs b. I864? educ., 
Presidency College, Calcutta? called to Bar, Lincoln’s Inn, 1886? Standing 
Counsel, Govt, of India, 1903? Advocate-General, Bengal, 1907-9 & 1915-17? 
a Rep. of India in Imperial War Conference, 1917? Member, Imperial War 
Cabinet, 1918$ Under-Secy, of State for India, 1919-20? Governor of Bihar 
and Orissa, 1920-21? d® 1928.
SLY, SIR FRANK GEORGEa b. 1866? Govornor of C.Po? educ., Balliol College, 
Oxford? entered ICS, 1885? career in various capacities until appointed 
Chief Commissioner, C.P., 1920? Governor of C.P., 1921-25? d® 1928.
TILAK, BAL GANGADHARa b. 18563 leading Brahmin journalist and politician 
from Poona? opposed Govt, intervention in Hindu social practices? leader of 
extreme wing of INC? jailed for 'sedition', 1897-98 & 1908-14, supported 
war effort, 1914? rejoined INC after exclusion by Moderates, 1916$ d. 1920®
VINCENT, SIR WILLIAM HENRY HOAREs b. 1866? Home Member, Govt, of India? 
educ®, Christ College, Brecon, and Trinity College, Dublin? entered ICS,
1887? served in various executive and judicial capacities until appointed 
Member of Viceroy’s Council,’ 1917? Vice-President of tho Council, 1921? 
Member, India Council, 1923-31? d. 1941®
WILLINGDON, FREEMAN FREEMAN-THOMAS, 1st MARQUESS OF* b. 1866? Governor of 
Madras? educ®, Eton, and Trinity College, Cambridge? Liberal M.P®, 1900-6$ 
Lord of Treasury, 1905-12? Governor of Bombay, 1913-19? Governor of Madras,
1919-24? delegate for India at the Assembly of the League of Nations,
Geneva, 1924? Governor-General of Canada, 1926-31? Viceroy of India, 1931- 
363 do 1941®
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PP, 1922, Cmd. 1641, Pronouncement by Three Allied Ministers for Foreign
Affairs Representing the Near Eastern Situation. Paris, March 27, 1922»
PP, 1923? Cmd. 1814, Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-23*
Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace,
PP, 1923? Cmd. 1922, Indians in Kenya.
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PP, 1923? Cmd. 1929> Treaty of Peace with Turkey, and other Instruments signed 
on 24 July, 1923, with Agreements between Greece and Turkey, signed on 50 
January, 1923, and subsidiary Documents forming part of the Turkish Peace 
Settlement.
PP, 1923? Cmd. 1961, Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and 
Condition of India During the Year 1922-i923, Fifty-Eighth Number.
PP, 1924? Cmd. 2154? Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1925.
PP, 1924-25? Cmd. 2311, Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress
and Condition of India During the Year 1925-1924, Fifty-Ninth Number.
PP, 1924-25? (183)? Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and 
Condition of India During the Year 1924-25, Sixtieth Number.
PP, 1924-25? Cmd. 2360? Report of the Reforms Enquiry Committee 1924,
Appointed by the Government of India and Connected Papers.
PP, 1929-30, (170), Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and
Condition of India During the Year 1928-29, Sixty-Fourth Number.
PP, 1930-31? Cmd. 3883? Report, Royal Commission on Labour in India, 1951*
PP, 1938-39? Cmd. 5957? Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon, G.C.M.G.,
G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., C.S.I., His Majesty’s High Commissioner at Cairo and 
the Sherif Hussein of Mecca, July 1915-March 1916.
PP, Hansard, The Parliamentary Debates of the House of Lords and the House 
of Commons.
(d) United States of America1
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Lansing
Papers, 1914-1920, 2 vols,, Washington, 1939-40.
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919. The Paris 
Peace Conference, 13 vols., Washington, 1942-47*
(i;i) NON-OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS s
(a) All-India Muslim Conferences
Report of the All-India Muslim Conference held at Delhi on 51st December, 1928., 
and 1st January, 1929, under the President ship of His Highness Sir Agha 
Sultan Mahomed Shah, Agha Khan, Aligarh7~71929,7")
The Main Resolution of the All-India Muslim Conference, Muhammad Shafee Daoodi? 
Working Secretary, All-India Muslim, Conference, Patna, /l9307.
(b) All-India Trade Union Congresss
Report of the First Session (Held at Bombay, 1920), Bombay, 1921.
(c) British Labour Partys
Report of The Twentieth Annual Conference of The Labour Party, Scarborough, 
1920, London, 1920.
(d) Central Khilafat Committee g
Dastur-i-Asasi Jamiyat-i-Khilafat-i-Hind, Secretary, Central Khilafat 
Committee, Bombay, 1923. Constitution of the CKC. Urdu D. 716.
Hisabat-iWafd-i-Khilafat-i-Europe, Ahmad Haji Siddik Khatri, Honorary 
Secretary, Central Khilafat Committee, Bombay, 1923. Statement of 
accounts of the Khilafat delegation to Europe, Urdu D. 718.
Karwai Ijlas Jamaat-i-Amila, held on February 27, 1923, at Allahabad, issued 
by the Honorary Secretaries, Central Khilafat Committee, Bombay, 1923, 
Proceedings of the Working Committee of the CKC. Urdu D. 717.
Report Numaindagan-i-Majalis Khilafat-i-Hind, Central Khilafat Committee, 
Bombay, /l926/.
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(e) Indian Khilafat Delegations
The Turkish Settlement and the Muslim and Indian Attitude, Indian Khilafat 
Delegation Publication No, 1, London, 1920.
The Secretary of State for India and the Indian Khilafat Delegation, Indian 
Khilafat Delegation Publication No, 2, London, 1920,
The Prime Minister and the Indian Delegation, Indian Khilafat Delegation 
Publication No. 3? London, 1920.
The Case for Turkey and the Khilafat, Indian Khilafat Delegation Publication 
No. 4, London, 1920.
Atrocities Committed by the Greeks in Smyrna, Indian Khilafat Delegation 
Publication No. 5? London, 1920.
Justice to Islam and Turkey, Indian Khilafat Delegation Publication No. 6, 
London, 1920.
India's Verdict on Turkish Treaty, Indian Khilafat Delegation Publication 
No. 7, London, 1920“
(f) Indian National Congress;
All Parties Conference 1928g Report of the Committee appointed by the
Conference to determine the principles of the Constitution for India, 
Allahabad, 1928.
Khaddar Work in India, Khaddar Department, Bombay, 1922.
Khaddar Work in India, All-India Congress Khaddar Department, Bojnbay, 1922.
Khaddi Bulletins, 1923, Director, All-India Khaddi Information Bureau, Ashram, 
Sabarmati, 1923*
Report of the Commissioners appointed by the Punjab Sub-Committee of the 
Indian National Congress, 2 vols., K. Santnam, Bar-at-Law, Lahore, 
Secretary to the Commission of Enquiry, 1920.
Report of the Enquiry Commission on the National Volunteers in Lahore,
Lahore, 1922.
Report of the Thirty-Third Session of the Indian National Congress held at 
Delhi on the 26th, 28th, 29th, 50th, 31st December, 1918, Delhi, 1919*
Report of the Thirty-Fourth Session of the Indian National Congress held at 
Amritsar on the 27th, 29th, 30th, 31st December, 1919 and 1st January 
1920, Amritsar, 1922.
Report of the Thirty-Fifth Session of the Indian National Congress, held at 
Nagpur, on the 26th, 28th, 50th and 51st December, 1920, Nagpur, 1923.
Report of the Thirty-Sixth Indian National Congress held at Ahmedabad on the 
27th and 28th December, 1921, Ahmedabad, 1922.
Report of the Thirty-Seventh Indian National Congress held at Gaya on the 
26th, 27th, 29th, 50th and 31st December, 1922, Patna, 1923*
Report of the Thirty-Eighth Indian National Congress held at Cocanada on 28th, 
29th, 50th, 51st December, 1925? and 1st January, 1924? Cocanada, 1924,
(g) Jamiyat-ul-Ulama-i-Hindg
Kifayatullah, Mufti, ed,, Masawwadah Dastur-ul-Amal Jamiyat-ul-Dlama-i-Hind, 
Delhi, 1922.
Miyan, Muhammad, ed., Jamiyat-ul-Ulama Kiya Hai, Parts I & II, Delhi, 1946.
(h) Mahomedan Literary Society, Calcutta g
Abstract of the Proceedings of the Mahomedan Literary Society of Calcutta.
Lecture by Moulvie Karamat Ali (of Jounpore) on a question of Mahomedan 
Law Involving the Duty of Mahomedans in British India towards the Ruling
Power, Calcutta, 1871.
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(iii) MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTSs
Adhikari, G., ed., Documents of the History of the Communist Party of India,
I, (1917-1922), New Delhi, 1971.
Degras, Jane, ed., The Communist International, 1919-1945? issued under the 
auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1956.
— -, ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, London, 1951*
Hurewitz, J.C., ed., Dipl&maoy in the Near and Middle Easts A Documentary 
Record, 1914-1956, II, Princeton, 1956.
Report of the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee, 1922, Madras, 1922.
(iv) COLLECTIONS OF PRIVATE AND OPEN LETTERSg
Englishs
Ali, Mohamed, Freedom of Faith and Its Price, London, 1920. Letters of the 
Ali brothers and their mother to the Viceroy, Ghate and others on the 
question of the Alls' internment, 1915-19*
Baird, J.G.A., ed., Private Letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie, London, 1910.
The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, 47 vols., Ministry of Information, 
Government of India, Delhi, 1958”•
Jagadisan, T.N., Letters of the Right Honourable V.S. Srinivasa Sastri, P.O.,
C.H., LL.D., D.Litt,, London, 196~3*
Martin, JjtJ M., The Despatches, Minutes, and Correspondence of the Marquess 
Wellesley, K.G., During his Administration in India, 5 vols., London, 
1856-37*
Mr. Shaukat Ali and Mr, Mohamed Ali, Muslim Internees Series No, 1, The
Central Bureau for the help of Muslim Internees, Delhi, 1918. Collection 
of letters of Abadi Bano Sahiba, their mother, and Mr. Ghate, their 
Legal Adviser, giving a connected history of the internment case. P/T 
1688.
Nehru, Jawaharlal, ed., A Bunch of Old Letters, Bombay, 1958. Written 
mostly to Jawaharlal Nehru and some written by him.
'Vencum', 'Facts Unveiled' or a Collection of Open Letters on the Khilafat 
and Non-Co-Operation, K.N. Shankar, Bombay,19207 Y p F I670. "
URDUs
Daryabadi, Abdul Majid, ed., Khutut-i-Mashahir, Lahore, 447. Letters of 
Mohamed Ali, Akbar Allahabadi and Shibli Numani addressed to the editor.
Hazrat Shaikh Mahmud-ul-Hassan /sic7 ka ek Zaruri Khat, issued by Masud Ali 
Nadvi on behalf of the Khilafat Committee, Azamgarh, n.d. Letter dated 
August 23, 1920.
Jafari, Rais Ahmad, ed., Ali Bradran, Lahore, 1963. Contains letters of the 
A H  brothers to Abdul Bari and others.
Nadvi, Syed Sulaiman, Barid-i-Parang, Karachi, 1952. Letters of Syed
Sulaiman Nadvi written from Europe to Abdul Bari, Abdul Majid Daryabadi 
and others.
Islahi, Maulana Najmuddin, ed,, Maqtubat-i- Shiekh-ul-Hind, 3 vols., Deoband, 
1950-59* Letters of Husain Ahmad Madni.
■ Nuqush (Lahore), CIX, April/May, 1968. Contains letters of Abdul Bari and 
other prominent leaders,
. Nuqush (Lahore), LV &' LYI, Nov, 1954* Contains a selection of letters of 155 
prominent Indian leaders, writers, poets and intellectuals.
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Sarwar, Muhammad, ed., Maulana Mohamed Ali ke Europe ke Safar (Khud Unke Apne 
Q,alam se), Lahore, 1941* Letters of Mohamed Ali written from Europe 
to his friends and relatives,
(v) EATAWAs
Abdul Aziz, Shah, Fatawa-i-Azizi, being an Urdu translation of Sarur-i-Azizi 
by Maulana Shah Abdul Aziz, 1 vol., Calcutta, 1906, Urdu E. 86(a).
Ansari, Raza, ed., Fatawa Farangi Mahal, mausum bah Fatawa Qadiriyya, Farangi 
Mahal, 1965. Fatawa of Muhammad Abdul Qadir (d.l959)> Mufti of Farangi 
Mahal.
Fatwa; Masala-i-Iltawa-i»Ea,i.j ke Mutalliq Hazrat tTlama-i-Kiram wa Mu,jtahaddin 
Uzzam ka Mudallal wa Mabsut Fatwa, issued by Jamiyat-i-Markazziya 
Khuddam-ul-Haramain, Lucknow, 1927« Urdu D. 2525.
Gangohi, Rashid Ahmad, Fatawa-i-Rashidiyya, 3 vols., Moradabad, 1906-10.
Urdu F. 219/1-3 <•
Hassan, Mahmud, Fatwa Shaikh-ul-Hind Hazrat Maulana Mahmud-ul-Hassan /sic7 
Sahib Muhaddis Deobandi Muttaaliq Tahrik-i-Tark-i-Mawalat, Vanyambadi, 
1920, Urdu D. 3091.
Hussaini, Qazi Syed Mahbub, Fatawa-i-Ulama-i-Mominin wa Muslimin fi Raddi 
Fatawa-i-Ulama-i-Ghair Muqallidin wa Wahabbin, Mangalore, 1926. Urdu
D. 1602.
Khan, Ahmad Raza and Ali, Abul Ala Muhammad Amjad, Mas,j id Kanpur ke Mutaalliq 
ek Nihayat Zaruri Fatwa, Bareilly, 1914* Urdu D. 181.
Liberal League aur Aman Sabhaon ke Mutaaliq Islami Fatwa, issued by Muhammad 
Mobin, Nazim, Jamiyat-i-Khilafat, Deoband, n.d. Urdu PP. 26.
Nazir Hussain Muhaddis Dehlavi, Shams-ul-Ulama Syed Muhammad, Fatawa-i- 
Naziriyya, 2 vols., Delhi, 1915~i6*
Tark-i-Mawalat par Ulama-i-Kiram Deoband, Saharanpur, Farangi Mahal, Lucknow, 
Delhi wa Badaun waghera ke Fatawe, issued by the Propaganda Department 
of the Agra and Meerut Provincial Khilafat Committees, 1921. Urdu D. 865.
Ulama-i-Hind ka Muttafiqqa Fatwa, leaflet issued by Muhammad Mobin, Nazim, 
Jamiyat-i-Khilafat, Deoband, n.d. Urdu PP. 26.
(vi) COLLECTIONS OF WRITINGS, SPEECHES AND ADDRESSESt
Englishs
Ali Brothers, For India and Islam, Calcutta, 1922.
Ali, Abdullah Yusuf, Tanzimg Its Scope and Objects, being the presidential 
address delivered at the All-India Tanzim Conference held at Aligarh 
on December 29, 1925> issued by the Tanzim Committee, Amritsar, 1925*
The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, 47 vols., Ministry of Information, 
Government of India, Delhi, 1958"-
Fazlul Haq, A.K., All India Moslem League, 1918 Session, Delhi, Presidential 
Address, Calcutta, 1919*
Gandhi, M.K., Speeches and Writings of M.K. Gandhi, Introduction by C.F, 
Andrews, Madras, 1922.
 t Young India, 1919-1922, 2 vols,, Madras, 1922.
 f Young India, 1924-26, Madras, 1927.
Hardinge of Penshurst, Lord, Speeches of His Excellency the Right Hon’ble 
Baron Hardinge of Penshurst, 2 vols., Madras, n.d.
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Iqbal, Afzal, ed., Select Writings and Speeches of Maulana Mohamed Ali, 2nd 
ed., Lahore, 1963*
Joshi, V.C., Lala La.jpat Rai- Writings and Speeches, 2 vols., Delhi and 
Jullundhar, 1966,
Pal, B.C., Writings and Speeches, 1 vol., Calcutta, 1958-•
Rai, Lajpat, India’s Will to Freedom. Writings and Speeches on the Present 
Situation, Madras, 1921,
Sastri, K.A. Nilakanta, ed., A Great Liberals Speeches and Writings of Sir 
P.S. Sivaswami Aiyar, Bombay, 1965*
Selections from Moulana Mohammed Ali's Comrade, ed., Rais Ahmad Jafari 
(Nadvi), Lahore, 1965*
URDUs
Abdul Bari, Mohamed Qayyam-ud-din, Khutba-i-Sadarat, being the presidential 
address at the third session of the Majlis-ul-Ulama held at Erode, 
District Koimbatoor on March 26 and 26, 1921, Erode, 1921. Urdu H. 16.
Ahmad, Mirza Bashir-ud-din Mahmud, Malakallah, being the three speeches of 
M.B.M. Ahmad on December 27, 28 and 29, 1920, Qadian, /l922/.
14105.f*29(4)*
Ali, Abdullah Yusuf, Khutba-i-Sadarat, being the Urdu translation of the
presidential address delivered at the All-India Tanzim Conference held at 
Aligarh on December 29, 19259 Amritsar, 1925* Urdu D. IO46.
Azad, Abul Kalam J m .AjJ  , Khutba-i-Sadarat, being the presidential address at 
the All-India Khilafat Conference, Cawnpore, December 24, 1925, Delhi, 
1926. Urdu D. 1595.
 , Mukammal Tahriri Bayan, being the written statement of Azad to the
magistrate from the Presidency jail, Alipore, Calcutta, dated January 
11, 1922, Delhi, 1922. Urdu D. 867.
 -, Paighamat-i-Azad, Bijnor, 1922. Urdu D. I878.
Eazlul Haq, A.K., Khutba-i-Sadarat, being the presidential address delivered 
at the All-India khilafat Conference held at Delhi on 23rd November 1919, 
Delhi, 1922. Urdu C. 17*
Hassan Nizami, Khwaja J s M c A j , Kaho Takbir, substance of his famous speech 
delivered at the Jamia Mosque, Meerut, on August 8, 1913, on the
Cawnpore Mosque issue, 1913- Urdu PP. 6.
Hasrat Mohani, /p.l l j, Khutba-i-Sadarat, read at the Mashawarti Conference 
held at Lucknow on the Hedjaz question, Lucknow, I925. Urdu D. 2663.
Hassan, Mahmud, Khutba-i-Sadarat ma Eatwa Shaikh-ul-Hind Hazrat Maulavi
Mahmud-ul-Hassarr7sic7~~Sahib Deobandi ,jo National University ke Iftitah 
Ke Waqt Parha Gya9 Vanyambadi, 1921. Urdu D. 3106.
— -9 Paigham-i-Sadarat, being the presidential address of Mahmud Hassan read 
at the last session of the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama at Delhi including the speech 
of Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, Delhi, /J-92.2/. Urdu D. 868.
Haroon, Seth Haji Abdoola, Khutba-i-Sadarat, being the presidential address 
at the All-India Khilafat Conference held at Lucknow on Rebruary 26, 27 
and 28, 1927> Karachi, 1927* Urdu D. 3055.
Kashmiri, Shorish, ed., IChutbat-i-Azad, 3rd ed., Lahore, 1944.
Khan, Hakim Ajmal, Khutba-i-Sadarat, being the presidential address at the
first convocation of the Jamia Milliya Islamia held on December 7, 1921, 
Aligarh, 1922. Urdu D. 1780.
Khan, Syed Ahmed, Akhiri Mazamin, Lahore, 1898.
Khan, Zafar Ali, Taqarir-i-Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, Meerut, n.d.
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Kidwai, Mushir Hosain, Taqrir-i-Sadarat, being the presidential address _ 
delivered at the Oudh Khilafat Conference, Faizabad, Lucknow, /l920J, 
Urdu F. 746.
Mihr, Ghulam Rasul, ed., Tabarkat-i-Azad, Lahore, f(T9597*
Numani, Shibli, Kulliyat-i-Shibli, 4th ed., Azamgarh, 1954*
 , Maqalat-i-Shibli, 4 vols,, Azamgarh, 1930-34.
Qadiri, Muhammad Miyan, Khutba-i-Sadarat, being the presidential address
delivered at the first session of the Jamaat Mubarka-i-Ansar-ul-Islam 
held at Bareilly on April 30 and May 1 and 2, 1921. Urdu F. 603.
Raghib j/Rais Badaun/, Maulana M. Yaqub Bakhsh, Khutba-i-Sadarat, being the
address delivered as Chairman of the Reception Committee at.the session 
of Anjuman-i-Tabligh Ujhiyani, Badaun, 1925. Urdu L>. 2394.
Rahman, Maulana Habibur, Khutba-i-Sadarat, being the presidential address 
at the fourth session of the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind held at Gaya on 
December 24, 25 and 26, 1922, Gaya, 1923. Urdu F. 232.
Shairani, Mazhar Mahmud, ed., Maqalat-i-Hafiz Mahmud Shairani, 2 vols.,
Lahore, 1966.
Usmani, Shabbir Ahmad, Tark-i-Mawalat par Mufassil Tabsara, being the speech 
delivered at the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind session at Delhi on November 
21, 1920. Urdu PP. 53.
(vii) NEWSPAPERS AND JOURNALS:
(a) Dalies g
Bombay Chronicle (Bombay).
Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore).
Daily Herald (London).
Daily Telegraph (London),
Englishman (Calcutta).
Madras Mail (Madras),
Pioneer (Lucknow).
Statesman (Calcutta).
The Times (London).
Times of India (Bombay).
(b) Weeklies and Fortnightliesg 
Comrade (Delhi).
Hindu (Madras).
India (London).
Islamic Mail (London).
Pioneer Mail (Allahabad).
(viii) PROPAGANDA MATERIALS
(a) Pro-Turkish and Pro-German (1914-18)s
Akhuwwat (Constantinople), ed., Muhammad Abdul Jabbar Kheri. Various issues 
of the propaganda weekly dating 1915 anh 1916. Urdu PP. 22, 23 (l) & (2) 
and 24 (l) & (2).
Angrezonka Zulm aur Iraqi Muqtal, Jamal Pasha's appeal issued by Abdur Rahman 
Urdu PP. 10.
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Bashingdan-i-Dehli ka Paigham Police ke Sipahion ke Nam, leaflet 
issued by 'Bashindgan-i-Dehli', n.d. Urdu PP. 30.
German War propaganda leaflets for Indian consumption and Indian 
troops. Urdu PP. 61-66.
Ghadar (San Francisco), June 21, 1916. Urdu PP. 15.
Hindi Bhaiyon ko ek Mushfiqana Nasihat, Jamal Pasha's appeal to the 
Indians issued by Abdur Rahman, n.d. Urdu PP. 7 (1-3)•
Hindustan ki Azadi ka Bin a Gaya hai, issued probably by the Indo- 
German Society, n.d. Urdu PP. 4.
Hindustan men Angrezon se Jang Karne ka Yehi Waqt hae9 San Francisco, 
^1914"15/ leaflet issued by the Ghadar Party. Urdu PP. 12.
Hindustani Sipahion /sic71 a leaflet copies of which were dropped 
from German aeroplanes among the Indian troops in France, n.d,
Urdu PP. 37 and 59.
Ilan-i-Jang, bi-lingual (Urdu & Punjabi) Ghadar Party poster, Stockton, 
n.d. Urdu PP. 2.
Jehan-i-Islam (Constantinople), ed., Abu Saeed al-Arabi al-Hindi.
Two issues of the anti-British journal dated Jan. 28 & July 1, 1915* 
Urdu PP. 14 & 14 (l).
al-Jihad fi Sabil-ul-Haq, Jamal Pasha's jihad appeal issued by Abdur 
Rahman, n.d. Urdu PP. 11 (l-3).
Leaflet dated March 19, 1915, on the rightful Khilafat of the Ottomans 
as naibs of the Prophet. Urdu PP. 38*
Leaflet, n.d., Urdu PP. 39.
Leaflet, n.d., Urdu PP. 40.
Muhibban-i-Watan se Iltija, Jamal Pasha's anti-British appeal issued 
by Abdur Rahman, n.d,, Urdu PP. 9•
Rafiq-i-Hind (San Francisco), ed., Ram Nath Puri, June 15? 1917* 
Bi-lingual Ghadar Party magazine. Urdu PP. 21.
Rasul-Allah ki /sic7 Rauza-i-Mubarak par Golahbari aur Sada-i-Intiqam, 
Jamal Pasha's jihad appeal issued by Abdur Rahman, n.d. Urdu PP.
(1-3) •
Yugantar (San Francisco), four issued of Ghadar Party literature dated 
May, June, August and September 1917* Urdu PP. 17-20.
(b) Pro-Kh.ilafat and Non-co-Qporation
English?
Gandhi, M.K., Non-Co-operation, Madras, 1921. p/t 1376.
---, Non-Co-operationg Important Speeches Delivered in Southern India. 
Mangalore, 1920. p/t 1987.
Non-Co-operation and Students, Calcutta, 1921. p/T 1988
 , Swaraj and Non-Co-operation. Mymensingh, 1921, p/t 1989.
 , Swaraj in One Year, Madras, 1921. p/T 1401.
 , The Tug of War, Calcutta, J 1922/ ,
Mahatma Gandhi (The World's Greatest Man) with an appreciation by 
Lajpat Rai, Bombay, 1922. p/t 1599.
Shah, V.M,, The Political Gita or the Philosophy of Life, Bombay, 1921, 
P/T 1386.
Warty, K.G., Non-Co-operation in Congress Week, Bombay, 1921. P/T 1400,
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Urdus
Ah-i-MazHuman, I, Shaikh Anwar Ahmad, Saharanpur, * Urdu PP 148.
Ahmad, Haji, Waqia Punjab, II, Aligarh, /l920-21/. Urdu PP 123.
Ali, Mahmud, Mahatma Gandhi ki Jai, Lucknow, 1922. Urdu B. 336.
Azad Subhani, Maulana f k .k/7, Azadi, Cawnpore, . Urdu B. 1246.
Badauni, Razm, Zalim-o-Mazlum ki Guftar, Badaun, Jj-922?. Urdu PP 151. 
Bahareddawaj Ved, Pandit Hardai Parkash, Inqilab-i-Hind, Meerut, 1921.
Urdu PP 143*
Bareillvi, Mahasha Lai Bahadur Varma, Kashganj ka Khawab, Bareilly,
Urdu PP 141.
 , Politioal Holion ka Guldasta, Bareilly, 1921. Urdu PP 45*
Brockway, A.P., Digar Mumalik men Q,ata-i~Taaluq, Rohtak, 1921. Urdu D. 1217 
Bulbulan-i-Huriyyat ke Tarane, The Khilafat Committee, Jaunpur, 1921,
Urdu PP 47-
Chand, Faqir, Chomasa Barsat, Cawnpore, 1922. Urdu PP 158.
Bin, Riaz-ud-, Islami Jhanda, Amroha, /J-9'2.2~J. Urdu PP 109.
Fahim Gwaliori, Mirza Pahim Beg Chagtai, Sada-i~Baz Gasht, Bombay, 1922.
Urdu PP 115.
Garg, Dr. Babu Ram, Kuza men Darya, Muzaffarnagar, J^-92.2/. Urdu PP 157. 
Garya-i-Hind, III, Qazi Muhammad Jamiluddin, Bijnor, /l922j , Urdu PP 153* 
Hassan, Maulavi Ahmad, ed,, Fida-i-Qaum, Bijnor, £}-9‘2 2 ] • Urdu PP 145*
Hind ka Sitara, Muhammad Ghulam Uabi Badauni, Badaun, 1922. Urdu PP 146. 
Jafari, Syed Kamaluddin Ahmad, Ihkam-i-Khilafat, Allahabad, 1922.
Urdu D. 1889.
 , Swaraj, Allahabad, 1921. Urdu D. 1880.
 , Tark-i-May/alat, Allahabad, 1920. Urdu D. 1888.
Jaini, Babu Jahuman LaJL, Mulk aur Qaurn ki Halat aur Jainion ka Parz, 
Saharanpur, /l92l/. Urdu PP. 88.
Kaifi Bareillvi, Lala Hand Lai alias Barendar Kapta, ed., Taran-i-Qaum, 
Bareilly, /192jL7» Urdu PP 124.
Khan, Muhammad Pahim, ed., Maghribi Bandar, Hardoi, 1921. Urdu PP 46.
Khan, Muhammad Haider alias Piyare Khan, ed., Qaumi Taranas Azadi ka 
Nuskha, Pilibhit, 1921. Urdu PP 108.
Khan, Zafar Ali, Islam ki Barkaten, Lahore, /l92l7. Urdu B. 368.
Khilafat ka Jhanda aur Gandhi ka Dhanda, Karimullah, Badaun, 1922.
Urdu B. 337.
Lai, Shiyam, Jailer ka Diwala, Lucknow, 1922. Urdu PP 155*
Nishtar-i-Hind, Muhammad Ismail, Badaun, 1922. Urdu D. 342.
Osthi, Pandit Shankar Diyal, ed., Tarana- i - Swaraj i.yya, Cawnpore, 1921.
.Urdu PP 89.
Payam-i-Leadran, Muhammad Makhdum Hussain, Madras, n.d. Urdu D. 3099.
Parshad, Guru, ed., Muhibb-i-Watan, Allahabad, /l922^ 7. Urdu PP 140.
Rastariya Kirtan Gan, I, Bharatia Press, Dehra Dun, 1921. Urdu PP 105.
Ratnakar, The Manager Arya Garanth, ed., Hukumat ki Pol, Bareilly, fjL922jt 
Urdu PP 147.
Sabr, Maulana Syed Ayyub Ahmad, Shukriyya England, Meerut, 1921. Urdu PP 49
Saharanpur!, Hafiz Zahur Ahmad, ed., Shahinshah Kabul. II, Saharanpur, n.d. 
Urdu PP 156.
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Sarsauti (Ram) Swami Rama Nand, Nauha-i-Ram, Aligarh, n.922/» Urdu 
PP 144-
Sattar Dhampuri, Master Abdus Sattar, Gulshan-i-Khilafat, Dhampur, 1922. 
Urdu PP 152.
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